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Commissioned by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation For Freedom Malaysia in late 2025, as part of a Study on Perceptions of Geopolitics and Regional Issues, this dedicated CRC report examines how Chinese and Russian influence affects Malaysia’s digital information environment and public opinion. The report integrates the results of two recent national surveys, narrative intelligence findings, and a media environment analysis. It argues, that Malaysia is not necessarily undergoing authoritarian conversion. Instead, it is consistently exposed to foreign-driven anti-Western and authoritarian-aligned narratives which are embedded across state media, diplomatic channels, local outlets, social media platforms, and amplifier assets. In that context, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the most prominent foreign actor, using a multi-layered influence architecture in an attempt to frame Beijing as Malaysia’s foremost economic and strategic partner. At the same time, Russian influence activity is also observed, albeit on a more limited scale. It relies mostly on diplomatic messaging, cultural institutions, individual influencers, and media partnerships promoting narratives around multipolarity, sovereignty, anti-Western sentiment, and closer Malaysia-Russia alignment. Survey data from the CRC and Merdeka Center provides important insights. It shows that although many Malaysians view the PRC as highly active and economically beneficial, a majority still holds China responsible for South China Sea tensions. For Malaysian and European influence defense stakeholders, the report highlights uneven cognitive resilience capacity across demographic groups, reinforcing the need for improved strategic communication deployment, as well as adoption of counter-FIMI detection, remediation and response capabilities in order to protect the crucial assets of democracy. This report was compiled in March 2026. [Download PDF Here]

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 22nd to the 28th of June 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [Social Media Platforms] X False Claims about Alberta Government Published by X Influencer [State Actors] Russia Russia's Wiki Warfare Tries to Distort Reality, Documents Show Russia Intensifies Shadow War to Undermine Support for Ukraine Russia Expanding Soft Power in Georgia via Culture and Language Ukraine Russian Disinformation Takes Aim at Poland-Ukraine Rift Russia Tweaks Language to Deceive the West New EEAS-CCD Report Exposes Russian FIMI Targeting Ukraine's EU Future Russian False Military Claims as Battlefield Gains Slow China Countering Disinformation Could Anchor Australia-Japan Intelligence Cooperation Chinese Network Launches Hundreds of Fake Accounts to Influence the Next Taiwanese Election [AI Related Articles] Tracking AI-Enabled Misinformation Disinformation in 2026 Forum Documents How Influence Operations Scale Through AI Enhancement Big Brands Fund AI Slop Africa Is Not Ready for Malicious AI Swarms on Its Prime News Source [General Reports] Trust in Media 2026 Longtime Exxon Legacy of Climate Denial and Misinformation BLF Propaganda Efforts Under Akhtar Nadeem's Leadership Disinformation in the Western Balkans Disinformation Elicits Learning Biases [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NewsGuard Launches First AI Chatbot Built to Deliver Trusted Journalism An Intelligence-Led Mission Approach for Australia-Japan Cooperation Evaluating Mexico's New Cybersecurity Plan The Opposite of America's AI Problem Is Happening in Brazil Cate Blanchett's Free Tool Helps Protect Identity from Being Deepfaked Youth Facing Disinformation [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] Leaked files from Russia's Social Design Agency reveal Project 2026, a plan to build fake Wikipedia-style sites, phony think tanks, and fabricated media outlets to shape how AI models and search engines understand political issues, run with consultant-style performance targets and achieving up to 86 million views per fabricated story. The Kyiv Independent documents how Russia's Matryoshka bot network exploited an active political dispute between Poland and Ukraine over a UPA unit title on 22 June to spread fabricated claims invoking Nazism and a fake statement attributed to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum director, using false logos of Euronews, Der Spiegel, and ISW. A joint EEAS-CCD report documented Russian FIMI systematically targeting Ukraine's EU accession path, with approximately 244,000 publications generating 1.39 billion views between January 2025 and May 2026, deploying a structured network of state and state-linked assets to portray Ukraine as incompatible with European values and EU membership as costly and risky for both parties. NewsGuard identified a network of 294 coordinated Threads accounts posing as Taiwanese-targeted dating profiles in what researchers assess as pre-positioning ahead of Taiwan's November 2026 local elections, with 40% of accounts following naming patterns associated with a prior network that spread narratives critical of Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party. NewsGuard's June 2026 AI Tracking Center update documents 3,749 AI Content Farm news websites across 16 languages, 358 directly linked to Russia's Storm-1516 operation, and finds that leading AI chatbots now generate false claims in response to news prompts more than one-third of the time, nearly double the prior-year rate. An eLife study found that exposure to potentially unreliable information strengthened a positivity bias and increased reliance on credible sources, meaning disinformation alters not only what people believe but also the learning mechanisms through which they process subsequent information, increasing the weight placed on positive feedback from trusted sources. Brazil enters October 2026 elections with one of the world's most detailed AI election governance frameworks, including a deepfake ban, mandatory AI content labelling, and candidate-ranking restrictions, while Cate Blanchett presented the Human Consent Registry at the European Parliament on 24 June. Mexico unveiled a National Cybersecurity Plan specifically identifying AI-enabled disinformation as a primary threat. [ Report Summary] DisinfoWatch identified a U.S. based X account with 678,000 followers promoting unsupported claims against Alberta's provincial government, including assertions linking officials to criminal child trafficking, misleading claims about Premier Smith's role in vaccine-related employment policies, and a false claim that Albertans will never receive a genuine independence referendum, despite a provincial referendum being scheduled for October 19th, 2026. Leaked files from Russia's Social Design Agency reveal Project 2026, a plan to build fake Wikipedia-style sites, phony think tanks, and fabricated media outlets to shape how AI models and search engines understand political issues, run with consultant-style performance targets and achieving up to 86 million views per fabricated story. An Atlantic Council analysis documents Russia's expanding hybrid warfare campaign against Western democracies, combining sabotage, cyber operations, election interference, and weaponised migration in a sustained effort to undermine democratic institutions and weaken Western support for Ukraine, including the documented use of Telegram-recruited assets to conduct arson attacks at properties linked to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. A Jamestown Foundation analysis documents a Russian soft power offensive in Georgia conducted through cultural diplomacy, language promotion, and educational programmes, with Russian presidential representative Mikhail Shvydkoy's June 2026 Tbilisi visit framing Russian language initiatives and cultural events as a pathway to restore trust, which Georgian civil society figures assess as promoting narratives designed to normalize a shared Russian Georgian identity. The Kyiv Independent documents how Russia's Matryoshka bot network exploited an active political dispute between Poland and Ukraine over a UPA unit title on 22 June to spread fabricated claims invoking Nazism and a fake statement attributed to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum director, using false logos of Euronews, Der Spiegel, and ISW. A Kyiv Post analysis identifies how Russia systematically exploits ambiguous diplomatic language, deploying terms such as 'negotiations,' 'battlefield realities,' and 'neutrality' to reduce Western support for Ukraine while embedding demands for Ukrainian capitulation within the cognitive architecture of international diplomacy. A joint EEAS-CCD report documented Russian FIMI systematically targeting Ukraine's EU accession path, with approximately 244,000 publications generating 1.39 billion views between January 2025 and May 2026, deploying a structured network of state and state-linked assets to portray Ukraine as incompatible with European values and EU membership as costly and risky for both parties. EUvsDisinfo's ongoing disinformation review documents Kremlin-aligned channels promoting false claims of Russian military success, including persistent claims of capturing Kupyansk and Mala Tokmachka that contradicted open-source intelligence and Ukrainian authorities, as Russia's battlefield progress slowed and Ukrainian tactical momentum partially recovered. An ASPI Strategist analysis argues that countering Chinese state-linked disinformation targeting Japan should become a standing mission for Australia-Japan intelligence cooperation, following documented escalation in Beijing's overt influence operations against Tokyo since Prime Minister Takaichi took office in October 2025. NewsGuard identified a network of 294 coordinated Threads accounts displaying signs of inauthentic coordination, including synchronised posting patterns, AI-generated profile images, and naming conventions linked to a prior DPP-critical network, posing as Taiwanese-targeted dating profiles in what researchers assess as pre-positioning ahead of Taiwan's November 2026 local elections. NewsGuard's June 2026 AI Tracking Center update documents 3,749 AI Content Farm news websites across 16 languages, 358 directly linked to Russia's Storm-1516 operation, and finds that leading AI chatbots now generate false claims in response to news prompts more than one-third of the time, nearly double the prior-year rate. An international security forum analysis published on 27 June documents the structural evolution of state-sponsored influence operations as AI integration reshapes campaign architecture, finding that AI enhancement is reducing human resource requirements for large-scale disinformation while simultaneously increasing geographic targeting precision and narrative adaptability. NewsGuard Reality Check documented major brand advertisers including Adobe, Disney, Verizon, and Fox inadvertently funding AI content farms fabricating stories about the disappearance of Savannah Guthrie's 84-year-old mother, through programmatic advertising systems that place ads based on traffic volume rather than editorial standards, with fabricated articles amplified via a network of Facebook pages posting fake breaking-news graphics. Business Day documents that Africa's information environment faces a structurally unaddressed AI disinformation threat through synthetic audio distributed via radio and encrypted messaging platforms, with voice-cloning detection tools performing poorly on African-language audio and existing counter-disinformation frameworks focused almost entirely on text and video content. YouGov's Trust in Media 2026 survey finds trust declined for most of 48 measured U.S. news outlets, with sharply deepening partisan divides, 70% of respondents concerned about deepfakes spreading disinformation, and continued multi-generational fragmentation of the American information environment. An analysis in The Conversation examining the legacy of former ExxonMobil CEO Lee Raymond, who died on 9 June 2026, documents how under Raymond's leadership Exxon directed millions of dollars to climate denial organisations, with over 80% of paid editorial advertisements promoting scientific doubt during a period when the company's own scientists were producing accurate early warming models. A Jamestown Foundation profile of Akhtar Nadeem, also known as Gwahram Baloch, a senior BLF spokesperson and propagandist, documents the organisation's expanded media operations including the publications Ispar and Sarmachar, multilingual video content, and structured messaging addressing AI applications in Baloch armed operations. British Council research finds that young people in the Western Balkans often assess information credibility based on who shared it, familiarity with the source, and 'official-looking' signals rather than through verification, with information overload creating anxiety and distrust, and sharing behaviour driven by social belonging rather than genuine belief in the accuracy of what is being shared. An eLife study found that exposure to potentially unreliable information strengthened a positivity bias and increased reliance on credible sources, meaning disinformation alters not only what people believe but also the learning mechanisms through which they process subsequent information, increasing the weight placed on positive feedback from trusted sources. NewsGuard launched 'NewsGuard AI' on June 25th, the first AI chatbot drawing exclusively from 12,000 editorially vetted sources, backed by a 64,000 false claim guardrail and a 50-50 publisher revenue-sharing model, positioning it as a structural counter-architecture to the AI Content Farm ecosystem NewsGuard has simultaneously been cataloguing. A new ASPI report proposes a formal intelligence-led framework for Australia-Japan counter-disinformation cooperation, recommending dedicated mission leads in both countries' intelligence agencies, joint annual narrative-risk assessments, and crisis simulation exercises targeting Chinese and Russian state-linked information operations. Recorded Future analysis of Mexico's new National Cybersecurity Plan identifies ransomware, AI-enabled disinformation, hacktivism, and state-sponsored cyber activity as primary threats, with the 2026 FIFA World Cup co-hosted by Mexico expected to elevate risks across all four categories significantly. Anchor Change documents Brazil's October 2026 election regulatory framework as one of the world's most detailed, including a deepfake ban in campaign materials, mandatory AI content labelling, restrictions on AI systems recommending candidates, and a 90-day deadline to build a national enforcement tools catalogue, situating Brazil as a reference model for AI election governance. Cate Blanchett introduced the Human Consent Registry at the European Parliament on June 24th 2026, a free tool allowing individuals to record whether AI systems may use their name, image, voice, and other personal attributes, providing a practical consent mechanism in an environment where unauthorised deepfakes and synthetic likenesses have become pervasive. The Council of Europe's Monaco Presidency launched the 'Youth Facing Disinformation: Why Journalists Matter' programme, including a Strasbourg conference, year-long youth working groups, an audiovisual awareness campaign, and EUR 5,000 grants for youth-led projects addressing disinformation, media literacy, journalists' safety, and freedom of expression. [Social Media Platforms] X False Claims about Alberta Government Published by X Influencer An analysis published by DisinfoWatch states that a U.S.-based X account with 678,000 followers promoted a cluster of unsupported claims against Alberta's provincial government, asserting without evidence that the government is controlled by a criminal child-trafficking and money-laundering operation, that Premier Danielle Smith enabled the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta to endanger children and punish unvaccinated health workers, and that Albertans will never receive a genuine independence referendum. DisinfoWatch's analysis identified these claims as presenting a false picture of Alberta's political, medical, and democratic institutions, noting that several allegations are presented without supporting evidence or documentation. An analysis published by DisinfoWatch states that the assertion that Albertans will never have an opportunity to vote on independence is not supported by the current public record; Alberta has scheduled a provincial referendum for 19 October 2026, including a question related to the process for a potential separation referendum. While citizen-led independence initiatives have faced legal and procedural challenges, DisinfoWatch notes that those obstacles do not in themselves demonstrate a coordinated effort to prevent a vote, and that the claims linking Premier Smith to COVID-19 vaccine employment policies are also misleading, as Alberta Health Services implemented and later rescinded those policies before Smith became premier. Source: DisinfoWatch. Florida-Based X Influencer Pushes Baseless Child-Trafficking Claim About Alberta Government. [online]. Published 22 June 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/florida-based-x-influencer-pushes-baseless-child-trafficking-claim-about-alberta-government Top Of Page [State Actors] Russia Russia's Wiki Warfare Tries to Distort Reality, Documents Show An investigation published by Bloomberg states that leaked files from Russia's Social Design Agency (SDA), an entity sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union for directing Kremlin disinformation, reveal a plan called Project 2026, which sets out to construct a sprawling network of Wikipedia-style reference sites, phony think tanks, and fake media outlets designed to shape how people and AI language models understand key political issues. The 73 leaked files, spanning May 2023 to April 2026, show the operation is run with the structured discipline of a Western consulting firm, complete with performance targets, case studies, and opinion-tracking systems, a significant evolution beyond the quota-driven approach of earlier Kremlin troll farms. An investigation published by Bloomberg states that a September 2025 assessment of one SDA-produced fabricated story, claiming Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky purchased his mother two apartments in Dubai's Burj Khalifa, showed the story reaching 86 million views, with 10 million attributable to 19 project contractors sharing it on social media. A second fake story about Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan buying a French villa received 10.6 million views, with internal SDA chat logs documenting how it forced Pashinyan to publicly deny the allegations, demonstrating the operation's ability to translate manufactured narratives into real-world political pressure. Source: Bloomberg. Leaked Files Show Russia’s Plan to Influence AI and Search Results. [online] Published 23 June 2026. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-06-23/leaked-files-show-russia-s-plan-to-influence-ai-and-search-results Top Of Page Russia Intensifies Shadow War to Undermine Support for Ukraine An analysis published by the Atlantic Council states that Russia is conducting an expanding hybrid warfare campaign against Western countries, combining acts of sabotage, cyber operations, election interference, and weaponised migration in a sustained effort to undermine democratic institutions, deepen social divisions, and weaken Western support for Ukraine. The analysis documents an incident in which a Ukrainian citizen was recruited through Telegram by a Russian-linked organiser and convicted in connection with arson attacks at properties linked to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, illustrating how Russian handlers use encrypted platforms to recruit and direct assets operating inside Western countries without direct personal contact. An analysis published by the Atlantic Council states that Western intelligence officials and NATO members have assessed Russia's activities as a coordinated campaign to challenge Western societies below the threshold of conventional warfare, combining disinformation operations with physical sabotage and cyber attacks in what analysts characterise as a deliberately ambiguous hybrid strategy. The analysis recommends that governments strengthen cooperation, improve resilience against hybrid threats, and treat disinformation and related influence operations as components of a sustained strategic campaign rather than isolated incidents, requiring doctrine, resources, and inter-agency coordination matched to the persistent, cross-domain nature of the threat. Source: Atlantic Council. Russia Intensifies Shadow War to Undermine Support for Ukraine. [online] Published 23 June 2026. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-intensifies-shadow-war-to-undermine-support-for-ukraine/ (atlanticcouncil.org). Top Of Page Russia Expanding Soft Power in Georgia via Culture and Language A report published by the Jamestown Foundation states that Russia is expanding its soft power presence in Georgia through cultural diplomacy, language promotion, educational initiatives, and sponsored public events, with presidential representative Mikhail Shvydkoy visiting Tbilisi in June 2026 to lead Russian-sponsored cultural activities framed as a pathway to restore trust between the two countries. Russian officials presented these initiatives as grounded in shared history, language, and civilizational connection, terminology that critics and Georgian civil society figures assess as promoting narratives designed to increase Russian influence and reinforce the concept of a shared Russian Georgian identity. A report published by the Jamestown Foundation states that protests have accompanied several Russian-language and cultural events in Georgia, reflecting public concerns that such activities serve broader political objectives rather than purely cultural ones. The report identifies the promotion of the Russian language through competitions, educational programmes, and outreach to Georgian teachers and youth as a particularly significant dimension of the operation, documenting a pattern in which culturally coded soft power activities operate as a long-term influence infrastructure, gradually normalising pro-Russian narratives within Georgian society while maintaining plausible deniability as civilian cultural exchange. Source: The Jamestown Foundation. Russia Expanding Soft Power in Georgia via Culture and Language. [online] Published 25 June 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/russia-expanding-soft-power-in-georgia-via-culture-and-language/ Top Of Page Ukraine Russian Disinformation Takes Aim at Poland-Ukraine Rift A fact-check published by the Kyiv Independent states that the Matryoshka bot network deployed fake social media posts on 22 June 2026 exploiting a Polish Ukrainian political dispute over a military unit being granted a title honouring the World War II-era Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), presenting the rift as evidence of rampant 'Nazism' among Ukrainian elites. The operation, detected by the Antibot4Navalny monitoring group, fabricated a statement by Piotr Cywinski, a Polish historian and director of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, falsely claiming he called for barring President Zelensky from Holocaust commemoration events. A fact-check published by the Kyiv Independent states that Matryoshka posts employed a signature technique of the operation: overlaying fabricated text on unrelated stock footage while attaching the logos of Euronews, Der Spiegel, and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) to lend false credibility. The bot network generated approximately 30,000 views per post on X, though Antibot4Navalny noted that Matryoshka routinely inflates view counts, making authentic reach difficult to establish, a deliberate component of the operation's strategy to create the impression of organic widespread resonance for manufactured narratives targeting EU and NATO audiences. Source: Kyiv Independent. Fact Check: Russian Disinformation Takes Aim at Poland-Ukraine Rift. [online] Published 23 June 2026. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/fact-check-russian-disinformation-takes-aim-at-poland-ukraine-rift/ Top Of Page Russia Tweaks Language to Deceive the West An analysis published by Kyiv Post states that Russia's use of the word 'negotiations' functions as a systematic cognitive warfare instrument, with Moscow openly stating readiness for 'talks' while simultaneously insisting on conditions amounting to Ukrainian capitulation, including permanent NATO exclusion, severe military limitations, and Ukrainian recognition of territories seized by illegal referendum. The analysis identifies how Russian officials deploy terms such as 'battlefield realities' and 'neutrality' to generate Western pressure on Kyiv while insulating Moscow from accountability for blocking any genuine ceasefire process. An analysis published by Kyiv Post states that the Kremlin's linguistic manipulation extends to framing Russian-installed collaborators in occupied Ukraine as 'separatists', a term that implies popular local agency rather than externally imposed occupation, and deploying the phrase 'special military operation' to deny the legal and moral character of a full-scale war of aggression. The analysis argues that Western actors who adopt Kremlin framing uncritically enable the information operation, as the repeated use of Russian-defined terms shapes the cognitive architecture within which policy options are evaluated, gradually shifting the perceived space of legitimate responses away from Ukrainian sovereignty. Source: Kyiv Post. OPINION: ‘Negotiations’ Are Traps – How Russia Tweaks Language to Deceive the West. [online] Published 28 June 2026. Available at: https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/78980 (kyivpost.com). Top Of Page New EEAS-CCD Report Exposes Russian FIMI Targeting Ukraine's EU Future An article published by EUvsDisinfo states that a joint analytical report by the European External Action Service and Ukraine's Centre for Countering Disinformation documented how Russian Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) operations are systematically targeting Ukraine's path towards European Union membership, with monitors observing approximately 244,000 publications on Ukraine's accession between January 2025 and May 2026 generating a combined 1.39 billion views. The report identifies a structured network of state, state-linked, and aligned information assets promoting recurring narratives that portray Ukraine as incompatible with European values, depict accession as an elite-driven process detached from public interests, and frame EU membership as costly and risky for both parties. An article published by EUvsDisinfo states that Russia views Ukraine's integration into the EU as a direct threat to its regional influence, and has deployed coordinated information activities within a broader hybrid campaign that exploits fears related to corruption, security, identity, and economic costs through AI-enabled content production, cross-platform amplification, and information laundering. The report calls for closer cooperation between Ukraine, the EU, and international partners through information sharing, strategic communication, digital regulation, sanctions, and resilience-building initiatives, situating counter-FIMI policy as a structural requirement of the EU enlargement process rather than a peripheral security measure. Source: EUvsDisinfo. New EEAS-CCD Report Exposes Russian FIMI Targeting Ukraine’s EU Future. [online] Published 23 June 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/new-eeas-ccd-report-exposes-russian-fimi-targeting-ukraines-eu-future/ (euvsdisinfo.eu). Top Of Page Russian False Military Claims as Battlefield Gains Slow A review published by EUvsDisinfo states that as Russia's battlefield gains have slowed and Ukraine has regained some tactical momentum, Kremlin-aligned information channels have increasingly promoted exaggerated or false claims of military success, including persistent claims of the capture of Ukrainian towns such as Kupyansk and Mala Tokmachka that persisted despite reports from Ukrainian authorities and open-source intelligence indicating both locations remained under Ukrainian control. At the same time, Russian information operations sought to shape perceptions of Ukrainian strikes on Russian military logistics and energy infrastructure by portraying them as attacks on civilians and evidence of Western escalation. A review published by EUvsDisinfo states that pro-Kremlin outlets portrayed Ukrainian strikes as targeting civilians and as evidence that Ukraine is unwilling to pursue peace, while some Russian officials simultaneously acknowledged that many strikes were aimed at military supply networks rather than civilian targets, demonstrating the internally inconsistent nature of the information campaign, which prioritises domestic audience management and Western perception shaping over factual coherence. The analysis situates these information efforts within a pattern of Russian operational communication increasingly designed to manage public perceptions of the war as Russia faces mounting casualties and diminishing battlefield returns, rather than to accurately inform either Russian or international audiences. Source: EUvsDisinfo. Still at War: Russia’s Disinformation Targeting Ukraine. [online] Published 25 June 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/still-at-war-russias-disinformation-targeting-ukraine/ (euvsdisinfo.eu). Top Of Page China Countering Disinformation Could Anchor Australia-Japan Intelligence Cooperation An analysis published by ASPI's The Strategist states that Australia and Japan are both targets of state-linked disinformation campaigns designed to exploit historical grievances, domestic political divisions, and alliance anxieties, with Beijing ratcheting up its information operations against Japan significantly since Sanae Takaichi became Prime Minister in October 2025. The analysis documents an information offensive conducted through overt propaganda channels, including Chinese state media, as well as through networks of social media influencers, inauthentic accounts, and bots amplifying Beijing's narratives across the regional information environment. An analysis published by ASPI's The Strategist states that Beijing's reaction to Japan's May 2026 intelligence reforms demonstrates that even legitimate democratic governance measures will be contested in the information domain, with Chinese state media and diplomatic accounts coordinating campaigns to portray the reforms as destabilising. The analysis recommends that mission leads be appointed in Australia's Office of National Intelligence and Japan's newly established National Intelligence Agency, alongside a standing bilateral forum on information integrity producing annual narrative-risk assessments and crisis simulations, positioning counter-disinformation as a structural feature of the alliance rather than an ad hoc response to individual incidents. Source: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Countering Disinformation Could Anchor Australia–Japan Intelligence Cooperation. [online] Published 26 June 2026. