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Weekly Report: Cyber based digital hostile influence campaigns 04th - 10th August

  • Writer: CRC
    CRC
  • Aug 13
  • 8 min read

Updated: Aug 14

Weekly Media Update cover: child with helmet, light bulb on teal background. Text: Information Operations report, 04th-10th of August 2025.

[Listen to the Podcast]

[Introduction]

From the 04th to the 10th of August, 2025, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints of information related to Digital Hostile Influence campaigns: The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.


The common thread weaving through this week’s events is the maturation of information as a primary battlespace. States are no longer just experimenting with influence operations; they are systematically integrating them as a core component of national strategy and warfare. Russia’s campaigns in Kursk, Moldova, and Latvia demonstrate a refined playbook for regional destabilization. Iran’s swift deployment of cyberattacks during kinetic conflict with Israel shows a tight fusion of digital and physical military action. Even in the private sector, the rise of mercenary groups in Africa is defined by a package of services that includes both lethal drones and targeted disinformation. From a domestic riot in the UK fueled by social media algorithms to a great-power wargame in Latin America, the field of conflict is increasingly informational



[Report Highlights]

  • Russia manufactures "frozen zones" of instability like Transnistria and South Ossetia not merely to control territory, but to wield them as strategic leverage to veto the sovereign foreign policy choices of entire nations. - DisinfoWatch

  • The Belarusian security services use a database named ‘BESporiadki’ (‘Riots’) to track over 100,000 individuals suspected of participating in the 2020 protests, effectively stripping them of basic civil rights. - EUvsDisinfo

  • Analysis of the Iran-Israel conflict demonstrated a three-tiered model of Iranian cyber operations, ranging from loosely aligned hacktivists to formally tasked state-sponsored APT groups, which collaborate to form a resilient and ideologically driven offensive front. - SecurityScorecard 

  • The convergence of mercenaries who profit from chaos, cheap drone technology that provides non-state actors with air power, and AI-driven disinformation creates a self-reinforcing cycle of instability across Africa. - The Conversation 

  • False narratives speculating that the Southport killer was a Muslim or an asylum-seeker received an estimated 27 million impressions on X within the first 24 hours, directly fueling subsequent real-world riots. - CyberNews

  • Latvia possesses one of the most developed ecosystems for countering disinformation in Europe, with a multi-layered approach involving government bodies, investigative journalists, NATO-affiliated centers, and NGOs all working in concert. - EU Disinfo Lab

  • The EU is partnering with the Nigerian Guild of Editors to build institutional capacity within newsrooms, viewing enhanced media literacy as a primary antidote to the destabilizing effects of disinformation. – EU Press and information team


[Weekly Review]



  1. Divergent Priorities Degrade Sino-Russian IO 

In a simulated crisis over a Guatemalan election, China and Russia joined forces and won, successfully backing a pro-Beijing party to victory. This initial success, documented in a CSIS wargaming report, demonstrated the potential power of their coordinated information operations in Latin America. Yet, the alliance quickly faltered. When faced with a subsequent decision on a lucrative mining deal, Russia prioritized its own economic interests over Beijing’s political goal of isolating Taiwan, creating a strategic rift. This fissure proved decisive, allowing the U.S. team, which had pursued a quieter, long-term influence-building strategy, to ultimately secure its objectives. The exercise reveals that the much-touted "no limits" partnership may be more of a brittle, opportunistic alignment, susceptible to fracturing under the pressure of competing national interests.


Source: CSIS, Ryan C. Berg and Henry Ziemer, 2025. Assessing the Impact of China-Russia Coordination in the Media and Information Space. [online] Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-impact-china-russia-coordination-media-and-information-space


  1. Sputnik's Kursk Thread: A Case Study in Moral Inversion 

An article from DisinfoWatch analyzes a Russian disinformation campaign, circulated by Sputnik International in August 2025, that sought to reframe Ukraine's Kursk offensive. The analysis details how Sputnik deployed a barrage of falsehoods, including grossly inflated statistics on Ukrainian casualties, recycled propaganda about "neo-Nazi thugs," and entirely unsubstantiated claims of atrocities committed by Ukrainian forces. According to the report, this narrative is a textbook example of Russian information warfare. It employs moral inversion to portray Russia as a justified liberator, not an aggressor, while simultaneously dehumanizing Ukrainians. The campaign’s strategic goals are to bolster domestic support for the war, legitimize Russian actions internationally, and erode Western backing for Ukraine.


