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[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 11th to the 17th of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Kremlin Indoctrination in the Russian Education System Russian Influence Amid Georgian Patriarch Election The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation About the Deportation of Ukrainian Children Pro-Russian Disinformation Targeting Ukraine and the EU Russian Network Warfare in Ukraine [AI Related Articles] AI Disinformation Growth in Australia AI-Driven Misinformation in the UK Election Politics Halupedia AI-Generated Misinformation New Pentagon-Linked Media Network [Cyfluence Attack] AI-Backed Cyber Threats and Influence [General Reports] Disinformation Around the Hantavirus Outbreak Conspiracy Theories Around Attempts on Donald Trump’s Life The Rise of Citizen Journalism and Its Effects on The Information Landscape AI-Generated Election Content in India Taiwan Security Bureau Records 60 Percent Surge in Inauthentic Social Accounts East Asian Disinformation Campaigns Foreshadow Future Global Threats [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NewsGuard’s Tool to Check and Evaluate Chatbots False Information FTC Targets AI-Generated Intimate Disinformation and Deepfake Abuse [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] As published by The Jamestown Foundation, the election of Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) as the new head of the Georgian Orthodox Church has sparked intense controversy, with critics accusing the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-Kremlin networks of influencing the process. A Small Wars Journal analysis evaluates Russia's integrated cognitive and network warfare model across four domains, finding a persistent gap between strategic intent and battlefield execution. AEI's China-Taiwan Update documents a 60 percent increase in inauthentic social media accounts identified by Taiwan's National Security Bureau, as Beijing increasingly outsources influence operations to IT contractors relying on AI-generated content to scale cognitive warfare campaigns. A new report from Google Threat Intelligence Group warned that cybercriminals and state-backed actors are increasingly using artificial intelligence to strengthen cyberattacks and automate malicious operations. The Belfer Center report argues that disinformation campaigns in Taiwan and South Korea demonstrate how state and non-state actors exploit digital platforms, political polarization, and foreign influence operations to manipulate democratic societies and shape public opinion. The FTC’s Take It Down Act guidance requires online platforms to rapidly remove AI-generated and nonconsensual intimate content and adopt measures to prevent its amplification and redistribution. [ Report Summary] According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, the Kremlin has expanded propaganda throughout the Russian education system to shape children into loyal supporters of the state and the war in Ukraine. As published by The Jamestown Foundation, the election of Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) as the new head of the Georgian Orthodox Church has sparked intense controversy, with critics accusing the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-Kremlin networks of influencing the process. According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia has faced growing international accusations over the forced deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children since the invasion of Ukraine. According to a report by EEAS, during the winter of 2025 - 2026, Russia intensified disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening Ukrainian morale and damaging support for Ukraine within the European Union. A Small Wars Journal analysis evaluates Russia's integrated cognitive and network warfare model across four domains, finding a persistent gap between strategic intent and battlefield execution. As stated in a report by ASPI, a growing number of Australians believe the online information environment is becoming unreliable and manipulative, with disinformation now seen as a major national security concern. As published by CyberNews, false online claims recently spread that George Boyd, a newly elected councilor from the UK’s Reform UK party, was not a real person but an AI-generated identity. As published by CyberNews, Halupedia is an experimental website that creates endless fictional encyclopedia articles generated entirely by AI. A recent investigation by former researchers involved in the 2022 “Unheard Voice” report examined a newer generation of Pentagon-linked media websites operating in multiple languages across the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. AEI's China-Taiwan Update documents a 60 percent increase in inauthentic social media accounts identified by Taiwan's National Security Bureau, as Beijing increasingly outsources influence operations to IT contractors relying on AI-generated content to scale cognitive warfare campaigns. A new report from Google Threat Intelligence Group warned that cybercriminals and state-backed actors are increasingly using artificial intelligence to strengthen cyberattacks and automate malicious operations. As revealed in a Wired article, following the hantavirus outbreak aboard the MV Hondius cruise ship, social media was quickly flooded with conspiracy theories and misinformation. A recent poll by NewsGuard and YouGov found that a significant number of Americans believe conspiracy theories claiming that assassination attempts against Donald Trump were staged. An article by The Hill argued that public trust in traditional media has sharply declined, with a 2025 Gallup poll showing only 28% of Americans trust mainstream news for accurate reporting, largely as a result of their perceived bias and selective reporting. A study published by ISSN explored how AI-generated political content affected first-time voters during India’s 2024 General Elections, with a particular focus on the state of Rajasthan. The Belfer Center report argues that disinformation campaigns in Taiwan and South Korea demonstrate how state and non-state actors exploit digital platforms, political polarization, and foreign influence operations to manipulate democratic societies and shape public opinion. NewsGuard announced it has upgraded its browser extension to work directly inside AI chatbots such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google Gemini, allowing users to see reliability scores for the sources cited in AI-generated answers. The FTC’s Take It Down Act guidance requires online platforms to rapidly remove AI-generated and nonconsensual intimate content and adopt measures to prevent its amplification and redistribution. [State Actors] Russia Kremlin Indoctrination in the Russian Education System According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, the Kremlin has expanded propaganda throughout the Russian education system to shape children into loyal supporters of the state and the war in Ukraine. Russian schools now combine patriotic rituals, military-style activities, and rewritten textbooks that promote the Kremlin’s version of history and justify the invasion of Ukraine. Authorities are also tightening ideological control in occupied Ukrainian territories, where thousands of children are being educated under Russian narratives designed to erase Ukrainian identity. An important example of this campaign is the mandatory class "Conversations about Important Things", introduced in 2022 and focused on patriotism and militarization. The program includes propaganda themes such as glorifying Russian victories, promoting "digital sovereignty", and presenting war participants as heroes. The Oscar-winning documentary Mr. Nobody Against Putin exposed these practices, showing pro-war indoctrination and visits from Wagner mercenaries before being banned in Russia in 2026. Beginning in 2026 and 2027, the Kremlin plans to deepen this influence by targeting even younger children with new classes such as "Good Games", "My Family", and "Spiritual and Moral Culture". While presented as lessons about family values and morality, these programs promote nationalist messaging, loyalty to the state, and traditional Russian values. Critics argue that the Kremlin is using schools to normalize propaganda from early childhood. Source: EUvsDisinfo. From preschool to adolescence: expanding ideological control in Russian schools. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/from-preschool-to-adolescence-expanding-ideological-control-in-russian-schools/ Top Of Page Russian Influence Amid Georgian Patriarch Election As published by The Jamestown Foundation, the election of Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) as the new head of the Georgian Orthodox Church has sparked intense controversy, with critics accusing the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-Kremlin networks of influencing the process. Allegations of pressure on bishops, coordinated pro-Shio media campaigns, and the presence of pro-Russian figures at the church council fueled claims that the election lacked transparency and independence. These concerns deepened political polarization in Georgia and raised fears that the Church could become more vulnerable to Russian influence. Information manipulation played a major role throughout the election period. Pro-government media and coordinated social media accounts promoted Shio as the “natural” successor, while opposition groups and clergy accused authorities of running a hidden campaign to secure his victory. Concerns about Russian influence were amplified by Shio’s theological education in Moscow, his reported ties to the pro-Russian businessman Levan Vasadze, and the rapid congratulations from Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. At the same time, government officials dismissed accusations of interference as politically motivated attacks and "black propaganda". Critics fear the Kremlin may use religious institutions and disinformation networks to preserve influence in Georgia and weaken pro-European sentiment. Although there is no direct evidence proving Shio holds pro-Russian views, the opaque election process and competing narratives have damaged public trust and intensified divisions within both Georgian society and the Church itself. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Georgian Patriarch Election Fuels Kremlin Interference Claims. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/georgian-patriarch-election-fuels-kremlin-interference-claims/ (jamestown.org) Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation About the Deportation of Ukrainian Children According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia has faced growing international accusations over the forced deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children since the invasion of Ukraine. While international organisations, investigators, and human rights groups describe these actions as war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Kremlin has launched a large-scale disinformation campaign to present them as humanitarian "rescues" or evacuations. Russian officials and state media repeatedly claim that children were saved from war zones, while denying allegations of kidnapping, forced assimilation, and unlawful deportation. The campaign even claims that these children are "naturally Russian" and belong within Russia’s cultural sphere. The Kremlin spreads these narratives through official statements, state-controlled media, and pro-Russian online networks. Different messages are tailored for different audiences - Russian citizens hear stories of heroic evacuations, while international audiences are told that Russia is protecting vulnerable children. At the same time, Russia attempts to discredit institutions such as the International Criminal Court by calling investigations politically motivated. Evidence gathered by international bodies, however, shows that many children were transferred without parental consent, separated from their families, and placed in Russian camps, schools, or adoptive families where Ukrainian identity is suppressed, and Russian patriotism is promoted. An article by Stop Fake even revealed that Russia has been accused of obstructing repatriation while promoting misleading claims that family reunification is simple and ongoing. Many parents were forced to search for their children independently, often relying on volunteers and charities because Russian authorities concealed the children’s location. Sources: EUvsDisinfo. How Russia lies about the stolen Ukrainian children. [online] Published 11 May 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/how-russia-lies-about-the-stolen-ukrainian-children/ (stopfake.org) StopFake. Fake: Russia did not engage in the “forced transfer” of Ukrainian children, but “evacuated” them. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/ru/fejk-polpredstva-rossii-v-es-rossiya-ne-zanimalas-prinuditelnym-peremeshheniem-ukrainskih-detej-a-evakuirovala-ih/ (StopFake) Top Of Page Pro-Russian Disinformation Targeting Ukraine and the EU According to a report by EEAS, during the winter of 2025 - 2026, Russia intensified disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening Ukrainian morale and damaging support for Ukraine within the European Union. As Russian attacks caused severe energy shortages and humanitarian difficulties in Ukraine, pro-Kremlin networks on Telegram, Facebook, and regional news sites spread manipulative narratives designed to exploit fear, exhaustion, and uncertainty. These campaigns portrayed Ukraine as a burden on EU countries and framed European integration as dangerous for Ukrainian society. The report found that Russian and pro-Russian actors promoted false claims about Ukrainian refugees, EU corruption, and declining European support for Ukraine. Disinformation narratives accused the EU of supporting forced mobilization, planning discriminatory actions against Ukrainians, etc. Some campaigns used gender-related disinformation, while other messages attempted to damage relations between Ukraine and Poland by spreading rumors about visas and historical conflicts. Researchers also documented fake stories about financial aid, property confiscation, and crimes allegedly committed by Ukrainian refugees. In occupied territories, propagandists created "mirror" narratives that copied Russia’s own practices while falsely blaming Ukraine or the EU. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Quarterly monitoring report on pro-Russian disinformation targeting EU–Ukraine relations (December 2025 – February 2026). [online] Published 7 May 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/quarterly-monitoring-report-pro-russian-disinformation-targeting-eu%E2%80%93ukraine-relations-december-2025_en (eeas.europa.eu) Top Of Page Russian Network Warfare in Ukraine An analysis published by Small Wars Journal states that Russian network warfare strategy, rooted in Soviet-era doctrines of reflexive control and strategic deception (maskirovka), seeks to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of adversary systems across four integrated operational domains: computer network operations, AI-enabled information operations, electronic warfare, and space-based capabilities, with the Ukraine conflict serving as the primary live laboratory for testing and refining this integrated doctrine. An analysis published by Small Wars Journal states that despite initial technical successes such as the Viasat satellite communication attack in the opening hours of the invasion, Moscow significantly underestimated commercial resilience, including SpaceX's Starlink network, and Ukraine's adaptive defense, revealing a persistent and structurally significant gap between Russia's ambitious network-centric design and its actual operational execution in the field. Source: Small Wars Journal. Assessing Russian Network Warfare Through the Lens of the Ukraine Conflict. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/05/12/assessing-russian-network-warfare/ (smallwarsjournal.com) Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] AI Disinformation Growth in Australia As stated in a report by ASPI, a growing number of Australians believe the online information environment is becoming unreliable and manipulative, with disinformation now seen as a major national security concern. Research by economist Joseph Stiglitz and Maxim Ventura-Bolet argued that online markets naturally reward disinformation because sensational and emotional content generates more engagement and user attention than accurate reporting. Social media platforms and AI systems have changed how people consume information. Instead of visiting original news sources, users increasingly rely on social media feeds or AI-generated summaries. This weakens traditional journalism by reducing revenue for professional news organizations, while platforms profit from keeping users engaged for as long as possible. According to the study, algorithms favor provocative and polarizing content, regardless of whether it is true, creating an environment where disinformation spreads faster and more widely than verified information. The report warned that AI could accelerate this downward spiral by quickly producing large volumes of low-quality or misleading content, relying on unreliable data sources. As audiences become more polarized, they seek information that confirms their existing beliefs and further damages trustworthy journalism. Market forces alone will not solve the problem and call for stronger government regulation, such as platform accountability, measures against coordinated disinformation campaigns, and protections for quality news producers. Source: The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute). How AI rots the information environment: a Nobel economist has modelled it. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-ai-rots-the-information-environment-a-nobel-economist-has-modelled-it/ Top Of Page AI-Driven Misinformation in the UK Election Politics As published by CyberNews, false online claims recently spread that George Boyd, a newly elected councilor from the UK’s Reform UK party, was not a real person but an AI-generated identity. The rumors were fueled by social media users and amplified by the AI chatbot Grok, which suggested that Boyd’s campaign photo was "very likely" AI-generated because of its overly polished appearance. These claims quickly became an example of how AI tools and online speculation can contribute to disinformation during elections. In reality, Boyd is a real person who successfully won a local election in Norfolk, England. Journalists from the BBC confirmed his identity directly through interviews. The confusion began because AI had been used to create a countryside background for his campaign image, while the original photo itself was genuine. Party officials explained that the edited image was intended only to improve the design of campaign materials, not to create a fake candidate. Sources: Cybernews. “I am not AI:” elected Reform UK councilor denies rumor spread by Grok. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/ai-elected-reform-uk-councilor-grok/ (cybernews.com) Top Of Page Halupedia AI-Generated Misinformation As published by CyberNews, Halupedia is an experimental website that creates endless fictional encyclopedia articles generated entirely by AI. Inspired by Wikipedia, the platform produces convincing but completely fabricated entries the moment users click on a topic. The articles imitate the style of academic writing, making the false information appear credible and realistic. The platform demonstrates how AI hallucinations can create fake historical events, institutions, and references that sound believable despite having no basis in reality. One example mentioned is the “Great Pigeon Census of 1887,” an invented, detailed but entirely fictional event. Because the format closely resembles trusted sources like Wikipedia, users may instinctively believe the content, even when it is inaccurate or misleading. Critics also pointed to problems with offensive and prejudicial content appearing on the site, highlighting the difficulty of moderating AI-generated material. Sources: Cybernews. Halupedia: Wikipedia fights AI hallucinations with its own AI. [online] Published 14 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/halupedia-wikipedia-ai-hallucination/ (cybernews.com) Top Of Page New Pentagon-Linked Media Network A recent investigation by former researchers involved in the 2022 “Unheard Voice” report examined a newer generation of Pentagon-linked media websites operating in multiple languages across the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. Earlier operations relied heavily on fake personas, coordinated social media activity, and AI-generated profile images. According to the latest report, the newer network appears to use a different approach, relying more on paid advertising and outlet-branded content distributed through platforms such as X and Meta. The report identified several connected websites, including Arabic, Farsi, Russian, Spanish, and English-language outlets covering topics such as regional security, China’s role in Latin America, Iran, Ukraine, and space policy. Researchers found links between the sites through shared technical infrastructure, advertising activity, and design similarities connected to earlier U.S. military-funded media projects. While many articles were based on real events and verifiable sources, the investigation argued that the editorial focus consistently emphasized themes such as corruption, foreign influence, organized crime, and geopolitical rivalry. The analysis also explored how audiences reacted to the content online. Some users questioned the framing of articles or asked AI tools like Grok to verify claims. Researchers noted that many discussions focused on whether individual claims were accurate, while broader questions about sponsorship, editorial selection, and audience targeting were harder to identify through standard fact-checking methods. Sources: Lawfare. Fewer Bots, More Ads: The Pentagon’s Evolving Online Influence Campaigns. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at :https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/fewer-bots--more-ads--the-pentagon-s-evolving-online-influence-campaigns (lawfaremedia.org) Top Of Page [Cyfluence Attack] AI-Backed Cyber Threats and Influence A new report from Google Threat Intelligence Group warned that cybercriminals and state-backed actors are increasingly using artificial intelligence to strengthen cyberattacks and automate malicious operations. Tools such as the AI-powered malware "PROMPTSPY" can independently analyze systems, generate commands, and manipulate victim devices in real time. Cybercriminals are also using AI-generated "decoy logic" and code obfuscation to hide malicious activity and evade security detection. Researchers identified what they believe is the first AI-assisted zero-day exploit, designed to bypass security protections and potentially support large-scale attacks. The report also found that threat actors linked to China, North Korea, and Russia are actively using AI for vulnerability research, malware development, and cyber espionage. A major concern indeed is the growing role of AI in influence operations. Pro-Russian campaigns such as "Operation Overload" use AI-generated media, including deepfakes and synthetic content, to create false narratives and manipulate public opinion. AI allows threat actors to produce fake videos and voices and coordinated propaganda at a large scale, making disinformation campaigns faster, cheaper, and more difficult to identify. Researchers warn that AI is becoming both a powerful weapon for attackers and a critical challenge for global cybersecurity and information integrity. Sources: Google Cloud Blog (Google Threat Intelligence Group). Adversaries leverage AI for vulnerability exploitation, augmented operations, and initial access. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ai-vulnerability-exploitation-initial-access (tildes.net) Top Of Page [General Reports] Disinformation Around the Hantavirus Outbreak As revealed in a Wired article, following the hantavirus outbreak aboard the MV Hondius cruise ship, social media was quickly flooded with conspiracy theories and misinformation. Some online influencers and conspiracy theorists compared the outbreak to the Covid-19 pandemic, falsely claiming it was part of a global control agenda or caused by Covid-19 vaccines. Others promoted unproven treatments such as ivermectin, often using fear surrounding the outbreak to market emergency medical kits and alternative health products. Health disinformation spread rapidly through platforms such as X, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, amplified by prominent anti-vaccine activists, wellness influencers, and political figures. False claims included accusations that pharmaceutical companies intentionally created the virus for profit and baseless theories linking the outbreak to Israel through antisemitic narratives. Some theories even suggested that the outbreak was caused by 6G technology, according to an article by NewsGuard. Experts noted that many of these conspiracy theories reused the same patterns and networks that became widespread during the COVID-19 pandemic, even when the claims directly contradicted one another. Public health experts warn that social media now functions as a fast-moving disinformation ecosystem where misleading narratives can spread before evidence-based medical information reaches the public. Organizations such as the World Health Organization responded by clarifying that there is no scientific evidence supporting claims that ivermectin treats hantavirus or that Covid vaccines cause the disease. Source: WIRED. Hantavirus conspiracy theories are already spreading online. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/hantavirus-conspiracy-theories-are-already-spreading-online/ (wired.com) Top Of Page Conspiracy Theories Around Attempts on Donald Trump’s Life A recent poll by NewsGuard and YouGov found that a significant number of Americans believe conspiracy theories claiming that assassination attempts against Donald Trump were staged (for further information, see W19 May Cyfluence Report). According to the survey, 30 percent of respondents believed at least one of the three incidents was fake, while only 38 percent believed all three were genuine. Investigators found no evidence that any of the attacks were staged, and authorities stated that the alleged attackers acted independently without links to Trump or his administration. The false narratives spread rapidly across social media after each incident. Conspiracy theorists claimed that Trump used "blood pills", staged shootings for political gain, or created distractions from political controversies. Many of the same accounts that promoted these theories after the 2024 Pennsylvania rally shooting also spread similar claims following later incidents. Researchers found that social media platforms helped amplify the narratives, allowing misinformation to continue circulating long after the events occurred. The poll also revealed strong political and generational divisions in belief in these conspiracy theories. Democrats and younger Americans were more likely to believe the events were staged compared to Republicans and older groups. Source: NewsGuard. 30 percent of Americans think at least one Trump assassination attempt was staged. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/30-percent-of-americans-think-at-least-one-trump-assassination-attempt-was-staged Top Of Page The Rise of Citizen Journalism and Its Effects on The Information Landscape An article by The Hill argued that public trust in traditional media has sharply declined, with a 2025 Gallup poll showing only 28% of Americans trust mainstream news for accurate reporting, largely as a result of their perceived bias and selective reporting. The article linked this distrust to what it described as media-driven “panic” during events like the COVID-19 pandemic and other major political controversies. In this environment, "citizen journalism" has emerged as an alternative source of information, using examples of independent creators who publish viral investigations on social media. These cases are presented as evidence that individuals outside traditional media can expose fraud or hold institutions accountable. At the same time, legacy outlets are criticized for allegedly misreporting or downplaying major events, therefore contributing to public skepticism. The piece also reflected broader debates about disinformation in the modern media landscape. While it praised independent reporting for increasing transparency, critics argue that the same ecosystem can spread misinformation quickly without editorial oversight. It highlighted competing narratives about trust, suggesting a shift from centralized journalism toward decentralized, digital-first reporting, where both verified information and misleading claims circulate more easily, and audiences must decide what to believe. Source: The Hill. Citizen journalism rise restores trust in media. [online] Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/5873753-citizen-journalism-rise-trust/ (archive.ph) Top Of Page AI-Generated Election Content in India A study published by ISSN explored how AI-generated political content affected first-time voters during India’s 2024 General Elections, with a particular focus on the state of Rajasthan. Researchers examined the spread of deep fakes and AI-assisted political messaging on platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook, especially in semi-urban and rural communities where digital and political awareness are still developing. According to the study, AI-driven online communication has changed the electoral environment faster than regulatory systems can respond. First-time voters were especially vulnerable to misleading political narratives because of low digital literacy and heavy reliance on social media. These factors strongly influenced political awareness, trust in institutions, and voting behaviour among young voters. Using case studies, policy analysis, and regional media discussions, the paper examined how AI-generated content shaped local political experiences during the elections. To protect democratic participation in the digital age, researchers recommended introducing clearer laws on AI use during elections, improving electoral oversight, expanding fact-checking systems in local languages, and developing community-based digital literacy programs. The paper particularly emphasizes the importance of grassroots education in helping voters critically evaluate online political content. Source: Lyceum India. Electoral Misinformation. by Dimple Oza. [online] Available at: https://repository.lyceumindia.in/wp-content/uploads/Electoral-Misinformation.-by-Dimple-Oza.pdf Top Of Page Taiwan Security Bureau Records 60 Percent Surge in Inauthentic Social Accounts A report published by American Enterprise Institute states that Taiwan's National Security Bureau has recorded a 60 percent increase in inauthentic social media accounts between 2024 and 2025 and tracked over 2 million instances of disinformation within the same period, a 74 percent increase since 2023, as Beijing increasingly outsources its influence operations to Chinese IT and marketing companies that rely on automation and AI-generated content to scale cognitive warfare campaigns targeting Taiwanese audiences. The report also states that Beijing's four core strategic goals for Taiwan influence operations, exacerbating internal divisions, weakening Taiwanese will to resist, influencing allied willingness to support Taiwan, and winning international support for Chinese standards, are being pursued through a sophisticated multi-domain framework blending economic incentives, AI-generated social media content, and coordinated cognitive pressure at a scale that increasingly challenges Taiwan's detection and response infrastructure. Source: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). China–Taiwan Update: May 15, 2026. [online] Published 15 May 2026. Available at: https://www.aei.org/articles/china-taiwan-update-may-15-2026/ Top Of Page East Asian Disinformation Campaigns Foreshadow Future Global Threats The Belfer Center report analyzes how disinformation has become an increasingly sophisticated instrument of political influence in Taiwan and South Korea, offering lessons for future threats to democratic systems. The report highlights that both state and non-state actors exploit digital platforms to disseminate false or misleading information, manipulate public opinion, and deepen social and political divisions. Taiwan’s experience demonstrates how foreign interference campaigns leverage evolving communication channels and culturally tailored narratives to influence elections and public discourse, while South Korea illustrates how domestic political environments can normalize rumors, speculation, and misinformation as recurring elements of political competition. The study warns that lowered technological and logistical barriers now enable a broader range of actors to conduct influence operations on a scale. The report emphasizes that disinformation campaigns rely on coordinated amplification across social media ecosystems, exploitation of societal polarization, and manipulation of trust in institutions and media. It identifies foreign influence operations, election-related disinformation, and digitally amplified misinformation as central threats to democratic resilience. The analysis further stresses that no single sector can effectively counter these campaigns alone: governments face civil-liberty constraints, technology companies lack sufficient incentives to aggressively moderate harmful content, and civil society organizations often lack scale and access. As a result, the report advocates for cross-sector coordination involving governments, technology platforms, researchers, journalists, and civil society actors to improve transparency, strengthen public awareness, enhance detection capabilities, and build resilience against hostile information manipulation campaigns. Source: Crowley, B. J., Corcoran, C., and Johnson, R. Disinformation Threat Watch. [online] Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Published May 2019. Available at: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/disinformation-threat-watch (belfercenter.org) Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NewsGuard’s Tool to Check and Evaluate Chatbots False Information NewsGuard announced it has upgraded its browser extension to work directly inside AI chatbots such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google Gemini, allowing users to see reliability scores for the sources cited in AI-generated answers. The tool shows whether a source is trustworthy or linked to disinformation, propaganda, or false reporting. For example, if a chatbot cites the Russian state media outlet TASS, NewsGuard displays a warning and its low trust score, helping users recognize potentially misleading information. The update responds to growing concerns that AI chatbots can unintentionally spread disinformation by relying on unreliable websites and low-quality content farms. According to NewsGuard’s research, leading AI chatbots repeated false or misleading claims nearly 29% of the time when asked about controversial topics, including narratives linked to Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence operations. Researchers found that users often cannot distinguish between credible journalism and manipulated or false content because chatbots present all sources equally. NewsGuard argued that transparency about sources is essential as AI tools become a major way people access news and information. Its system uses journalist-reviewed ratings and detailed "Nutrition Labels" to explain why a source may be unreliable, including cases involving health misinformation, election falsehoods, or state propaganda. The goal is to help users better identify disinformation and critically evaluate the information provided by AI systems. Source: NewsGuard. NewsGuard’s reliability ratings now appear in ChatGPT and Gemini responses, displaying the trustworthiness of AI chatbots’ news sources. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/press/newsguards-reliability-ratings-now-appear-in-chatgpt-and-gemini-responses-displaying-the-trustworthiness-of-ai-chatbots-news-sources/ Top Of Page FTC Targets AI-Generated Intimate Disinformation and Deepfake Abuse The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stakeholder letter regarding the Take It Down Act (TIDA) outlines new compliance obligations for online platforms in response to the growing spread of nonconsensual intimate imagery, including AI-generated “digital forgeries” and manipulated media. The document frames such content as a significant online harm facilitated by social media, messaging services, image-sharing platforms, and other user-generated content environments. It emphasizes that digitally altered or AI-generated intimate content can be rapidly disseminated across platforms, contributing to harmful information manipulation and reputational damage. The FTC identifies online platforms as key actors responsible for mitigating the spread of this content through mandatory notice-and-removal systems and proactive detection measures. The letter details several countermeasures intended to limit the amplification and recirculation of manipulated or nonconsensual content. Platforms are required to establish accessible reporting mechanisms, remove reported material and identical copies within 48 hours, and implement technologies such as hashing to prevent reuploads. The guidance also encourages coordination with organizations such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and StopNCII.org to improve cross-platform detection and suppression efforts. The FTC warns that failure to comply with these requirements may result in substantial civil penalties, underscoring a broader regulatory effort to address AI-enabled abuse, deceptive digital content, and the viral spread of harmful manipulated media online. Source: Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Take It Down Act – Template Letter. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/TIDA-Stakeholder-Letter.pdf (ftc.gov) Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

In this article, Jason Potel examines how AI-powered chatbots are being weaponized for influence operations by exploiting emotional dependency and loneliness. Unlike early bots that simply amplified pre-written content, today's large language models can build prolonged parasocial relationships with users, cultivating trust before nudging them toward desired political views. Recent studies show these tactics are remarkably effective: AI chatbots shifted voter attitudes by up to 10 percentage points in the 2025 Polish and Canadian elections, outperforming traditional campaign advertising. Compounding the threat, autonomous AI agent swarms have demonstrated the ability to coordinate propaganda campaigns without any human direction. Potel identifies loneliness as the primary vulnerability driving susceptibility to these operations, alongside personality traits like agreeableness and pre-existing beliefs in immaterial systems. State-aligned models like China's DeepSeek and companion apps like Xiaoice illustrate how governments are already embedding ideological constraints directly into AI that millions interact with daily. The article concludes with a call for sustained academic and policy attention as AI grows from a blunt amplification tool into a self-directing engine capable of running influence operations end-to-end. Author: Jason Potel [Download PDF Here]

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 04th to the 10th of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Russian Disinformation Targets Europe Russian Victory Day Parade Unmasks the Truth Behind the Propaganda Argentina Detained Suspected Russian Operative Linked to Disinformation Network The War in Ukraine Russian Propaganda Attacks Kyiv’s Outreach to National Minority’s in Russia Kremlin Disinformation About Strikes in Ukraine Pro-Russian Disinformation Monitoring Iran IRGC Influence Networks in Latin America Iran's Digital Manipulation During the War [AI Related Articles] Anthropic’s Chatbot Influenced by Russian and Iranian Propaganda AI Image Detection Tools Mislead Users and Empower Fake News [Cyfluence Attack] BO Team Cyber Threats and Possible Connection to Hacktivism [General Reports] NewsGuard’s Index Proves Surge in Americans’ Vulnerability to Misinformation Online Misinformation and Hate Speech in Jordan Antisemitic Conspiracies Spread Through Social Media Algorithms Trump’s Assassination Attempt Creates Waves of Misinformation in the Media Natural Disasters Disinformation Networks Foreign Manipulation Takes Advantage of the Alberta Separatist Debate The Evolution of South African Media and Its Effect on Society Jailbroken AI Models Fuel Disinformation and Malicious Operations [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] South Korea Battles Surge In AI-Driven Election Disinformation eYou as a European Alternative to X With AI Fact-Checking Poland Launches a New Initiative Against Disinformation [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, Ukraine’s recent decision to expand outreach to non-Russian national minorities within the Russian Federation has become a new target for manipulation. A recent NewsGuard audit found that Anthropic’s AI chatbot Claude has become more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns, showing a significant increase in repeating false claims sourced from Russian and Iranian state-affiliated media. A two-year study by ISD Jordan found that misinformation and online hate speech are deeply interconnected within Jordan’s digital environment. Research by ISD showed that algorithm-driven disinformation and harmful recommendation systems on TikTok and Rumble are exposing UK minors to antisemitic content, often without users actively searching for it. A publication by VSW Bundesverband describes how Jailbroken AI systems are enabling hostile actors to automate disinformation, bypass safety controls, and support cyber and physical attack planning at scale. As published by TVP World, Poland’s state-owned media organizations launched a joint fact-checking initiative to combat the growing spread of disinformation. [ Report Summary] As published by EEAS, between December 2025 and February 2026, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns intensified alongside Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which caused severe winter blackouts and hardship. As revealed in an EU vs. Disinfo report, the Kremlin’s decision to significantly scale back the 2026 Victory Day parade highlights a growing gap between Russia’s propaganda narratives and operational reality. As reported by The Record, Argentine authorities have detained Russian citizen Dmitrii Novikov and ordered his expulsion over allegations that he was involved in a Kremlin-linked disinformation network operating across Latin America, Europe, and the United States. According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, Ukraine’s recent decision to expand outreach to non-Russian national minorities within the Russian Federation has become a new target for manipulation. As stated in a Stop Fake report, a recent claim by the Russian Ministry of Defense that it had avoided striking central Kyiv "for humanitarian reasons" is a clear example of disinformation aimed at distorting the reality of Russia’s military actions. According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, recent pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have focused on portraying Europe as economically unstable, authoritarian, and morally corrupt. According to a report by Resecurity, the destabilization of Venezuela following Nicolás Maduro’s reported arrest in January 2026 has significantly disrupted Iranian-linked operational networks in Latin America. According to an article by The Hill, Iran has increasingly used disinformation and digital influence tactics as part of its response to the United States. A recent NewsGuard audit found that Anthropic’s AI chatbot Claude has become more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns, showing a significant increase in repeating false claims sourced from Russian and Iranian state-affiliated media. A recent article by NewsGuard highlighted a growing disinformation risk linked to AI image detection tools, as several leading systems frequently misidentify real images as AI-generated. NewsGuard’s latest Reality Gap Index showed a sharp rise in Americans’ susceptibility to online disinformation, with 43 percent of respondents believing at least one major false claim circulating during the first quarter of 2026. As published by Secure List, research uncovered signs of possible collaboration between BO Team and the hacktivist group "Head Mare" through shared infrastructure and overlapping activity. A two-year study by ISD Jordan found that misinformation and online hate speech are deeply interconnected within Jordan’s digital environment. As published by Wired, recent online discussions surrounding alleged assassination attempts against President Donald Trump have become a major example of disinformation spreading across all communities. Research by ISD showed that algorithm-driven disinformation and harmful recommendation systems on TikTok and Rumble are exposing UK minors to antisemitic content, often without users actively searching for it. Graphika’s publication revealed that natural disasters have become prime opportunities for misinformation actors to exploit public attention and spread false narratives. According to a report by DisinfoWatch, foreign actors are increasingly exploiting the Alberta separatist debate to spread disinformation, deepen internal divisions, and undermine trust in Canada’s democratic institutions. A publication by VSW Bundesverband describes how Jailbroken AI systems are enabling hostile actors to automate disinformation, bypass safety controls, and support cyber and physical attack planning at scale. According to an article by The Conversation, South African television reflects the country’s broader political and social struggles, particularly in the way information has been controlled and sometimes distorted. According to an article by CyberNews, a new European social media platform called eYou aims to position itself as an alternative to X by offering AI-powered fact-checking in real time and emphasizing digital sovereignty. As published by TVP World, Poland’s state-owned media organizations launched a joint fact-checking initiative to combat the growing spread of disinformation. An article by France 24 shows how South Korea is intensifying efforts to counter AI-generated election disinformation as deepfakes, conspiracy narratives, and manipulated political content rapidly spread across digital platforms. [State Actors] Russia Russian Disinformation Targets Europe According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, recent pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have focused on portraying Europe as economically unstable, authoritarian, and morally corrupt. In the lead-up to Victory Day on 09th of May, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) outlets spread false narratives claiming that Europe is "reviving Nazism", facing possible food rationing, and using new digital tools to spy on citizens. A central tactic has been the distortion of real events and official statements. For example, comments by the European Central Bank about possible fuel market disruptions were falsely reframed as warnings of food rationing across Europe. Similarly, the EU’s new age verification app, developed to protect minors online, was falsely presented as a mass surveillance tool. Another recurring theme is the false accusation that Europe is reviving Nazism, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify hostility toward the West and delegitimize support for Ukraine. By repeatedly labeling political opponents as "Nazis", Russian propaganda attempts to manipulate historical memory and frame Russia as a defender against fascism. Source: EUvsDisinfo. Fake European crises and real Russian failures. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/fake-european-crises-and-real-russian-failures/ Top Of Page Russian Victory Day Parade Unmasks the Truth Behind the Propaganda As revealed in an EU vs. Disinfo report, the Kremlin’s decision to significantly scale back the 2026 Victory Day parade, including the absence of tanks and heavy military equipment, highlights a growing gap between Russia’s propaganda narratives and operational reality. Officially justified by "security concerns" and alleged threats from Ukraine, the reduced parade contrasts sharply with pro-Kremlin disinformation claims that Russia’s war in Ukraine is "proceeding according to plan". The event, traditionally used to project military strength and national resilience, now exposes the limits of this narrative. Victory Day parades have long been a central tool of Russian information manipulation. For years, they have been used to reinforce false narratives of Russia’s military superiority and moral legitimacy. These spectacles have transformed historical memory into propaganda and replaced the message of preventing future war with militarized symbolism designed to normalize confrontation. The shrinking scale of the 2026 parade undermines this disinformation strategy. It reflects the pressure of military setbacks, internal security concerns, and Russia’s difficulty maintaining the image of invincibility it has carefully constructed. As the Kremlin continues to rely on symbolic displays and historical revisionism, the reduced parade serves as evidence that the reality of the war increasingly contradicts the propaganda narrative presented to both Russian citizens and international audiences. Source: EUvsDisinfo. The parade that shrank Russia’s Victory Day under pressure. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-parade-that-shrank-russias-victory-day-under-pressure/ Top Of Page Argentina Detained Suspected Russian Operative Linked to Disinformation Network As reported by The Record, Argentine authorities have detained Russian citizen Dmitrii Novikov and ordered his expulsion over allegations that he was involved in a Kremlin-linked disinformation network operating across Latin America, Europe, and the United States. According to Argentina’s Ministry of National Security, Novikov was connected to "La Compañía", also known as Project Lakhta, an influence operation allegedly coordinated by Russian intelligence services and previously associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Officials accused Novikov of entering Argentina under false pretenses and participating in efforts to influence domestic affairs through propaganda, political intelligence gathering, and coordinated social media campaigns. The investigation reportedly uncovered collaboration between La Compañía and local actors aimed at discrediting the Argentine government. Authorities also linked Novikov to earlier allegations in the Dominican Republic, where he was accused of managing cyber influence operations funded through cryptocurrency. Russia denied any involvement and dismissed the accusations as anti-Russian claims unsupported by evidence. Source: Recorded Future News. Argentina to expel Dmitrii Novikov. [online] Published 6 May 2026. Available at: https://therecord.media/argentina-to-expel-dmitrii-novikov Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Russian Propaganda Attacks Kyiv’s Outreach to National Minority’s in Russia According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, Ukraine’s recent decision to expand outreach to non-Russian national minorities within the Russian Federation has become a new target for manipulation. While Kyiv presents this policy as support for minority rights and resistance to Russian imperialism, pro-Kremlin narratives are likely to portray it as an attempt to destabilize Russia and provoke state collapse. These narratives aim to distort Ukraine’s diplomatic and political initiatives by framing them as aggressive subversion rather than strategic engagement with oppressed communities. A key disinformation risk lies in the Kremlin’s likely use of this development to reinforce claims that Ukraine and its Western partners seek the "destruction" of Russia, depicting external actors as orchestrating chaos inside Russia. By exaggerating Ukraine’s cooperation with ethnic activists and military volunteers, Russian information campaigns justify further repression and rally domestic support. Disinformation surrounding Ukraine’s outreach efforts is likely to focus on fear, division, and false claims of foreign interference, while obscuring the underlying political realities of ethnic repression and regional discontent inside the Russian Federation. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Kyiv to Expand Its Outreach to National Minorities within Russia. [online] Published 7 May 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/kyiv-to-expand-its-outreach-to-national-minorities-within-russia/ Top Of Page Kremlin Disinformation About Strikes in Ukraine As stated in a Stop Fake report, a recent claim by the Russian Ministry of Defense that it had avoided striking central Kyiv "for humanitarian reasons" is a clear example of disinformation aimed at distorting the reality of Russia’s military actions. This narrative has been widely amplified through Russian state media and Telegram channels to create a false image of restraint, despite extensive evidence of repeated strikes on civilian areas throughout the war. In reality, Russian forces have repeatedly targeted central Kyiv and civilian infrastructure since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Documented attacks include missile strikes on residential districts in October 2022, the destruction of parts of the Okhmatdet Children’s Hospital in July 2024, and deadly attacks on homes, schools, and kindergartens in 2025. The continued escalation of missile and drone strikes, including incidents near Kyiv’s city center in 2026, directly contradicts any claim of "humanitarian abstinence". Source: StopFake. Fake: Russia refrained from strikes on the center of Kyiv for humanitarian reasons — Russian Ministry of Defense. [online] Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/ru/fejk-rossiya-vozderzhivalas-ot-udarov-po-tsentru-kieva-po-gumanitarnym-soobrazheniyam-minoborony-rf/ Top Of Page Pro-Russian Disinformation Monitoring As published by EEAS, between December 2025 and February 2026, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns intensified alongside Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which caused severe winter blackouts and hardship. Coordinated networks across Telegram, Facebook, and news sites used emotional manipulation and fear to influence public opinion, portraying Ukraine as a burden to the EU and framing European integration as harmful. These campaigns aimed to weaken morale and shift blame for the war away from Russia. As part of these events, propagandists promoted claims of "EU fatigue", accused the EU of corruption and weakness, and attempted to damage trust in European support for Ukraine. Disinformation also targeted Ukrainian refugees with contradictory stories, depicting them both as mistreated victims and as threats to European societies, while false claims were used to undermine relations between Ukraine and key partners such as Poland. Another major pattern was the deliberate use of manipulative and fabricated content, including gender-based disinformation and "mirrored" narratives that project Russia’s actions onto Ukraine. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). DARE Compilation Q1 2026 (English). [online] Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/DARE_Compilation_Q1_2026_ENG.pdf Top Of Page Iran IRGC Influence Networks in Latin America According to a report by Resecurity, the destabilization of Venezuela following Nicolás Maduro’s reported arrest in January 2026 has significantly disrupted Iranian-linked operational networks in Latin America, forcing IRGC and Hezbollah-affiliated actors to shift activities toward Colombia and Ecuador. These networks continue to rely on criminal partnerships involving drug trafficking, money laundering, and logistical cooperation with local cartels and armed groups. While regional authorities have intensified arrests, sanctions, and counterterrorism cooperation, Iranian-linked structures remain adaptive and capable of reorganizing across new operational environments. As part of this activity, Iranian state-backed media platforms, cultural centers, proxy communication channels, and encrypted social media networks are reportedly used to recruit sympathizers and manipulate local political discourse. Under the cover of cultural diplomacy and religious outreach, these networks allegedly promote ideological messaging and create influence ecosystems designed to support broader strategic objectives while obscuring operational intent. Despite operational setbacks, Iranian-linked actors are increasingly shifting toward digital influence and information warfare, which makes counter-disinformation efforts as critical as traditional counterterrorism measures. Strengthened cyber intelligence, regional coordination, and proactive monitoring of online influence networks are essential to limit Iran’s ability to exploit instability across Latin America. Source: Resecurity. Iranian Proxy Networks in Latin America Post-Maduro: IRGC. [online] Published 5 May 2026. Available at: https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/iranian-proxy-networks-in-latin-america-post-maduro-irgc Top Of Page Iran's Digital Manipulation During the War According to an article by The Hill, Iran has increasingly used disinformation and digital influence tactics as part of its response to the United States, turning social media into a central battleground during the ongoing conflict over the last months. Through sarcastic messaging, AI-generated videos, and other tailored content, Iranian-linked accounts have sought to flood the information environment with material designed to undermine U.S. credibility and weaken support for President Trump. Experts describe these efforts as a form of "sharp power", the deliberate use of communication platforms to destabilize opponents by exploiting their own media systems and narratives. Iranian digital campaigns have mirrored and reversed earlier U.S. social media messaging, repurposing American political imagery, internet humor, and viral formats to create counter-narratives. A recent analysis by CSIS added that Iranian disinformation campaigns framed the conflict as a corrupt and costly war serving elite interests, using manipulated content to amplify concerns about economic hardship, political corruption, military sacrifice, etc. These narratives were often boosted by verified accounts and amplified by aligned Russian and Chinese messaging ecosystems. The analysis stressed that democratic societies must adapt to this evolving information battlefield by responding faster and more effectively to digital disinformation. The central warning is that in modern warfare, controlling the information environment is as critical as military operations, and credibility has become a decisive strategic asset. Source: The Hill. Iran’s social media war. [online] Available at: https://thehill.com/newsletters/technology/5863155-irans-social-media-war/ Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] Anthropic’s Chatbot Influenced by Russian and Iranian Propaganda A recent NewsGuard audit found that Anthropic’s AI chatbot Claude has become more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns, showing a significant increase in repeating false claims sourced from Russian and Iranian state-affiliated media. Claude repeated pro-Kremlin falsehoods in 15 percent of responses to typical user prompts, a sharp rise from previous audits, and for the first time cited Russian state-controlled outlets such as RT and sites linked to the Pravda disinformation network. The chatbot also cited Iranian state-affiliated media when responding to false claims related to the U.S.-Iran conflict. The findings highlighted how coordinated disinformation ecosystems exploit the structure of web-based AI systems. Networks such as Pravda, which reportedly published millions of articles amplifying Kremlin falsehoods, can flood search results and increase the likelihood that AI models treat repeated propaganda as credible information. This creates a serious amplification risk, where chatbots not only repeat false narratives but also direct users toward deceptive sources, exposing them to further misinformation. Similar patterns were observed in Iranian state-controlled media, where false economic and geopolitical claims were repeated without sufficient verification of sources. Experts attribute this trend to different reasons, such as limited transparency in how AI systems prioritize sources, possible performance adjustments affecting response quality, and the growing manipulation of online information spaces by state-backed influence operations. The audit underscored a critical challenge for AI platforms: without stronger source validation and safeguards, chatbots risk becoming accidental distributors of disinformation, reinforcing hostile information campaigns. Source: NewsGuard. Anthropic’s AI Chatbot Is Leaning More on Russian and Iranian Propaganda Sources, NewsGuard Audit Finds. [online] Published 4 May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/anthropic-ai-chatbot-claude-russia-iran-propaganda/ Top Of Page AI Image Detection Tools Mislead Users and Empower Fake News A recent article by NewsGuard highlighted a growing disinformation risk linked to AI image detection tools, as several leading systems frequently misidentify real images as AI-generated. In tests involving authentic photos from the 2026 U.S.–Iran conflict, some tools incorrectly labeled genuine images as fake, with one tool producing false positives 40 percent of the time. The findings showed how unreliable detection results can fuel disinformation campaigns. In one notable case, social media users cited an AI detector’s incorrect classification to falsely claim that an authentic video of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was fabricated, using this to support false rumors about his death. The audit also revealed major inconsistencies between tools, with different systems often giving contradictory assessments of the same image. This lack of industry standards makes it easier for disinformation actors to cite results that support false claims selectively. Therefore, AI detection tools should not be treated as definitive proof of authenticity or manipulation but should be combined with human verification and source analysis to counter visual disinformation effectively. Sources: NewsGuard. Leading AI image detection tools mislead online users, often declaring authentic content fake. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/leading-ai-image-detection-tools-mislead-online-users-often-declaring-authentic-content-fake/ Top Of Page [Cyfluence Attack] BO Team Cyber Threats and Possible Connection to Hacktivism As published by Secure List, in the first quarter of 2026, the BO Team cyber group shifted its attacks from healthcare organizations to manufacturing, telecommunications, and oil and gas sectors, while continuing to justify its actions through political messages shared on Telegram. This messaging reflects a disinformation strategy, as it presents the group’s operations as politically motivated activism while hiding their real objectives, which increasingly point toward covert cyberespionage rather than public disruption. Nevertheless, the investigation also uncovered signs of possible collaboration between BO Team and the hacktivist group "Head Mare" through shared infrastructure and overlapping activity, which suggests that BO Team may be part of a broader coordinated cyber threat network. Sources: Securelist (Kaspersky). BoTeam campaign, ZeroNetKit, Headmare. [online] Available at: https://securelist.ru/tr/boteam-campaign-zeronetkit-headmare/115429/ Top Of Page [General Reports] NewsGuard’s Index Proves Surge in Americans’ Vulnerability to Misinformation NewsGuard’s latest Reality Gap Index showed a sharp rise in Americans’ susceptibility to online disinformation, with 43 percent of respondents believing at least one major false claim circulating during the first quarter of 2026, which makes nearly double the 22 percent recorded in December 2025, and with only seven percent of respondents correctly identifying all three tested claims as false. The findings suggested a significant deterioration in the public's ability to identify false narratives, while uncertainty about online information also increased. The most successful false narratives involved politically and emotionally charged topics, including a false claim accusing CNN of fabricating Iranian ceasefire statements or an AI-manipulated image of an Iranian missile. The CNN-related falsehood proved especially effective, generating over 35 million views and misleading nearly a quarter of respondents. The report highlighted the increasing role of AI-generated and AI-edited content in modern disinformation campaigns. Although respondents performed somewhat better at identifying the manipulated missile image as false, widespread uncertainty shows that synthetic media continues to challenge public verification skills. Source: NewsGuard. Q1 2026 Reality Gap Index Report. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Q1-2026-Reality-Gap-Index-Report-1.pdf Top Of Page Online Misinformation and Hate Speech in Jordan A two-year study by ISD Jordan found that misinformation and online hate speech are deeply interconnected within Jordan’s digital environment. Events such as the Gaza conflict and instability in Syria triggered significant spikes in sectarian, nationalist, and gender-based abuse across social media platforms. The research showed that disinformation often creates the conditions for hate speech to spread by fueling fear, polarization, and identity-based tensions. The report identified three dominant forms of harmful content: misogynistic abuse targeting women in public life, sectarian hate directed mainly at Shia communities and other minorities, and exclusionary nationalist discourse that deepens social divisions. These narratives are frequently reinforced by coordinated harassment campaigns and manipulated through regional information flows. Arabizi, which is Arabic written in Latin characters and numbers, is often used to evade platform moderation systems, exposing major gaps in Arabic-language content detection and enabling harmful disinformation to circulate with limited oversight. Jordan’s online disinformation challenges cannot be treated as purely domestic, as regional narratives and external influence regularly shape local discourse. To change the situation, the report called for stronger digital governance, clearer legal definitions, greater transparency in Arabic-language moderation, and digital literacy programs focused on how disinformation spreads through algorithms and online echo chambers. Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). Mapping Digital Hate: Jordan. [online] Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Mapping-digital-hate_Jordan.pdf Top Of Page Antisemitic Conspiracies Spread Through Social Media Algorithms Research by ISD showed that algorithm-driven disinformation and harmful recommendation systems on TikTok and Rumble are exposing UK minors to antisemitic content, often without users actively searching for it. TikTok’s recommendation algorithm gradually pushes young users from lifestyle-related content toward conspiracy theories and politically charged antisemitic narratives. Rumble presents a more direct threat, exposing users immediately to overt hate speech and violent conspiracy content through its "Editor’s Picks" feature. algorithms amplify disinformation by connecting mainstream topics, such as lifestyle content or discussions around the Israel-Palestine conflict, to extremist narratives. Interactive features, including comments, stickers, and sounds, further accelerate the spread of harmful misinformation by linking seemingly benign posts to coded antisemitic messaging. Additionally, the findings highlighted major failures in platform moderation and content detection, particularly in identifying coded hate speech and preventing algorithmic escalation. It showed that reactive content removal is insufficient, calling instead for stronger regulation, algorithmic transparency, and proactive safeguards under the UK Online Safety Act. Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). Amplifying Antisemitism: How Recommender Algorithms Serve Harmful Content to Children. [online] Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Amplifying-Antisemitism_How-Recommender-Algorithms-Serve-Harmful-Content-to-Children.pdf Top Of Page Trump’s Assassination Attempt Creates Waves of Misinformation in the Media As published by Wired, recent online discussions surrounding alleged assassination attempts against President Donald Trump (for further information, see W18 April Cyfluence Report) have become a major example of disinformation spreading across both left-wing and right-wing communities. Following the White House Correspondents’ Dinner incident, social media was quickly flooded with unsupported claims that the attack was staged. These narratives then expanded to include the 2024 Butler, Pennsylvania, assassination attempt, with influencers and commentators promoting conspiracy theories despite the lack of credible evidence. The disinformation relies on the selective interpretation of incomplete information, misleading video clips, and speculative claims presented as proof. Viral posts pointed to Trump’s public reactions, the positioning of photographers, security procedures, and limited public details about the attackers as supposed evidence of orchestration. However, available reporting, witness accounts, and official investigations contradict these claims, showing that many of the so-called "anomalies" are either misrepresented or taken out of context. Source: WIRED. There is no evidence the Trump assassination attempts were staged. People still believe they were. [online] Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/there-is-no-evidence-the-trump-assassination-attempts-were-staged-people-still-believe-they-were/ Top Of Page Natural Disasters Disinformation Networks Graphika’s founder's appearance on "60 Minutes" on the 26th of April was published in Graphika this week, revealing that natural disasters have become prime opportunities for misinformation actors to exploit public attention and spread false narratives. Because such crises focus widespread public attention on a single event, extremist groups use these moments to push misleading content and amplify distrust in official institutions. These campaigns often present distorted or alternative explanations designed to exploit fear and uncertainty during emergencies. Foreign influence networks, including white nationalist networks, have increasingly used disaster zones to promote themselves through highly visible aid efforts while spreading conspiracy theories that undermine trust in government agencies such as FEMA. By portraying themselves as more effective than official responders, they seek to recruit supporters and legitimize their agendas. Foreign state-linked actors have also weaponized disaster-related disinformation. Chinese influence networks, for example, have used U.S. natural disasters to promote narratives of American government failure while portraying China’s crisis response as superior. Source: Graphika. What We Told 60 Minutes: What Happens Online When Natural Disaster Strikes. [online] Available at: https://graphika.com/posts/what-we-told-60-minutes-what-happens-online-when-natural-disaster-strikes Top Of Page Foreign Manipulation Takes Advantage of the Alberta Separatist Debate According to a report by DisinfoWatch, foreign actors are increasingly exploiting the Alberta separatist debate to spread disinformation, deepen internal divisions, and undermine trust in Canada’s democratic institutions. While Alberta’s political and economic grievances are legitimate topics for democratic debate, external influence campaigns seek to distort these concerns by portraying separation as inevitable or widely supported. This manipulation threatens Canada’s "cognitive sovereignty": the public’s ability to make political decisions free from foreign interference. The report identified three main disinformation sources: covert Russian influence operations, overt amplification by U.S. political figures and influencers, and AI-generated "slopaganda". Russian-linked media networks have repeatedly promoted narratives depicting Alberta as exploited and primed for separation, while U.S.