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/countering-disinformation-could-anchor-australia-japan-intelligence-cooperation/ Top Of Page Chinese Network Launches Hundreds of Fake Accounts to Influence the Next Taiwanese Election A report published by NewsGuard states that a network of 294 coordinated Threads accounts displaying multiple signs of inauthentic coordination, including similar naming conventions, synchronised posting patterns, identical profile content, and repurposed or AI-generated images, has been operating as attractive Asian women seeking relationships with Taiwanese men, with researchers assessing the accounts as positioned to build audiences and credibility ahead of Taiwan's November 2026 local elections. The network shares characteristics with previously identified China-linked influence operations targeting Taiwan, with 40% of accounts following naming patterns associated with a network that previously spread narratives critical of Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party. A report published by NewsGuard states that account location data, cultural inaccuracies in posts about Taiwan, and posting schedules aligned with standard working hours in China indicate the operators are likely based outside Taiwan. The analysis assesses the accounts as designed to establish relationships, collect audience information, and build online reach before potentially being deployed to amplify coordinated messaging around politically significant events, a well-documented tactic in which networks established as socially benign are repurposed for political influence operations once they have accrued sufficient followers and engagement history to avoid rapid platform detection. Source: NewsGuard Technologies. Chinese Network Launches Hundreds of Fake Dating Accounts to Influence the Next Taiwanese Election. [online] Published 24 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/chinese-network-launches-hundreds-of-fake-dating-accounts-to-influence-the-next-taiwanese-election/ (newsguardtech.com). Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] Tracking AI-Enabled Misinformation A report published by NewsGuard states that its AI Tracking Center, updated 23 June 2026, has identified 3,749 AI Content Farm news and information websites operating across 16 languages, sites that use AI tools to produce substantial volumes of content without disclosure, presenting synthetic material as human-authored journalism. The center identifies 358 of these sites as directly linked to Storm-1516, a pro-Russian influence operation that creates fabricated content on sites designed to resemble local newspapers in the United States and Europe, targeting audiences unlikely to encounter mainstream fact-checking. A report published by NewsGuard states that an audit of the 10 leading generative AI tools found the rate of generating false claims in response to news prompts has nearly doubled, with AI chatbots now providing false information more than one-third of the time. NewsGuard confirmed specific instances, including an AI-edited image purportedly showing an Iranian missile (the original predating the March 2026 conflict) and images circulating as purported photographs of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro that in fact depicted former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from December 2003, illustrating the compounding risk created when AI models are trained on or cite content originating from adversarial AI Content Farms. Source: NewsGuard Technologies. Tracking AI-Enabled Misinformation: 3,749 AI Content Farm Sites (and Counting), Plus the Top False Claims Generated by Artificial Intelligence Tools. [online] Last updated 23 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/ai-tracking-center/ (newsguardtech.com). Top Of Page Disinformation in 2026 Forum Documents How Influence Operations Scale Through AI Enhancement A report published by the Center for Foreign Interference Research states that a 25 June 2026 international security forum analysis revealed that the integration of artificial intelligence tools into influence operation architectures is producing a structural shift in how state-sponsored disinformation campaigns are designed and executed, with AI enabling smaller operational teams to produce higher volumes of contextually tailored content targeting multiple geographic markets simultaneously. The forum documentation identifies this as a departure from earlier volume-over-precision models, with AI enhancement allowing operators to embed narratives within organic public debates rather than relying on identifiable high-volume posting patterns that platform moderation tools are calibrated to detect. A report published by the Center for Foreign Interference Research states that the forum also documented coordinated foreign campaigns deliberately exploiting dormant inter-state conflicts and ethnic tensions across post-Soviet states to sow discord, a tactic that AI enhancement makes more scalable by enabling rapid localisation of destabilising narratives for different linguistic and cultural contexts within the same operational deployment. The forum findings position AI-augmented influence operations as a compounding threat in the run-up to the 2026 U.S. midterm elections and ongoing European electoral cycles, where reduced attribution confidence and increased content volume are simultaneously degrading the effectiveness of platform-level moderation responses. Source: Foreign Interference Research Center. Disinformation in 2026 Forum Documents How Influence Operations Scale Through AI Enhancement. [online] Published 25 June 2026. Available at: https://www.foreigninterference.org/post/disinformation-in-2026-forum-documents-how-influence-operations-scale-through-ai-enhancement (foreigninterference.org). Top Of Page Big Brands Fund AI Slop A report published by NewsGuard's Reality Check states that major brand advertisers including Adobe, Disney, Verizon, and Fox had advertisements running on AI-generated content farm websites publishing fabricated stories about the disappearance of Nancy Guthrie, the 84-year-old mother of Today show co-anchor Savannah Guthrie, sites that produced false claims about FBI breakthroughs, new evidence, and alleged family involvement in the case despite authorities having cleared relatives. The fake articles were engineered to capitalise on public interest in a high-profile missing-person case while generating advertising revenue through programmatic advertising systems that place brand ads on content regardless of veracity. A report published by NewsGuard's Reality Check states that traffic to the fabricated stories was amplified through a network of apparently connected Facebook pages that post fake breaking-news graphics directing users to AI-generated sites, and that the operation may be operated from Vietnam, though ownership could not be confirmed. NewsGuard identifies the case as illustrating a systemic business model in which AI content farms produce fabricated or misleading stories about high-profile topics to attract clicks and monetise audience attention through advertising, a model that is financially self-sustaining as long as programmatic ad systems route advertising budgets to content based on traffic volume rather than editorial standards. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Big Brands Fund AI Slop. [online] Published 22 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/big-brands-fund-ai-slop (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page Africa Is Not Ready for Malicious AI Swarms on Its Prime News Source An analysis published by Business Day states that Africa's information environment faces growing risks from AI-enabled disinformation distributed through audio content on radio and encrypted messaging platforms, creating a significant gap in existing defences against emerging threats because global counter-disinformation efforts have largely focused on social media and text-based content while radio remains the primary news source for many Africans, particularly in rural communities, among women, and among people with limited digital access. Synthetic audio can exploit trusted communication channels to spread false narratives, influence elections, and create the illusion of public consensus in environments where voice-cloning technology is increasingly accessible. A report published by Business Day states that recent elections in Nigeria and Ghana demonstrated how misleading audio content circulates rapidly through WhatsApp and other peer-to-peer networks, bypassing traditional moderation and fact-checking mechanisms, and that investment in audio deepfake detection systems designed for African languages and acoustic environments remains limited, with voice-cloning models trained on limited African-language data harder to detect using standard tools built for English, French, and Mandarin. The analysis identifies the growing accessibility of voice-cloning technology as increasing the risk that political figures, community leaders, and public officials can be impersonated to manipulate public opinion, calling for governments, election bodies, media organisations, and fact-checking groups across Africa to strengthen resilience against audio-based disinformation as a priority. Source: Business Day. BIG READ | Africa Is Not Ready for ‘Malicious AI Swarms’ on Its Prime News Source. [online] Published 23 June 2026. Available at: https://www.businessday.co.za/lifestyle/2026-06-23-africas-dominant-news-source-is-underprepared-for-ai-disinformation Top Of Page [General Reports] Trust in Media 2026 A survey published by YouGov states that trust declined for most of the 48 news outlets measured in its 2026 Trust in Media survey, with only a handful making modest gains within the margin of error. The survey identifies sharply defined partisan divides as the dominant structural feature of American media trust, a pattern that limits the capacity of any single outlet or platform to serve as a shared factual reference point across the electorate, creating conditions that state and non-state disinformation actors systematically exploit to widen existing societal fractures. A survey published by YouGov states that 70% of respondents expressed concern that deepfakes would be used to spread disinformation, reflecting a broad awareness of synthetic media threats even as institutional mechanisms for labelling or detecting AI-generated content remain underdeveloped. The survey situates declining media trust within a broader pattern of information environment fragmentation in which generational differences in news consumption habits, platform preferences, and source authority create structurally separate information ecosystems, a condition that disinformation research identifies as increasing vulnerability to targeted influence operations by reducing the shared factual baseline needed to evaluate and reject false narratives collectively. Source: YouGov. Trust in Media 2026: Which News Sources Americans Use and Trust. [online] Published 29 June 2026. Available at: https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/55045-trust-in-media-2026-which-news-sources-americans-use-and-trust (yougov.com). Top Of Page Longtime Exxon Legacy of Climate Denial and Misinformation An article published by The Conversation states that former ExxonMobil CEO Lee Raymond, who died on June 9th 2026, at age 87, left a consequential legacy of spreading doubt about climate change despite his own company's internal scientists having produced some of the most accurate early models of human-caused global warming. Over 80% of Exxon's paid editorial-style advertisements during Raymond's tenure specifically promoted uncertainty and doubt about climate science, and Raymond's 1997 address to the World Petroleum Congress explicitly denied that the world was warming, denied the fossil fuel industry's causal role, and challenged the scientific consensus at a critical juncture in international climate policy formation. An article published by The Conversation states that under Raymond's leadership, Exxon directed millions of dollars to organisations promoting climate denial, establishing a pattern of corporate disinformation that continues to shape public discourse and policy contestation today. The analysis identifies a broad range of persistent narratives used to cast doubt on climate change or its causes, including claims that warming is primarily driven by natural factors, scepticism about links between emissions and extreme weather, and criticism of proposed solutions, and argues that inoculation strategies, critical thinking education, and prebunking are among the most evidence-supported tools for building public resilience to this form of corporate-origin disinformation. Source: The Conversation. Longtime Exxon CEO Lee Raymond’s Legacy of Climate Denial and Misinformation Lives On – A Psychologist Offers Ways to Counter It. [online] Published 22 June 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/longtime-exxon-ceo-lee-raymonds-legacy-of-climate-denial-and-misinformation-lives-on-a-psychologist-offers-ways-to-counter-it-285667 Top Of Page BLF Propaganda Efforts Under Akhtar Nadeem's Leadership A report published by the Jamestown Foundation profiled Akhtar Nadeem, also known as Gwahram Baloch, a senior figure and spokesperson for the Balochistan Liberation Front, as part of a broader analysis of how educated and middle-class activists have assumed more prominent leadership roles within the Baloch insurgency. Under Akhtar Nadeem's leadership, the organisation has expanded its propaganda efforts through the publications 'Ispar' and 'Sarmachar,' video content, multilingual messaging, and increasingly structured communication strategies addressing ideological themes, organisational developments, and the use of artificial intelligence in combat operations. A report published by the Jamestown Foundation states that the BLF's expanded media operations reflect a deliberate effort to modernise the organisation's outreach, strengthen its narrative position, and maintain relevance alongside its armed activities, following a strategic communication model in which insurgent groups use professional-grade media production to recruit internationally, shape foreign press coverage, and contest the Pakistani state's information environment. The profiling of Akhtar Nadeem illustrates a pattern identified across multiple insurgent movements in which the combination of educated leadership and sophisticated information operations produces a more durable and harder-to-isolate influence infrastructure than purely tactical communication approaches. Source: The Jamestown Foundation. Briefs Archive. [online] Available at: https://jamestown.org/briefs/ Top Of Page Disinformation in the Western Balkans A study published by the British Council states that young people in the Western Balkans often judge the credibility of information based on who shared it, familiarity with the source, and 'official-looking' signals rather than through detailed verification, reflecting a context in which checking information requires significant time and effort, leading many to rely on trusted friends, family members, influencers, or quick credibility cues, especially when confronted with large volumes of content. Researchers observed that sharing content does not always reflect genuine belief, with young people frequently sharing information for humour, social connection, or group belonging even when uncertain of its accuracy. A study published by the British Council states that information overload is creating confusion, anxiety, and increasing distrust in the Western Balkans information environment, with some participants reporting it has become increasingly difficult to determine what is true, and that the growing presence of AI-generated and manipulated content is further weakening traditional authenticity signals and increasing reliance on source identity and reputation. The research recommends improving media and information literacy, helping users recognise common credibility cues, supporting trustworthy journalism and fact-checking initiatives, and increasing platform transparency and accountability, framing youth information resilience as a structural requirement for democratic health in a region with significant vulnerability to both domestic and externally driven disinformation. Source: British Council. Next Generation What We Know: Mis/disinformation in the Western Balkans. [online] Published June 2026. Available at: https://www.britishcouncil.org/research-insight/next-generation-wwk-rfp-western-balkans Top Of Page Disinformation Elicits Learning Biases A study published by eLife states that an assessment of how people learn and update their beliefs when exposed to potentially false information found that while individuals generally learned more from credible sources, consistent with rational decision-making principles, they also showed important biases when confronted with unreliable information, including continuing to learn from sources known to be unreliable rather than ignoring them entirely. The study also found that exposure to misleading information increased reliance on trusted sources, leading participants to place greater weight on credible feedback than they otherwise would. A study published by eLife states that the presence of unreliable information strengthened a positivity bias, making people more likely to accept positive feedback while discounting negative feedback, and that this pattern suggests disinformation affects not only what people believe but also how they process and learn from subsequent information. By exploiting existing cognitive biases, including cognitive load effects from the effort of filtering non-credible sources, positivity bias, and motivated cognition, misleading information can alter decision-making processes even when people are consciously aware that some sources are untrustworthy, with significant implications for the design of counter-disinformation interventions that must address not just belief content but underlying learning mechanisms. Source: eLife. [Article 106073]. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://elifesciences.org/articles/106073 (elifesciences.org). Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NewsGuard Launches First AI Chatbot Built to Deliver Trusted Journalism An announcement published by NewsGuard states that the company launched 'NewsGuard AI' on June 25th, 2026, the first AI chatbot sourcing responses exclusively from 12,000 news and information websites whose editorial processes have been evaluated against nine apolitical journalistic standards. The system incorporates a guardrail trained on 64,000 documented false claims to suppress misinformation and is built on a revenue-sharing model in which publishers receive 50% of subscription fees generated from use of their content, positioning the platform as both a quality information tool and a mechanism to fund journalism from trusted sources. An announcement published by NewsGuard states that the chatbot is designed as a direct architectural response to the AI Content Farm ecosystem the company has simultaneously been cataloguing, in which 3,749 AI-generated content farms pollute the training data and citation pools that standard AI tools draw from. By restricting sourcing to verified publishers and explicitly excluding unreliable AI-generated content, NewsGuard AI represents a structural counter-model to the compounding feedback loop between adversarial content farms and AI hallucination that standard retrieval-augmented generation systems are currently unable to break. Source: NewsGuard Technologies. NewsGuard Launches First AI Chatbot Built to Deliver Trusted Journalism Only from Reliable News Websites. [online] Published 24 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/press/newsguard-launches-first-ai-chatbot-built-to-deliver-trusted-journalism-only-from-reliable-news-websites/ (newsguardtech.com). Top Of Page An Intelligence-Led Mission Approach for Australia-Japan Cooperation A report published by ASPI states that a new report for the Australia-Japan security relationship proposes that counter-disinformation be elevated into a standing intelligence mission co-led by Australia's Office of National Intelligence and Japan's newly established National Intelligence Agency, moving beyond ad hoc responses to individual influence operations toward a structural bilateral framework for countering Chinese and Russian state-linked disinformation targeting both countries and their shared strategic interests. The report identifies both Australia and Japan as sustained targets of state-linked information operations designed to exploit historical grievances, domestic political divisions, and alliance anxieties. A report published by ASPI states that the proposed Australia-Japan counter-disinformation framework would include an annual bilateral narrative-risk assessment identifying the most significant information operations threatening alliance cohesion, as well as crisis simulation exercises testing institutional responses to coordinated disinformation events, providing shared operational preparedness infrastructure that neither country currently has in place for the information domain. The report situates the recommendation within a documented escalation of Chinese disinformation operations against Japan since Prime Minister Takaichi's election in October 2025, with Beijing deploying overt state media channels, influencer networks, and inauthentic accounts in a campaign ASPI assesses as part of a broader Chinese strategy to contest Japan's role as a U.S. defence and security partner in the Indo-Pacific. Source: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). From Common Threats to Narrative Defence. [online] Published June 2026. Available at: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/from-common-threats-to-narrative-defence Top Of Page Evaluating Mexico's New Cybersecurity Plan An analysis published by Recorded Future states that Mexico has unveiled a National Cybersecurity Plan to strengthen the country's cyber resilience and address threats including ransomware, disinformation, hacktivism, and state-sponsored cyber activity, following a series of cyber incidents affecting government institutions and critical sectors. Ransomware is identified as one of the most significant threats facing Mexican organisations, particularly in the government, healthcare, and financial sectors, and the 2026 FIFA World Cup co-hosted by Mexico is expected to increase cyber risks by creating a target-rich environment for ransomware groups, hacktivists, fraud actors, and disinformation networks. A report published by Recorded Future states that disinformation networks represent a specific risk category in Mexico's cybersecurity landscape, with foreign and domestic actors potentially exploiting major events to spread fabricated narratives that can undermine institutional trust and complicate emergency response. The analysis recommends adopting international cybersecurity standards, improving threat intelligence capabilities, conducting cyber incident exercises, strengthening public awareness and cyber hygiene, and deepening cooperation with international partners, particularly the United States, as Mexico implements new legislation and regulatory frameworks in advance of the FIFA World Cup and the October 2026 electoral period. Source: Recorded Future Insikt Group. Evaluating Mexico's New Cybersecurity Plan. [online] Published 25 June 2026. Available at: https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/mexico-new-cybersecurity-plan-evaluation Top Of Page The Opposite of America's AI Problem Is Happening in Brazil An article published by Anchor Change states that Brazil is entering its October 2026 elections with one of the world's most detailed regulatory frameworks for AI and online political content, including a ban on deepfakes in campaign materials, mandatory labelling of AI-generated content, restrictions on AI systems recommending or ranking candidates, and a blackout period for AI-altered content before voting. Brazil's electoral court has also created a permanent commission on AI in elections and established a 90-day deadline to build a national catalogue of enforcement tools, with a recent study identifying 18 AI-generated political profiles active in Brazil between January 2025 and April 2026, most of which did not disclose their AI nature. An article published by Anchor Change states that uncertainty around how some rules should be interpreted, particularly restrictions on ranking political candidates, has created challenges for AI companies, with some platforms potentially choosing to limit or suspend political AI features rather than risk penalties, raising concerns about reduced access to information during the election period. The analysis situates Brazil's approach within more than a decade of efforts to address online harms, election integrity, and platform accountability, identifying a growing tension between efforts to limit misleading or manipulated content and concerns that overly restrictive or unclear rules could discourage platforms from providing political information altogether, a tension likely to become a reference point for other democracies developing AI election governance frameworks. Source: Anchor Change. The Opposite of America’s AI Problem. [online] Published 25 June 2026. Available at: https://anchorchange.substack.com/p/the-opposite-of-americas-ai-problem (anchorchange.substack.com). Top Of Page Cate Blanchett's Free Tool Helps Protect Identity from Being Deepfaked An article published by CyberNews states that Australian actress Cate Blanchett introduced the Human Consent Registry at the European Parliament on June 24th 2026, a free tool that allows individuals to record whether AI systems may use their name, image, voice, and other personal attributes, or to define consent terms for specific uses, providing a practical mechanism for the growing demand for individual control over AI-generated representations in an environment where unauthorised deepfakes and synthetic likenesses have become pervasive. The platform is designed to be accessible to both individuals and third parties such as agents and managers, and is expected to expand to enable protection of artworks, characters, and brands. A report published by CyberNews states that the Human Consent Registry reflects the convergence of celebrity advocacy, legislative momentum, and public demand for AI identity protections, with governments and regulators in the European Union, Australia, Japan, and the United States increasingly responding to the harm associated with nonconsensual AI-generated content. The initiative addresses the intersection between individual consent rights and information integrity, while the registry's primary function is identity protection rather than disinformation countermeasures; the broader ecosystem of nonconsensual AI-generated representations creates risks for democratic discourse when synthetic media depicting real individuals is used to fabricate statements, manipulate public opinion, or undermine institutional trust. Source: Cybernews. Cate Blanchett Joins the Fight Against Deepfakes. [online] Published 25 June 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/cate-blanchett-ai/ (cybernews.com). Top Of Page Youth Facing Disinformation An announcement published by the Council of Europe states that Monaco has launched the 'Youth Facing Disinformation: Why Journalists Matter' initiative as part of its 2026 Presidency of the Committee of Ministers, under the broader 'Journalists Matter' campaign for the safety and role of journalists in democratic societies. The programme aims to strengthen media and information literacy among young Europeans navigating an information environment where social media and AI tools blur the distinction between reliable information and misleading content, including through conferences, workshops, debates, and an audiovisual awareness campaign designed to engage young audiences on information overload, conspiracy theories, and disinformation. An announcement published by the Council of Europe states that a major conference in Strasbourg in November 2026 will bring together youth participants, journalists, experts, media organisations, and social media stakeholders to discuss challenges related to reliable information, and will launch year-long youth-led working groups focused on practical projects supporting quality journalism and strengthening resilience against disinformation. The programme includes a grants programme awarding up to four projects of EUR 5,000 each for youth-led initiatives addressing disinformation, media literacy, journalists' safety, and freedom of expression, positioning youth participation not merely as a communications target but as an active structural contributor to the development of information integrity solutions. Source: Council of Europe. Youth Facing Disinformation – Why Journalists Matter. [online] Published June 2026. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/youth-facing-disinformation-why-journalists-matter Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