Source:  DisinfoWatch, Aug 2025, Kremlin Disinformation in Sputnik’s Account of Ukraine's Kursk Offensive. [online] Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/kremlin-disinformation-in-sputniks-account-of-ukraines-kursk-offensive/


  1. Kremlin Employs Consistent Playbook to Destabilize Post-Soviet States

EUvsDisinfo in their recent article, describes the characteristically consistent playbook that the Kremlin employs to destabilize post-Soviet neighbors that seek Euro-Atlantic integration. The analysis asserts that whether in Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine, Russia repeatedly fuels separatism, spreads disinformation such as false genocide claims, and intervenes militarily under the pretext of “peace enforcement.” This strategy creates dependent proxy regions, or “frozen zones,” which serve as instruments of instability to block the sovereign ambitions of its neighbors. The report identifies the 2008 invasion of Georgia as a crucial “test run” for the tactics of disinformation, passportization, and supposed humanitarian intervention that were later scaled up for the invasion of Ukraine.


Source: EUvsDisinfo, Aug 2025, Genocide Claims, Peace Enforcement and Proxy Regions: Disinformation from Georgia to Ukraine. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/genocide-claims-peace-enforcement-and-proxy-regions-disinformation-from-georgia-to-ukraine/


  1. Lukashenka Entrenches Totalitarian Rule Five Years After Protests

The Belarusian state maintains a database of over 100,000 “enemies of the state” called ‘BESporiadki,’ a name whose Russian root ‘BES’ means ‘demon.’ According to a paper by EUvsDisinfo, this list is just one tool in Aleksandr Lukashenka’s ongoing war against his own people, five years after they peacefully protested his rule. The analysis reveals a state transformed into a “repression machine” that has institutionalized torture and created an atmosphere of total fear to crush dissent.2 Dependent on Vladimir Putin's backing, Lukashenka’s regime has drifted towards a harsh, semi-totalitarian dictatorship that no longer feigns democracy and openly persecutes anyone deemed disloyal.


Source:  EUvsDisinfo, 2025, Lukashenka’s ongoing retaliation against Belarusians. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/lukashenkas-ongoing-retaliation-against-belarusians/


  1. Iran-Linked Cyber Actors Coordinated Attacks During Kinetic Conflict

Within days of kinetic conflict erupting between Iran and Israel in June 2025, the Iranian state-sponsored hacking group Imperial Kitten purchased domains like stopirannukes[.]com to launch sophisticated phishing campaigns against Israeli supporters. This swift, tailored action, detailed in a SecurityScorecard analysis, exemplifies the tight integration of cyber and kinetic warfare. The analysis of hundreds of thousands of Telegram messages shows a broader ecosystem of IRGC-linked proxies and ideologically motivated hacktivists from across the region launching disruptive attacks in concert. The report concludes that modern conflict now inherently features a digital front where state tasking and grassroots ideological fervor merge, creating a complex and agile threat that moves at the speed of war.


Source: SecurityScorecard, 2025. From The Depths of the Shadows: IRGC and Hacker Collectives Of The 12-Day War. [online] Available at: https://securityscorecard.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/From-The-Depths-of-the-Shadows_IRGC-and-Hacker-Collectives_AUG5.pdf


  1. The Privatization of Violence: PMC Models and Asymmetric Tech in Africa

A new book by Alessandro Arduino, summarized in The Conversation, argues that conflict in Africa is being fundamentally reshaped by the convergence of privatized violence, new technology, and disinformation. The analysis tracks the rise of mercenaries and private military companies from Russia, Turkey, and China, each with distinct operational models for profiting from instability. It highlights how the proliferation of cheap, lethal drones provides non-state actors with an "off-the-shelf air force," while AI is poised to "turbocharge" disinformation campaigns targeting Africa's youthful population. The book concludes that these intersecting trends thrive in power vacuums across the continent, creating complex new threats that demand global vigilance and regulation.