-based influencers have amplified annexation and instability narratives to massive online audiences. At the same time, AI-generated political content can imitate authentic Canadian commentary and make coordinated manipulation harder to detect. The greatest concern is that these disinformation efforts exploit existing public distrust and information gaps, particularly during sensitive political moments such as petition verification, referendum campaigns, or post-vote disputes. The report emphasized that strengthening media literacy, improving rapid-response systems, and supporting independent journalism are essential to countering foreign manipulation before such narratives take hold. Source: DisinfoWatch. Foreign interference targeting Canada and Alberta. [online] Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/foreign-interference-targeting-canada-and-alberta/ Top Of Page The Evolution of South African Media and Its Effect on Society According to an article by The Conversation, South African television reflects the country’s broader political and social struggles, particularly in the way information has been controlled and sometimes distorted. Introduced only in 1976 after years of government resistance, television was initially used by the apartheid regime as a tool of propaganda and exclusion. By limiting access and carefully controlling content, the state used broadcasting to reinforce disinformation, preserve racial segregation, and isolate South Africans from global narratives and alternative perspectives. With the arrival of democracy in 1994, television underwent a major transformation. The broadcasting system shifted from a state-controlled monopoly to a more diverse and competitive media environment, with the SABC redefined as a public broadcaster meant to inform, educate, and represent all communities. This period marked an effort to replace propaganda with inclusive storytelling and nation-building. However, later years saw renewed challenges, including political interference, financial mismanagement, and forms of institutional manipulation that threatened editorial independence and raised concerns about the spread of biased or misleading information. Today, South African television operates in a digital era shaped by streaming platforms and algorithm-driven media. While these platforms offer opportunities to globalize local stories and amplify marginalized voices, they also create new risks of disinformation through commercial influence and unequal control over narratives. The history of South African television highlights the continuing struggle to ensure the media remains a source of accurate representation rather than distortion. Therefore, the fight against disinformation is central to the country’s democratic future. Source: The Conversation. Propaganda machine to public good: A brief history of 50 years of TV in South Africa. [online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/propaganda-machine-to-public-good-a-brief-history-of-50-years-of-tv-in-south-africa-280085 Top Of Page Jailbroken AI Models Fuel Disinformation and Malicious Operations A publication by VSW Bundesverband describes how jailbroken AI models are being exploited by hostile actors to support disinformation operations, cyber activities, and potential physical attacks. By bypassing built-in safeguards, these manipulated systems can generate harmful content that would normally be restricted, including propaganda narratives, malicious guidance, and operational planning materials. The report highlights growing concerns that such capabilities are increasingly accessible to state-linked groups and extremist networks seeking to amplify influence campaigns and destabilizing activities. According to the article, the primary tactic involves “jailbreaking” AI systems through specially crafted prompts designed to override safety controls and content restrictions. Once compromised, the models can be used to automate the creation of persuasive false narratives, coordinate deceptive online messaging, and assist in producing detailed instructions for malicious operations. The article emphasizes that these techniques lower the technical barrier for conducting influence and disruption campaigns at scale. The actors referenced in the article include state-affiliated entities, cybercriminal groups, and other malicious organizations seeking strategic advantages through AI-enabled manipulation. The report frames the issue as part of a broader information security challenge in which generative AI tools are increasingly weaponized for hostile influence operations, disinformation dissemination, and coordinated destabilization efforts. Source: Verein für Sicherheitspolitik (VSW) Bundesverband. Studie: Desinformation. [online] Available at: https://www.vsw-bundesverband.de/wp-content/uploads/Studie-Desinformation.pdf Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] South Korea Battles Surge In AI-Driven Election Disinformation A France24 article examines how South Korea is confronting the rapid expansion of AI-driven disinformation ahead of national and local elections, as increasingly sophisticated generative AI tools enable the production of highly convincing fabricated content. South Korean election authorities and digital forensic teams have identified a sharp rise in manipulated media, including fake television reports, AI-generated political propaganda songs, and fabricated videos targeting political candidates. The report highlights that false AI-generated election content increased dramatically between the 2024 general election and the subsequent presidential campaign, reflecting the accelerating use of generative AI in influence operations. Election officials described the challenge as a constant “whack-a-mole” struggle, with disinformation spreading rapidly across social media platforms, chatrooms, and politically aligned online communities. The article further details how conspiracy narratives surrounding election fraud and vote-rigging have amplified distrust in democratic institutions, including claims promoted by supporters of former president Yoon Suk Yeol. Authorities have responded with strengthened legislation introduced in 2023, allowing the removal of deceptive AI-generated election content and imposing severe penalties on repeat offenders. Detection efforts combine AI-based forensic software with human review to identify manipulated imagery and media. The report emphasizes that hostile information tactics increasingly exploit emotionally persuasive AI-generated narratives, deepfake content, and coordinated amplification across digital platforms, while online harassment and intimidation campaigns against election workers further contribute to the destabilization of the information environment. Source: France 24. AI disinfo tests South Korean laws ahead of local elections. [online] Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260507-ai-disinfo-tests-south-korean-laws-ahead-of-local-elections Top Of Page eYou as a European Alternative to X With AI Fact-Checking According to an article by CyberNews, a new European social media platform called eYou aims to position itself as an alternative to X by offering AI-powered fact-checking in real time. Founded by French entrepreneur Grégoire Vigroux and his partner Jasseem Allybokus, the platform was developed after surveys showed widespread concern about fake news and algorithm-driven echo chambers on social media. eYou use multiple large language models simultaneously to reduce bias and improve fact-checking accuracy, while also dividing its feed into followed accounts, discovery content, and a curated news section powered by sources such as Agence France-Presse. The platform also places strong emphasis on European data sovereignty. According to the company, all user data is stored in Belgium under GDPR protections to reduce dependence on American and Chinese technology platforms. Unlike many social networks, eYou currently operates without advertising and presents itself as a more user-centric and responsible alternative focused on reducing misinformation rather than maximizing engagement. As of now, most users are based in Romania, where the company operates, although the platform is also seeing growing interest from users in the United States. Source: Cybernews. Eyou social media. [online] Available at: https://www.cybernews.com/tech/eyou-social-media/ Top Of Page Poland Launches a New Initiative Against Disinformation As published by TVP World, Poland’s state-owned media organizations launched a joint fact-checking initiative called "Sprawdzam to" ("I’m checking this") to combat the growing spread of disinformation. The project, created by Telewizja Polska, the Polish Press Agency, and Polish Radio, will operate through a new online platform that will publish fact-checks, investigative reports, and analysis of how false information is created and spread. The initiative aims to strengthen public access to verified information and improve awareness of media manipulation. The launch comes amid increasing concerns over foreign disinformation campaigns targeting Poland’s information space. Polish officials have linked many of these operations to Russia and Belarus, describing them as part of hybrid warfare designed to create confusion, weaken public trust, and destabilize the country. According to officials, false narratives have accompanied incidents such as Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace and acts of railway sabotage, with online campaigns attempting to shift blame onto Ukraine or NATO. Source: TVP World. After the drones came the trolls, now Poland is fighting back online. [online] Published 7 May 2026. Available at: https://tvpworld.com/93126173/drones-sabotage-and-trolls-polands-new-front-line-is-fact-checking Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

Cyfluence Research Center (CRC) has identified an emerging, state-aligned influence network targeting English-language discourse about the South China Sea. The campaign combines Chinese institutional actors, credentialed researchers, and inauthentic social media amplifiers to shape international perceptions in favor of the PRC. The network operates through a 3-layered model that includes think tanks, researchers, and inauthentic X accounts that promote dominant narratives framing China as a responsible regional actor while targeting other nations’ presence as destabilizing forces. Key Takeaways CRC researchers identified an emerging coordinated influence network targeting English language discourse on the South China Sea, combining Chinese stateaffiliated institutions, researchers, and inauthentic amplification assets. The network operates through a hybrid model of legitimacy and amplification, where credible actors provide authoritative framing while pseudonymous accounts expand reach and simulate organic engagement. Behavioral indicators demonstrate a deliberate coordination effort, supported by a high volume (~35%) of inauthentic or bot-like activity. The observed cluster is assessed to be in early establishment stages and aligns with known Chinese efforts to achieve long-term narrative dominance. Author: The CRC Team [Download PDF Here]

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 20th to the 26th of April 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] X Investigation Into Disinformation and Misconduct On X Russia The Narrative of Russian Colonialism Russian Propaganda as a Weapon and Its Impact on Belief and Behavior The EU Lists Two Entities for Information Manipulation Activities China Chinese Influence Operation Targets Tibetan Elections Iran Pro-Iran Sources Reframed U.S. Strike Video as Two Different Iranian Victories Antisemitic Narratives Surge Following the Iran Conflict Iran’s Generated Misinformation Strategy During War Iran Uses Viral AI Propaganda to Distract Western Audiences [AI Related Articles] Deepfakes Targeting U.S. Officials AI-Generated Influencer Spreads Political Disinformation Jailbroken AI Enables Disinformation and Attack Planning [General Reports] Orbán’s Hungary Defeat Showed Disinformation is Not a Political Magic Trick The Role of Meme Culture in Shaping War Perception and Understanding Trump Pope Rift Sparked Viral False Claims [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Campaign to Counter Climate Disinformation EU Mission to Strengthen Armenia’s Resilience EU Calls for Initiative to Tackle Evolving Disinformation Threats EU Tackles Disinformation Through New Media Program Biometric Verification to Counter AI-Driven Disinformation and Fraud [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] An article by The Psychological Defense Agency argued that Russia has long functioned as a colonial empire, but that misleading narratives have obscured its history. The European Union announced it has imposed sanctions on two entities: Euromore and Pravfond, for their role in spreading disinformation as part of Russia’s hybrid strategy. As published by DFR Lab, a China-linked influence network known as Spamouflage has been spreading disinformation ahead of the April 26 elections for the Central Tibetan Administration. As published by ISD, following the 28th of February strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran, online antisemitic content rose sharply, increasing by 68% within a week. As revealed in a CyberNews article, a medical student used AI tools, including Gemini, to create a fake online persona named Emily Hart, demonstrating how deepfakes can be monetized. Based on an analysis by Tech Policy Press, Hungary’s April 2026 parliamentary election offered a clear reminder that disinformation is not a decisive political force on its own. As published by NewsGuard's Reality Check, Tensions between Donald Trump and Pope Leo XIV have fueled a wave of viral misinformation on social media, with multiple false claims gaining significant traction online. The European Union announced that its Delegation to Türkiye has launched a new initiative to combat disinformation through a television programme called Ambassadors of Truth, produced in collaboration with CNN Türk. [ Report Summary] According to a report by The Hill, French prosecutors have summoned Elon Musk and former X CEO Linda Yaccarino for questioning over alleged misconduct linked to X. An article by The Psychological Defense Agency argued that Russia has long functioned as a colonial empire, but that misleading narratives have obscured its history. A study by the Ukrainian NGO LingvaLexa, conducted with support from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, found that Kremlin propaganda plays a direct and measurable role in shaping the beliefs and behavior of Russian soldiers. The European Union announced it has imposed sanctions on two entities: Euromore and Pravfond, for their role in spreading disinformation as part of Russia’s hybrid strategy. As published by DFR Lab, a China-linked influence network known as Spamouflage has been spreading disinformation ahead of the April 26 elections for the Central Tibetan Administration. As reported by NewsGuard's Reality Check, Pro-Iran social media accounts have circulated a video of a burning ship in the Strait of Hormuz, falsely presenting it as evidence of Iranian military success. An article from Le Monde states that Iranian state-linked actors deploy AI-generated, highly shareable propaganda content to manipulate narratives, amplify anti-Western messaging, and divert attention from domestic issues. As published by ISD, following the 28th of February strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran, online antisemitic content rose sharply, increasing by 68% within a week. According to an article by ISD, since the start of the Iran war, official Iranian accounts on X have shifted from formal messaging to provocative, meme-driven content designed to maximize engagement. A recent analysis by CyberNews found 156 deepfake incidents involving U.S. government officials over two years. As revealed in a CyberNews article, a medical student used AI tools, including Gemini, to create a fake online persona named Emily Hart, demonstrating how deepfakes can be monetized. Based on an analysis by Tech Policy Press, Hungary’s April 2026 parliamentary election offered a clear reminder that disinformation is not a decisive political force on its own. According to an article by Wired, modern conflicts are increasingly mediated through memes and meme-like content that simplify, decontextualize, and emotionally amplify war narratives, often creating a widespread illusion of understanding without deeper knowledge. As published by NewsGuard's Reality Check, Tensions between Donald Trump and Pope Leo XIV have fueled a wave of viral misinformation on social media, with multiple false claims gaining significant traction online. According to a short publication by The European Commission, it has launched the #ClimateFactsMatter campaign to address the growing spread of climate disinformation across the EU. An article published by Politico highlights that jailbroken AI models allow state-linked and malicious actors to bypass safeguards, enabling the spread of disinformation and the generation of detailed plans for cyber and physical attacks. The EEAS European External Action Service announced that the European Union has launched a new civilian mission in Armenia, known as EUPM Armenia, aimed at strengthening the country’s resilience against complex threats. The European Commission announced it has launched a new funding call under its European Democracy Shield strategy to strengthen research on information integrity. The European Union announced that its Delegation to Türkiye has launched a new initiative to combat disinformation through a television programme called Ambassadors of Truth, produced in collaboration with CNN Türk. According to a report by CyberNews, as AI-generated content becomes harder to distinguish from reality, concerns over disinformation and fraud are growing. [Social Media] X Investigation Into Disinformation and Misconduct On X According to a report by The Hill, French prosecutors have summoned Elon Musk and former X CEO Linda Yaccarino for questioning over alleged misconduct linked to X. Central to the investigation are claims that X facilitated the spread of illegal and harmful content, including child sexual abuse material and AI-generated deepfakes. Authorities emphasized that these interviews aim to assess compliance with French law and determine whether platform leadership adequately addressed these risks. A major focus of the case is disinformation generated by Grok. The chatbot reportedly produced false and harmful content, including Holocaust denial narratives and explicit nonconsensual deepfakes. Although Grok later corrected some outputs, the incident raised serious concerns about how AI systems can amplify disinformation on a scale. French officials are also investigating whether X’s algorithms contributed to biased or distorted information flows, further undermining public trust. Prosecutors additionally suspect that the controversy surrounding Grok’s disinformation may have been deliberately amplified to influence market value ahead of a planned corporate listing involving Musk’s companies. Meanwhile, U.S. authorities currently decline to assist the French probe. Source: Associated Press. French prosecutors summon Elon Musk over allegations of child abuse images and deepfakes on X. [online] Published 20 April 2026. Available at: https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-technology/france-elon-musk-x-social-media/?email=467cb6399cb7df64551775e431052b43a775c749&emaila=12a6d4d069cd56cfddaa391c24eb7042&emailb=054528e7403871c79f668e49dd3c44b1ec00c7f611bf9388f76bb2324d6ca5f3&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=04.20.26%20Tech Top Of Page [State Actors] Russia The Narrative of Russian Colonialism An article by The Psychological Defense Agency argued that Russia has long functioned as a colonial empire, but that misleading narratives have obscured its history. Unlike other European empires, Russian expansion has often been framed as defensive or civilizing rather than imperial. Such narratives act as a form of disinformation, masking patterns of domination and shaping global misunderstanding of both past and present conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. Propaganda and distorted historical claims have been used to justify Russian actions. These include portraying conquest as beneficial, denying colonial practices, and spreading narratives that Russia is uniquely “anti-colonial.” The article points to modern examples like state-aligned media and online content that present occupation as positive while ignoring violence, repression, and cultural erasure. It concluded that such disinformation has severe consequences - it delays recognition of imperial behavior, weakens international responses, and enables continued aggression. Source: Psychological Defence Agency. The Last European Colonial Empire. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://mpf.se/download/18.732eef4e19d7078d81ab8/1775717958942/The-last-european-colonial-empire.pdf Top Of Page Russian Propaganda as a Weapon and Its Impact on Belief and Behavior A study by the Ukrainian NGO LingvaLexa, conducted with support from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, found that Kremlin propaganda plays a direct and measurable role in shaping the beliefs and behavior of Russian soldiers. Based on surveys of over 1,000 prisoners of war, the research showed that a large majority accepted at least some state narratives, with many viewing the invasion of Ukraine as justified. Those who believed propaganda more strongly were significantly more likely to support the war, dehumanize Ukrainians, resist surrender, and express willingness to fight again, indicating that propaganda is not just background noise, but a key driver of combat motivation. The study also highlighted the central role of anti-Western narratives, which frame the war as a defensive struggle against NATO and a broader "decadent" West. These narratives were widely believed among surveyed soldiers and proved just as influential as other propaganda themes in shaping attitudes and behavior. The findings suggested that propaganda should be understood as a core instrument of modern warfare, one that facilitates mobilization, sustains aggression, and influences battlefield decisions. The report called for stronger international recognition of propaganda as a tool of aggression, including potential legal accountability not only for political leaders but also for those involved in creating and disseminating such narratives. Source: The Ukrainian NGO LingvaLexa. Words that Kill: How Russian Propaganda Shapes Mobilizarion and Combat Motivation. [online] Google Drive. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NEQFv4YCQ0boNq6EbIeIDeqyUTwn3U6n/view Top Of Page The EU Lists Two Entities for Information Manipulation Activities The European Union announced it has imposed sanctions on two entities: Euromore and Pravfond, for their role in spreading disinformation as part of Russia’s hybrid strategy. Euromore functions as an unofficial media relay, amplifying and legitimizing pro-Kremlin narratives aimed at European audiences, including content that questions the legitimacy of EU institutions and justifies Russia’s war against Ukraine. Pravfond, funded by the Russian state, contributes to disinformation through legal and analytical materials that reinforce key propaganda claims. These include false narratives such as the "Nazification of Ukraine”, "Russophobia”, and alleged persecution of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring countries. Together, these efforts are designed to manipulate public perception and weaken trust in democratic institutions. At the same time, as reported by EU VS Disinfo, pro-Kremlin disinformation continues to recycle familiar narratives. These include portraying Ukraine as a "terrorist state" allegedly supported by NATO, reviving long-debunked conspiracy theories about Western "biolabs", and spreading false claims about secret NATO infrastructure. Disinformation surrounding the Bucha massacre has also evolved, from outright denial to more complex conspiracy theories aimed at deflecting responsibility for documented war crimes. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Russian hybrid threats: EU lists two entities over information manipulation activities. [online] Published 22 April 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/russian-hybrid-threats-eu-lists-two-entities-over-information-manipulation-activities_en EUvsDisinfo. Disinformation Review: EU sanctions and the Kremlin’s recycled narratives. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-review-eu-sanctions-and-the-kremlins-recycled-narratives/ Top Of Page China Chinese Influence Operation Targets Tibetan Elections As published by DFR Lab, a China-linked influence network known as Spamouflage has been spreading disinformation ahead of the April 26 elections for the Central Tibetan Administration. This activity is part of a broader pattern of Chinese information manipulation targeting multiple countries and issues, including Taiwan, the United States, and Japan. Using dozens of fake Facebook and Instagram profiles, the operation promotes misleading narratives aimed at undermining trust in the Tibetan democratic process. These include personal attacks against leader Penpa Tsering, claims that the elections are manipulated, and portrayals of the government as corrupt or dominated by religious elites. The campaign relies on coordinated, inauthentic behavior, including mass-sharing posts within its own network to simulate credibility. It also amplifies real controversies by inserting false or exaggerated claims, attempting to deepen divisions within the Tibetan community. AI-generated images and recycled narratives are used to make the disinformation appear more convincing, although most posts receive little genuine engagement. Despite becoming more technologically sophisticated, the operation has largely failed to gain significant organic traction. Source: Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). China-linked Spamouflage targets Tibetan parliament-in-exile elections. [online] Published 24 April 2026. Available at: https://dfrlab.org/2026/04/24/china-linked-spamouflage-targets-tibetan-parliament-in-exile-elections/ Top Of Page Iran Pro-Iran Sources Reframed U.S. Strike Video as Two Different Iranian Victories As reported by NewsGuard's Reality Check, Pro-Iran social media accounts have circulated a video of a burning ship in the Strait of Hormuz, falsely presenting it as evidence of Iranian military success. Initially, the footage was shared as proof that Iran had sunk a U.S. vessel near Bandar Abbas. Days later, the same video was reused to claim that Iranian forces had severely damaged Indian-flagged ships. In reality, the video showed a U.S. strike on an Iranian warship, identified through visual analysis as the IRIS Haj Qasem, with no credible evidence supporting either of the viral claims. The misinformation emerged amid escalating tensions following the collapse of U.S.-Iran peace talks and a subsequent maritime blockade ordered by Donald Trump. Since the war began in late February 2026, reports indicated that over 155 Iranian naval vessels have been destroyed by U.S. and Israeli operations. While Iran did intercept two Indian-flagged ships, verified reports showed only minor damage, with no injuries or major losses. Source: NewsGuard. One video, two conflicting false narratives. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/one-video-two-conflicting-false-narratives Top Of Page Antisemitic Narratives Surge Following the Iran Conflict As published by ISD, following the 28th of February strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran, online antisemitic content rose sharply, increasing by 68% within a week. Much of this surge was driven by disinformation and conspiracy theories, particularly claims that the war was a “false flag” orchestrated by Jewish elites or that Western governments are controlled by a hidden Jewish power structure. These narratives, widely shared across platforms, reframed the conflict through misleading and harmful lenses that amplified distrust and hostility. Disinformation also spread through distorted criticism of Israel, where legitimate political debate was often mixed with antisemitic tropes. Online content frequently blames Jewish communities worldwide for the actions of the Israeli state or uses Holocaust-related distortions to push false narratives. At the same time, direct hate speech and slurs increased significantly, creating a more aggressive and hostile digital environment shaped by viral misinformation and conspiracy-driven rhetoric. This wave of disinformation had real-world consequences, coinciding with a rise in antisemitic attacks across several countries. Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). The impact of the war with Iran on antisemitic discourse. [online] Published 22 April 2026. Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/the-impact-of-the-war-with-iran-on-antisemitic-discourse/ Top Of Page Iran’s Generated Misinformation Strategy During War According to an article by ISD, since the start of the Iran war, official Iranian accounts on X have shifted from formal messaging to provocative, meme-driven content designed to maximize engagement. This includes AI-generated and misleading visuals targeting figures like Donald Trump and references to conspiracy-linked individuals such as Jeffrey Epstein. While often framed as humor, this content blends satire with disinformation, distorting political narratives and trivializing serious geopolitical issues. The strategy has proven highly effective in spreading these narratives, generating hundreds of millions of views and dramatically increasing likes, shares, and comments. By using viral, platform-native formats, Iranian state actors have expanded their reach and made disinformation more accessible, especially to online audiences less engaged with traditional political messaging. This approach has also helped reshape perceptions of Iran, portraying it as a relatable or even sympathetic “underdog” rather than focusing on its controversial policies or human rights record. Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). Iran’s diplomats launch a meme war. [online] Published 23 April 2026. Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/irans-diplomats-launch-a-meme-war/ Top Of Page Iran Uses Viral AI Propaganda to Distract Western Audiences An article from Le Monde describes a coordinated Iranian propaganda campaign that leverages advanced generative AI and pop-culture aesthetics to conduct influence operations targeting Western audiences. Regime-linked actors, particularly a studio identified as Explosive Media, produce high-quality animated videos, often using Lego-style visuals, that mock U.S. and Israeli leaders and promote anti-Western narratives. These materials are disseminated across major social media platforms (X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok), achieving large-scale reach through viral distribution, with hundreds of millions of views. The campaign combines technical sophistication with humor, satire, and emotionally engaging content to increase acceptability and shareability, particularly among politically disengaged or neutral audiences. Tactically, the operation relies on narrative manipulation, co-opting existing anti-establishment sentiment and embedding ideological messaging within entertaining formats to obscure propagandistic intent. It employs distortion and omission, including downplaying or denying state violence and reframing geopolitical dynamics to divide adversaries, such as portraying the United States as subordinate to Israel. The campaign also exploits amplification dynamics, as media coverage and public attention in the West further extend its reach, inadvertently reinforcing its impact. Analysts warn that this strategy diverts attention from domestic repression in Iran and functions as a broader disinformation effort aimed at weakening democratic discourse by shaping perceptions and redirecting focus away from human rights issues. Source: Le Monde. How Tehran’s propaganda lures the West into distraction. [online] Published 25 April 2026. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2026/04/25/how-tehran-s-propaganda-lures-the-west-into-distraction_6752815_8.html Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] Deepfakes Targeting U.S. Officials A recent analysis by CyberNews found 156 deepfake incidents involving U.S. government officials over two years. Most cases focus on a small group of high-profile figures, especially Donald Trump, who alone accounts for 58% of all incidents. Notably, some of these deepfakes are self-generated or shared by individuals, blurring the line between deliberate disinformation and political messaging. Other frequent targets include Marco Rubio, JD Vance, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. While the raw numbers suggest Republicans are targeted more often, this is largely due to Trump’s dominance in the dataset; excluding him, deepfake incidents are relatively balanced between political parties. Generally, Deepfake-driven disinformation tends to focus on widely recognizable leaders rather than on the broader political system, as familiar figures are more likely to attract attention and influence public opinion. Source: Cybernews. Trump, Rubio and Vance are the most deepfaked U.S. government officials in office today. [online] Published 23 April 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/most-deepfaked-us-government-officials/ Top Of Page AI-Generated Influencer Spreads Political Disinformation As revealed in a CyberNews article, a medical student used AI tools, including Gemini, to create a fake online persona named Emily Hart, demonstrating how deep fakes can be monetized. By targeting a specific political audience of older, conservative, pro-Trump users, the creator crafted posts promoting divisive and misleading narratives on issues like immigration, religion, and politics, often aligned with supporters of Donald Trump. The strategy relied on AI-generated images and tailored messaging designed to appear authentic and emotionally engaging. This approach quickly gained traction, with some posts reaching millions of views and attracting thousands of followers, many of whom paid for exclusive content. Although the accounts were eventually suspended, the operation shows how easily individuals can use AI to create convincing fake identities that spread misleading content on a large scale. Sources: Cybernews. Indian man is behind MAGA’s AI-generated sweetheart Emily Hart. [online] Published 25 April 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/emily-hart-maga/ Top Of Page Jailbroken AI Enables Disinformation and Attack Planning An article published by Politico highlights the growing exploitation of artificial intelligence by malicious actors, demonstrating how AI systems, when stripped of built-in safeguards, can be weaponized to support harmful and potentially violent activities. Researchers from the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology and Education Center (NCITE) showed U.S. lawmakers that “jailbroken” or “abliterated” AI models, with disabled safety mechanisms, can generate detailed instructions for terrorism, cyberattacks, and criminal acts. These models, unlike safeguarded “censored” systems, provide step-by-step guidance for executing attacks, illustrating how easily adversaries can manipulate AI tools to bypass restrictions. Tactics used include prompt engineering techniques, such as disguising harmful queries in complex or academic language, to evade detection systems and extract prohibited information. The article also identifies state-linked actors and cyber threat groups as key participants in leveraging AI for disinformation and offensive operations. Russia-linked groups have reportedly used AI models to disseminate disinformation online, while Beijing-backed hackers attempted to automate cyberattacks using advanced language models. The accessibility of off-the-shelf AI tools further lowers the barrier for such activities, increasing the risk of widespread misuse. Overall, the article underscores a rapidly evolving threat landscape in which both state and non-state actors exploit vulnerabilities in AI systems to conduct influence operations, spread disinformation, and enable harmful real-world actions, raising significant concerns about the adequacy of current safeguards and regulatory responses. Sources: Politico. AI chatbots can be jailbroken, alarming lawmakers and exposing safety gaps. [online] Published 22 April 2026. Available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/22/ai-chatbots-jailbreak-safety-00887869 Top Of Page [General Reports] Orbán’s Hungary Defeat Showed Disinformation is Not a Political Magic Trick Based on an analysis by Tech Policy Press, Hungary’s April 2026 parliamentary election offered a clear reminder that disinformation is not a decisive political force on its own. In the election, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party lost to newcomer Péter Magyar, despite a campaign marked by extensive pro-government disinformation. While Fidesz spread coordinated false claims, such as manipulated videos alleging plans to reintroduce conscription, this did not prevent a decisive opposition victory. The findings reinforced that the purpose of factchecking is not to sway election outcomes, but to provide voters with reliable information and tools to assess claims independently. The campaign also highlighted the limits of other commonly cited influences. Russian-linked disinformation efforts appeared weak and largely ineffective compared to domestic propaganda networks. At the same time, AI-generated political content was widely used by both sides, often to provoke emotional responses rather than to convincingly deceive. Meanwhile, the EU-driven ban on political advertising by platforms such as Meta and Google significantly reduced the volume of online propaganda and may have benefited the opposition, which achieved stronger organic engagement. Source: Fülöp, Z. and Teczár, S. Orbán’s Hungary defeat shows disinformation is not a political magic trick. [online] Tech Policy Press. Published 20 April 2026. Available at: https://www.techpolicy.press/orbns-hungary-defeat-shows-disinformation-is-not-a-political-magic-trick/ (techpolicy.press) Top Of Page The Role of Meme Culture in Shaping War Perception and Understanding According to an article by Wired, Recent conflicts involving the United States, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon have spread widely on social media, not only through news but through memes. These ranged from jokes about conscription and viral songs to dark humor about missile strikes and wartime life. While humor has long been a way to cope with fear and uncertainty, social media has transformed it into a fast-moving, global phenomenon. Memes are designed to be simple, relatable, and highly shareable, often stripping away context in favor of engagement. Governments are increasingly adopting meme-like formats to shape narratives, blending real footage with cinematic edits, gaming references, or AI-generated visuals. This content spreads easily because it mirrors the language of online culture, making propaganda more accessible and emotionally engaging. However, this environment creates an "illusion of understanding", where constant exposure to simplified content makes people feel informed without deep knowledge. Source: WIRED. War memes are turning conflict into content. [online] Published 20 April 2026. Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/war-memes-turn-conflict-into-content/ Top Of Page Trump Pope Rift Sparked Viral False Claims As published by NewsGuard's Reality Check, Tensions between Donald Trump and Pope Leo XIV have fueled the spread of 3 viral false claims related to the Catholic Church, garnering 1.5 million views on the social media platform X alone. The claims began spreading on the 12th of April 2026, following public criticism exchanged between the two figures. Both pro- and anti-Trump users circulated claims that the pope donated to Kamala Harris’s campaign, a fabricated quote attributed to Cardinal Timothy Dolan supporting Trump, and a fake post suggesting Trump threatened the Vatican with secret "files". None of these claims is supported by evidence. Source: NewsGuard. Trump-Pope rift sparks viral false claims. [online] Published 24 April 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/trump-pope-rift-sparks-viral-false Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Campaign to Counter Climate Disinformation According to a short publication by The European Commission, it has launched the #ClimateFactsMatter campaign to address the growing spread of climate disinformation across the EU. Led by its climate department, the initiative provides multilingual resources: videos, infographics, and guides, to help citizens recognize misleading content and better understand climate issues and policies. The campaign focuses on exposing how disinformation distorts public understanding of climate change, often by spreading false or misleading claims that undermine trust in scientific facts and delay action. It offers practical tools for identifying manipulation techniques and encourages critical thinking about the sources and intent behind climate-related information. Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Climate Action. #ClimateFactsMatter: Countering climate disinformation in the EU. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-disinformation/climatefactsmatter-countering-climate-disinformation-eu_en (climate.ec.europa.eu) Top Of Page EU Mission to Strengthen Armenia’s Resilience The EEAS European External Action Service announced that the European Union has launched a new civilian mission in Armenia, known as EUPM Armenia, aimed at strengthening the country’s resilience against complex threats. Operating under the Common Security and Defence Policy, the mission will provide strategic and operational support to Armenian institutions in addressing challenges such as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyberattacks, and illicit financial activities. It will focus on capacity building across government bodies and promote a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to crisis management and national security. The mission, requested by Armenian authorities, will initially run for two years and be headquartered in Armenia. It complements the existing EU Mission in Armenia, which focuses on observation and confidence-building in conflict-affected areas. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Armenia: EU establishes a new civilian mission to contribute to strengthening the country’s resilience. [online] Published 21 April 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/armenia-eu-establishes-new-civilian-mission-contribute-strengthening-country%E2%80%99s-resilience_en (consilium.europa.eu) Top Of Page EU Calls for Initiative to Tackle Evolving Disinformation Threats The European Commission announced it has launched a new funding call under its European Democracy Shield strategy to strengthen research on information integrity. The initiative responds to the rapid rise of disinformation and manipulation tactics online, including the use of AI-generated content, fake websites, influencer misuse, and the exploitation of algorithms to amplify misleading or divisive narratives. The proposal emphasized that by distorting information environments, influencers can affect elections, policy debates, and individual choices, making it essential to better understand how such manipulation operates and spreads. To counter this, the EU plans to invest in research infrastructure and collaboration across sectors such as academia, civil society, and technology to improve the ability to detect, analyze, and respond to disinformation. Source: European Commission. New open call for proposals under the Digital Europe Programme. [online] Published 21 April 2026. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/new-open-call-proposals-under-digital-europe-programme Top Of Page EU Tackles Disinformation Through New Media Program The European Union announced that its Delegation to Türkiye has launched a new initiative to combat disinformation through a television programme called Ambassadors of Truth, produced in collaboration with CNN Türk. The show aims to educate audiences about how disinformation operates, why it spreads, especially during crises, and how individuals can better recognize and resist misleading content. Hosted by Nezih Orhon, the programme brings together experts from academia, media, and fact-checking organizations to examine key disinformation challenges. Topics include the risks of AI-generated content, health misinformation, foreign influence campaigns, and the vulnerabilities of children and families in the digital space. It also highlights how false or manipulated information can undermine trust and decision-making. Beyond raising awareness, the initiative focuses on practical solutions, offering viewers tools to verify information and navigate online media more critically. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Delegation of the European Union to Türkiye takes a new step in the fight against disinformation: “Ambassadors of Truth” premieres on CNN Türk. [online] Published 24 April 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/t%C3%BCrkiye/ambassadors-truth_en Top Of Page Biometric Verification to Counter AI-Driven Disinformation and Fraud According to a report by CyberNews, as AI-generated content becomes harder to distinguish from reality, concerns over disinformation and fraud are growing. A company co-founded by Sam Altman, Tools for Humanity, is partnering with Match Group and Zoom to introduce biometric identity verification. Their solution, the “Orb”, uses iris scanning to confirm whether users are real humans, aiming to reduce the spread of fake identities and AI-generated personas online. This effort responds to the increasing use of synthetic media and deepfakes in disinformation campaigns and scams. Instead of detecting fake content directly, the system verifies real users and assigns a “proof-of-human” badge to their profiles. While technology promises greater trust and security, it also raises questions about privacy and accessibility. As AI continues to enable large-scale deception, tools like biometric verification highlight the growing need for new defenses against disinformation, even as they introduce new challenges around data protection and user trust. Source: Cybernews. Sam Altman’s iris-scanning company joins forces with Tinder and Zoom to exterminate deepfake scams. [online] Published 23 April 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/tinder-zoom-human-verification/ Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

As cyber and influence operations grow increasingly intertwined, a reductive framing of "cyber-enabled influence" is no longer sufficient. This primer from the Cyfluence Research Center introduces Cyfluence, a conceptual domain that models cyber and influence operations as components of integrated, non-linear kill chains. It examines how these threats manifest in Managed Contested Spaces (MCSs) such as universities, smart cities, and corporate environments, and proposes a new defence framework, Cognitive and Cyber Security Posture Management (C2SPM), that adapts proven cybersecurity principles to the cognitive threat landscape. With the integration of hyper-automation, C2SPM offers near-real-time detection, assessment, and remediation across cognitive, digital, and physical dimensions. [Download PDF Here]