In recent years, a growing number of documented cases have shown how dating-oriented platforms are consistently being exploited and weaponized by threat actors to deliver both cyber and cognitive threats. Dating platforms are inherently built around the promise of intimate connection through the sharing of personal information. This premise hints at why such platforms may be attractive to state and non-state actors seeking to identify, assess, and exploit potential targets. In this blog, we highlight various recurring uses of dating platforms in today’s hybrid threat landscape, spanning intelligence collection and recruitment, malware delivery, and hostile narrative manipulation. Figure 1 – Kill chain models integrating dating-oriented platforms. Dating Apps as Threat Channels Intelligence Collection and Recruitment According to a recent analysis by EUvsDisinfo, since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, dating apps such as Tinder have reportedly been abused by different actors.[1] Recently, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has warned that inauthentic female personas, or accounts posing as law enforcement officials, initiate contact, build trust, collect personal information, and eventually shift toward blackmail or recruitment. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) identified similar methods involving fake profiles that gathered information before pressuring targets to cooperate. This kind of activity has also been reported outside Ukraine. Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service (BAMAD) stated that Russian intelligence operatives used Tinder to target politicians and soldiers. In some cases, recruitment has moved beyond information collection. In July 2025, the SBU arrested a woman who was reportedly recruited through a dating platform and instructed to plant a bomb in a hotel. In November 2025, authorities arrested a man in Nikopol accused of passing Ukrainian defense positions to Russian artillery after being recruited in a similar manner. These recent cases exemplify a repeated pattern: dating apps increasingly serve as effective tools for identifying vulnerable individuals and, in some cases, recruiting them for intelligence purposes. Hostile Influence and Narrative Manipulation In recent years, dating platforms and forums have been increasingly exploited and integrated into influence attack chains. Observed cases have shown attackers utilize seemingly-innocent female personas on social media platforms and dedicated dating sites to garner exposure, proliferate narratives, or generate “source material” that could be leveraged for narrative manipulation. According to the EUvsDisinfo analysis, a fake Tinder account was used in Ukraine in 2018 as part of a campaign against a senior police official.[2] Manipulated screenshots of a private dating conversation were leaked online, triggering public reactions and damaging trust in law enforcement. Another operational model can be found in a recent report by NewsGuard, which uncovered an ongoing PRC-aligned threat activity cluster, targeting Taiwan ahead of the local election expected November 2026. The investigation provides details of “[a] network of 294 coordinated accounts on Meta’s Threads, which launched in May 2026”. NewsGuard’s findings suggest that the identified operational assets are mainly designed to leverage established trust for subsequent narrative amplification. In addition, these sockpuppets can be utilized to study the behavioral patterns of potential targets, before attackers craft and proliferate their political messaging. Figure 2 – An inauthentic Threads dating account targeting Taiwanese users, according to NewsGuard.[3] The overall effectiveness of such tactics stems from the credibility assigned to dating-based interactions. An inauthentic dating account can spread a narrative, illicit sensitive information, lure unsuspecting high-value targets, or social-engineer its way to malicious payload delivery. Malware Delivery The same psychological incentives and trust-based dynamics that make dating apps an effective channel for HUMINT recruitment can also make them effective malware delivery vectors. Research from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) documented how the terrorist organization Hamas targeted Israeli soldiers through what local officials called “Operation Broken Heart”.[4] The MO was fairly simple. Threat actors used sockpuppets, pretending to be young attractive women on social media platforms and dating apps. They convinced targeted soldiers to download malicious apps onto their mobile devices. Hamas also reportedly developed fake dating apps specifically for this purpose. Once installed, the malware provided access to cameras, microphones, and location data of the victim’s device. Another similar instance can be found in a 2026 ESET research report.[5] Security researchers identified an Android app called GhostChat circulating in Pakistan. The app resembled a dating platform and presented users with multiple female profiles, each requiring exclusive access credentials. Once installed, the application operated in the background, collecting contacts, files, photographs, and other information from the victim’s device. ESET linked the app to a broader cyber-espionage infrastructure that included fake government websites and WhatsApp-focused scams. Figure 3 – The malicious GhostChat app requiring access codes to unlock chats Conclusion Within the context of sophisticated hybrid threats, such as hostile influence campaigns (HICs) and cyfluence attack chains, dating apps should be considered as largely-unmonitored digital spaces, allowing hybrid threat actors and cyber-criminals to easily exploit a wide array of attack surfaces. Based on current trends in the foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat landscape, we expect attempts by threat actors to move laterally across social media platforms to persist. Hostile actors are likely to increasingly turn to unmonitored apps, while continuing to operate under the cover of perceived trust and privacy. Influence defense practitioners and cognitive security stakeholders must consider that influence operations may increasingly take place in restricted online spaces that are difficult to monitor. It is therefore crucial to identify and deploy the needed sensors to support ongoing defensive efforts. [References:] EUvsDisinfo. Tough Love: Spies, Dating Apps, and the Dark Side of Online Intimacy. [online] Published 10 June 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/tough-love-spies-dating-apps-and-the-dark-side-of-online-intimacy/ (euvsdisinfo.eu). NewsGuard Technologies. Chinese Network Launches Hundreds of Fake Dating Accounts to Influence the Next Taiwanese Election. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/chinese-network-launches-hundreds-of-fake-dating-accounts-to-influence-the-next-taiwanese-election/ (newsguardtech.com). Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Understanding Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s Uses of Information Technology. [online] Published 31 July 2023. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-hamass-and-hezbollahs-uses-information-technology (csis.org). ESET Research. Love? Actually: Fake Dating App Used as Lure in Targeted Spyware Campaign in Pakistan. [online] Published 28 January 2026. Available at: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/love-actually-fake-dating-app-used-lure-targeted-spyware-campaign-pakistan/ (welivesecurity.com).

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 15th to the 21st of June 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Russian Narrative Adaptation in the Global South Gallant Boar Exercise Falsely Framed as Kaliningrad Invasion The War in Ukraine Putin’s “Denazification” Narrative EU Expands Sanctions Targeting Russian Operations [AI Related Articles] AI-Generated Screenshots Involving Eric Trump Benchmark for Detecting AI-Generated Videos Deepfake Detection in the Post-Artifact Era Deepfakes and Disinformation Targeting West Papua Activists AI Deepfakes Proliferate in 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections Despite Regulatory Efforts [General Reports] False Claims About Hirings at the Obama Presidential Center Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Sanctions Over Interference in Moldova Danish Parliamentary Election with No Sign of Significant Disinformation [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to an article by Atlantic Council, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to frame the war against Ukraine through the goal of “denazification”, presenting it as a central war aim rather than a justification for territorial gains. A report by Public First examined AI’s societal perception in 2026 and its potential risks. According to an article by CyberNews, a controversy emerged after UFC commentator Daniel Cormier posted screenshots that allegedly showed messages from Eric Trump asking whether any fights were "rigged" for betting purposes. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, in the weeks leading up to the opening of the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, several conservative social media accounts claimed that the Obama Foundation had hired only Black contractors to work on the project. Foreign Interference documents over 2,800 AI-generated deepfakes deployed in 2026 U.S. midterm election contexts despite the TAKE IT DOWN Act entering FTC enforcement and state-level AI disclosure laws. The Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 finds overall news trust at a record low of 37% across 48 surveyed countries, with social media and video networks surpassing all other sources as the primary global news channel for the first time. Weekly AI chatbot use for news rose to 10%, with AI-generated pink slime content farms set to proliferate further. An analysis published by EU vs. Disinfo monitored TikTok activity around Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election and found no evidence of large-scale Russian disinformation efforts. [ Report Summary] A study published by Post-Soviet Affairs examined how Russian state-sponsored media outlets adapt their messaging for different audiences across the Global South. According to an article by Atlantic Council, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to frame the war against Ukraine through the goal of “denazification”, presenting it as a central war aim rather than a justification for territorial gains. EUvsDisinfo's weekly review documents Kremlin-aligned outlets reframing NATO's Gallant Boar 2026 exercise in the Suwalki Gap as offensive preparation for a Kaliningrad invasion, a false claim portraying Belarus as a peaceful victim of Ukrainian aggression, and Bulgaria's EU fiscal obligations recast as political punishment. The European Union has published that it has adopted a new package of sanctions against Russia in response to its war against Ukraine, hybrid activities, and human rights violations. According to an article by CyberNews, a controversy emerged after UFC commentator Daniel Cormier posted screenshots that allegedly showed messages from Eric Trump asking whether any fights were "rigged" for betting purposes. A paper published by The Digital Library introduced “Chameleon”, a new benchmark dataset that is designed to detect whether a video is AI-generated and trace generated videos back to their source materials. A review published in the Digital Library examined how advances in AI video generation have made synthetic videos increasingly realistic. According to an article by ABC News, West Papuan activists have raised concerns about the growing use of AI-generated content and online disinformation to undermine their advocacy. Foreign Interference documents over 2,800 AI-generated deepfakes deployed in 2026 U.S. midterm election contexts despite the TAKE IT DOWN Act entering FTC enforcement and state-level AI disclosure laws. The report finds that regulatory deterrence is outpaced by the low cost and high availability of AI content generation tools. The Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 finds overall news trust at a record low of 37% across 48 surveyed countries, with social media and video networks surpassing all other sources as the primary global news channel for the first time. Weekly AI chatbot use for news rose to 10%, with AI-generated pink slime content farms set to proliferate further. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, in the weeks leading up to the opening of the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, several conservative social media accounts claimed that the Obama Foundation had hired only Black contractors to work on the project. The European Union announced it has imposed sanctions on six individuals accused of activities aimed at undermining Moldova’s sovereignty, independence, and democratic processes. An analysis published by EU vs. Disinfo monitored TikTok activity around Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election and found no evidence of large-scale Russian disinformation efforts. [State Actors] Russia Russian Narrative Adaptation in the Global South A study published by Post-Soviet Affairs examined how Russian state-sponsored media outlets, particularly RT and Sputnik, adapt their messaging for different audiences across the Global South. Focusing on narratives about multipolarity and neocolonialism, Russian messaging is not uniform but tailored to specific regional contexts. Through analysis of English, French, and Spanish-language content, the study showed that Russia adjusts its narratives to resonate with local historical experiences, political concerns, and existing beliefs. The most significant differences emerge between Africa and Latin America. French-language content aimed at African audiences places strong emphasis on colonial legacies, portraying France as a former colonial oppressor while presenting Russia as a supporter of sovereignty and a multipolar world order. In contrast, Spanish-language content targeting Latin America links neocolonialism more closely to US influence, capitalism, and interventionism, while often portraying China rather than Russia as the leading force behind a multipolar future. These adaptations draw on distinct regional memories and grievances to increase the narratives' appeal. Source: Taylor & Francis Online. [Article DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2026.2690912]. [online journal article] Published 2026. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1060586X.2026.2690912 (tandfonline.com). Top Of Page Gallant Boar Exercise Falsely Framed as Kaliningrad Invasion A weekly disinformation review published by EU vs Disinfo states that Kremlin-aligned outlets reframed NATO's Gallant Boar 2026 military exercise, a defensive training operation in the Suwalki Gap involving multiple allied forces, as an offensive preparation for an invasion of Russia's Kaliningrad exclave. The false narrative, widely circulated on Russian state media and amplified on Telegram, illustrates the Kremlin's consistent pattern of inverting the defensive character of NATO activities to sustain a warmongering West narrative among domestic and Global South audiences. A weekly disinformation review published by EUvsDisinfo states that Bulgaria's obligations under EU fiscal rules were simultaneously reframed as political punishment for the country's pro-EU governance, and that a false claim portraying Ukraine as planning a military assault on Belarus was introduced across pro-Kremlin channels during the reporting period. The review identifies the Belarus narrative as part of a coordinated effort to destabilise Minsk-Kyiv relations by attributing aggressive intent to Ukraine while obscuring Belarus's documented military buildup along its Ukrainian border since at least April 2026. Source: EUvsDisinfo. Warmongering NATO, Peaceful Belarus and Bulgaria’s Punishment. [online] Published 18 June 2025. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/warmongering-nato-peaceful-belarus-and-bulgarias-punishment/ (euvsdisinfo.eu). Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Putin’s “Denazification” Narrative According to an article by Atlantic Council, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to frame the war against Ukraine through the goal of “denazification”, presenting it as a central war aim rather than a justification for territorial gains. This narrative reflects a broader rejection of Ukrainian statehood and helps explain the lack of progress in peace negotiations. The article traces the origins of the “Nazi Ukraine” narrative to Soviet-era portrayals of Ukrainian nationalist movements and argues that the Kremlin has revived and expanded this theme in the years leading up to and during the full-scale invasion. Russian state media and official rhetoric have consistently portrayed Ukrainian patriotism and independence as forms of extremism, while using the “denazification” concept to delegitimize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. This narrative has been challenged by international institutions and historians. Ukraine’s 2019 elections, where President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a Russian-speaking Jewish candidate, won by a large margin, showed that the characterization of Ukraine as a Nazi state lacks support. The “denazification” narrative also functions as a powerful propaganda theme within Russia. Repeated references to an alleged Nazi threat have been used to justify the invasion and sustain public support for the war, despite the absence of credible evidence for such claims. Source: Atlantic Council. Putin’s Obsession With ‘Denazifying’ Ukraine Makes Peace Impossible. [online] Published 18 June 2026. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-obsession-with-denazifying-ukraine-makes-peace-impossible/ (atlanticcouncil.org). Top Of Page EU Expands Sanctions Targeting Russian Operations The European Union has published that it has adopted a new package of sanctions against Russia in response to its war against Ukraine, hybrid activities, and human rights violations. The measures target 34 individuals and 47 entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial sector, energy exports, sanctions evasion networks, and influence operations. According to the EU, the sanctions are intended to reduce Russia’s ability to sustain the war, limit revenues from its “shadow fleet” of oil transport companies, and counter activities that threaten European security. A notable part of the package focuses on individuals and organizations accused of spreading narratives that support or justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The EU sanctioned several media figures, commentators, and public personalities whom it describes as involved in foreign information manipulation and interference. These individuals are accused of promoting narratives that justify the war, dehumanize Ukrainians, or distort historical events. The sanctions also include the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives and a senior Russian Orthodox Church bishop, both cited for their role in supporting pro-Kremlin messaging. The package additionally includes sanctions related to the persecution and death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, as well as the renewal of restrictions connected to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Russia’s War of Aggression Against Ukraine: New EU Sanctions Target Energy Revenues, the Military-Industrial Complex, Propaganda and Human Rights Violations. [online] Published 18 June 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/russia%E2%80%99s-war-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-sanctions-target-energy-revenues-military-industrial_en (eeas.europa.eu). Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] AI-Generated Screenshots Involving Eric Trump According to an article by CyberNews, a controversy emerged ahead of the UFC Freedom 250 event after UFC commentator Daniel Cormier posted screenshots that allegedly showed messages from Eric Trump asking whether any fights were "rigged" for betting purposes. Cormier deleted the post within 15 minutes, while Eric Trump publicly denied ever communicating with him and stated that the screenshots were fake and AI-generated. According to later reporting, Trump also reiterated that he had never spoken to Cormier. Even so, the incident quickly sparked debate online, with some questioning why Cormier would share screenshots if the conversation never occurred, while others noted that screenshots alone are increasingly difficult to verify in an era of advanced AI-generated content. The discussion was further amplified by responses on X, including comments about the challenges of determining authenticity when digital content can be easily manipulated. Source: Cybernews. Eric Trump Claims Rigged UFC Event Texts Were Actually AI Deepfakes. [online] Published 15 June 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/news/eric-trump-ufc-polymarket-deepfake/ (cybernews.com). Top Of Page Benchmark for Detecting AI-Generated Videos The rapid advancement of AI video generation has made it easier to create highly realistic synthetic videos, raising concerns about fraud, privacy violations, and the misuse of fabricated content in public virtual spaces. A paper published in the Digital Library introduced “Chameleon”, a new benchmark dataset containing 1,700 AI-generated videos created using commercial closed-source models. Chameleon includes high-resolution videos with strong temporal and spatial consistency, making them more representative of real-world AI-generated content. The dataset is designed to evaluate two key challenges: detecting whether a video is AI-generated and tracing generated videos back to their source materials. To support this, the researchers collected real videos from domains vulnerable to manipulation and generated corresponding synthetic versions using text-to-video and image-to-video methods. This approach allows researchers not only to assess detection performance but also to investigate the origins of manipulated content. The authors argued that existing benchmarks no longer reflect the capabilities of modern video generation systems and that improved detection and source-tracing tools are needed to address challenges posed by increasingly realistic AI-generated videos. Source: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). [online] Published 2024. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/full/10.1145/3805622.3810862 (dl.acm.org). Top Of Page Deepfake Detection in the Post-Artifact Era A review published in the Digital Library examined how advances in AI video generation have made synthetic videos increasingly realistic, with modern models capable of producing high-resolution, minute-long clips featuring coherent motion and complex scenes. As video quality improves, many of the visual artifacts that earlier detection systems relied on, such as facial inconsistencies, unnatural blinking, or frequency distortions, are disappearing, making it more difficult to distinguish AI-generated content from authentic footage. To address this challenge, the authors proposed a forensic framework based on five assumptions: physiological integrity, temporal coherence, geometric consistency, semantic consistency, and provenance signals. Comparing several detection approaches, they found that current evaluation benchmarks often focus on accuracy while giving less attention to trustworthiness, robustness, and real-world deployment. The review also highlights broader societal concerns associated with increasingly convincing synthetic media, including privacy violations, non-consensual deepfake content, and other forms of misuse. Therefore, future detection systems should move beyond searching for technical artifacts and instead combine multiple sources of evidence, stronger provenance mechanisms, and more comprehensive evaluation methods to improve resilience against rapidly evolving AI-generated video technologies. Source: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). [Article in the Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT ’24)]. [online] Published 2024. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/full/10.1145/3810988.3812659 (dl.acm.org). Top Of Page Deepfakes and Disinformation Targeting West Papua Activists According to an article by ABC News, West Papuan activists have raised concerns about the growing use of AI-generated content and online disinformation to undermine their advocacy. Koteka Wenda, daughter of independence leader Benny Wenda, discovered a deepfake video falsely portraying her as criticizing a documentary about deforestation and indigenous land exploitation in West Papua. She warned that such content could mislead supporters and damage the credibility of activists. Another prominent activist, Veronica Koman, reported similar experiences, including manipulated videos falsely showing her praising the Indonesian government. The article highlighted broader concerns about information manipulation in Indonesia. An Amnesty International report argued that disinformation campaigns have increasingly been used to target government critics, discredit dissenting voices, and influence public debate (for further information, see W21 May Cyfluence Report). These tactics have become a significant tool for attacking critics online, while activists and human rights advocates describe them as part of a longer pattern of repression. Researchers have also documented previous coordinated online campaigns related to West Papua, including the use of misleading content and automated social media accounts to promote pro-government narratives and weaken activist voices. Activists argue that AI-generated deepfakes represent a new challenge in this information environment, making it harder for the public to distinguish authentic messages from fabricated ones. Source: ABC News. AI-generated content targeting West Papuan activists. [online] Published 21 June 2026. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-21/ai-generated-content-targeting-west-papuan-activists/106760046 (abc.net.au). Top Of Page AI Deepfakes Proliferate in 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections Despite Regulatory Efforts A report published by Foreign Interference states that AI-generated deepfakes targeting the 2026 U.S. midterm elections have proliferated significantly despite federal and state-level regulatory interventions, with tracking indicating over 2,800 documented cases of synthetic media deployed to manipulate electoral discourse across social media platforms. The report identifies that the TAKE IT DOWN Act, signed into law in May 2025 with FTC enforcement beginning 19 May 2026, has not materially reduced production volumes due to the low cost and high availability of AI content generation tools accessible to both state and non-state actors. A report published by Foreign Interference states that the supply-side economics of AI deepfake production -- where a single actor can generate thousands of synthetic media assets at near-zero marginal cost -- have outpaced the deterrent capacity of existing legislation and platform enforcement mechanisms. The report notes that despite New York State's AI influencer disclosure law taking effect on 9 June 2026 and the EU Code of Practice on AI-generated content marking published 10 June 2026, the global regulatory patchwork creates arbitrage opportunities for foreign and domestic influence operators to route production through unregulated jurisdictions while targeting regulated audiences. Source: Foreign Interference Research Center. AI Deepfakes Proliferate in 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections Despite Regulatory Efforts. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://foreigninterference.org/post/ai-deepfakes-proliferate-in-2026-u-s-midterm-elections-despite-regulatory-efforts (foreigninterference.org). Top Of Page [General Reports] False Claims About Hirings at the Obama Presidential Center According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, in the weeks leading up to the opening of the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, several conservative social media accounts claimed that the Obama Foundation had hired only Black contractors to work on the project. These posts framed the alleged hiring practices as racial discrimination and linked them to broader criticism of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. The claims gained significant attention online, accumulating hundreds of thousands of views. However, available information does not support the assertion that only Black contractors were involved in the project. The center’s construction was managed by Lakeside Alliance, a joint venture that includes leaders and member companies from diverse backgrounds. Publicly available records and company information indicate that both Black-owned and non-Black-owned firms participated in the project. Confusion around unpaid subcontractor disputes appears to have been combined with inaccurate claims about contractor demographics. According to Lakeside Alliance’s latest published report, 40% of subcontracts were awarded to minority-owned businesses, indicating that a majority of contracts went to other companies. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. False Claims of Racism at the Obama Administration / Related Viral Misinformation Debunked. [online] Published 2023. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/false-claims-of-racism-at-the-obama (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 A report published by Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism states that overall news trust across 48 surveyed countries has fallen to a record low of 37%, with 38 of 48 countries recording declining trust in news over the past year. For the first time in the survey's history, social media and video networks surpassed all other sources as the most widely used channel for news globally, with 54% of audiences now reaching news primarily through social and video platforms, representing a 13-percentage point gain over television since 2020. The report states that weekly use of AI chatbots for news rose from 7% in 2025 to 10% in 2026, with growth concentrated in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Southern and Eastern Europe -- regions with historically weaker institutional media infrastructure and higher vulnerability to AI-generated disinformation. The report warns that AI-powered pink slime content farms are set to proliferate further as platforms struggle to distinguish synthetic from legitimate news content, raising structural risk that the architecture of public information ecosystems will increasingly reward low-cost synthetic production over credible editorial standards. Source: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Digital News Report 2026. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026 (reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk). Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Sanctions Over Interference in Moldova The European Union announced it has imposed sanctions on six individuals accused of activities aimed at undermining Moldova’s sovereignty, independence, and democratic processes. According to the EU, the individuals were involved in Russian-funded efforts to influence Moldova’s September 2025 parliamentary elections, including vote-buying schemes and coordinated influence campaigns. Some of those sanctioned are linked to organizations and political networks associated with businessman Ilan Shor and the Russia-based NGO Evrazia. With these additions, EU restrictive measures now apply to 29 individuals and five entities connected to activities viewed as destabilizing Moldova. The sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans Among those listed are political figures and Russian nationals accused of organizing election-related activities, facilitating illicit funding, and coordinating influence operations. These efforts included the dissemination of propaganda, the mobilization of local networks, and attempts to shape voter behavior through coordinated campaigns. The sanctions also cite the use of religious and community structures to support political messaging and collect personal data. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Republic of Moldova: Council lists six individuals for actions destabilising the country. [online] Published 16 June 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/republic-moldova-council-lists-six-individuals-actions-destabilising-country_en (eeas.europa.eu). Top Of Page Danish Parliamentary Election with No Sign of Significant Disinformation According to Danish authorities and independent analyses, there was no major foreign disinformation campaign targeting Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election. An analysis published by EU vs. Disinfo monitored TikTok activity across more than 40 political and media channels, specifically looking for coordinated inauthentic behavior, bot networks, and AI-amplified influence operations. While election-related content increased as expected, investigators found no evidence of large-scale Russian disinformation efforts or systematic bot activity aimed at influencing public opinion. The findings suggested that Denmark’s resilience against disinformation stems from several factors, including high public trust in government and media, free press, broad political consensus on key issues such as support for Ukraine, and proactive warnings from Danish intelligence services. Additionally, it showed that Russian influence operations are selective rather than universal, with resources directed toward countries where political divisions make influence campaigns more likely to succeed. As a result, Denmark may have been viewed as a low-return target compared with countries facing greater polarization and weaker information resilience. Source: EUvsDisinfo. The dog that didn’t bark: What the Danish election reveals about Russian influence operations. [online] Published 27 May 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-dog-that-didnt-bark-what-the-danish-election-reveals-about-russian-influence-operations/ (euvsdisinfo.eu). Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 08th to the 14th of June 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [Social Media Platforms] YouTube YouTube Channels Linked to Sanctioned Iranian Entities [State Actors] Russia Russian Narratives Target NATO Unity and Baltic Security Georgia’s Balancing Act Between Western Partnerships and Non-Western Ties Misinformation Targeting Macron Ahead of World Cup Fact-Checking Claims Made by Putin at SPIEF FIMI Operations Targeting Armenia’s 2026 Elections The War in Ukraine Russian Distorted Messaging on Canada–Ukraine Partnership ODNI Release Revives Claims About Ukrainian Biolabs The Russia–Ukraine Conflict in the Media Battlefield China AI-Generated Influence Campaigns Target U.S. Technology Debates Autism Misunderstandings and Information Challenges in Chinese Communities Iran Iran’s Evolving Information Strategy AI Chatbots Show Greater Vulnerability to False Claims About the Iran War [AI Related Articles] German Court Holds Google Liable for False AI-Generated Search Overviews [General Reports] False Claims About California's 2026 Primary Elections BlackCore Linked to Digital Interference Campaigns Across Multiple Countries [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NATO Exercise Examines Responses to Information Campaigns During Crises Democratic Preparations for Election Interference and Information Threats Workshop on Hybrid Threats, Disinformation, and Cyber Influence in Somalia [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, the possibility of a Russian attack on the Baltic states remains uncertain, but a growing Russian narrative that questions NATO’s willingness and ability to defend its members is perceived. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as the World Cup begins in North America, a widely shared online narrative falsely claimed that French football star Kylian Mbappé had accused French President Emmanuel Macron of years of sexual harassment. According to an article by Stop Fake, during a meeting with international news agencies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin made several misleading claims regarding the war in Ukraine, Russian military operations, European energy policy, and regional politics. According to an article by Disinfo Watch, a recently declassified slide deck from the U.S. ODNI has drawn attention for reviving debate around long-standing claims about U.S.-supported laboratories in Ukraine. OpenAI reported the disruption of two clusters of ChatGPT accounts that were allegedly used to support covert online influence activities linked to actors likely originating from China. An essay published in The Journal of Autistic Culture argued that public understanding of autism in many Chinese communities is shaped by a combination of misconceptions and inaccurate information. As stated in an article by CFR, Iran has developed a highly effective online communication strategy that relies on humor, memes, and AI-generated content rather than traditional propaganda. As published by EEAS, a workshop held in Nairobi focused on strengthening Somalia’s ability to address hybrid threats, disinformation, and foreign interference. [ Report Summary] A report by the Tech Transparency Project found that YouTube hosted and displayed advertisements on dozens of channels connected to Iranian individuals, organizations, and government entities subject to U.S. sanctions. According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, the possibility of a Russian attack on the Baltic states remains uncertain, but a growing Russian narrative that questions NATO’s willingness and ability to defend its members is perceived. According to an article by The Jamestown Foundation, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has expressed interest in restoring the suspended U.S.-Georgia strategic partnership while insisting that improved relations should not require changes to its domestic or foreign policies. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as the World Cup begins in North America, a widely shared online narrative falsely claimed that French football star Kylian Mbappé had accused French President Emmanuel Macron of years of sexual harassment. According to an article by Stop Fake, during a meeting with international news agencies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin made several misleading claims regarding the war in Ukraine, Russian military operations, European energy policy, and regional politics. Research by the EEAS and CheckFirst found that Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections became a major target for foreign information manipulation campaigns, particularly from Kremlin-linked networks. As published in a DisinfoWatch analysis, a statement by Russian state media outlet TASS criticized a new Canada–Ukraine drone production arrangement and framed it as evidence of Canada’s growing involvement in the war. According to an article by Disinfo Watch, a recently declassified slide deck from the U.S. ODNI has drawn attention for reviving debate around long-standing claims about U.S.-supported laboratories in Ukraine. A paper published in the International Journal of Social and Economic Development examined how the Russia–Ukraine war is represented in modern media. OpenAI reported the disruption of two clusters of ChatGPT accounts that were allegedly used to support covert online influence activities linked to actors likely originating from China. An essay published in The Journal of Autistic Culture argued that public understanding of autism in many Chinese communities is shaped by a combination of misconceptions and inaccurate information. As stated in an article by CFR, Iran has developed a highly effective online communication strategy that relies on humor, memes, and AI-generated content rather than traditional propaganda. A May 2026 audit by NewsGuard found that leading AI chatbots were more likely to repeat false claims related to the Iran war than misinformation on other news topics. According to The Decoders’ publication, a German court ruled that Google can be held directly responsible for false statements generated by its AI search overviews, finding that these summaries are Google's own content rather than traditional search results. As published in NewsGuard’s Reality Check, following California's June 2026 primary elections, several conservative figures, including President Donald Trump, claimed that the results were being manipulated to benefit Democratic candidates. As published by Reuters, France’s digital interference watchdog Viginum reported that the Israeli-linked influence firm BlackCore is suspected of conducting digital interference operations in political campaigns in France, New York City, Scotland, Angola, and Togo. As published by the Financial Times, NATO recently conducted a simulation in Poland to test how allied countries might respond to information campaigns during major crises. According to a Politico article, Senate Democrats are preparing legal and communications strategies for a range of potential election-related disruptions ahead of the midterm elections. As published by EEAS, a workshop held in Nairobi focused on strengthening Somalia’s ability to address hybrid threats, disinformation, and foreign interference. [Social Media Platforms] YouTube YouTube Channels Linked to Sanctioned Iranian Entities A report by the Tech Transparency Project (TTP) found that YouTube hosted and displayed advertisements on dozens of channels connected to Iranian individuals, organizations, and government entities subject to U.S. sanctions. According to the investigation, 56 channels were associated with Treasury-designated sanctioned actors, while 28 others were linked to the Iranian government. YouTube may be providing services to sanctioned entities and potentially generating revenue from their content, although TTP could not determine whether the channels themselves received a share of advertising income. Following media inquiries, Google stated that it is committed to sanctions compliance and removed many of the identified channels. Among the channels identified were accounts linked to organizations and individuals connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), sanctioned businesses, banks, state media outlets, government ministries, and senior political figures. The investigation also noted that some of the identified media outlets have previously been sanctioned by the United States for activities including propaganda, distorted reporting, or other actions cited by U.S. authorities. However, the central focus is not the content of the channels, but the broader question of whether YouTube's platform and advertising infrastructure are being used by entities that U.S. sanctions are intended to restrict. The findings raise questions about YouTube’s compliance with sanctions regulations and the effectiveness of safeguards designed to prevent sanctioned actors from using the platform. Source: Tech Transparency Project. YouTube Profits Off U.S.-Sanctioned Iranians Amid Middle East Conflict. [online] Published 11 June 2026. Available at: https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/youtube-profits-off-u.s.-sanctioned-iranians-amid-middle-east-conflict (techtransparencyproject.org). (campaignforaccountability.org) Top Of Page [State Actors] Russia Russian Narratives Target NATO Unity and Baltic Security According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, the possibility of a Russian attack on the Baltic states remains uncertain. Still, a growing Russian narrative that questions NATO’s willingness and ability to defend its members is perceived. Senior Russian officials have argued that if a conflict were to occur, the Baltic states would be responsible for provoking it and therefore could not rely on NATO’s collective defense commitments. The article also described a broader pattern of Russian statements and media activity concerning the Baltic region. Remarks by Russian officials and claims circulated by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that Latvia is involved in preparations for attacks against Russia. Latvian experts quoted in the text argued that these claims are unsupported and are part of an effort to portray the Baltic states as participants in a conflict rather than potential targets of Russian pressure. Russian state and state-affiliated media outlets amplified these narratives, while channels targeting Baltic audiences further spread them. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Moscow Tells Baltics NATO Will Not Come to Their Rescue. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/moscow-tells-baltics-nato-will-not-come-to-their-rescue/ (jamestown.org). Top Of Page Georgia’s Balancing Act Between Western Partnerships and Non-Western Ties According to an article by The Jamestown Foundation, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has expressed interest in restoring the suspended U.S.-Georgia strategic partnership while insisting that improved relations should not require changes to its domestic or foreign policies. At the same time, Tbilisi has expanded cooperation with the People’s Republic of China and maintained engagement with Iran and Russia, prompting increased scrutiny from Washington. Recent U.S. legislative initiatives and official statements have focused on concerns regarding foreign influence and Georgia’s broader political trajectory. The debate has increasingly extended into the information sphere as U.S. officials and critics of the Georgian government have raised concerns that growing ties with China, Russia, and Iran could increase external influence in Georgia. Georgian Dream argued that such claims exaggerate the scale and significance of these relationships, and the government continues to present itself as a defender of national sovereignty against outside pressure, even as it seeks renewed engagement with Washington. At the same time, foreign actors, including Iranian representatives, have become more visible participants in Georgia’s public discourse, contributing to competing narratives about the country’s direction and international partnerships. As a result, Tbilisi faces the challenge of balancing its pursuit of diversified foreign relations with maintaining trust with its traditional Western partners. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Georgian Dream Seeking U.S. Reset While Resisting Requisite Reforms. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/georgian-dream-seeking-u-s-reset-while-resisting-requisite-reforms/ (jamestown.org). Top Of Page Misinformation Targeting Macron Ahead of World Cup According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as the World Cup begins in North America, a widely shared online narrative falsely claimed that French football star Kylian Mbappé had accused French President Emmanuel Macron of years of sexual harassment. The story circulated through a video and article designed to resemble content from Eurosport and gained significant attention on social media, generating millions of views in multiple languages within days. The content originated from a website impersonating Eurosport rather than the legitimate broadcaster. The purported article was falsely attributed to a Eurosport journalist, who publicly rejected the claim and confirmed that neither he nor Eurosport had any connection to the story. The accompanying audio, presented as Mbappé’s voice, showed signs of manipulation, including unnatural speech patterns and inaccuracies that cast doubt on its authenticity. No credible evidence was presented to support the allegations against Macron. Researchers cited in the article linked the campaign to a network previously associated with anti-Macron narratives, particularly in response to France’s support for Ukraine. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Russia Plays Dirty at the World Cup. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/russia-plays-dirty-at-the-world-cup (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page Fact-Checking Claims Made by Putin at SPIEF According to an article by Stop Fake, during a meeting with international news agencies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), Vladimir Putin made several claims regarding the war in Ukraine, Russian military operations, European energy policy, and regional politics. The article argues that a number of these statements were inaccurate or misleading when compared with publicly available data and official records. The article challenged Putin’s claims about the extent of Russian territorial control in Ukraine, the scale of desertion in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the condition of Ukraine’s air defense network. For example, while Ukraine faces shortages in air defense coverage and interceptor missiles, it continues to operate an integrated, multi-layered air defense system. The review also highlighted inconsistencies between Putin’s recent description of an Oreshnik missile strike near Bila Tserkva as a test against a non-military target and earlier Russian official statements that described the strike as a successful attack on military infrastructure. Additionally, Russia’s own actions contributed significantly to the decline in gas supplies, as opposed to Putin’s characterization of Europe’s reduction of Russian energy imports. Source: StopFake. «Просто ударили туда, где было удобно посмотреть результаты». 7 фейков Путина на встрече с руководителями зарубежных информагентств. [online] Published 8 June 2026. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/ru/prosto-udarili-tuda-gde-bylo-udobno-posmotret-rezultaty-7-fejkov-putina-na-vstreche-s-rukovoditelyami-zarubezhnyh-informagentstv/ (stopfake.org). (stopfake.org) Top Of Page FIMI Operations Targeting Armenia’s 2026 Elections Research by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and CheckFirst found that Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections became a major target for foreign information manipulation campaigns, particularly from Kremlin-linked networks. Following Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s efforts to strengthen ties with the European Union and reduce dependence on Russia, coordinated influence operations portrayed him as an EU puppet, an ally of Azerbaijan, or a leader working against Armenia’s interests. These narratives were spread across social media, messaging apps, and networks linked to Russian influence operations such as Overload, Pravda, and Storm-1516. The investigation documented a broad ecosystem of manipulated content, including AI-generated videos, fake news websites, impersonated media outlets, and coordinated social media activity. At least 72 websites connected to the Storm-1516 network were identified, many of which published false stories about Pashinyan and promoted pro-Russian narratives. French TikTok users searching for Pashinyan were exposed mainly to hostile content originating from Kremlin-linked actors, members of the Armenian diaspora, or Azerbaijani sources. Russian state-affiliated media and influence actors also amplified these narratives through French-language content and messaging platforms. Findings showed Russia conducted a multi-layered effort to influence Armenian public opinion and undermine support for pro-Western political leaders. Evidence from leaked documents and domain registration patterns suggested coordination between influence networks operating in Armenia and similar campaigns previously observed in Europe, and Researchers noted that actors from the Armenian diaspora and Azerbaijan contributed to the online criticism of Pashinyan. Source: CheckFirst. Noise Without Effect. [online PDF] Published June 2026. Available at: https://checkfirst.network/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/NOISE_WITHOUT_EFFECT_11.pdf (checkfirst.network). Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Russian Distorted Messaging on Canada–Ukraine Partnership As published in a DisinfoWatch analysis, a statement by Russian state media outlet TASS, quoting Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, criticized a new Canada–Ukraine drone production arrangement and framed it as evidence of Canada’s growing involvement in the war. Even though the statement was based on a real Canadian government announcement, the report argues that Russian officials used this announcement to advance broader narratives portraying Canada as a direct participant in the conflict, questioning the legitimacy of Ukraine’s government, and suggesting that support for Ukraine makes foreign partners responsible for the war. The most notable element of the statement was a threat to publish the addresses of Canadian production facilities connected to the project. The analysis highlighted several recurring themes in Russian messaging, including describing Ukraine as the “Kiev regime”, portraying defensive military support as aggression, characterizing Ukrainian military activity as terrorism, and suggesting that Canada is profiting from the conflict. These claims are presented without evidence or omit key context about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and appear intended to discourage support for Ukraine and increase pressure on Canadian organizations involved in defence cooperation. Source: DisinfoWatch. Russian Spokeswoman Threatens Canada Over Drone Manufacturing. [online] Published 9 June 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/russian-spokeswoman-threatens-canada-over-drone-manufacuring/ (disinfowatch.org). Top Of Page ODNI Release Revives Claims About Ukrainian Biolabs According to an article by Disinfo Watch, a recently declassified slide deck from the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), released under Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, has drawn attention for reviving debate around long-standing claims about U.S.-supported laboratories in Ukraine. While the slides contain information about public health laboratories, biosafety programs, and international scientific cooperation, they present it in a way that could be interpreted as supporting allegations of biological weapons activity. The documents do not provide evidence of a biological weapons program but instead use language and framing that may encourage such conclusions. Attention is given to references to pathogen storage, laboratory networks, and connections between Ukrainian institutions and U.S. organizations. However, dangerous pathogens are commonly stored and studied in public health and veterinary laboratories for disease surveillance and research, and the presence of such facilities does not indicate the development of biological weapons. Following the release, Russian state media outlets cited the documents as support for their long-standing narrative about Ukrainian “biolabs,” despite the absence of direct evidence in the slides themselves. The significance of the release lies less in the information it contains and more in how that information is framed. The report noted that international organizations and public-health experts have previously stated that there is no credible public evidence of a U.S.