Source: The Conversation, Alessandro Arduino, 2025. Drones, disinformation and guns-for-hire are reshaping conflict in Africa: new book tracks the trends. [online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/drones-disinformation-and-guns-for-hire-are-reshaping-conflict-in-africa-new-book-tracks-the-trends-262256

  1. Algorithmic Amplification and Malinformation During the Southport Crisis

An article in CyberNews, reporting on a new analysis by Amnesty International, concludes that Elon Musk and his platform X played a central role in inciting the 2024 UK riots. The analysis found that following the tragic Southport murders, X’s engagement-driven algorithm systematically amplified racially charged misinformation about the killer's true identity, directly contributing to violence against Muslim and migrant communities. Musk himself fueled the unrest, with one post declaring "civil war is inevitable." Amnesty attributes the platform’s failure to Musk's post-2022 gutting of trust and safety teams, arguing that X now lacks adequate safeguards and fundamentally prioritizes outrage over user safety.


Source: CyberNews, 7 Aug 2025,  Amnesty: Musk played central role in inciting 2024 UK riots. [online] Available at: https://cybernews.com/news/united-kingdom-riots-misinformation-x-musk/


  1. Analysis of Russian FIMI Operations Targeting Moldova's Elections

Days before a landmark EU-Moldova summit in Chisinau, a Russian-linked operation dubbed "Matryoshka" released doctored videos with fake Euronews branding to spread false claims of conflict between EU and Moldovan leaders. This was part of a wider disinformation blitz analyzed in an EUvsDisinfo article, which concludes that pro-Kremlin actors are in a full-scale offensive to derail Moldova's European path ahead of its September elections. The campaign uses a multi-platform strategy, from Telegram to TikTok, to push narratives of debt traps and lost sovereignty, seeking to exploit economic fears and ultimately undermine the democratic process itself.


Source: EUvsDisinfo, Aug 04 2025, The summit on a disinformation mountain. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-summit-on-a-disinformation-mountain/


  1. Latvia Counters Persistent Kremlin Disinformation Narratives

A recent Kremlin-backed narrative falsely claimed that Latvians read more "Mein Kampf" than Harry Potter, part of a broader effort to brand the country as a Nazi sympathizer. According to a report from the EU Disinfo Lab, this is one of five persistent disinformation themes Russia uses to attack Latvia's statehood. The analysis finds that these narratives, which also include claims of "ethnic cleansing" of Russian speakers and portray Latvia as a "failed state", are designed to erode public trust and destabilize the nation from within. While Latvia has developed one of Europe's strongest ecosystems for countering disinformation, the report concludes that it remains on the front lines of an enduring information war.


Source: EU Disinfo Lab, Aug  2025, Disinfo landscape in Latvia. [online] Available at: https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/20250809_Disinfo-landscape-in-Latvia-v2.pdf


  1. EU-Backed Initiative Aims to Build Newsroom Verification Capacity in Nigeria

Following an EU-backed workshop in Lagos, about 40 of Nigeria's top media editors have pledged to create dedicated fact-checking desks within their newsrooms. This initiative, announced in a press release by the EU Delegation to Nigeria, is a direct response to the surge of fake news and propaganda that threatens to undermine the country's stability. The EU Ambassador, Gautier Mignot, framed the issue as an "existential imperative," arguing that misinformation erodes the credibility of both the message and the messenger. This collaboration between the EU and the Nigerian Guild of Editors marks a critical effort to equip media gatekeepers with the skills needed to defend the information space.


Source: Press and information team of the Delegation to NIGERIA, 2025. EU, editors unite against disinformation. [online] Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria/eu-editors-unite-against-disinformation_en


[Takeaways]

Multiple events this week, from a simulated Sino-Russian IO campaign to Russia's real-world operations in Europe, reveal that authoritarian information strategies have inherent vulnerabilities. While states are refining their playbooks for destabilization, their alliances are often brittle and transactional, prone to fracturing under the pressure of competing national interests. The most durable defense is not reactive, but proactive. Investing in the resilience of the broader information ecosystem, such as the EU-backed initiative to build verification capacity in Nigerian newsrooms, proves to be a more effective long-term strategy than attempting to counter every individual threat.



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