-backed biological weapons program in Ukraine. Source: DisinfoWatch. Tulsi Gabbard Biolab Report Feeds Russian State Anti-Ukraine Media Narratives. [online] Published 16 June 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/tulsi-gabbard-biolab-report-feeds-russian-state-anti-ukraine-media-narratives/ (disinfowatch.org). Top Of Page The Russia–Ukraine Conflict in the Media Battlefield A paper published in the International Journal of Social and Economic Development examined how the Russia–Ukraine war is represented in modern media. It argued that disinformation can play a role in warfare that is as significant as military force, as media narratives shape public understanding of the conflict and influence perceptions of reality. Drawing on the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz, we see how war becomes a media spectacle in which audiences form judgments based on information provided by the media. The research highlighted the risks associated with war reporting, particularly in an environment where audiences are vulnerable to misinformation. The political, technological, and psychological foundations of media coverage strongly affect the interpretation of war. Source: Indonesian Journal of Sociology, Education and Development (IJSED). [Article Title]. [online] Published 30 June 2021. Available at: http://ijsedjournal.com/index.php/ijsed/article/view/68/56 (ijsedjournal.com). Top Of Page China AI-Generated Influence Campaigns Target U.S. Technology Debates OpenAI reported the disruption of two clusters of ChatGPT accounts that were allegedly used to support covert online influence activities linked to actors likely originating from China. The accounts generated social media content designed to shape public discussions around U.S. technology and AI-related policies. The campaigns focused on existing public concerns, including the impact of AI data centers on electricity prices and debates surrounding U.S. trade and technology policies. The first campaign, referred to as "Data Center Bandwagon", produced comments and images claiming that AI data center expansion was driving up energy costs for American households. The second campaign, "Tech and Tariffs", generated content criticizing U.S. tariffs and promoting narratives about technological competition. OpenAI also linked this activity to a network of likely inauthentic social media accounts that spread false claims alleging that ChatGPT user data had been compromised. The campaigns did not achieve significant public reach beyond their own activity. However, they illustrate how foreign actors may use AI tools to participate in and influence legitimate public debates while concealing their identity and objectives. Source: OpenAI. PRC-linked Influence Operations Are Targeting AI Debates in the US. [online] Published 10 June 2026. Available at: https://openai.com/index/prc-linked-influence-operations-ai-debates/ (openai.com). Top Of Page Autism Misunderstandings and Information Challenges in Chinese Communities An essay published in The Journal of Autistic Culture argued that public understanding of autism in many Chinese communities is shaped by a combination of misconceptions, inaccurate information, and, in some cases, deliberately misleading claims. Cultural pressures related to competition and conformity can reinforce negative perceptions of autism. As a result, autism is frequently viewed through a deficit-based lens, and inaccurate narratives can become widely accepted and difficult to challenge. A major issue is the role of language, social media, and professional authority in shaping public perceptions. Chinese terms for autism are often interpreted literally, leading many people to associate autism with loneliness, emotional withdrawal, or temporary social difficulties rather than a lifelong neurodevelopmental condition. Social media platforms further amplify misleading claims, including stories suggesting that autism can be "cured" through increased social interaction. Furthermore, some medical and educational professionals continue to promote outdated classifications, unsupported theories, and commercialized treatments, including claims that autism can be cured through rehabilitation programs or traditional remedies. These misunderstandings have significant consequences, including discrimination, delayed diagnosis, and inadequate support for autistic individuals, particularly those with higher support needs. The author called for greater awareness of autism, as well as cultural stereotypes from outside Chinese communities. Source: Timpe, K. What are Intended as Systems of Support become Systems of Struggle. Ought: The Journal of Autistic Culture. [online] Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Article 8, 2021. Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/ought/vol3/iss1/8 (scholarworks.gvsu.edu). Top Of Page Iran Iran’s Evolving Information Strategy As stated in an article by CFR, Iran has developed a highly effective online communication strategy that relies on humor, memes, and AI-generated content rather than traditional propaganda. Iranian officials and pro-Iranian content creators increasingly use internet culture, sarcastic social media exchanges, and AI-produced videos to respond to U.S. messaging and engage audiences. This content is designed to function as entertainment first and political messaging second, making it more difficult to counter through conventional responses. This approach presents a challenge because existing tools were largely developed to address covert influence operations or deceptive AI content. Openly published satire and AI-generated memes do not fit neatly into those categories, and traditional fact-checking or content labeling is often ineffective when the message is primarily humorous. Iranian content has achieved significant engagement online, so much so that other countries may study and adopt similar techniques. To respond, the author recommends improving threat monitoring, increasing transparency from AI companies, disrupting covert influence networks when they are identified, and strengthening the United States’ own public diplomacy and soft power. At the same time, the article argues that the United States should avoid conducting its own covert influence campaigns, as this could undermine public trust and ultimately damage democratic institutions. Source: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Iran’s Trolling Caught the U.S. Off Guard. Here’s How to Push Back. [online] Published 10 June 2026. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/articles/irans-trolling-caught-the-u-s-off-guard-heres-how-to-push-back (cfr.org). (cfr.org) Top Of Page AI Chatbots Show Greater Vulnerability to False Claims About the Iran War A May 2026 audit by NewsGuard found that leading AI chatbots were more likely to repeat false claims related to the Iran war than misinformation on other news topics. Across all tested claims, chatbots provided false responses in about 15 percent of cases, but that rate increased to 25 percent for prompts related to the Iran conflict. This may be due to coordinated influence efforts that generate large volumes of content around specific narratives, increasing the likelihood that AI systems encounter and repeat those claims. One of the most frequently repeated false stories claimed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps destroyed an Israeli military satellite communications center. In reality, the strike targeted a civilian commercial facility and was attributed to Hezbollah, not the IRGC. Ten of the eleven chatbots repeated at least part of the false claim when presented with leading prompts. Several models cited Iranian state-linked or pro-Iranian media outlets, including Tasnim News, Mehr News, and the Tehran Times, when generating inaccurate responses. The report also found that chatbots sometimes relied on state-controlled media from Iran, Russia, and China when answering news-related questions. Many AI systems still struggle to assess source credibility effectively, allowing false or misleading narratives to influence their outputs. While some models improved compared with previous audits, the findings highlight ongoing challenges in preventing AI tools from amplifying inaccurate information that originates from coordinated influence networks. Source: NewsGuard. Quarterly AI False Claim Monitor — May 2026: Quarterly Audit of the 11 Leading Generative AI Tools and Their Propensity to Repeat False Claims on Controversial Topics in the News. [online] Published 8 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/ai-monitor/may-2026/ (newsguardtech.com). (newsguardtech.com) Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] German Court Holds Google Liable for False AI-Generated Search Overviews According to The Decoders’ publication, a German court ruled that Google can be held directly responsible for false statements generated by its AI search overviews, finding that these summaries are Google's own content rather than traditional search results. The case involved AI-generated responses that incorrectly linked two publishing companies to scams, subscription traps, and other questionable business practices. According to the court, the AI combined information from unrelated sources, created connections that did not exist in the cited material, and presented them as factual claims. Because the AI generated new statements instead of simply displaying third-party content, the court concluded that Google bears responsibility for the accuracy of those claims. The ruling rejected Google's argument that users can verify AI summaries by checking the linked sources themselves. The court noted that the overviews are presented as complete, standalone answers and may contain claims that do not appear in any source. It also found that existing legal protections for search engines do not apply because AI overviews actively interpret, summarize, and generate content. As a result, victims of false statements should be able to seek legal remedies directly from Google, rather than from the websites referenced by the AI. Source: The Decoder. Landmark German Ruling Declares Google's AI Overviews Are Google's Own Words and Makes It Liable for False Answers. [online] Published 9 June 2026. Available at: https://the-decoder.com/landmark-german-ruling-declares-googles-ai-overviews-are-googles-own-words-and-makes-it-liable-for-false-answers/ (the-decoder.com). (the-decoder.com) Top Of Page [General Reports] False Claims About California's 2026 Primary Elections As published in NewsGuard’s Reality Check, following California's June 2026 primary elections, several conservative figures, including President Donald Trump, claimed that the results were being manipulated to benefit Democratic candidates. These allegations focused on the slow pace of vote counting and the large number of mail-in ballots, with critics arguing that late-counted votes unfairly changed the standings of Republican candidates in the gubernatorial and Los Angeles mayoral races. However, election officials and voting experts noted that California's counting process routinely extends beyond Election Day because state laws allow mail-in ballots to arrive after Election Day if postmarked on time. Mail-in ballots also tend to be counted later and have historically favored Democratic candidates, a pattern observed in previous elections. As a result, shifts in vote totals after Election Day are not, by themselves, evidence of fraud. The controversy reflects the continued spread of election-related misinformation and unsubstantiated fraud claims that have persisted since the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Election Denial, California Edition. [online] Published 12 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/election-denial-california-edition (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page BlackCore Linked to Digital Interference Campaigns Across Multiple Countries As published by Reuters, France’s digital interference watchdog, Viginum, reported that the Israeli-linked influence firm BlackCore is suspected of conducting digital interference operations not only in France’s 2025 municipal elections, but also in political campaigns in New York City, Scotland, Angola, and Togo. According to Viginum, the company allegedly used networks of fake or coordinated online accounts to target political figures and influence public debate, although investigators have not identified who may have commissioned these activities. French authorities said technical analysis connected BlackCore to an online smear campaign against candidates from the French left-wing party La France Insoumise. Similar tactics were reportedly observed in Scotland, where accounts linked to the operation targeted John Swinney and the Scottish National Party during election campaigns. The report highlighted growing concerns about the commercial market for influence operations, where private firms allegedly offer services designed to shape narratives and manipulate online discussions. While France has asked Israel for assistance in identifying those behind the campaigns, investigators say the sponsors remain unknown. BlackCore, which previously described itself as a company specializing in influence, cyber, and information warfare services, has not responded to requests for comment. Source: Reuters. Israeli Firm BlackCore Also Suspected of Meddling in NYC, Scotland Votes, French Official Says. [online] Published 11 June 2026. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/israeli-firm-blackcore-also-suspected-meddling-nyc-scotland-votes-french-2026-06-11/ (reuters.com). Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NATO Exercise Examines Responses to Information Campaigns During Crises As published by the Financial Times, NATO recently conducted a simulation in Poland to test how allied countries might respond to information campaigns during major crises. Using a fictional scenario in which an authoritarian neighboring state launched a cyberattack on an energy grid, participants faced coordinated online messaging designed to exploit public fear, undermine trust in authorities, and create social divisions. Additional scenarios included a major flood and a cyberattack on the banking system. Ukrainian officials played the role of the hostile actor, using AI-generated content and social media campaigns to spread narratives blaming government incompetence and corruption while presenting the fictional adversary as a source of assistance. The exercise highlighted how coordinated messaging can be used during emergencies to influence public perceptions, complicate crisis response efforts, and challenge official communications. Participants countered these efforts with messages promoting public trust, social stability, and national unity. The idea drew heavily on Ukraine’s experience since Russia’s full-scale invasion and reflected broader efforts within NATO to improve resilience against hostile information activities. Participants noted that while simulations help strengthen coordination and preparedness, they cannot fully replicate the pace and complexity of real-world wartime environments, and Ukrainian officials emphasized that adversaries often adapt their narratives rapidly. Source: Financial Times. Nato narrowly beats Russia-style NATO rece enemy in cyber attack simulation. [online]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/cda17cca-a651-41c5-9ac7-75dcde998c66?syn-25a6b1a6=1 (ft.com). Top Of Page Democratic Preparations for Election Interference and Information Threats According to a Politico article, Senate Democrats are preparing legal and communications strategies for a range of potential election-related disruptions ahead of the midterm elections. In a recent tabletop exercise led by Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, lawmakers and election experts discussed responses to scenarios such as ballot seizures, federal agents at polling places, and foreign influence operations. A key focus was coordinating messaging to counter misinformation that could undermine public confidence in election results. One scenario examined the impact of a foreign influence campaign using AI-generated deepfakes alongside efforts to suppress reporting on false narratives. Another explored how unsubstantiated claims of widespread election fraud could encourage armed citizens to monitor polling sites and potentially justify increased federal involvement at voting locations. The exercises reflect concerns among Democratic officials about election integrity and public confidence. Participants emphasized the need for rapid legal action and collaboration with state and local authorities to address misleading information and ensure that voters remain confident that elections will be conducted fairly and that legitimate votes will be counted. Source: Politico. How Senate Democrats Are Planning to Push Back on Potential Election Interference. [online] Published 11 June 2026. Available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/11/how-senate-democrats-are-planning-to-push-back-on-potential-election-interference-00957663 (politico.com). (美轮美换 The American Roulette). Top Of Page Workshop on Hybrid Threats, Disinformation, and Cyber Influence in Somalia As published by EEAS, a workshop held in Nairobi by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia, the European Union Delegation to Somalia, and partner organizations focused on strengthening Somalia’s ability to address hybrid threats, disinformation, and foreign interference. The initiative introduced participants to key principles of cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity, while building expertise in cyber resilience, critical information infrastructure protection, and the detection of influence operations in the digital space. The training also guided the EU’s legal and policy framework for cybersecurity, helping Somali institutions improve national strategies, legislation, governance, and coordination mechanisms. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Somalia Advances Cybersecurity and Cyber Diplomacy Through EU-Supported Training on Hybrid Threats. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-som/somalia-advances-cybersecurity-and-cyber-diplomacy-through-eu-supported-training-hybrid-threats_en (eeas.europa.eu). Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

Several reports published recently have highlighted a noteworthy technique increasingly employed by hybrid threat actors in hostile influence campaigns (HICs). As most Influence Defense practitioners and researchers know, the effectiveness of HICs often depends not only on the proliferated content itself, but also on the perceived credibility of the entity producing it. While clear propaganda can be easier to identify, entities that resemble research institutes, news outlets, or open-source investigation platforms may be viewed as more trustworthy by targeted audiences. As a result, the inherent legitimacy associated with these institutions is increasingly exploited and used to increase the reach and impact of malign narratives. In this context, it is worth defining credibility as the perceived reliability of information; While legitimacy refers to the perceived authority or institutional standing of the actor producing it. This blog examines three different models of influence-driven entities that exploit borrowed legitimacy, highlights the similarities between them, and their operational importance to cognitive attack-chains. OSINT Investigation Platforms In April 2026, the FDD published a detailed report on a Qatar-linked influence operation called “Eekad”.[1] Active since 2020, Eekad presents itself as the Arab World’s first open-source intelligence (OSINT) platform. It operates across platforms including X/Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram, producing content that mimics the conventions of OSINT work: satellite imagery analysis, social network visualizations, geolocation investigations, and debunking of viral content. Eekad's outputs are designed to appear credible and methodologically sound, regardless of the accuracy or integrity of the underlying analysis. Figure 1 – An EekadFacts network graph showing “proof” of Israeli-linked accounts, allegedly amplifying anti-Hamas content online. According to the FDD report, Eekad has repeatedly promoted misleading or false claims which were aligned with Qatari political interests: defending Qatar, targeting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, and promoting the post-Assad Syrian government. Its Meta ads showed payments made in Qatari currency, with many ads removed for violating political advertising rules. The FDD analysis linked the operation to a professional PR firm and pointed to financial resources that appeared inconsistent with those of an independent investigative outlet of its stated size. Eekad derives much of its perceived credibility from its presentation of investigative methodology. Rather than simply making claims, it presents them through investigative methods and formats that resemble established OSINT practices. For many audiences, this can create an impression of legitimacy. The FDD report goes into granular detail, mapping Eekad’s connections to Qatari state-media, its associated technical assets, inauthentic amplification of its output, and the ways in which it seems to be embedded within a broader influence infrastructure. ‘Pink Slime’ and Impersonated News Outlets A second model is that of news outlets which look and function like normal media organizations. However, their published content is systematically shaped by a political or state figure operating in the background. The now-infamous Russian hostile influence campaign codenamed Operation Doppelgänger provides a clear example of this model.[2] Its core tactic was the coordinated creation of look-alike websites that visually mimicked legitimate European news outlets. These high-profile influence assets consistently published pro-Kremlin content that appeared to originate from trusted sources. Doppelgänger operators employed webpage cloning tactics, allowing them to impersonate dozens of reputable European news outlets, including prominent European outlets such as Der Spiegel and Bild, as well as major US publications including The Washington Post and Fox News. Doppelgänger relied on audiences, associating familiar journalistic brands with credibility and legitimacy. Figure 2 - A fake Spiegel article, attributed to Russian influence campaign Doppelganger (Courtesy of CORRECTIV).[3] A 2025 report by Logically Facts provides yet another example of trust abuse, in the form of an alleged “Pink Slime” network used to proliferate Russian propaganda through the Dubai-listed Big News Network FZ LLC (BNN) and its subsidiary entities (Midwest Radio Network and The Mainstream Media). This extensive network of “eNewspapers” is suspected of enabling sanction evasion for Russian state media outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today).[4] A recent CRC investigation has mapped over 2,340 distinct domains linked to BNN’s infrastructure. Figure 3 - Big News Network eNewspapers, suspected of spreading reporting by the EU-sanctioned Russia state media outlet RT.[5] What these inauthentic news entities share is their reliance on familiar journalistic features to appear credible. Bylines, publication dates, editorial sections, and professional layouts can all contribute to an impression of legitimacy before the content is even seen. Research Institutes and Intellectuals A third model of credibility abuse consists of pseudo think tanks and research institutes that spread state-dictated narratives under the guise of analytical observations. Audiences exposed to the content generated by these seemingly independent entities might be unaware of the underlying agendas. The approach taken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regarding the South China Sea public discourse serves as a clear example of this technique in action. A recent CRC report mapped an emerging influence infrastructure comprised of multiple PRC-linked entities that present themselves as research organizations. However, these organizations consistently promote narratives that support Beijing’s territorial claims in the region. The discovered influence campaign was observed employing networks of amplification assets on X/Twitter to proliferate the PRC-aligned narratives accusing Western powers and other regional actors as the primary aggressors in the contested region, while diverting attention from repeated Chinese violations of international maritime law.[6] Figure 4 – X accounts linked to PRC-aligned research institutions forming an emerging influence infrastructure. Crucially, ongoing PRC influence operations continue to demonstrate a centrally coordinated approach, integrating both authentic and inauthentic behavior, together with civilian, academic, and state actors, within a multi-layered influence architecture. Inspired by Soviet and Russian political warfare doctrines, recently-identified PRC information manipulation and interference efforts highlight the growing operational complexity of modern cognitive threats. Figure 5 – A structural mapping of the emerging PRC-attributed influence infrastructure, consisting of three inter-connected activity clusters (content generators, amplifiers, and research institutions) The Operational Role of Exploited Credibility The above-mentioned models all exhibit the same operational logic. They maximize their efficacy by abusing pre-existing trust, the veneer of credible information outlets, and the perceived legitimacy assigned to inauthentic operational assets posing as trustworthy entities. “Independent” OSINT research teams, viewed as credible data verification platforms, are leveraged to spread misleading or biased narratives. Meanwhile, impersonation of legitimate and reputable news sources helps threat actors spread information disorder and sow distrust in media coverage. The employment of state-aligned research institutes and individual intellectuals provides a solid base of validity to multi-layered influence architectures. To counter these highly effective adversarial TTPs, counter-influence efforts must dissect documented cases of credibility abuse and apply scrutiny to all kinds of information sources, media outlets and research entities. Defensive measures, including cognitive resilience capacity building, must be scaled and adapted to better inform targeted audiences of novel cognitive threats as they emerge. Reinforcing societal resiliency means providing vulnerable information to consumers with basic awareness and sufficient tools to critically evaluate claims, fighting the common instinct to trust an outdated notion of legitimacy. [References:] Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Qatar Influence Operations: Unmasking a Suspected Network. [online] Published 27 April 2026. Available at: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/04/27/qatar-influence-operations-unmasking-a-suspected-network/ (fdd.org) Cyfluence Research. Visibility as Victory: The Strategic Logic of Doppelgänger. [online] Published 12 May 2025. Available at: https://www.cyfluence-research.org/post/visibility-as-victory-the-strategic-logic-of-doppelg%C3%A4nger CORRECTIV. Inside Doppelganger: How Russia Uses EU Companies for Its Propaganda. [online] Published 22 July 2024. Available at: https://correctiv.org/en/fact-checking-en/2024/07/22/inside-doppelganger-how-russia-uses-eu-companies-for-its-propaganda/ (correctiv.org) Logically Facts. Behind the Network of Pink Slime Sites Sharing Sanctioned Content to EU Readers. [online] Published 28 May 2025. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20250528135617/https://www.logicallyfacts.com/en/analysis/behind-the-network-of-pink-slime-sites-sharing-sanctioned-content-to-eu-readers Big News Network. Big News Network – Global News Service, Web Directory. [online] Available at: https://www.bignewsnetwork.net/ Cyfluence Research Center (CRC). From Pseudo-Research to Narrative Superiority: Mapping an Emerging PRC Influence Campaign in the South China Sea. [online] Published 11 May 2026. Updated 12 May 2026. Available at: https://www.cyfluence-research.org/post/from-pseudo-research-to-narrativesuperiority-mapping-an-emerging-prc-influencecampaign-in-the-south

Background A recent OCCRP investigation revealed leaked documents related to the Social Design Agency (SDA), a Russian firm and long-time hostile influence campaigns (HICs) contractor executing “cognitive strikes” against Western countries. The investigation focused in part on a September 2025 Islamophobic incident in which several mosques and cultural centers in and around Paris reported pig heads marked with the word “Macron” left outside their entrances. These attacks appeared to extend beyond the physical act itself. Following online amplification, it drew extensive media attention and fed existing societal tensions and political polarization. The newly leaked documents demonstrate how hybrid threats, such as multi-dimensional influence efforts, increasingly integrate physical and digital aspects into a single operational structure. Rather than functioning only through online platforms, hostile influence campaigns (HICs) instigate and exploit real-world events to continuously destabilize adversaries. Revisiting The Russian Cognitive Warfare Playbook The reported operations align closely with established patterns of Russian hostile influence activity. One of the most prominent remains the DSA-linked Doppelgänger campaign coordinated information operations with the orchestration of antisemitic incidents in Paris to amplify social polarization. The uncovered modus operandi reflects the persistent rationale behind Russian HICs: the exploitation of existing societal fault lines surrounding immigration, nationalism, religion, identity politics and institutional distrust. Instead of creating an entirely new narrative, Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations are designed to intensify pre-existing tensions within targeted democratic and western societies. Importantly, the convergence between cognitive and physical effects is increasingly visible within urban environments. Hostile FIMI activities, including the instigation and exploitation of racial, religious or politically-charged incidents, mostly occur within urban environments. They are aimed against high-value managed contested spaces (MCSs), such as major cities, demonstrating how local communities and municipal authorities are in fact the front lines of hybrid geopolitical conflict, a dynamic that is central to the CRC’s Urban Cyfluence Framework initiative. The leaked material also provides a valuable behind-the-scenes view, in the form of internal SDA chats. These shed new light on the organizational structure behind the firm’s operations, particularly through the role of Sofia Zakharova, a Russian senior official who appeared under the name of “Kristin Kiler”. The exposed conversations suggest that Zakharova operated as a coordinating figure between the SDA and senior administration officials, overseeing operational updates, funding discussions, and broader project management across multiple campaigns. Zakharova was previously sanctioned by several Western countries due to her involvement in previous Russian influence operations. Figure 1 - EU sanctions designation of Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, issued in December 2024, citing her continued involvement in hostile Russian information manipulation and interference activities, including the Doppelganger campaign. 1, 2 The internal documents further suggest that these activities were not isolated operations, but part of wider and ongoing destabilization efforts. Plans for 2026 included projects focused on monitoring Western opinion leaders, creating media platforms, and expanding AI-assisted informational capabilities across several European information environments. The leaked documents thus highlight the emphasis on operational continuity, connecting past, present and to-be-executed narrative attacks. While the methods continue to adapt across different platforms and environments, the long-term strategic objective remains consistent. Multi-Dimensional Operations One of the most important aspects of the reported activities was the operational fusion between the physical, digital and cognitive layers. The pig-head attacks were not just physical provocations, but were meant to drive online discourse, attract media attention, and trigger political reactions. This operational hybridity – recently defined by the Cyfluence Security Paradigm – reflects an increasingly common model for influence operations: A provocative physical act generates emotional reactions. Visual content from the incident is being circulated across online platforms. Media coverage and coordinated inauthentic activity amplify and reframe narratives. Polarized public and political discourse affect societal cohesion. The HICs described in the leaked documents demonstrate how hostile influence efforts increasingly function as multi-dimensional threats. These threats are not limited to fictitious narratives or synthetic propaganda proliferated online. Instead, physical acts of provocation and online amplification are used as core components that elevate the sophistication of modern hybrid threats. Implications for Cognitive Security and Defensive Cyfluence Although this operational structure complicates influence defense efforts, the exposure of ongoing Russian FIMI activities targeting Western communities and MCSs through the opportunistic exploitation and orchestration of hate crimes demonstrates the value of proactive defensive cyfluence operations. Much like the exposure of Russian proxy interference efforts surrounding the Moldovan elections – where a timely hack-and-leak operation revealed the operational architecture of Ilan Shor’s FIMI apparatus – this case, alongside previous SDA leaks (which were likely cyber-enabled rather than HUMINT-derived), underscores the strategic importance of publicly exposing adversarial methods, infrastructure, and objectives. Regardless of the information’s source, these crucial disclosures help in neutralizing future narrative attacks, while supporting the cognitive resilience of targeted communities against hybrid threats. [References:] https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/171196 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403188#:~:text=3.-,Sofia%20Avraamovna%20ZAKHAROVA,-(Russian%3A%20%D0%A1%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%90%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 01st to the 07th of June 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Turkish Propaganda Amplifies Russian Misinformation About the Armenian Elections Russian Information Campaigns Ahead of Armenia’s Elections False Narratives Surrounding the Baltic Drone Incursions Abu Dhabi-Based Video News Agency Links to RT The War in Ukraine FSB’s “Matryoshka” Cyberespionage Campaign Against Ukraine China Congressional Concerns Over Foreign Influence on U.S. AI Development Misinformation About Anthropic’s Access in China Iran Handala Brand Threat Expands to Support MOIS Operations [AI Related Articles] 2026 U.S. Midterm Election Threat Outlook Uncensored AI Accelerates the Spread of Conspiracy Theories Online Disinformation About London AI Use in Political Campaigns Gemini Omni Generates Videos Advancing False Online Claims AI-Generated Police “Drag Queen Raid” Story Misleads Global Media [General Reports] 2026 FIFA World Cup Threat Outlook NATO’s Defence Strategic Communications Journal Modeling the Strategic Logic of Disinformation Governance NSO Group Breaks Court Order, Targets Journalists and Officials via WhatsApp [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] Using TrustOps in Governments' Fight Against Deepfakes and Disinformation Tools for Addressing Climate Misinformation in Reporting Training Platform to Investigate Online Influence Campaigns [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to an article by DFR Lab, following drone incursions into Latvia and Estonia in March 2026 and another incident in Latvia in May, pro-Russia media and officials promoted claims that the Baltic states had opened their airspace to support Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia. A three-part investigation by Sekoia reconstructed the cyberespionage group Gamaredon’s 2026 infection chain and clarified its malware ecosystem through a unified taxonomy. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, pro-China social media accounts have circulated claims that American AI company Anthropic has begun allowing users in China to access its Claude chatbot. According to a report by Insikt Group, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence has likely expanded its use of the Handala brand beyond cyber activities to include physical threat actors and influence operations targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. Research by CIR, assisted by other research, found a growing volume of online content portraying London as unsafe, lawless, and in decline. A survey of campaign professionals found that AI has become a routine part of political operations, with 87% using it daily or several times a week. A NewsGuard assessment found that Google’s text-to-video model, Gemini Omni, was able to generate realistic videos illustrating several false claims that have circulated online. Song Xiaoyu's article, published in Scientific Reports, proposes a behavioral game-theoretic model that shows that effective disinformation governance requires penalties severe enough to cross a psychological loss-aversion threshold that shifts platforms from passive to active content moderation. [ Report Summary] A NewsGuard investigation identified Turkish freelance journalist Okay Deprem as a significant source of false narratives circulated ahead of Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections. According to an article by DFR Lab, following drone incursions into Latvia and Estonia in March 2026 and another incident in Latvia in May, pro-Russia media and officials promoted claims that the Baltic states had opened their airspace to support Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia. A Bellingcat investigation examined the relationship between Viory, an Abu Dhabi-based video news agency that promotes itself as a “video news agency of the Global South,” and Ruptly, a video agency connected to Russian state media outlet RT. A three-part investigation by Sekoia reconstructed the cyberespionage group Gamaredon’s 2026 infection chain and clarified its malware ecosystem through a unified taxonomy. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s letter has raised concerns about evidence suggesting that foreign influence campaigns may be attempting to slow U.S. artificial intelligence development and the infrastructure needed to support it. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, pro-China social media accounts have circulated claims that American AI company Anthropic has begun allowing users in China to access its Claude chatbot. According to a report by Insikt Group, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence has likely expanded its use of the Handala brand beyond cyber activities to include physical threat actors and influence operations targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. As stated in a Check Point publication, the 2026 U.S. midterm election cycle will likely see increased cyber-related activity targeting the election ecosystem, including campaigns, media organizations, and government services. As published in a NewsGuard Reality Check, “Uncensored AI” is a chatbot that promotes itself as a source of “unfiltered” and “objective” information, positioning itself as an alternative to mainstream AI models. Research by CIR, assisted by other research, found a growing volume of online content portraying London as unsafe, lawless, and in decline. A survey of campaign professionals found that AI has become a routine part of political operations, with 87% using it daily or several times a week. A NewsGuard assessment found that Google’s text-to-video model, Gemini Omni, was able to generate realistic videos illustrating several false claims that have circulated online. As revealed by CyberNews, an AI-generated image shared on a Thai police Facebook page falsely depicted officers dressed as drag queens during a drug raid, leading to widespread media coverage of what appeared to be a real undercover operation. Song Xiaoyu's article, published in Scientific Reports, proposes a behavioral game-theoretic model that shows that effective disinformation governance requires penalties severe enough to cross a psychological loss-aversion threshold that shifts platforms from passive to active content moderation. According to Recoded Future’s paper, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is expected to face a complex threat environment across the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The new Defence Strategic Communications journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence argued that societies need new, credible narratives to address political, economic, and technological transformation. Meta published that despite a permanent court injunction, NSO Group continued spear phishing operations against journalists, officials, and civil society actors via WhatsApp, prompting Meta to seek a federal contempt order and publish threat indicators. As published by the Global Government Forum, Gartner predicted that by 2028, 40% of government organizations will establish dedicated “TrustOps” functions to address growing risks from deepfakes and other forms of disinformation. A webinar organized by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) focused on helping journalists identify and respond to misleading climate-related claims. Check First introduced “Tutki”, a training platform developed to provide realistic OSINT and online investigation exercises based on real-world cases and information environments. [State Actors] Russia Turkish Propaganda Amplifies Russian Misinformation About the Armenian Elections A NewsGuard investigation identified Turkish freelance journalist Okay Deprem as a significant source of false narratives circulated ahead of Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections. According to the report, 17 of the 43 claims promoted by the pro-Kremlin influence operation Storm-1516 originated with Deprem. These allegations targeted Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and included claims about constitutional changes, personal scandals, and concessions to Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Rather than relying on fake websites, many of these stories were first published in established Turkish media outlets, allowing them to appear more credible before spreading across social media and regional news networks. Armenia has become a major focus of Russian influence efforts as Pashinyan continues to pursue closer ties with the European Union and the West. Researchers found that Storm-1516 directed more narratives at Armenia over the past year than at Ukraine, reflecting Moscow’s concern over Armenia’s geopolitical trajectory. Analysts described the campaign as more sophisticated than previous efforts, combining political messaging with personal attacks designed to influence undecided voters ahead of the election. Several examples highlighted in the investigation involve claims that were later denied or contradicted by available evidence, including allegations concerning Pashinyan’s wife and reports of government approval for an LGBTQ parade. Such stories moved from Turkish media outlets to pro-Kremlin social media accounts and regional news platforms, amplifying their reach. Source: NewsGuard. How a Turkish Propagandist Powers a Russian Campaign Targeting Armenia’s Elections. [online] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/how-a-turkish-propagandist-powers-a-russian-campaign-targeting-armenias-elections/ (newsguardtech.com) Top Of Page Russian Information Campaigns Ahead of Armenia’s Elections According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, ahead of Armenia’s 07th June parliamentary elections, Russia has pursued a broad campaign to weaken support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party. According to the article, Moscow’s strategy focuses less on securing victory for a single opposition candidate and more on strengthening multiple opposition forces to prevent Civil Contract from achieving a dominant parliamentary position. The elections are widely viewed as a choice between maintaining Armenia’s current pro-Western course and preserving closer ties with Russia. A central element of this effort has been an extensive information campaign. Reports cited in the article state that pro-Kremlin media channels and the “Matryoshka” network have circulated hundreds of videos and messages targeting Pashinyan, including claims about his health, his policies, and Armenia’s relations with Russia. Many of these narratives portray Pashinyan as endangering Armenia’s stability, risking conflict with Russia, or undermining the country’s national identity, while presenting opposition figures as better suited to maintain relations with Moscow. These messaging efforts have been accompanied by economic pressure. Russia has warned Armenia about the costs of deeper integration with the European Union, threatened higher gas prices, and imposed restrictions on several Armenian exports. Adding to this subject, a joint investigation by DFRLab and CivilNet examined the activities of the Russian NGO Evrazia in Armenia ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections. Evrazia, which has been sanctioned by the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom, is replicating methods previously observed in Moldova. Through humanitarian aid programs, educational initiatives, church-related campaigns, and online platforms, the organization has sought to build networks of influence and mobilize public support around political and social issues. Researchers also highlighted Evrazia’s cooperation with figures linked to the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Moscow Nervous About Armenian Parliamentary Elections. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/moscow-nervous-about-armenian-parliamentary-elections/ (jamestown.org). Top Of Page False Narratives Surrounding the Baltic Drone Incursions According to an article by DFR Lab, following drone incursions into Latvia and Estonia in March 2026 and another incident in Latvia in May (for further information, see W21 May Cyfluence Report), pro-Russia media and officials promoted claims that the Baltic states had opened their airspace to support Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia. These allegations originated in Kremlin-linked media and were later amplified by Russian state television, senior officials, and pro-Kremlin online networks. Baltic governments repeatedly rejected the accusations, stating that their territories and airspace had not been used for attacks on Russia. The article also documented several false stories that emerged after the 07th May drone incident in Latvia, including claims that a drone had struck a passenger train, hit an apartment building, and caused multiple deaths. Researchers found that these reports were based on unrelated events or unsupported allegations but were widely circulated through Telegram channels, social media accounts, and pro-Kremlin information networks. An analysis of international coverage found that Russia-linked sources generated substantial attention to the drone incidents, particularly in Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian-language information spaces. While the narrative gained limited traction among mainstream audiences in NATO countries, it reached wider audiences in parts of Latin America and Africa through a network of media outlets, social media accounts, and republished content. Source: DFRLab. Russian Narratives about Baltic Drone Incursions Miss Europe, Land in Global South. [online] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://dfrlab.org/2026/06/04/russian-narratives-about-baltic-drone-incursions-miss-europe-land-in-global-south/ (dfrlab.org). Top Of Page Abu Dhabi-Based Video News Agency Links to RT A Bellingcat investigation examined the relationship between Viory, an Abu Dhabi-based video news agency that promotes itself as a “video news agency of the Global South”, and Ruptly, a video agency connected to Russian state media outlet RT. Viory has rapidly expanded its international presence through partnerships with media organizations, universities, and government institutions across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. However, the investigation identifies multiple technical connections between Viory and Ruptly, despite both organizations denying any formal relationship. These links include shared IP addresses, the use of a security certificate associated with Ruptly on a Viory-related website, and Ruptly domains sending technical performance data to Viory-controlled infrastructure. In the broader context of international media influence, Analysts cited in the report note that Viory provides news content and training to media organizations across the Global South and that its coverage often features prominent reporting on Russia, China, and Russia–China cooperation. RT has been sanctioned by the European Union for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives and supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine, and while Viory maintains that it is an independent media company, technical evidence raises questions about its relationship with Ruptly and the transparency of its operations. Source: Bellingcat. Tracing Digital Links Between Viory and Ruptly. [online] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2026/06/04/viory-ruptly-rt-russia-uae-propaganda-video-news/ (bellingcat.com). Top Of Page The War in Ukraine FSB’s “Matryoshka” Cyberespionage Campaign Against Ukraine Gamaredon, a cyberespionage group operated by Russia’s FSB, continues to conduct long-term intrusion operations against Ukrainian government, military, and critical infrastructure networks. A three-part investigation by Sekoia reconstructed the group’s 2026 infection chain and clarified its malware ecosystem. The first part of the investigation examined Gamaredon, an FSB-linked cyberespionage group targeting Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure networks, focusing on its malware ecosystem, phishing operations, USB-based propagation, and long-term persistence techniques. In the second part and the third parts, researchers analyzed GammaLoad, a multi-layered in-memory loader used to deploy malware while avoiding detection, and GammaSteel, a data-collection tool that monitors drives, USB devices, and active files to gather intelligence from compromised systems. Combined with fileless execution, extensive use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams, registry-based payload staging, and encrypted storage mechanisms, these capabilities demonstrate a significant evolution in Gamaredon’s tradecraft and provide the group with a resilient platform for long-term espionage against Ukrainian targets. Sources: Sekoia.io. FSB’s Matryoshka #1/3 – Gamaredon’s Gifts That Keeps Unpacking – GammaPhish and GammaWorm. [online] Published 1 June 2026. Available at: https://blog.sekoia.io/fsbs-matryoshka-1-3-gamaredons-gifts-that-keeps-unpacking-gammaphish-and-gammaworm/ (blog.sekoia.io). Sekoia.io. FSB’s Matryoshka #2/3 – Gamaredon’s Gifts That Keeps Unpacking – GammaLoad. [online] Published 2 June 2026. Available at: https://blog.sekoia.io/fsbs-matryoshka-2-3-gamaredons-gifts-that-keeps-unpacking-gammaload/ (blog.sekoia.io). Sekoia.io. FSB’s Matryoshka #3/3 – Gamaredon’s Gifts That Keeps Unpacking – GammaSteel. [online] Published 3 June 2026. Available at: https://blog.sekoia.io/fsbs-matryoshka-3-3-gamaredons-gifts-that-keeps-unpacking-gammasteel/ (blog.sekoia.io). Top Of Page China Congressional Concerns Over Foreign Influence on U.S. AI Development The House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s letter has raised concerns about evidence suggesting that foreign influence campaigns may be attempting to slow U.S. artificial intelligence development and the infrastructure needed to support it. Reports from the Bitcoin Policy Institute and Power the Future show that international actors, particularly from China, are working through state media organizations, nonprofit networks, and other channels to shape public opinion and policy discussions related to AI and data center expansion. According to the reports referenced in the letter, these efforts are accompanied by funding networks that support activist campaigns opposing data center projects and related energy infrastructure. Some groups have sought to delay or block projects through litigation, regulatory challenges, and campaigns targeting the financial mechanisms used to fund infrastructure development. The letter also raises concerns about limited transparency regarding the sources of funding behind some of these activities. Maintaining U.S. leadership in the AI sector requires continued investment in data centers and supporting infrastructure. Therefore, the committee has requested a briefing from the Trump Administration on how it is investigating alleged foreign influence efforts and what steps are being taken to address activities that could hinder the growth of the U.S. AI ecosystem. Source: U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Letter to PCAST and FBI on Foreign Influence and AI Data Centers. [online PDF] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/2026_06_04_Letter_to_PCAST_and_FBI_on_Foreign_Influence_AI_Data_Centers_99f6aa6cda.pdf (cloudfront.net). Top Of Page Misinformation About Anthropic’s Access in China According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, pro-China social media accounts have circulated claims that American AI company Anthropic has begun allowing users in China to access its Claude chatbot, portraying the alleged move as evidence that U.S. technology firms cannot ignore the Chinese market despite national security concerns. The narrative was supported by a widely shared screenshot that appeared to show Claude accepting Chinese phone numbers during account registration. However, the claim is false. Anthropic confirmed that China is not a supported region and that users in China cannot access its products or create Claude accounts using Chinese phone numbers. NewsGuard found no evidence that the company had changed its policy, and multiple China-based users reported being unable to register with Chinese numbers. The authenticity of the viral screenshot could not be verified and may have been manipulated or artificially generated. Anthropic continues to restrict access in China and has previously acted against Chinese state-linked accounts accused of misusing its services. Other major U.S. AI companies, including OpenAI and Google, also do not operate in China for similar national security reasons. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Anthropic’s Fictional Entry into the … [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/anthropics-fictional-entry-into-the (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page Iran Handala Brand Threat Expands to Support MOIS Operations According to a report by Insikt Group, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) has likely expanded its use of the Handala brand beyond cyber activities to include physical threat actors and influence operations targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. The report identified a newly emerged persona, the Handala Popular Resistance Front (HPRF), along with three influence-operation networks that appear to be linked to MOIS through coordinated online activity, cross-promotion, and shared messaging. These entities support a common objective of recruiting individuals for espionage, sabotage, and other operations directed at U.S. and Israeli personnel and assets. Combining cyber, physical, and influence activities under a single recognizable brand increases the reach and effectiveness of MOIS’s external operations. Handala-linked actors are believed to use online platforms to solicit recruits, amplify operational claims, and promote their capabilities. Looking ahead, Insikt Group assessed that coordination among these different personas may enable more sophisticated operations by integrating cyber intrusions, intelligence gathering, and physical activities into a single campaign. MOIS and other Iranian intelligence and military entities will likely continue conducting cyber, influence, espionage, and physical operations against U.S. and Israeli targets regardless of developments in the Iran War. Source: Recorded Future, Insikt Group. TA-IR-2026-0602. [online PDF] Published 2 June 2026. Available at: https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2026/TA-IR-2026-0602.pdf Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] 2026 U.S. Midterm Election Threat Outlook As stated in a Check Point publication, the 2026 U.S. midterm election cycle will likely see increased cyber-related activity targeting the election ecosystem, including campaigns, media organizations, and government services. Rather than focusing primarily on voting systems, threat actors are expected to target trusted accounts, public-facing platforms, and information channels that play a key role in shaping public trust and communications. A major concern is the growing use of phishing, impersonation, and coordinated misinformation campaigns. Election-themed websites, fraudulent donation pages, AI-generated content, and more misleading online narratives are expected to be used to influence public perception. These tactics are relatively inexpensive and can generate significant political and psychological effects without directly compromising election infrastructure. In the foreign influence field, Russia, Iran, and China were identified as the principal state-linked actors associated with risks of foreign interference. Overall, the most significant threat to the 2026 election environment is the cumulative impact of disruption and manipulation across the channels that voters, campaigns, media outlets, and public institutions rely on for accurate information. Source: Check Point Research. 2026 U.S. Midterm Election Threat Outlook. [online PDF] Published June 2026. Available at: https://checkpoint.cyberint.com/hubfs/2026%20U.S.%20Midterm%20Election%20Threat%20Outlook.pdf (checkpoint.cyberint.com). Top Of Page Uncensored AI Accelerates the Spread of Conspiracy Theories As published in a NewsGuard Reality Check, “Uncensored AI” is a chatbot that promotes itself as a source of unfiltered and objective information, positioning itself as an alternative to mainstream AI models. Although its user base is relatively small, its responses have been widely shared by prominent conservative social media influencers, giving visibility to claims about topics such as the 2020 U.S. election, assassination attempts against President Trump, and the killing of commentator Charlie Kirk. According to NewsGuard, several influencers cited Uncensored AI as an authoritative source when sharing claims that contradict established findings and official investigations. Examples include assertions that the 2020 election was rigged, that Trump assassination attempts were staged, and that Israeli intelligence was involved in Kirk’s murder. These claims lack supporting evidence and conflict with conclusions reached by law enforcement, courts, and other official investigations. NewsGuard also tested the chatbot on several well-known conspiracy theories and found that it endorsed claims that the 1969 moon landing was faked, that the 11th of September attacks involved Mossad and elements of the U.S. government, and that COVID-19 vaccines caused millions of deaths. Chatbot-generated responses can be presented as independent analysis, potentially increasing the perceived credibility of claims when they are amplified by influential online accounts. Sources: NewsGuard Reality Check. Uncensored AI Chatbot Pushes Conspiracy Theories. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/uncensored-ai-chatbot-pushes-conspiracy (newsguardrealitycheck.com). (euronews.com) Top Of Page Online Disinformation About London Research by CIR, assisted by other research, found a growing volume of online content portraying London as unsafe, lawless, and in decline. Across platforms including X, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, posts frequently use misleading, exaggerated, or decontextualized information to link crime, social disorder, and cultural change to immigrant and minority communities. The study identified five recurring themes: London as unsafe, anti-immigration narratives, Islamophobia, “Great Replacement” conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for a perceived better past. One of the findings was the widespread use of AI-generated content to reinforce these narratives. Examples included fabricated scenarios depicting immigrants receiving special treatment, fictional futures in which London is “taken over” by specific ethnic groups, and staged “street interviews” that present misleading claims about migrants and asylum seekers. By mimicking authentic footage or citizen journalism, this content makes false narratives appear more credible to online audiences. These narratives are often amplified through comment sections, where users repeat claims about demographic change, crime, and cultural decline, sometimes alongside extremist rhetoric or calls for action. The narratives even extend beyond UK audiences and are increasingly reaching international users. Misleading content about London is frequently intertwined with anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and conspiracy-based themes, contributing to social polarization and reinforcing perceptions of conflict between different communities. Sources: InfoRes (Centre for Information Resilience). London Has Fallen: How Online Disinformation Distorts Perceptions of Safety in the Capital. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.info-res.org/cir/articles/london-has-fallen-how-online-disinformation-distorts-perceptions-of-safety-in-the-capital/ (info-res.org). Top Of Page AI Use in Political Campaigns A survey of campaign professionals found that AI has become a routine part of political operations, with 87% using it daily or several times a week. The most common applications are internal functions such as research, news monitoring, and drafting content rather than direct voter engagement. At the same time, 75% of respondents identified inaccurate or misleading AI outputs as their biggest concern, reflecting broader worries about the reliability of AI-generated information in political contexts. Results showed growing attention to how AI systems handle political information and civic questions. AI companies are taking steps to improve the quality of election-related responses and direct users to authoritative sources, but concerns remain about transparency, source selection, and the accuracy of information provided to voters. The survey also found a gap between voter expectations and campaign practices regarding AI transparency. While most voters consider disclosure of AI-generated content important, only a small share of campaigns consistently disclose such use, and one-third of campaign professionals report having no formal AI policy. According to the author, more public disclosure is needed regarding how AI companies make decisions about political content and what measures they use to address errors and misinformation. Additionally, campaigns should develop clear governance and disclosure frameworks as AI becomes more deeply integrated into political research, communications, voter outreach, and campaign operations. Sources: Anchor Change. What Campaign Professionals Told Us About AI-Generated Content. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://anchorchange.substack.com/p/what-campaign-professionals-told (anchorchange.substack.com). (anchorchange.com). Top Of Page Gemini Omni Generates Videos Advancing False Online Claims A NewsGuard assessment found that Google’s text-to-video model, Gemini Omni, was able to generate realistic videos illustrating several false claims that have circulated online. In seven out of ten tested prompts, the model produced videos depicting inaccurate narratives related to topics such as the Iran war, migration, international shipping, and geopolitical events. The examples included videos portraying a false claim that Somalia had blocked Israeli ships from passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a fabricated story about migrants receiving free PlayStations in the UK, and so on. The model also generated videos connected to inaccurate narratives about military events and major companies. At the same time, the report found that some safeguards were effective. Gemini Omni consistently refused requests involving false health-related claims and generally declined to generate videos depicting specific public figures. While the model has stronger protections than some earlier AI image and video generators, the findings suggested that realistic AI-generated videos can still be used to create persuasive visual content around inaccurate claims, particularly on political, geopolitical, and social issues. Sources: NewsGuard Reality Check. Google’s New AI Video Model Churns Out Misinformation. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/googles-new-ai-video-model-churns (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page AI-Generated Police “Drag Queen Raid” Story Misleads Global Media As revealed by CyberNews, an AI-generated image shared on a Thai police Facebook page falsely depicted officers dressed as drag queens during a drug raid, leading to widespread media coverage of what appeared to be a real undercover operation. The viral post showed five men and one woman in costumes surrounding a detained suspect and was picked up by major outlets, including The Sun, The Telegraph, The Mirror, and The New York Post, before being revealed as fake. Thai police later confirmed that the image was AI-generated and not an authentic depiction of the arrest, although the underlying drug arrest itself was real. The post originated from a local police station administrator who reportedly intended it as a humorous way to make police work seem more approachable. However, because it came from an official source, it was widely accepted as genuine and quickly spread across international media. Experts noted that the image contained inconsistencies that could have raised suspicion, but its official origin helped it appear credible at first glance, demonstrating how authority can amplify the impact of synthetic media. Sources: Cybernews. Thai Police Use AI-Generated “Drag Raid” Photo in Anti-Drug Campaign Hoax. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/thai-police-ai-drag-raid-photo-hoax/ (cybernews.com). Top Of Page [General Reports] 2026 FIFA World Cup Threat Outlook According to Recoded Future’s paper, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is expected to face a complex threat environment across the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Physical security remains the primary concern due to the scale of the event and the concentration of large crowds. Cybercriminal activity is also expected to increase as the tournament approaches. The report also assessed that Russian, Chinese, and Iranian state-sponsored groups may use the tournament as an intelligence-gathering opportunity. World Cup-related influence activity observed so far has been largely overt and driven through state media and diplomatic messaging, focusing on issues such as host-country legitimacy, public safety, immigration, visa access, ticketing, and Iran’s participation. While covert activity has remained limited, it could increase in response to geopolitical developments or major news events during the tournament. Source: Recorded Future, Insikt Group. CTA-2026-0604. [online PDF] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2026/CTA-2026-0604.pdf (recordedfuture.com). Top Of Page NATO’s Defence Strategic Communications Journal The new Defence Strategic Communications journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence reflected on growing concerns about the decline of the post-World War II liberal international order. It argued that societies need new, credible narratives to address political, economic, and technological transformation. Drawing on discussions from the Knowledge Economy Transition by 2045 dialogue at Cambridge, participants emphasized the importance of legitimacy, strategic communication, and long-term storytelling in shaping future political and economic systems. Effective narratives must be rooted in authentic ideas and practical solutions rather than slogans, particularly as societies confront challenges such as geopolitical competition, AI, climate change, and declining trust in institutions. A significant place was given to the changing information environment. The foreword highlighted concerns about AI, algorithmic influence, microtargeting, and emerging neurotechnology's, arguing that these developments are reshaping how people form opinions, build consensus, and understand reality. It also noted the growing role of state-sponsored influence campaigns and information manipulation, particularly through the concept of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), which emerged in response to systematic efforts by state actors to shape public perceptions and political discourse. Strategic communication should help societies develop shared understanding and legitimacy during periods of disruption. Several contributions to the journal explored topics including foreign information manipulation, international cooperation against influence operations, hybrid threats, media objectivity, and the role of narratives in democratic resilience. The authors stress the need for stronger frameworks to understand how information, technology, and political power interact in an increasingly contested global environment. Source: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 15, Spring 2025. [online] Published 4 June 2025. Available at: https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/defence-strategic-communications-volume-15-spring-2025/322 (stratcomcoe.org). (stratcomcoe.org) Top Of Page Modeling the Strategic Logic of Disinformation Governance Song Xiaoyu's article, published in Scientific Reports (2026), proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze strategic behavior in online disinformation governance. The three actors modeled are regulators, social media platforms, and self-media operators, the last referring to independent or semi-professional content producers who function as primary vectors for disinformation spread. The core methodological contribution is the integration of Prospect Theory into the game-theoretic framework, replacing the standard assumption of rational utility maximization with a behaviorally grounded model that accounts for loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity to outcomes. This allows the model to capture how subjective perception of risk and loss, rather than objective cost-benefit calculation, drives each actor's strategic choices in an environment characterized by high uncertainty, such as an unfolding public opinion crisis. The paper maps the disinformation ecosystem as a dynamic equilibrium problem. Self-media operators choose between truthful, verified reporting and false or unverified reporting, with the latter driven by traffic incentives, urgency, and low verification costs. Platforms choose between active content moderation and passive response, with governance inertia explained not as irresponsibility but as rational risk-aversion under insufficient regulatory pressure. Regulators choose between proactive information disclosure and silence, with silence producing credibility erosion, and public distrust. The model's replicator dynamics equations demonstrate that the system converges to an ideal cooperative equilibrium, where all three actors adopt proactive strategies, only under specific parameter conditions: sufficiently high reward-penalty intensity, strong initial participation willingness, and a loss aversion coefficient exceeding a critical threshold of approximately 2.25. Below this threshold, platforms default to passive governance; above it, fear of reputational and legal consequences outweighs the costs of active moderation. Numerical simulations conducted in MATLAB confirm several policy-relevant findings. First, initial willingness across actors significantly accelerates convergence toward cooperative governance, suggesting that norm-building and pre-crisis coordination have structural effects on disinformation resilience. Second, the relationship between loss aversion and platform behavior is non-monotonic: moderate loss aversion reinforces passivity, while high loss aversion triggers proactive moderation, a dynamic with direct implications for regulatory design, since sanctions must cross a perceptual threshold to alter platform behavior. Third, reward-penalty intensity must reach what the paper terms a "perceived tipping point" to achieve synchronized responses across all three actors. The model's limitations include reliance on theoretically assumed rather than empirically calibrated parameters and a simplified treatment of platform-regulator interaction that does not fully account for legal-obligation structures or dynamic content-moderation costs. Source: Nature Portfolio. A Prospect-Theoretic Evolutionary Game Approach for Disinformation Governance in Social-Media Ecosystems. Scientific Reports. [online] Published 3 June 2026. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-026-53697-9 (nature.com). Top Of Page NSO Group Breaks Court Order, Targets Journalists and Officials via WhatsApp Meta published that WhatsApp's June 2026 update discloses that NSO Group, a commercial spyware firm placed on the US government's Entity List for activities contrary to national security, continued offensive cyber operations against WhatsApp users despite a permanent federal injunction barring it from doing so. The tactics employed included spear phishing via malicious links that redirected targets to external websites outside the WhatsApp environment, consistent with previously documented one-click phishing campaigns associated with NSO's Pegasus platform. NSO-linked actors also created fraudulent test accounts and groups on WhatsApp as part of their targeting infrastructure. WhatsApp is now seeking a federal contempt order against NSO and has published three malicious domains used in the operation as threat indicators. NSO's CEO confirmed in court that the company actively seeks access vectors beyond WhatsApp, targeting browsers, operating systems, and other applications, with a reported target set that includes journalists, government officials, military personnel, and humanitarian organizations, a profile consistent with state-adjacent surveillance operations designed to suppress information flows and enable intelligence gathering against civil society. The article frames commercial spyware as a structural threat to secure communications infrastructure and argues that no single platform can counter it unilaterally. WhatsApp's response centers on a multi-stakeholder coalition of security researchers, digital rights organizations, and legal advocates, alongside financial support to the Spyware Accountability Initiative, positioning coordinated institutional action across legal, technical, and civil society domains as the necessary framework for defense. Source: Meta. Fighting Spyware: An Update from WhatsApp. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://about.fb.com/news/2026/06/fighting-spyware-an-update-from-whatsapp/ (about.fb.com). Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] Using TrustOps in Governments' Fight Against Deepfakes and Disinformation According to a Global Government Forum publication, Gartner predicted that by 2028, 40% of government organizations will establish dedicated “TrustOps” functions to address growing risks posed by deepfakes, impersonation, social engineering, and other forms of disinformation. To counter these threats, Gartner recommended creating trust-focused governance structures, strengthening high-risk business processes, and implementing procedures to verify the content. The firm also highlighted technologies such as the C2PA standard, which can help authenticate the origin and integrity of digital content through cryptographic provenance data. These measures are intended to help governments move from reacting to false information toward proactively building trust in official communications. Concerns about AI-generated disinformation are already influencing public policy and debates. In the UK, efforts are underway to develop frameworks to detect harmful deepfakes, while recent research in London identified a sharp increase in online narratives portraying the city as unsafe or in decline. The analysis found signs of coordinated activity, including repetitive posting and AI-generated content used to amplify misleading claims, with some activity linked to extremist groups and accounts aligned with foreign state interests. Source: Global Government Forum. Growth of Government ‘TrustOps’ Predicted in Fight Against Deepfakes and Disinformation. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.globalgovernmentforum.com/growth-of-government-trustops-predicted-in-fight-against-deepfakes-and-disinformation/ (globalgovernmentforum.com). Top Of Page Tools for Addressing Climate Misinformation in Reporting A webinar organized by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) focused on helping journalists identify and respond to misleading climate-related claims. Climate scientist Emmanuel Vincent of Science Feedback emphasized that media outlets are often targeted because they remain trusted sources of information. Using examples such as the claim that “global warming stopped for 18 years”, he demonstrated how the selective use of data can create misleading narratives that ignore broader scientific evidence and long-term trends. The session highlighted practical resources journalists can use to verify climate-related information. Recommended sources included the IPCC, NASA, NOAA, Carbon Brief, and Climate Brink for scientific information, as well as fact-checking and research tools such as the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), InfluenceMap, DeSmog’s Climate Disinformation Database, Retraction Watch, and PubPeer. Vincent also stressed the importance of evaluating the credibility of sources, checking for conflicts of interest, and investigating the background of individuals making climate-related claims. Speakers also warned against “false balance” in reporting, arguing that presenting climate science and climate skepticism as equally supported positions can mislead audiences. Journalists were encouraged to challenge inaccurate claims with evidence and prepare thoroughly before interviews. Source: International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). Climate: Tips and Tools to Help Journalists Counter Disinformation. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/unesco-climate/article/climate-tips-and-tools-to-help-journalists-counter-disinformation (ifj.org). Top Of Page Training Platform to Investigate Online Influence Campaigns Check First introduced “Tutki”, a training platform developed to provide realistic OSINT and online investigation exercises based on real-world cases and information environments. The platform allows trainers to create custom scenarios or use templates inspired by actual influence campaigns, helping participants develop practical investigative skills. It supports multiple languages and has been used in contexts such as election-related information environments, including work with Armenian civil society organizations. A key feature of Tutki is its simulation of social media platforms. Instead of relying on live content, which may be deleted, moderated, or contain harmful material, the platform recreates realistic online environments where participants can safely investigate posts, accounts, and networks. This approach improves consistency across training sessions and reduces exposure to graphic or disturbing content while preserving the experience of conducting authentic online investigations. Tutki also includes professional OSINT tools such as cross-platform search, timeline analysis, network visualization, and coordinated inauthentic behavior detection. In 2026, it was used in a training exercise for Radio France journalists involving a fictional foreign interference scenario linked to local elections. The platform is designed both for organizations seeking tailored training and for independent trainers who want to run their own investigation exercises. Source: CheckFirst. Introducing Tutki: We Simulated Social Media to Teach How It Gets Weaponised. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://checkfirst.network/introducing-tutki-we-simulated-social-media-to-teach-how-it-gets-weaponised/ (checkfirst.network). (checkfirst.network) Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

This article highlights a significant blind spot in existing counterintelligence frameworks: unresolved integration trauma as a distinct psychological vulnerability exploited by foreign intelligence services. Critically engaging with the Swedish Defence Research Agency's 2026 "Spies Among Us" report, the author argues that while the study acknowledges "divided loyalties" among recruited agents, it treats these as static demographic markers rather than active psychological mechanisms. The dominant MICE model (Money, Ideology, Coercion, Ego) has no category for the emotional experience of failed integration, the chronic sense of non-belonging that leaves individuals open to manipulation. Drawing on social psychology research on belonging and acculturation stress, the author argues that when integration fails, the resulting psychological state is a structural vulnerability. An offer of belonging from an intelligence-linked recruiter operates at a more fundamental level than ideological persuasion, making such recruits harder to identify through conventional screening, and less likely to recognize themselves as being recruited at all. The article further argues that influence operations systematically priming diaspora communities with narratives of grievance and Western betrayal are not separate from HUMINT recruitment, but part of a deliberate, coordinated strategy. The policy implication cuts across both intelligence and social policy: genuine integration may be the most effective long-term countermeasure, and integration quality should be understood as directly intersecting with national cognitive security. Author: Tamara Klevova (The author’s name has been changed at their request to protect their privacy. The author’s identity has been verified by the CRC’s editorial board) [Download PDF Here]

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 25th to the 31st of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Russian-Linked Conspiracy Theories Amplified by Political Figures Disinformation Through Hacked Bluesky Accounts Matryoshka Launches Campaign Targeting Armenia’s Elections The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation Campaigns About Ukrainian Refugees China China’s Influence Campaign Against Japan [AI Related Articles] New “NewsBench” Tool to Evaluate AI-Based News Reliability AI in California Courts Raises Concerns Over Accuracy and Fairness AI-Generated Influencers Spread Political Propaganda [General Reports] Australia’s Defence Strategy in Facing Foreign Misinformation Diphtheria Outbreak and Public Misinformation Challenges in Australia Hidden Polarisation on Malaysian TikTok Addressing Misinformation in the Public Health Field Investigation into the Cuban Influence Network in the United States The Sandygate Affair Raises Disputed Evidence and Public Trust in Cyprus [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] OpenAI’s Measures to Safeguard Elections Information and Transparency Exposing Fake AI Content YouTube’s New AI Content Labels RESIST Framework to Create Resilience to Disinformation Fighting Climate Disinformation [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to a report by TechXplore, researchers have uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign that hacked hundreds of Bluesky accounts to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda. A report by First Monday examined Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian refugees in Europe and argued that these campaigns are effective not only because they imitate credible media sources, but because they activate existing cultural prejudices and social anxieties. According to a publication by The Jamestown Foundation, since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office in late 2025, Beijing has increased political, economic, and military pressure on Japan in response to Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its security policies. According to an article by EDMO, a traditional weakness of ideological movements has been the gap between what their leaders preach and how they behave in private. As published by ASPI, Australia’s defence strategy is being challenged by the growing importance of information environments in modern conflict. YouTube announced it is introducing new updates to improve transparency around AI-generated content. As published by the Council of Europe, it developed the RESIST framework to help countries understand and strengthen their resilience to disinformation while respecting democratic principles, human rights, and freedom of expression. [ Report Summary] According to a report by DisinfoWatch, recent claims promoted by far-right conspiracy theorist Alex Jones and convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout represent a clear example of disinformation designed to spread fear and uncertainty. According to a report by TechXplore, researchers have uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign that hacked hundreds of Bluesky accounts to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda. As revealed in a NewsGuard report, the Russia-linked influence operation Matryoshka launched a coordinated disinformation campaign against Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections. A report by First Monday examined Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian refugees in Europe and argued that these campaigns are effective not only because they imitate credible media sources, but because they activate existing cultural prejudices and social anxieties. According to a publication by The Jamestown Foundation, since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office in late 2025, Beijing has increased political, economic, and military pressure on Japan in response to Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its security policies. A large independent evaluation of more than 12,500 chatbot responses found significant weaknesses in how major AI models handle news and current events. According to an article by CyberNews, California’s largest courts are testing an AI tool called Learned Hand to assist judges and court staff with drafting legal orders, summarizing motions, and conducting legal research. According to an article by EDMO, a traditional weakness of ideological movements has been the gap between what their leaders preach and how they behave in private. As published by ASPI, Australia’s defence strategy is being challenged by the growing importance of information environments in modern conflict. As stated in an article by ABC News, health authorities in Western Australia’s far north are responding to an ongoing diphtheria outbreak while addressing confusion and misinformation surrounding the disease and vaccination. A study published by University Sains Islam Malaysia states that polarizing and disinformation-adjacent content circulates widely on Malaysian TikTok through strategically neutral captions and identity-coded moral framing, not through overt hostility. As published by Health Policy Watch, recent disease outbreaks, including hantavirus, Ebola, and COVID-19, have been accompanied by false claims about the causes of diseases, vaccines, and treatments. An article by Fox News examined allegations that U.S. authorities are investigating a network of nonprofit organizations, activist groups, media platforms, and political organizations that coordinate activities supportive of the Cuban government. As reported by MEDDMO, an influential media event named the “Sandygate affair” began with serious allegations of sexual abuse, corruption, and influence involving prominent figures in Cyprus. As published by OpenAI, as major elections approach in 2026, efforts are focused on helping people access accurate voting information and strengthening trust in election-related content. According to an article by The Conversation, the rapid growth of online images and videos has made disinformation more convincing and harder to detect. YouTube announced it is introducing new updates to improve transparency around AI-generated content. As published by the Council of Europe, it developed the RESIST framework to help countries understand and strengthen their resilience to disinformation while respecting democratic principles, human rights, and freedom of expression. An essay published by The Union of Concerned Scientists argued that periods of extreme weather and climate-related disasters depend on a strong “safety chain”, which connects scientific data, weather forecasting, trusted communication, public understanding, and effective preparation and response. [State Actors] Russia Russian-Linked Conspiracy Theories Amplified by Political Figures According to a report by DisinfoWatch, recent claims promoted by far-right conspiracy theorist Alex Jones and convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout represent a clear example of disinformation designed to spread fear and uncertainty. The segment falsely presents Bout as a credible Russian military expert while omitting his criminal background, and it makes unverified claims that Vladimir Putin has announced plans to attack NATO sites and devastate major Ukrainian cities. There is no independent evidence to support these claims, making them best understood as escalation propaganda rather than factual reporting. While Russia has engaged in nuclear signaling and military exercises with Belarus, credible reporting does not confirm any official plan for imminent strikes on NATO or global nuclear war. NATO has consistently described its actions as defensive support for Ukraine’s self-defence, while Russia continues its documented attacks on Ukrainian civilians, with the UN reporting a significant rise in civilian casualties in 2026. Another publication by DisinfoWatch stated that recent claims amplified by Alex Jones falsely portray Canada as forcibly committing political critics and using medically assisted death (MAiD) as a tool of state punishment. These allegations are based on an uncorroborated individual case that is misleadingly expanded into sweeping accusations of government abuse. The claims that more than 100,000 people were “medically murdered” in the past year and that psychiatrists can force people into MAiD are demonstrably false and unsupported by official data. Sources: DisinfoWatch. Russia’s “Merchant of Death” Threatens Nuclear War Against NATO on Alex Jones Show. [online] Published 26 May 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/russias-merchant-of-death-threatens-nuclear-war-against-nato-on-alex-jones-show/ (disinfowatch.org) DisinfoWatch. Alex Jones “Canada Death-State” Conspiracy Promotes MAiD Panic. [online] Published 26 May 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/alex-jones-canada-death-state-conspiracy-promotes-maid-panic/ (DisinfoWatch) Top Of Page Disinformation Through Hacked Bluesky Accounts According to a report by TechXplore, researchers have uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign that hacked hundreds of Bluesky accounts to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda. Instead of creating fake profiles, the operation used real accounts belonging to journalists, academics, and other public figures, making the false information appear more credible and harder to detect. Many of the compromised accounts were used to share anti-Ukraine narratives before the posts were removed. The campaign was linked to the Moscow-based Social Design Agency and the broader influence operation known as Matryoshka, which has previously used impersonation, stolen media logos, and AI-generated voice cloning to spread misleading content. Although Bluesky removed thousands of accounts connected to state-backed influence activity, researchers believe the real scale of the operation may be larger. However, experts emphasized that the campaign’s impact was limited, as most posts received little attention. They argued that its main goal was not direct persuasion, but creating the perception of widespread support for false narratives. Source: Tech Xplore. Bluesky accounts hijacked in pro-Russia propaganda campaign. [online] Published 29 May 2026. Available at: https://techxplore.com/news/2026-05-bluesky-accounts-hijacked-pro-russia.html (techxplore.com) Top Of Page Matryoshka Launches Campaign Targeting Armenia’s Elections As revealed in a NewsGuard report, the Russia-linked influence operation Matryoshka launched a coordinated disinformation campaign against Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections. The campaign spread dozens of fabricated reports designed to damage his credibility, falsely portraying him as abusive, corrupt, and preparing for conflict with Russia. These fake stories were made to look like they came from trusted international and Armenian media outlets, increasing their appearance of legitimacy. The campaign used anonymous social media accounts and AI-generated content to make false claims more convincing. Some videos copied real news broadcasts and used cloned voices of journalists to present fabricated accusations, including false reports about Pashinyan’s health, personal misconduct, and election fraud. The operation also exploited celebrity names and even impersonated media monitoring organizations to amplify misleading narratives and create confusion among voters. Researchers say this is one of the most extensive disinformation efforts linked to Armenia’s election, with hundreds of fake reports produced over several months. Source: NewsGuard. Russia Takes Aim at Armenia. [online] Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/russia-takes-aim-at-armenia/ (newsguardtech.com) Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation Campaigns About Ukrainian Refugees A report by First Monday examined Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian refugees in Europe and argued that these campaigns are effective not only because they imitate credible media sources, but because they activate existing cultural prejudices and social anxieties. False narratives portraying refugees as violent, dishonest, or dependent on welfare circulated widely in countries such as Germany, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. According to the authors, these messages sought to weaken public support for refugees and increase social division within European societies. The paper paid particular attention to the role of racial and ethnic prejudice in these campaigns, especially regarding Roma refugees, as disinformation resonates more easily when audiences already hold fears or negative stereotypes about migrants or minority groups. Rather than viewing disinformation simply as false information entering an otherwise healthy public sphere, the authors suggest that these narratives build upon long-standing social inequalities, nationalism, and distrust already present in society. To counter this, responses such as fact-checking or prebunking may help, but addressing disinformation also requires confronting the deeper cultural and political conditions that allow such narratives to spread and gain support. Source: First Monday. [Article title unavailable from URL alone]. [online] Available at: https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/14649/12443 Top Of Page China China’s Influence Campaign Against Japan According to a publication by The Jamestown Foundation, since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office in late 2025, Beijing has increased political, economic, and military pressure on Japan in response to Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its security policies. China has imposed export restrictions, sanctioned Japanese officials, and increased activity near Japanese territory, while state media has strongly criticized Japan’s defense expansion. The article highlighted how Beijing is using media influence operations to shape public opinion inside Japan. Chinese state media amplified small anti-missile protests and presented them as broader national opposition to government policy. These efforts focus on exploiting real public concerns, such as local frustration over missile deployments, to influence debate without confrontation. Japan’s internal communication gaps make it more vulnerable to external influence campaigns, as selective reporting and pressure tactics can undermine trust and affect public opinion on key national security decisions. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Cognitive Warfare Against Japan’s Security Normalization. [online] By Sze-Fung Lee. Published 29 May 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/cognitive-warfare-against-japans-security-normalization/ (jamestown.org) Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] New “NewsBench” Tool to Evaluate AI-Based News Reliability A large independent evaluation of more than 12,500 chatbot responses found significant weaknesses in how major AI models handle news and current events. About 30% of responses contained factual errors, including incorrect dates, figures, and policy details, while nearly one in four failed neutrality checks. These issues were especially noticeable in election-related prompts, where mistakes appeared in responses about voting procedures, public opinion, and major political issues. The study also highlighted differences between models. ChatGPT showed the highest overall accuracy, while other systems had much higher error rates. Responses varied in political framing, with some models showing stronger left-leaning patterns and others more right-leaning tendencies. Examples included inconsistent answers to politically sensitive questions and responses that appeared to shift depending on how a prompt was framed. Another key finding was source quality - many responses cited state-controlled foreign outlets or commercial sources when answering public-policy and foreign-affairs questions. As AI becomes a more common tool for accessing news, these issues raise important concerns about accuracy, neutrality, and source selection. Source: ForumAI. Introducing NewsBench. [online] Published on Substack. Available at: https://forumai.substack.com/p/introducing-newsbench Top Of Page AI in California Courts Raises Concerns Over Accuracy and Fairness According to an article by CyberNews, California’s largest courts are testing an AI tool called Learned Hand to assist judges and court staff with drafting legal orders, summarizing motions, and conducting legal research. The pilot program, launched by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, is part of an effort to improve efficiency and reduce growing case backlogs by providing faster research and drafting support. However, the program has raised significant concerns among judges and legal professionals. Critics warn that AI systems are prone to inaccuracies, including hallucinated facts and false legal citations, problems that have already affected real court cases. Some judges argue that relying on AI in legal decision-making could undermine human judgment, especially in complex cases involving social dynamics and racial bias appeals under California’s Racial Justice Act. Opponents also stress that AI lacks the human understanding and empathy required for fair judicial evaluation, and that its use could lead to a “one-size-fits-all” approach to justice and reduce public confidence in the fairness of the courts. Sources: Cybernews. California courts are secretly testing AI to help decide criminal cases, including racial bias appeals. [online] Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/california-court-ai-criminal-cases-racial-bias/ (cybernews.com) Top Of Page AI-Generated Influencers Spread Political Propaganda According to an article by EDMO, a traditional weakness of ideological movements has been the gap between what their leaders preach and how they behave in private. Public figures often lose credibility when their actions contradict their stated values. AI-generated characters can continuously produce content, engage with large audiences, and promote a consistent ideological message without the personal flaws, contradictions, or behavioral scandals that affect real people. In an online environment where algorithms reward outrage and polarization, such synthetic figures could become increasingly influential tools for spreading political propaganda and mobilizing supporters. As an example, the article discusses “Danny Bones”, an AI-generated rapper created by The Node Project and funded by Advance UK. Although the character does not exist, he has attracted followers through anti-immigration and racist content. The risk is that some audiences either do not realize or do not care that the figure is artificial, focusing instead on the message being delivered. Sources: European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). AI Political Influencers: The New Gods of Propaganda and Disinformation? [online] Available at: https://edmo.eu/publications/ai-political-influencers-the-new-gods-of-propaganda-and-disinformation/ Top Of Page [General Reports] Australia’s Defence Strategy in Facing Foreign Misinformation As published by ASPI, Australia’s defence strategy is being challenged by the growing importance of information environments in modern conflict. Adversaries increasingly use digital platforms, algorithmic amplification, and emotionally charged content to shape how crises are interpreted by the public and decision-makers. Examples such as Russian influence operations related to Ukraine and Chinese narrative-shaping efforts around Taiwan and COVID-19 show how information campaigns are used to create confusion and influence responses during moments of strategic tension. While Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy acknowledges the information domain, these issues are still treated as secondary to conventional military planning. This creates risks, including strategic disadvantages against actors that prioritise influence operations and slower responses to rapidly evolving information campaigns. Interference and online influence efforts could exploit social divisions and intensify uncertainty before any direct military confrontation occurs. The article called for Australia to strengthen national resilience through coordinated government action, media literacy initiatives, and stronger public communication systems, and suggested integrating information warfare scenarios into defence planning and building closer cooperation between government agencies, technology platforms, and media organizations. Source: The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute). Australia is not prepared for the war over perception. [online] By Daniel Baldino. Published 25 May 2026. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-is-not-prepared-for-the-war-over-perception/ Top Of Page Diphtheria Outbreak and Public Misinformation Challenges in Australia As stated in an article by ABC News, health authorities in Western Australia’s far north are responding to an ongoing diphtheria outbreak while addressing confusion and misinformation surrounding the disease and vaccination. The outbreak has contributed to rising case numbers across Western Australia, the Northern Territory, and Queensland, with at least one reported death. Health officials noted that diphtheria, which had not been detected in the Kimberley region for decades, has spread more rapidly due to socio-economic pressures and limited healthcare access in remote communities. A major challenge has been public uncertainty about diphtheria’s symptoms, transmission, and prevention. Some residents were unfamiliar with the disease, while others expressed scepticism about vaccines and Western medicine. As a result, authorities had to fight disinformation and misconceptions to contain the outbreak. Source: ABC News. Diphtheria vaccine push in WA's north as authorities battle ‘disease of the past’ disinformation. [online] By Giulia Bertoglio. Published 29 May 2026. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-05-29/diphtheria-vacine-push-wa-north-disinformation/106732378 (abc.net.au) Top Of Page Hidden Polarisation on Malaysian TikTok A study published by University Sains Islam Malaysia analysed 1,841 publicly accessible Malaysian TikTok videos (2023–2025) using a Digital Humanities computational workflow combining sentiment modelling, thematic clustering, and engagement metrics to map digital polarisation. The key finding is that 86.1% of captions are neutral in sentiment, yet polarising content still circulates through “moderated affect”, where identity boundary-making is embedded in everyday sociocultural discourse rather than overt hostility. Disinformation and hoax framings account for 8.09% of themes and mainly act as credibility-contest tools. In this context, calling something fake works less as a factual check and more as a way to delegitimise claims and mobilise audiences, in line with information disorder frameworks. The study did not identify organised or state-led campaigns, but it shows how TikTok’s platform design, algorithmic recommendations, hashtag clustering, and short-form formats like stitches, duets, and “receipt” videos allow decentralised users to produce boundary work at scale. Religious discourse shows the highest concentration of explicitly antagonistic signals, making religion a key site for loyalty signalling and out-group suspicion. Political content relies more on satire, insinuation, and indirect framing than confrontation, while racial and ethnic polarisation often emerges through recontextualised historical references used as proof-like narratives to reinforce communal grievance. The study showed a fragmented system where platform incentives reward subtle, identity-coded content rather than open hostility. This allows disinformation-adjacent narratives and credibility disputes to circulate widely while still appearing normal within platform norms. Source: Research Square. [Title unavailable from URL alone]. [online] Available at: https://www.researchsquare.com/article/rs-9268897/v1 Top Of Page Addressing Misinformation in the Public Health Field As published by Health Policy Watch, recent disease outbreaks, including hantavirus, Ebola, and COVID-19, have been accompanied by false claims about the causes of diseases, vaccines, and treatments. Speakers at the World Health Assembly noted that misinformation and disinformation have become increasingly visible in health-related discussions and are spreading rapidly through social media, AI tools, and online platforms. Examples mentioned in the article include false claims about vaccine safety, infertility, contraceptives, and public health guidance. Participants argued that these narratives affect how people understand health information, whether they seek medical care, and how they respond to public health recommendations. Several speakers linked the issue to declining trust in health authorities and governments, and highlighted cases in which misleading information influenced attitudes toward vaccination and other health measures in different countries. The discussion focused on the need to improve access to reliable health information, strengthen communication between health institutions and communities, and respond more quickly to false claims. Source: Health Policy Watch. How to Treat the Disinformation ‘Virus’ Undermining Health and Democracy. [online] By Kerry Cullinan. Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://healthpolicy-watch.news/how-to-treat-the-disinformation-virus-undermining-health-and-democracy/ Top Of Page Investigation into the Cuban Influence Network in the United States An article by Fox News examined allegations that U.S. authorities are investigating a network of nonprofit organizations, activist groups, media platforms, and political organizations that coordinate activities supportive of the Cuban government. One example is the rapid response that followed the indictment of Cuban leader Raúl Castro, when several organizations and individuals quickly published messages criticizing the charges and expressing support for Cuba. Investigators are examining whether certain groups coordinated lobbying, messaging, fundraising, delegations, and political organizing efforts with Cuban government officials. The inquiry involves organizations connected to labor activism, socialist and solidarity movements, travel delegations, media platforms, and humanitarian aid campaigns. Additionally, the article discussed possible investigations under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and U.S. sanctions regulations. Authorities are examining whether any organizations moved beyond independent advocacy into activities directed by or coordinated with the Cuban government, including fundraising efforts, aid shipments, and political campaigns. In response, Cuban officials deny any improper conduct and state that their diplomatic activities comply with international law and standard diplomatic practice. Source: Fox News. DOJ, Treasury investigate nonprofits and leaders allegedly coordinating with Cuba in influence campaign. [online] By Asra Q. Nomani. Published 23 May 2026. Available at: https://www.foxnews.com/politics/doj-treasury-investigate-nonprofits-leaders-allegedly-coordinating-cuba-influence-campaign Top Of Page The Sandygate Affair Raises Disputed Evidence and Public Trust in Cyprus As reported by MEDDMO, an influential media event named the “Sandygate affair” began with serious allegations of sexual abuse, corruption, and influence involving prominent figures in Cyprus. The claims were made public by journalist and parliamentary candidate Makarios Drousiotis and were largely based on messages, photographs, audio recordings, and other digital material allegedly provided by a source known as “Sandy”. As the case gained political attention during the 2026 election campaign, the focus gradually shifted from the allegations themselves to the reliability of the evidence used to support them. Several Cypriot media outlets conducted independent verification of the digital material and identified significant inconsistencies. Journalists traced some images to unrelated websites, linked a key audio recording to a previously published documentary, and raised questions about the authenticity of videos and translated messages. At the same time, investigators reportedly examined additional concerns involving disputed files, timelines, and digital records. These findings did not resolve whether the original allegations were true or false, but they increased scrutiny of the evidence and its authenticity. The case became a major topic in the election campaign and broader public debate, demonstrating the importance of journalistic fact-checking, as media organizations went beyond reporting claims and examined the supporting material themselves. Rather than providing clear answers, Sandygate exposed how difficult it can be to assess sensitive allegations when key evidence remains disputed or unauthenticated. Source: MEDDMO (Mediterranean Digital Media Observatory). “Sandygate”: How journalists’ investigations shook up the election campaign and public debate in Cyprus. [online] By Théophile Bloudanis. Published 25 May 2026. Available at: https://meddmo.eu/sandygate-how-journalists-investigations-shook-up-the-election-campaign-and-public-debate-in-cyprus/ Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] OpenAI’s Measures to Safeguard Elections Information and Transparency As published by OpenAI, as major elections approach in 2026, efforts are focused on helping people access accurate voting information and strengthen trust in election-related content. The measures include directing users to reliable sources for voter registration, voting locations, deadlines, and live election results, while continuing to improve the quality of information provided on election topics and breaking news. Another important priority is increasing transparency around AI-generated content. New tools such as digital watermarks, metadata standards, and public verification systems are being introduced to help people identify whether images have been created or modified using AI. These measures are intended to make online content more traceable and to support informed decision-making during election periods. In addition, strict safeguards are in place to prevent the misuse of AI tools for election interference or other deceptive activities. Ongoing monitoring also aims to ensure political neutrality in responses to election-related questions, while continued collaboration with public institutions and election authorities supports secure and resilient election processes. Source: OpenAI. Election Information and Safeguards in 2026. [online] Published 27 May 2026. Available at: https://openai.com/index/election-safeguards-2026/ Top Of Page Exposing Fake AI Content According to an article by The Conversation, the rapid growth of online images and videos has made disinformation more convincing and harder to detect. AI-generated content, including fake celebrity photos and realistic deepfake videos, can spread quickly and mislead large audiences before fact-checkers have time to verify it. As synthetic media becomes more advanced, traditional verification methods are becoming less effective, increasing the risk of false information shaping public opinion. The article gives three keys to fighting disinformation. First, people need to develop stronger media literacy skills and get familiar with examples of fake and distorted content. Then, it is important to inspect the article very closely and carefully examine visual details such as unnatural textures, distorted movements, inconsistent shadows, and unrealistic perspective. The third note is to look at the wide context: the source of the content in comparison with trusted reports, and whether credible evidence supports the claims. All these are used by fact-checkers to verify whether content is real or fake. However, these clues are not always reliable. Even older or “verified” accounts can spread false information, since platforms like Facebook and X allow users to pay for verification. This is why people should carefully question online content instead of trusting it immediately. Source: The Conversation. Three ways to avoid being fooled by AI slop. [online] By Silvia Montaña-Niño and T.J. Thomson. Published 26 May 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/three-ways-to-avoid-being-fooled-by-ai-slop-282974 Top Of Page YouTube’s New AI Content Labels YouTube announced it is introducing new updates to improve transparency around AI-generated content. Since 2024, the platform has required creators to label videos made with AI tools, and it is now making these disclosures more visible and easier for viewers to notice. For long-form videos, labels will appear directly below the video player, while for Shorts, they will appear as an overlay on the video itself. Less significant or unrealistic AI edits will continue to be disclosed in the expanded description. Starting in May 2026, YouTube will also begin using automatic detection systems to identify significant photorealistic AI-generated content. If creators fail to disclose AI use, YouTube may automatically apply a label. Creators can challenge incorrect labels through YouTube Studio, although disclosures will remain permanent for videos created with YouTube’s AI tools or those containing metadata that confirms full AI generation. YouTube clarified that AI disclosure labels will not affect a video’s recommendations or monetization, reflecting the platform’s goal of providing clear information to viewers rather than limiting AI-generated content. Source: YouTube. Improving AI Labels for Viewers and Creators. [online] Published 27 May 2026. Available at: https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/improving-ai-labels-viewers-creators/ Top Of Page RESIST Framework to Create Resilience to Disinformation As published by the Council of Europe, the RESIST framework was developed by the Council to help countries understand and strengthen their resilience to disinformation while respecting democratic principles, human rights, and freedom of expression. Rather than measuring countries through rankings, the framework provides a structured way to examine how societies are exposed to disinformation and how well institutions and communities are prepared to address it. The methodology is based on three complementary levels of analysis. The first examines structural conditions that may influence resilience to disinformation, such as education, media, information literacy, youth, and culture. The second assesses the legal frameworks, policies, coordination mechanisms, and governance arrangements that governments have in place. The third focuses on how these measures are experienced in practice by civil society organizations and practitioners. By comparing these three dimensions, the framework aims to identify gaps between policy design and real-world implementation. The results are intended to support evidence-based policy discussions, cooperation between governments and civil society, and the development of long-term approaches to strengthening democratic resilience against disinformation. Source: Council of Europe. Report on the Methodology to Assess Societal Vulnerabilities and Strengths to Disinformation (RESIST Methodology). [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-methodology-to-assess-societal-vulnerabilities-and-stren/48802b8213 Top Of Page Fighting Climate Disinformation An essay published by The Union of Concerned Scientists argued that periods of extreme weather and climate-related disasters depend on a strong “safety chain,” which connects scientific data, weather forecasting, trusted communication, public understanding, and effective preparation and response. According to the author, this chain is weakened when climate research is reduced, scientific expertise is lost, or misleading information about climate science and disaster risks circulates in public debate. Disinformation can disrupt public understanding and decision-making during disasters. It identifies several recurring patterns, including false explanations for disasters, misleading claims about responsibility, attacks on the credibility of public institutions, messages that downplay risks, and efforts to link disaster response to divisive political issues. These narratives can reduce trust in official information and affect how people respond to warnings and emergencies. Therefore, the article encouraged individuals to verify information before sharing it, rely on trusted sources for weather and emergency updates, and pay attention to misleading narratives that emerge during extreme weather events. Source: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). Your Anti-Disinformation Safety Chain for Danger Season. [online] By Kate Cell. Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://blog.ucs.org/kate-cell/your-anti-disinformation-safety-chain-for-danger-season/ Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page