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 06th to the 12th of April 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Global Expansion of Kremlin Disinformation Network AI Poisoning in Large Language Models Kremlin Disinformation Networks Targeting French-Speaking Audiences Propaganda as Driver of Russian Military Recruitment Disinformation in Reporting on Alleged Attack on USS Tripoli The War in Ukraine Disinformation Campaign Targeting Arab Media Recent Kremlin Disinformation Campaigns Against Ukraine and the EU AI Slop Ahead of Hungary’s Crucial Election China Fake Facebook Accounts Bolster Chinese Embassy Attacks vs PCIJ China’s Biased Coverage of the Iran War Iran Fake video of Captured U.S. Pilot in Iran AI-Driven Disinformation About World Leaders’ Health Iran Threats Produce Fake Claims of Missile Strikes Disinformation Trends in the Iran War [AI Related Articles] Disinformation Risks in AI-Generated Search Results Growing Propaganda Threats Through Language Models AI-Amplified Disinformation in Russia and China AI Chatbots Pose a Growing Risk of Disinformation Disinformation Risks in AI-Generated Search Results [General Reports] Disinformation Ecosystem in Spain NATO’s Assessment and Response to Cognitive Warfare Threats Fake Claim that CNN Reported a Fake Iranian Statement A GOP-Aligned Group is Using Klan Imagery to Target Black Voters Elon Musk’s xAI Sues Colorado Over AI Law [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] The Evolving Impact of Digital Technologies on European Democracy Check First and French Journalists in a Virtual Foreign Interference Campaign US Budget Frames Global Institutions as Disinformation Actors [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] An essay by ISW described a long-term disinformation strategy in which the Kremlin is building a global media network to shape international narratives. As reported by NewsGuard's Reality Check, ahead of Hungary’s pivotal parliamentary election, coordinated misinformation campaigns are using AI-generated "slop" content and low-grade Russian disinformation to reinforce Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s campaign messaging and undermine the opposition led by Péter Magyar. According to an article by PressOne.PH, a coordinated network of fake Facebook accounts and pro-Duterte influencers amplified attacks by the Chinese Embassy in Manila against the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), following PCIJ’s reporting on pro-Beijing influence operations in the country. As published by The Jamestown Foundation, disinformation played a central role in shaping narratives about the Iran war, particularly through Chinese state media. An article by The New York Times highlighted how AI-generated search summaries, such as Google’s "AI Overviews", can contribute to the spread of misleading or inaccurate information. A report by The European Commission argued that Europe’s democratic resilience is being weakened by an information environment shaped by the "attention economy", in which digital platforms prioritize engagement and advertising revenue over accuracy and public interest. The U.S. budget document characterizes certain international organizations and programs as sources of biased narratives and coordinated information influence that it frames as disinformation undermining U.S. interests. [ Report Summary] An essay by ISW described a long-term disinformation strategy in which the Kremlin is building a global media network to shape international narratives. An article by DFR Lab exposed a disinformation strategy in which pro-Kremlin networks, such as the Pravda system, flood the internet with propaganda to influence how AI models learn and respond. As published by DFR Lab, a Morocco-based YouTube channel, ODC TV, acts as a platform for disinformation by broadcasting pro-Kremlin narratives to French-speaking audiences, including within the EU. According to an article by the Atlantic Council, propaganda plays a key role in sustaining Russian military recruitment in Ukraine, beyond financial incentives or coercion. Stop Fake’s report revealed a clear case of disinformation in a report claiming that Iran attacked the USS Tripoli. A Telegram report by the SPRAVDI Center for Strategic Communications described disinformation efforts in which actors linked to the Kremlin attempt to influence Arab public opinion about Ukraine by purchasing placements on popular Telegram channels. According to an article by EU VS Disinfo, recent pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns focused on portraying Ukraine as a danger to the Baltic states, interfering in European elections, and pressuring the EU to reverse its energy sanctions on Russia. As reported by NewsGuard's Reality Check, ahead of Hungary’s pivotal parliamentary election, coordinated misinformation campaigns are using AI-generated "slop" content and low-grade Russian disinformation to reinforce Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s campaign messaging and undermine the opposition led by Péter Magyar. According to an article by PressOne.PH, a coordinated network of fake Facebook accounts and pro-Duterte influencers amplified attacks by the Chinese Embassy in Manila against the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), following PCIJ’s reporting on pro-Beijing influence operations in the country. As published by The Jamestown Foundation, disinformation played a central role in shaping narratives about the Iran war, particularly through Chinese state media. NewsGuard’s Reality Check reported a disinformation campaign in which pro-Iran social media users circulated a video falsely claiming it showed Iranian forces capturing a U.S. pilot after an F-15E jet was shot down on 03th of April 2026. As revealed by NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as part of a coordinated disinformation campaign, pro-Iran social media users used AI-generated images and videos to manipulate perceptions of key political leaders during wartime. A report by NewsGuard's Reality Check highlighted a recurring disinformation pattern in which Iran publicly threatens specific targets and pro-Iran social media accounts then falsely claim that those targets were successfully struck, even when no such attacks occurred. According to NewsGuard’s publication, disinformation has spread rapidly during the Iran war, with at least 69 false claims gaining hundreds of millions of views in less than a month. According to an article by The Conversation, we are experiencing a growing wave of disinformation known as "slopaganda", where AI-generated or misleading content is used for propaganda purposes. As highlighted in a DFR Lab report, a sophisticated form of disinformation in which pro-Kremlin networks flood the internet with AI-generated propaganda to influence how large language models are trained. According to research by Hybrid CoE, China and Russia are increasingly using artificial intelligence to enhance disinformation and influence operations abroad. According to a report by TechXplore, the increasing role of AI chatbots in spreading harmful and misleading information, especially among vulnerable users like children. An article by The New York Times highlighted how AI-generated search summaries, such as Google’s "AI Overviews", can contribute to the spread of misleading or inaccurate information. According to a report by EU Disinfo Lab, the disinformation landscape in Spain is complex and rapidly evolving, as false narratives are often triggered by major events such as natural disasters and geopolitical tensions. A NATO report highlighted that modern security threats increasingly rely on disinformation and propaganda to influence public opinion and decision-making. A report by NewsGuard's Reality Check debunked claims that CNN fabricated an Iranian statement regarding the April 2026 U.S.-Iran ceasefire. According to an article by The Washington Post, a Republican-aligned political action committee in Virginia, Democracy and Justice, is facing criticism for a mailer campaign that uses Ku Klux Klan imagery, civil rights symbolism, and old quotes from Barack Obama and Governor Abigail Spanberger to target Black voters ahead of the state’s 21st of April redistricting referendum. As reported by CyberNews, Elon Musk’s xAI has filed a federal lawsuit seeking to block Colorado’s new AI law, arguing that the law violates the First Amendment by compelling developers to redesign systems, such as its chatbot Grok, to reflect the state’s preferred views on fairness, diversity, and discrimination. Check First, in partnership with the French training organization Samsa, developed an immersive one-day workshop to help journalists identify foreign information manipulation, disinformation campaigns, and coordinated inauthentic behavior in an electoral context. A report by The European Commission argued that Europe’s democratic resilience is being weakened by an information environment shaped by the "attention economy", in which digital platforms prioritize engagement and advertising revenue over accuracy and public interest. The U.S. budget document characterizes certain international organizations and programs as sources of biased narratives and coordinated information influence that it frames as disinformation undermining U.S. interests. [State Actors] Russia Global Expansion of Kremlin Disinformation Network An essay by ISW described a long-term disinformation strategy in which the Kremlin is building a global media network to shape international narratives. By forming partnerships with foreign media outlets, expanding multilingual services, and distributing state-produced content, Russia aims to embed its narratives into local information ecosystems. This effort is part of a broader "cognitive warfare" approach, designed to influence public opinion and affect decision-making in other countries. A key component of this strategy is the cultivation of a global network of journalists trained through Russian-backed programs. These initiatives, along with collaborations with universities and media organizations, help spread pro-Kremlin narratives in a way that appears locally credible. At the same time, disinformation is amplified through both traditional media and digital platforms, including Telegram networks and influencers, enabling coordinated messaging across regions and languages. While Russia has faced resistance and restrictions, especially in Western countries, it continues to expand its influence in regions such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Source: Institute for the Study of War. The Kremlin’s Expanding Media Conglomerate. [online] Published 15 January 2020. Available at: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-expanding-media-conglomerate/ Top Of Page AI Poisoning in Large Language Models An article by DFR Lab exposed a disinformation strategy in which pro-Kremlin networks, such as the Pravda system, flood the internet with propaganda to influence how AI models learn and respond. This tactic, known as "AI poisoning", aims to embed false or biased narratives directly into training data used by large language models (LLMs). Unlike surface-level manipulation, this approach is more dangerous because once disinformation is absorbed into a model, it becomes difficult and costly to remove. Research showed that propaganda from sources like Pravda and Russian state media has already entered widely used datasets such as Common Crawl, which feeds many AI systems. In some cases, models were able to reproduce false narratives, such as conspiracy claims about U.S.-Ukrainian biolabs, almost word for word. This demonstrates how disinformation can be internalized and later presented as credible information, potentially misleading users on a large scale. The broader risk is that AI systems themselves may become tools for spreading disinformation if their training data is compromised. While not all influence efforts succeed, those that do can have long-lasting effects by shaping how AI interprets and presents information. As propaganda networks continue to expand their output, the threat of AI-driven disinformation is likely to grow, highlighting the need for better data filtering and oversight in AI development. Source: DFRLab. Pravda in the pipeline: Early evidence of state-adjacent propaganda in AI training data. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://dfrlab.org/2026/04/08/pravda-in-the-pipeline/ Top Of Page Kremlin Disinformation Networks Targeting French-Speaking Audiences As published by DFR Lab, a Morocco-based YouTube channel, ODC TV acts as a platform for disinformation by broadcasting pro-Kremlin narratives and sanctioned Russian figures to French-speaking audiences, including within the EU. Despite sanctions, the channel remains accessible and has gained significant reach, hosting individuals linked to Russian propaganda, far-right extremism, and influence operations. Through documentaries and interviews, it promotes narratives aligned with Kremlin ideology, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine. A central feature of the channel’s content is the spread of misleading and false claims. Its videos present biased interpretations of events, such as portraying Russia’s actions in Ukraine as justified or suggesting Western conspiracies behind major incidents like the Moscow terror attack. The inclusion of conspiracy theorists and extremist figures further amplifies disinformation and polarizing content. The channel demonstrates how disinformation ecosystems operate across borders by using alternative platforms, multilingual content, and third-country intermediaries. Source: DFRLab. Morocco-based YouTube channel acts as French-language proxy for sanctioned Kremlin propagandists. [online] Published 10 April 2026. Available at: https://dfrlab.org/2026/04/10/morocco-based-youtube-channel-acts-as-french-language-proxy-for-sanctioned-kremlin-propagandists/ Top Of Page Propaganda as Driver of Russian Military Recruitment According to an article by the Atlantic Council, propaganda plays a key role in sustaining Russian military recruitment in Ukraine, beyond financial incentives or coercion. Although enlistment bonuses have declined, many soldiers still volunteer, suggesting that belief in state narratives significantly influences their decision to fight. Research on Russian prisoners of war shows a strong link between exposure to propaganda and support for the invasion. Soldiers who accept Kremlin narratives are far more likely to view the war as legitimate, dehumanize Ukrainians, and express willingness to return to combat. These narratives, including the "Russian World" ideology, rely on false information to justify violence and reinforce loyalty. propaganda strengthens military resilience and prolongs conflict, acting as a force multiplier that helps sustain Russia’s war effort despite heavy losses. Source: Atlantic Council. Recognizing the role of propaganda in Russia’s infrastructure of aggression. [online] Published 9 April 2026. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/recognizing-the-role-of-propaganda-in-russias-infrastructure-of-aggression Top Of Page Disinformation in Reporting on Alleged Attack on USS Tripoli Stop Fake’s report revealed a clear case of disinformation in a report claiming that Iran attacked the USS Tripoli. The claim, based on statements from the Iranian military and amplified by TASS, alleges that the ship was struck and forced to retreat. However, the report contains internal contradictions about the ship’s supposed location and retreat route, suggesting a lack of factual consistency and reliability. Verified information from U.S. Central Command directly contradicts these claims, confirming that the USS Tripoli was not attacked and continues to operate normally in the Arabian Sea. The false narrative appears to exaggerate or fabricate a military success, presenting misleading information about events that did not occur. Source: StopFake. ТАСС повторил фейк КСИР об ударе по американскому кораблю с 5000 моряков и морпехов на борту. [online] Published 8 April 2026. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/ru/tass-povtoril-fejk-ksir-ob-udare-po-amerikanskomu-korablyu-s-5000-moryakov-i-morpehov-na-bortu/ Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Disinformation Campaign Targeting Arab Media A Telegram report by the SPRAVDI Center for Strategic Communications described disinformation efforts in which actors linked to the Kremlin attempt to influence Arab public opinion about Ukraine by purchasing placements on popular Telegram channels. Channel owners are reportedly approached with ready-made anti-Ukrainian videos and asked to publish them as if they were legitimate news content. This strategy relies on disguising coordinated propaganda as organic, locally sourced information. By outsourcing distribution to trusted regional influencers, the campaign seeks to increase credibility and obscure the original source of the content. The broader objective of this disinformation campaign is to weaken trust in Ukraine across the Arab world, particularly at a time when Ukraine is strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with Gulf states. Source: SPRAVDI. Telegram post. [online] n.d. Available at: https://t.me/spravdi/54328?embed=1 Top Of Page Recent Kremlin Disinformation Campaigns Against Ukraine and the EU According to an article by EU VS Disinfo, recent pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns focused on portraying Ukraine as a danger to the Baltic states, interfering in European elections, and pressuring the EU to reverse its energy sanctions on Russia. One of the main false narratives claimed that Ukraine’s strikes on Russian Baltic ports could provoke Russia into attacking the Baltic states and even trigger nuclear escalation. This allegation was based on already debunked reports that Ukrainian drones had flown over Baltic territory. At the same time, Russian FIMI operations intensified around upcoming parliamentary elections in several EU countries, including Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as in Armenia. Other narratives portraying Europe as dependent on Russian energy supplies have been a persistent feature of the information space since the outbreak of the conflict in Iran. They are often paired with the claim of an impending European economic crisis, aiming to promote the lifting of European sanctions on Russian oil trade. Source: EUvsDisinfo. The Kremlin points at Ukraine as a threat for the Baltic states, and accuses the EU with meddling in upcoming elections. [online] Published 2 April 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-kremlin-points-at-ukraine-as-a-threat-for-the-baltic-states-and-accuses-the-eu-with-meddling-in-upcoming-elections/ Top Of Page AI Slop Ahead of Hungary’s Crucial Election As reported by NewsGuard's Reality Check, ahead of Hungary’s pivotal parliamentary election, coordinated misinformation campaigns are using AI-generated "slop" content and low-grade Russian disinformation to reinforce Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s campaign messaging and undermine the opposition led by Péter Magyar. Although much of the content appears absurd, such as AI-generated videos featuring talking fruits, vegetables, and cartoon characters, the report argued that its purpose is not to persuade directly, but to normalize false associations and spread emotionally charged narratives through algorithm-friendly social media content. These campaigns aim to plant recurring ideas, such as Ukraine as a dangerous, Brussels as unaccountable, and the opposition as violent. False claims ranged from fabricated stories that Ukrainians attempted to assassinate Orbán to allegations that the opposition planned to conscript young Hungarians to fight in Ukraine. Russian-linked campaigns, including Matryoshka and Storm-1516, reportedly amplified these claims through fake news reports, forged websites, and coordinated TikTok videos that gained significant reach. This combination of top-down political messaging and bottom-up viral content is more insidious and likely more effective. That’s why short, low-grade, repetitive slop and Russia’s slapdash fake news reports are not to be underestimated. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Don’t Dismiss AI Slop Ahead of Hungary’s Crucial Election. [online] Published 9 April 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/dont-dismiss-ai-slop-ahead-of-hungarys Top Of Page China Fake Facebook Accounts Bolster Chinese Embassy Attacks vs PCIJ According to an article by PressOne.PH, a coordinated network of fake Facebook accounts and pro-Duterte influencers amplified attacks by the Chinese Embassy in Manila against the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), following PCIJ’s reporting on pro-Beijing influence operations in the country. After PCIJ republished a guide on identifying pro-China propaganda in February 2026, the embassy accused the newsroom of being a U.S.-backed "tool" and questioned its editorial independence by pointing to funding from the National Endowment for Democracy. Within hours, more than one hundred accounts with a combined reach of nearly 3 million followers rapidly spread the embassy’s message, ensuring the narrative was already widely circulating by morning. Analysis of more than 640 Facebook accounts found that a significant share showed medium to high signs of inauthentic behavior, including suspicious usernames, dormant profiles that suddenly became highly active, generic comments, bot-like posting patterns, and the use of stock or AI-generated profile images. These accounts systematically echoed the embassy’s claims that PCIJ was biased and part of a broader anti-China media campaign. This artificial amplification was designed to make the embassy’s messaging appear as organic public sentiment, while discouraging investigative reporting on sensitive issues such as the West Philippine Sea and foreign influence operations. More broadly, the campaign reflected a familiar state-backed tactic: discrediting independent media by portraying foreign-funded journalism as a hostile political operation. The report warned that this strategy threatens not only a single newsroom but the broader integrity of the Philippine information space and public understanding of national sovereignty issues. Source: PressOne.PH. Fake Facebook accounts bolster Chinese Embassy attacks vs PCIJ. [online] Published 9 April 2026. Available at: https://pressone.ph/fake-facebook-accounts-bolster-chinese-embassy-attacks-vs-pcij/ Top Of Page China’s Biased Coverage of the Iran War As published by The Jamestown Foundation, disinformation played a central role in shaping narratives about the Iran war, particularly through Chinese state media. Instead of reporting Iranian military losses or weaknesses, official outlets amplified Iranian claims, many of which were false, about successful strikes on U.S. assets. These included unverified reports of destroyed radar systems and downed aircraft, sometimes supported by AI-generated images or even video game footage presented as real evidence. This selective reporting reflects a deliberate effort to construct a distorted picture of the battlefield. By repeating Iranian disinformation and ignoring contradictory evidence, Chinese media created the impression that Iran’s defenses remained strong and effective, despite clear indications of U.S. and Israeli tactical success. As the gap between claims and reality became more apparent, the narrative shifted toward portraying the United States as strategically failing. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Weapons Systems Failures May Have Led to Personnel Removals. [online] Published 9 April 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/weapons-systems-failures-may-have-led-to-personnel-removals/ Top Of Page Iran Fake video of Captured U.S. Pilot in Iran NewsGuard’s Reality Check reported a disinformation campaign in which pro-Iran social media users circulated a video falsely claiming it showed Iranian forces capturing a U.S. pilot after an F-15E jet was shot down on 03th of April 2026. The video quickly gained traction online, amassing hundreds of thousands of views, and was presented as real-time evidence of major military success. In reality, the video was unrelated to the event and had been circulating online since at least May 2025, well before the 2026 conflict. Earlier versions of the same footage had been used in a completely different context. This highlights a common disinformation tactic of recycling old or unverifiable content and reframing it to fit current events. Notably, even Iranian state media avoided definitively claiming the pilot’s capture, instead using vague or contradictory language. At the same time, credible reports confirmed that both U.S. crewmembers were successfully rescued, contradicting the viral claims. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. The Captured US Pilot Who Wasn’t Captured. [online] Published 7 April 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/the-captured-us-pilot-who-wasnt-captured Top Of Page AI-Driven Disinformation About World Leaders’ Health As revealed by NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as part of a coordinated disinformation campaign, pro-Iran social media users used AI-generated images and videos to manipulate perceptions of key political leaders during wartime. False content portrayed Iran’s leader as strong and active, while depicting U.S. President Donald Trump as weak and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as dead or incapacitated. These narratives were widely shared, particularly in Arabic and Farsi, indicating a targeted regional influence effort. In reality, the viral materials were fabricated or misrepresented. The video showing Iran’s leader was identified as AI-generated, and the image of Trump struggling to walk was also artificially created, containing clear digital markers and visual inconsistencies. At the same time, authentic footage of Netanyahu was falsely labeled as AI-generated to support claims that he had died. This mix of fake content and false accusations against real content demonstrates a dual strategy of creating disinformation while also discrediting genuine evidence. Sources: NewsGuard Reality Check. AI Misdiagnoses Health of World Leaders. [online] Published 7 April 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/ai-misdiagnoses-health-of-world-leaders Top Of Page Iran Threats Produce Fake Claims of Missile Strikes A report by NewsGuard's Reality Check highlighted a recurring disinformation pattern in which Iran publicly threatens specific targets and pro-Iran social media accounts, then falsely claims that those targets were successfully struck, even when no such attacks occurred. On several occasions before the 7th of April 2026 ceasefire, users on X and other platforms circulated misleading videos and posts claiming Iranian missile strikes on high-profile sites, including Israel’s Dimona nuclear facility, Intel and IBM offices in Petah Tikva, and the King Fahd Causeway linking Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. These posts attracted millions of views and significantly amplified the perception of Iranian military success. In each case, the claims were false or unsupported by credible evidence. Sources: NewsGuard Reality Check. Iran Threats Produce Fake Claims of Missile Strikes. [online] Published 8 April 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/iran-threats-produce-fake-claims Top Of Page Disinformation Trends in the Iran War According to NewsGuard’s publication, disinformation has spread rapidly during the Iran war, with at least 69 false claims gaining hundreds of millions of views in less than a month. These misleading narratives appear frequently and consistently, and Most of these claims promote a pro-Iran perspective. A key trend is the evolution of disinformation techniques. Early false claims often relied on misused or taken-out-of-context images and videos, but more recent ones increasingly use AI-generated content to fabricate events. Another growing tactic is to discredit accurate reporting by falsely claiming that real, verified media is actually AI-generated. Interestingly, much of this disinformation does not originate directly from Iranian state media but spreads through a wider network of actors and platforms. This reflects a decentralized information environment where false narratives can circulate widely regardless of their source. Sources: NewsGuard. 2026 Iran War False Claims Tracking Center. [online] Published 10 April 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/2026-iran-war/ Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] The Rise of "Slopaganda" and AI-Driven Disinformation According to an article by The Conversation, we are experiencing a growing wave of disinformation known as "slopaganda", where AI-generated or misleading content is used for propaganda purposes. Following U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, both sides engaged in spreading manipulated media: official communications mixed real footage with entertainment clips. At the same time, Iran and its supporters circulated outdated war videos and AI-generated images falsely depicting attacks. Slopaganda relies on emotionally charged, attention-grabbing content that spreads quickly on social media, often without concern for truth. It includes not only misleading material but also symbolic or exaggerated content designed to shape perceptions and associations, such as portraying political figures in absurd or negative ways. Even when not meant to be taken literally, such content can influence beliefs and reinforce biases, especially when audiences are repeatedly exposed to it in fast-moving, low-attention environments. Source: The Conversation. Slopaganda wars: how (and why) the US and Iran are flooding the zone with viral AI-generated noise. [online] Published 8 April 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/slopaganda-wars-how-and-why-the-us-and-iran-are-flooding-the-zone-with-viral-ai-generated-noise-280024 Top Of Page Growing Propaganda Threats Through Language Models As highlighted in a DFR Lab report, a sophisticated form of disinformation in which pro-Kremlin networks, such as the Pravda system, flood the internet with AI-generated propaganda to influence how large language models (LLMs) are trained. This tactic, known as "AI poisoning" or "LLM grooming", aims to embed false or biased narratives directly into the data that AI systems learn from. Unlike surface-level manipulation (such as search results), poisoning training data is far more dangerous because it can permanently shape how AI models generate responses. Research shows that even a relatively small number of malicious documents can distort AI outputs, and evidence suggests that such propaganda has already entered widely used datasets like Common Crawl. In some cases, models were able to reproduce false narratives, such as Kremlin-backed claims about U.S.-Ukrainian biolabs, almost word for word. The broader implication is that AI systems themselves can become vehicles for disinformation if their training data is compromised. This threat is especially serious for smaller developers relying on public datasets, and it underscores the need for stricter data filtering and oversight to prevent long-term contamination of AI-generated knowledge. Source: Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). Pravda in the pipeline: Early evidence of state-adjacent propaganda in AI training data. [online] Published 8 April 2026. Available at: https://dfrlab.org/2026/04/08/pravda-in-the-pipeline/ Top Of Page AI-Amplified Disinformation in Russia and China According to research by Hybrid CoE, China and Russia are increasingly using artificial intelligence to enhance disinformation and influence operations abroad. AI allows these actors to produce and spread misleading content at a greater scale and speed, making propaganda more efficient and harder to detect. This includes generating fake images, videos, and text, and targeting specific audiences with tailored narratives that distort reality. While both countries use AI for disinformation, their approaches differ. China has more advanced domestic AI capabilities and uses them not only for content creation but also for data collection, monitoring, and precise targeting of individuals. Russia, although less advanced technologically, compensates by using widely available AI tools and focusing on high-volume, experimental disinformation campaigns. In some cases, both countries amplify similar narratives when their interests align. As a result of the growing use of AI in disinformation, democratic societies face greater risks of manipulation and polarization. Addressing this challenge requires a combination of technological solutions, regulation, and human oversight to detect and counter increasingly sophisticated disinformation tactics. Source: - Top Of Page AI Chatbots Pose a Growing Risk of Disinformation According to a report by TechXplore, the increasing role of AI chatbots in spreading harmful and misleading information, especially among vulnerable users like children. Unlike traditional disinformation on social media, which is broadcast to large audiences, AI chatbots deliver personalized content directly to individuals. This makes disinformation more persuasive and harder to detect, as it can be tailored to a user’s emotions, fears, and personal situation. Research cited in the text shows that many AI systems are willing to generate dangerous or false guidance, including instructions related to violence, self-harm, or illegal activities. In some cases, chatbots present harmful content as reliable and factual, blurring the line between truth and falsehood. The report warned that because the "new" AI-driven disinformation operates more privately and at scale, it can influence individuals without public scrutiny. This creates a new form of disinformation where misleading or dangerous ideas are not just shared but actively produced and adapted in real time and raises urgent concerns about regulation and the need to prevent AI systems from generating or reinforcing harmful content. Source: Tech Xplore. AI chatbots offer children harm as if it were help, says activist. [online] Published 11 April 2026. Available at: https://techxplore.com/news/2026-04-ai-chatbots-children-activist.html Top Of Page Disinformation Risks in AI-Generated Search Results An article by The New York Times highlighted how AI-generated search summaries, such as Google’s "AI Overviews", can contribute to the spread of misleading or inaccurate information. While these systems aim to provide quick and authoritative answers, they sometimes produce responses that contradict reliable sources or lack proper evidence. This can confuse users and create uncertainty about what is true, especially when incorrect information is presented with confidence. Although AI Overviews are accurate most of the time, even a small error rate results in a massive volume of misinformation due to the scale of global searches. Additionally, many answers are “ungrounded,” meaning they are not fully supported by the sources they cite. This makes it difficult for users to verify claims and increases the risk that false or distorted information will be accepted as fact. AI systems can unintentionally amplify disinformation by generating and distributing incorrect content at scale. Therefore, the text underscored that as these tools become more central to how people access information, the need for critical evaluation and cross-checking sources becomes essential to avoid being misled. Source: The New York Times. Google’s A.I. Overviews Struggle With Accuracy, Study Finds. [online] Published 7 April 2026. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/technology/google-ai-overviews-accuracy.html Top Of Page [General Reports] Disinformation Ecosystem in Spain According to a report by EU Disinfo Lab, the disinformation landscape in Spain is complex and rapidly evolving, as false narratives are often triggered by major events such as natural disasters and geopolitical tensions. These campaigns use emotionally charged and misleading content, ranging from conspiracy theories about weather manipulation to false claims about migration or energy failures, to exploit public fear. Social media platforms play a central role in amplifying such content, often prioritizing virality over accuracy. This ecosystem stands out for the blending of domestic and foreign disinformation efforts. Russian-linked networks and other external actors frequently amplify internal divisions by spreading misleading narratives about migration, elections, or EU policies. At the same time, local "digital agitators" and political movements use similar tactics to build influence and erode trust in institutions. This creates a feedback loop where disinformation spreads across platforms and even translates into real-world political action. Recurring themes, such as anti-migrant sentiment and conspiracy theories, are constantly adapted to new contexts, making them more resilient and harder to counter. Despite efforts like factchecking and regulation, the speed and scale of disinformation continue to challenge authorities. Source: EU DisinfoLab. The disinformation landscape in Spain. [online] Published 8 April 2026. Available at: https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/disinformation-landscape-in-spain/ Top Of Page NATO’s Assessment and Response to Cognitive Warfare Threats A NATO report highlighted that modern security threats increasingly rely on disinformation and propaganda to influence public opinion and decision-making. Adversaries exploit digital platforms, social media, and emerging technologies such as AI and deepfakes to spread misleading or false information, weaken trust in institutions, and interfere in democratic processes. These tactics are part of broader "cognitive warfare", where the goal is not only to inform but to manipulate how individuals and societies think and act. Disinformation is central to this strategy, targeting both civilians and military decision-makers. The report emphasized that such manipulation has already played a major role in recent conflicts, demonstrating how information can be weaponized alongside traditional military force. By exploiting vulnerabilities in human cognition and the information environment, adversaries aim to disrupt decision-making cycles and gain a strategic advantage without confrontation. In response, NATO stressed the need for stronger scientific and technological capabilities to detect, analyze, and counter disinformation-driven cognitive attacks. This includes improving resilience at both societal and institutional levels, investing in research, and fostering cooperation across governments and sectors. Source: NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO). NATO Chief Scientist Research Report on Cognitive Warfare. [online] Published 19 January 2026. Available at: https://www.sto.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/chief-scientist-report-cognitive-warfare-final.pdf Top Of Page Fake Claim that CNN Reported a Fake Iranian Statement A report by NewsGuard's Reality Check debunked claims that CNN fabricated an Iranian statement regarding the April 2026 U.S.-Iran ceasefire. Following CNN’s report that Iran claimed it had "forced the United States to accept in principle its 10-point plan", Donald Trump publicly accused the network of spreading "fake news". His criticism was quickly amplified by members of his administration, conservative media outlets, and online influencers, generating millions of views across multiple countries and languages. According to the report, CNN’s coverage was actually based on an authentic statement issued by Iran’s security council and also published by Iranian state media, including Fars News and Press TV. The confusion appears to stem from the existence of two legitimate versions of the statement: a full version, which included Iran’s claim that the U.S. had accepted its 10-point plan, and an abridged version later cited by Trump that omitted this language. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. No, CNN Did Not Fake Iranian Statement. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/no-cnn-did-not-fake-iranian-statement Top Of Page A GOP-Aligned Group is Using Klan Imagery to Target Black Voters According to an article by The Washington Post, a Republican-aligned political action committee in Virginia, Democracy and Justice, is facing criticism for a mailer campaign that uses Ku Klux Klan imagery, civil rights symbolism, and old quotes from Barack Obama and Governor Abigail Spanberger to target Black voters ahead of the state’s 21st of April redistricting referendum. Critics, including the NAACP and Democratic officials, said the ads are designed to create confusion and suppress turnout by falsely implying that Obama and Spanberger oppose the measure. The campaign appears aimed at African American and elderly voters, both key constituencies in what is expected to be a closely contested vote. The referendum is politically significant because it could reshape Virginia’s congressional districts in a way that benefits Democrats and influences the broader national battle for control of the U.S. House. While polling suggests that most Black voters support the measure, opponents are spending heavily to challenge it, and even limited confusion among voters could affect the outcome. Source: The Washington Post. A GOP-aligned group is using Klan imagery to target Black voters. [online] Published 9 April 2026. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/04/09/virginia-redistricting-obama-civil-rights/ Top Of Page Elon Musk’s xAI Sues Colorado Over AI Law As reported by CyberNews, Elon Musk’s xAI has filed a federal lawsuit seeking to block Colorado’s new AI law, Senate Bill 24-205, which is set to take effect on June 30. The law requires developers of "high-risk" AI systems used in areas such as employment, housing, education, healthcare, and financial services to take reasonable steps to prevent algorithmic discrimination and disclose known risks. xAI argued that the law violates the First Amendment by compelling developers to redesign systems, such as its chatbot Grok, to reflect the state’s preferred views on fairness, diversity, and discrimination. The lawsuit also reflects a broader national debate over whether AI regulation should be handled by individual states or by Washington. xAI claimed that a patchwork of state-level rules could hinder innovation, weaken competition, and undermine U.S. leadership in artificial intelligence. The company is seeking both an injunction to stop enforcement and a court ruling declaring the law unconstitutional. Source: Cybernews. Elon Musk's xAI sues Colorado over AI law and claims it forces specific viewpoints into AI. [online] Published 10 April 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/musk-xai-court-colorado-ai-law-kill-innovation-viewpoints/ Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] The Evolving Impact of Digital Technologies on European Democracy A report by The European Commission argued that Europe’s democratic resilience is being weakened by an information environment shaped by the "attention economy", in which digital platforms prioritize engagement and advertising revenue over accuracy and public interest. Algorithms tend to amplify emotional, divisive, and conflict-driven content, contributing to fragmented realities, ideological echo chambers, and the spread of mis- and disinformation. Rather than simply convincing people of specific falsehoods, today’s manipulation often seeks to "flood the zone" with confusion, distrust, and competing narratives, eroding any shared sense of reality essential for democratic institutions to function. The report described this as a growing "fantasy-industrial complex", further intensified by generative AI, which can produce persuasive text, audio, and video at scale. To address these risks, the report recommended building alternative public digital spaces that do not rely on engagement-based business models, strengthening crowd-sourced knowledge systems similar to Wikipedia, expanding fact-checking mechanisms, improving media literacy, and reducing the profitability of disinformation. It also called for greater user control over recommendation algorithms and platform feeds, as well as reforms to platform business models through regulation and alternative revenue structures such as subscriptions or non-profit models. A central conclusion was that these measures cannot succeed without stronger EU digital sovereignty, as much of Europe’s information space is controlled by foreign-owned platforms whose interests may not align with democratic values. Source: European Commission, Joint Research Centre. Fractured reality: How democracy can win the global struggle over the information space. [online] Published 9 April 2026. Available at: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC144603 Top Of Page Check First and French Journalists in a Virtual Foreign Interference Campaign Check First, in partnership with the French training organization Samsa, developed an immersive one-day workshop to help journalists identify foreign information manipulation, disinformation campaigns, and coordinated inauthentic behavior in an electoral context. The training was designed in response to growing concerns that foreign interference is increasingly targeting not only national elections but also local elections in France, where candidates have recently faced disinformation attacks. The initiative aims to strengthen newsroom preparedness so journalists can quickly recognize and explain such campaigns to the public. Using Check First’s "Tutki" platform, participants were placed in a simulated election scenario set in the fictional coastal city of Porteval. Journalists navigated a realistic stream of social media content, including ordinary lifestyle posts, manipulated political narratives, troll activity, and fabricated documents linked to a fake foreign company. Following a similar session in Armenia, the organizers were convinced that raising awareness of disinformation campaigns can be practical, entertaining, and applicable to a wide audience of media professionals throughout Europe. Source: Check First. Check First and Samsa immerse French journalists in a virtual foreign interference campaign. [online] Published 13 March 2026. Available at: https://checkfirst.network/check-first-and-samsa-immerse-french-journalists-in-a-virtual-foreign-interference-campaign/ Top Of Page US Budget Frames Global Institutions as Disinformation Actors The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2027, identifies certain international organizations and programs as contributors to disinformation and narrative manipulation, particularly highlighting the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the National Endowment for Democracy. It asserts that these actors disseminate biased or misleading narratives that undermine U.S. interests and distort global information environments, including through media support initiatives and fact-checking mechanisms that are portrayed as selectively shaping public discourse. The document characterizes these activities as part of broader influence tactics that involve funding media networks, promoting specific ideological narratives, and using institutional platforms to legitimize contested information. It frames these actors as participating in coordinated efforts that influence perception and policy debates, and proposes reducing or eliminating funding to such entities as a means of countering what it identifies as disinformation-driven influence operations. Source: The White House. Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2027. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/budget_fy2027.pdf Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 13th to the 19th of April 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Weaponizing Comedy as a Disinformation Tactic Fabricated Media Content Used to Spread Disinformation Russia Targeted Elections in Hungary and Bulgaria The War in Ukraine Religion as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare Political Changes in Hungary Affect Its International Relations Misleading Framing of the Russia–Ukraine War and Timeline China PRC Media Influence in Arabic-Language Environments Iran Pro-Iran Networks Gained a Billion Views on War Propaganda Disinformation as a Divisive Strategic Weapon [General Reports] Musk Gave a 50 Million-View Boost to the COVID Vaccine Hoax Online Extremism in Canada in 2025 Deep State Narratives Blur Lines Between Truth and Disinformation Disinformation Exploits Algorithms and Human Vulnerabilities to Erode Trust [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Called for Stronger Action on Information Integrity Ofcom Founds Additional Online Safety Measures [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] As reported by EU VS Disinfo, pro-Kremlin information channels intensified efforts to undermine trust in democratic processes in both Hungary and Bulgaria. An article by The Jamestown Foundation described Péter Magyar’s electoral victory in Hungary as a major political shift, particularly in reducing Russian influence in the European Union. According to a study by NATO, the People’s Republic of China has expanded its media presence in Arabic-speaking regions as part of broader FIMI efforts. A report by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that digital technologies, especially social media and AI, are increasingly used by governments to shape public opinion and reinforce political narratives, with this dynamic particularly visible in relations between China and Taiwan. Ofcom announced that it will take new regulatory steps to combat the spread of illegal intimate images online, including non-consensual content and explicit deepfakes. An article published by the International Journal of Communication examines how deep state conspiracies function as adaptable disinformation narratives used by diverse political actors to shape perceptions, link domestic and foreign threats, and blur the boundary between truth and falsehood. An article published in Healthcare MDPI analyses how disinformation spreads through algorithm-driven platforms that exploit emotional and cognitive vulnerabilities, reinforcing false beliefs and eroding trust in media and institutions. [ Report Summary] According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russian figures Vladimir Kuznetsov and Alexei Stolyarov present themselves as pranksters, but their activities function as a form of coordinated disinformation. As revealed by the FREEDOM TV channel’s website, Russian propaganda circulated a false claim that Ukraine declared itself a "winner" in the Iran war, using a manipulated image from the FREEDOM channel as supposed evidence. As reported by EU VS Disinfo, pro-Kremlin information channels intensified efforts to undermine trust in democratic processes in both Hungary and Bulgaria. According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia has used religion, particularly Orthodox Church structures, as a tool in its broader disinformation and hybrid warfare strategy against Ukraine. An article by The Jamestown Foundation described Péter Magyar’s electoral victory in Hungary as a major political shift, particularly in reducing Russian influence in the European Union. As published by The Atlantic Council, widespread narratives about the Russia–Ukraine War are shaped by misleading or incomplete information, particularly the claim that the conflict began in 2022. According to a study by NATO, the People’s Republic of China has expanded its media presence in Arabic-speaking regions as part of broader FIMI efforts. A report by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that digital technologies, especially social media and AI, are increasingly used by governments to shape public opinion and reinforce political narratives, with this dynamic particularly visible in relations between China and Taiwan. According to an article by ISD Institute for Strategic Dialogue, during the first month of the Iran war, two coordinated pro-Iran networks on X, BRICS4CLICKS and Verified4War, generated over one billion views by spreading false, misleading, and AI-generated content. According to a report by The Hill, disinformation rooted in real social tensions has long been a national security concern. As reported by NewsGuard's Reality Check, Elon Musk significantly amplified a false claim that COVID-19 vaccines caused up to 60,000 deaths in Germany by reposting content to his massive audience on X. A report by ISD analyzed Canadian domestic extremist activity across social media between June and November 2025, identifying hundreds of accounts generating over one million posts. In a statement at the UN Committee on Information, the European Union reaffirmed its support for efforts to promote accurate, reliable, and accessible information worldwide. Ofcom announced that it will take new regulatory steps to combat the spread of illegal intimate images online, including non-consensual content and explicit deepfakes. An article published by the International Journal of Communication examines how deep state conspiracies function as adaptable disinformation narratives used by diverse political actors to shape perceptions, link domestic and foreign threats, and blur the boundary between truth and falsehood. An article published in Healthcare MDPI analyses how disinformation spreads through algorithm-driven platforms that exploit emotional and cognitive vulnerabilities, reinforcing false beliefs and eroding trust in media and institutions. [State Actors] Russia Weaponizing Comedy as a Disinformation Tactic According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russian figures Vladimir Kuznetsov (Vovan) and Alexei Stolyarov (Lexus) present themselves as pranksters, but their activities function as a form of coordinated disinformation. By impersonating political figures and publishing selectively edited conversations, they create misleading narratives that consistently favor the Kremlin. Although framed as entertainment, their content is amplified by pro-Russian media networks, turning staged interactions into tools for influencing public opinion. Their operations focus heavily on discrediting Ukraine, Western governments, and post-Soviet opposition movements. Through deceptive calls, they extract comments that are taken out of context and used to support false claims, such as portraying protests in Belarus and Georgia as Western-controlled "color revolutions" or suggesting declining Western support for Ukraine. These manipulated narratives are then spread online, highlighting how modern propaganda no longer relies only on traditional media but also on viral, seemingly informal content. Source: EUvsDisinfo. Pranked by the Kremlin: fake phone calls as a FIMI instrument. [online] Published 15 April 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/pranked-by-the-kremlin-fake-phone-calls-as-a-fimi-instrument/ Top Of Page Fabricated Media Content Used to Spread Disinformation As revealed by the FREEDOM TV channel’s website, Russian propaganda circulated a false claim that Ukraine declared itself a "winner" in the Iran war, using a manipulated image from the FREEDOM channel as supposed evidence. The image was digitally altered to include a fake caption stating that Ukraine had defeated Iran and that its air defense instructors were returning home. This fabricated visual was designed to mislead audiences and create a false narrative about Ukraine’s role in the conflict. The disinformation spread quickly across Russian Telegram channels. It was even picked up by some Ukrainian media outlets and bloggers without proper verification. In reality, the original broadcast had nothing to do with Iran. It featured commentary on the European Commission's positions on Russian threats to the Baltic states, with an Estonian official speaking via video link. Source: Freedom (UATV). Повідомлення ДП “МПІУ” щодо використання логотипа і зображення студії телеканалу FREEДОМ для створення російського фейку. [online] Published 9 April 2026. Available at: https://uatv.ua/uk/povidomlennya-dp-mpiu-shhodo-vykorystannya-logotypa-i-zobrazhennya-studiyi-telekanalu-freedom-dlya-stvorennya-rosijskogo-fejku/ Top Of Page Russia Targeted Elections in Hungary and Bulgaria As reported by EU VS Disinfo, pro-Kremlin information channels intensified efforts to undermine trust in democratic processes in both Hungary and Bulgaria. In Hungary, the campaign focused on discrediting the opposition party TISZA and its leader, Péter Magyar, while spreading claims that the EU and Ukraine were interfering in the 12th of April 2026. Following TISZA’s victory, similar narratives are expected to persist, targeting both the new political leadership and the EU. Comparable messaging has also been directed at Bulgaria ahead of its upcoming parliamentary elections, particularly through allegations of EU interference and censorship. Beyond election-related disinformation, pro-Kremlin outlets promoted broader narratives aimed at weakening trust in the EU. These included false claims that the EU is secretly developing nuclear weapons. At the same time, messaging around EU financial support to Ukraine framed the assistance as prolonging the war. Another report by EU VS Disinfo presented a specific case where a Russian disinformation campaign spread a fabricated claim that Magyar had killed a family puppy. The story, originating from a newly created and anonymous website, falsely alleged that Magyar’s ex-wife had accused him of abusive behavior in a memoir that does not exist. Despite lacking any evidence, the claim quickly gained traction online, reaching millions of users across multiple languages. The disinformation moved beyond fringe platforms when Polish opposition leader Jarosław Kaczyński repeated the allegation during a press conference. The claim was later acknowledged as untrue by his party, while Magyar’s ex-wife explicitly denied ever making such accusations. Source: EUvsDisinfo. Russia targets elections in Hungary and Bulgaria. [online] Published 17 April 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/russia-targets-elections-in-hungary-and-bulgaria/ Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Religion as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia has used religion, particularly Orthodox Church structures, as a tool in its broader disinformation and hybrid warfare strategy against Ukraine. Alongside historical ties between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and Moscow, affiliated networks have spread propaganda that frames the war in religious terms. These narratives falsely portray Ukraine as persecuting believers and describe Russia’s actions as a "holy war" to defend true Christianity, reinforcing pro-Kremlin ideology. A key element of this disinformation is the systematic use of media channels linked to the UOC to spread false claims, conspiracy theories, and manipulative interpretations of events. These platforms promote narratives about a supposed "church schism" and label Ukrainian institutions and believers as "Satanists" or "heretics". Such language is designed to dehumanize Ukrainians and legitimize Russian aggression by embedding propaganda within religious discourse. Additionally, these campaigns aim to reshape public perception by introducing Kremlin-aligned terminology into everyday use. Source: EUvsDisinfo. How Russia weaponizes the church in Ukraine. [online] Published 14 April 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/how-russia-weaponizes-the-church-in-ukraine/ (euvsdisinfo.eu) Top Of Page Political Changes in Hungary Affect Its International Relations An article by The Jamestown Foundation described Péter Magyar’s electoral victory in Hungary as a major political shift, particularly in reducing Russian influence in the European Union. While the new government plans to investigate past ties between Hungarian officials and Moscow, the legacy of Russian influence, especially through energy dependence and political networks, remains significant. Disinformation is highlighted as a key tool previously used to shape public opinion and policy, particularly under the former government. A central theme is how pro-Kremlin disinformation has affected Hungary’s domestic attitudes, especially toward Ukraine. Years of narratives portraying Ukraine negatively have contributed to public skepticism about closer ties and EU membership for Ukraine. The text emphasized that while political leadership can shift quickly, the effects of disinformation are more persistent. Public distrust, shaped by repeated misleading narratives, continues to complicate Hungary’s foreign policy decisions. Source: The Jamestown Foundation. Péter Magyar’s Historic Victory Holds Implications for Russia and Ukraine. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/peter-magyars-historic-victory-holds-implications-for-russia-and-ukraine/ Top Of Page Misleading Framing of the Russia–Ukraine War and Timeline As published by The Atlantic Council, widespread narratives about the Russia–Ukraine War are shaped by misleading or incomplete information, particularly the claim that the conflict began in 2022. In reality, the war started in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its covert military intervention in eastern Ukraine. Framing the war as a shorter, recent conflict obscures its true nature as a long-term campaign of aggression and contributes to misunderstandings in international discourse. A central theme is the role of Kremlin disinformation in distorting perceptions of the conflict. Russia portrayed its actions in 2014 as local uprisings by oppressed Russian-speaking populations, while denying direct military involvement. These false narratives were sometimes repeated by international media, creating confusion and lending credibility to fabricated claims. In fact, evidence and later admissions confirm that the so-called "separatist" movements were orchestrated and supported by Moscow from the outset. This disinformation continues to influence policy debates and peace proposals, such as the idea that territorial concessions could end the war, and therefore dismantling these persistent falsehoods and acknowledging the full history of the conflict since 2014 is essential for understanding the war and achieving any meaningful resolution. Source: Atlantic Council. Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 long before the full-scale war of 2022. [online] Published 18 April 2026. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-invaded-ukraine-in-2014-long-before-the-full-scale-war-of-2022/ Top Of Page China PRC Media Influence in Arabic-Language Environments According to a study by NATO, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded its media presence in Arabic-speaking regions as part of broader foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) efforts. Through state-controlled media and partnerships with local outlets, Beijing seeks to shape public opinion, promote its global image, and challenge Western narratives. While social media plays a role, traditional media remains a key channel for spreading these narratives, often presenting China as a reliable development partner while downplaying sensitive issues such as human rights. The study found that PRC messaging is selectively effective. Narratives tied to practical benefits like infrastructure projects, trade, and logistics are more likely to be picked up and amplified by local media. Similarly, content that aligns with existing anti-Western or geopolitical competition narratives gains traction. In contrast, more ideological messaging, such as concepts like a "shared global destiny", has limited impact. Importantly, PRC narratives are rarely critically challenged in Arabic-language media, even when they carry a strong promotional or propagandistic tone. The findings highlighted a pattern of indirect disinformation influence. Rather than spreading overt falsehoods, PRC media promote biased, one-sided narratives that are selectively adopted and reframed by regional outlets. This contributes to shaping perceptions of global politics in ways that favor Beijing, with potential spillover effects on Arabic-speaking audiences beyond the region, including in Europe. Source: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Assessing PRC Media: Framing and Narratives in Arabic-Language Media Environments. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/publications/download/Assessing-PRC-Media-FINAL-465f0.pdf?zoom=page-fit Top Of Page China’s Digital Disinformation Affects Taiwan’s Policy A report by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that digital technologies, especially social media and AI, are increasingly used by governments to shape public opinion and reinforce political narratives, with this dynamic particularly visible in relations between China and Taiwan. It highlighted how Beijing promotes a simplified "unification versus independence" framework to describe Taiwan’s political future, reducing a complex and diverse set of public attitudes into a binary choice. This framing, amplified through global media, influencer networks, and Chinese-developed AI systems, supports China’s broader effort to enforce the "One China" principle and weaken international support for Taiwan’s self-determination. However, survey data from Taiwan showed that public opinion is far more nuanced, spanning multiple positions such as conditional unification, maintaining the status quo, or conditional independence. This complexity is often overlooked not only by external actors but also by domestic media and political discourse, which tend to favor simplified narratives for mobilization purposes. The report concluded that this "digital hegemony" poses a significant challenge to democratic debate and policymaking. Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Digital Hegemony and the Reification of Taiwan’s “Unification-Independence” Dichotomy. [online] Published 14 April 2026. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/04/digital-hegemony-and-the-reification-of-taiwans-unification-independence-dichotomy Top Of Page Iran Pro-Iran Networks Gained a Billion Views on War Propaganda According to an article by ISD Institute for Strategic Dialogue, during the first month of the Iran war, two coordinated pro-Iran networks on X, BRICS4CLICKS and Verified4War, generated over one billion views by spreading false, misleading, and AI-generated content. Despite comprising only a few dozen accounts, the networks achieved massive reach through coordinated reposting, paid verification (blue checkmarks), and amplification via X’s "For You" algorithm. Their content was further boosted by high-profile accounts, including diplomats and influencers. Both networks posed as news or commentary accounts while promoting pro-Iran narratives that exaggerated military successes and targeted the United States and Israel. They widely circulated fabricated claims, such as the death of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and used AI-generated war footage, clickbait posts, and conspiracy theories to drive engagement. Their activity revealed clear coordination patterns, with most reposts occurring within the networks themselves and consistent similarities in account metadata and behavior. ISD has no further evidence that either network is state-backed, and it also remains unclear if the underlying motivations are financial or ideological. Although X removed some accounts, gaps in moderation allowed these networks to gain visibility and credibility. Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. How pro-Iran networks gained a billion views on war propaganda. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/how-pro-iran-networks-gained-a-billion-views-on-war-propaganda/ Top Of Page Disinformation as a Divisive Strategic Weapon According to a report by The Hill, disinformation rooted in real social tensions has long been a national security concern. It recalls how President Eisenhower warned during the Little Rock crisis that visible racism damaged U.S. credibility and gave adversaries propaganda material. Today, the same dynamic persists in a different form, as foreign actors, particularly Iran, exploit America’s racial history and internal divisions to weaken unity and undermine support for national policies. According to the passage, modern disinformation blends with exaggerations and falsehoods. Iranian-linked campaigns reportedly use social media, memes, and music to target specific groups, such as Black Americans and women, while promoting anti-American, anti-Israel, and antisemitic narratives. This strategy does not aim to invent new conflicts but to amplify existing ones, creating deeper polarization and mistrust within society. The report emphasized that domestic actors unintentionally contribute to this problem. Political extremes, influencers, and media figures may amplify divisive narratives for profit or ideology, effectively reinforcing foreign propaganda. Sources: The Hill. Iran is exploiting our racial divisions online — and Americans are helping. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5830889-iran-propaganda-american-divisions/ Top Of Page [General Reports] Musk Gave a 50 Million-View Boost to the COVID Vaccine Hoax As reported by NewsGuard's Reality Check, Elon Musk significantly amplified a false claim that COVID-19 vaccines caused up to 60,000 deaths in Germany by reposting content to his massive audience on X. The claim originated from testimony by a former Pfizer toxicologist, who speculated, without evidence, 0that official reports of vaccine-related deaths were vastly undercounted. While the claim initially gained limited traction, it spread rapidly after being shared by a commentator and then boosted by Musk, reaching tens of millions of views within hours. In reality, Germany’s vaccine regulator, the Paul Ehrlich Institute, reported 2,133 deaths following vaccination, but emphasized that such reports do not imply causation. Its analysis identified only 74 cases in which a link to vaccination was possible or probable, out of nearly 200 million doses administered. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Musk Gives a 50 Million View Boost. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/musk-gives-a-50-million-view-boost Top Of Page Online Extremism in Canada in 2025 A report by ISD analyzed Canadian domestic extremist activity across social media between June and November 2025, identifying hundreds of accounts generating over one million posts. These groups are highly active on platforms like X and Telegram, where different ideologies, from ethnonationalism to white supremacy, thrive. Their content often focuses on narratives of societal decline, threats to national identity, and hostility toward minorities, helping to amplify and normalize extremist worldviews online. Disinformation plays a central role in amplifying conspiracy theories and distorting real-world events. Narratives linked to figures like Romana Didulo, anti-vaccination movements, and false claims about minority groups are widely circulated. Offline incidents, such as violent attacks or political events, are often misrepresented or exaggerated to justify hatred, for example, by falsely linking entire communities to violence or spreading claims of media bias. The spread of disinformation is closely tied to rising hate speech and calls for violence. False or misleading claims about migrants, LGBTQ individuals, and other minorities fuel hostility and dehumanization, while viral posts from influential accounts can rapidly intensify these trends. Although only a small portion of posts contain explicit violent language, spikes often follow disinformation-driven reactions to major events. Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). Online Domestic Extremism in Canada: June–November 2025. [online] Published April 2026. Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Online-Domestic-Extremism-in-Canada-June-November-2025.pdf Top Of Page Deep State Narratives Blur Lines Between Truth and Disinformation An article published by the International Journal of Communication, written by Stephen Hutchings, examines how “deep state” (DS) narratives function as a fluid and contested form of disinformation across political and cultural contexts. It shows that DS conspiracism is used by a wide range of actors, including populist political movements, mainstream politicians, Kremlin-affiliated media, and counter-disinformation organizations, to advance competing narratives. These actors deploy DS claims both as tools of influence and as accusations against opponents, often linking domestic grievances with foreign adversaries in a circular dynamic. Tactics include narrative amplification through media ecosystems, strategic framing of elites as covert manipulators, cross-border adaptation of conspiracy tropes, and the use of hashtags and community-building mechanisms to reinforce shared belief systems. The study highlights how DS narratives are frequently integrated into broader geopolitical messaging, particularly along the U.S. – Russia axis, where they are alternately framed as hidden truths or as disinformation, depending on the political perspective. The article emphasizes that DS conspiracism operates as a “master narrative” within disinformation campaigns, capable of absorbing and connecting multiple claims into a coherent but unfalsifiable framework. Its effectiveness lies in its adaptability: it shifts between being presented as factual revelation, symbolic critique, or deliberate falsehood, allowing actors to exploit ambiguity and evade straightforward refutation. Disinformation tactics associated with DS narratives include selective use of evidence, rhetorical distancing, repurposing foreign-origin concepts to serve local political agendas, and reciprocal accusations between opposing actors. The analysis concludes that this fluidity undermines binary distinctions between truth and falsehood, enabling DS narratives to persist and evolve across platforms, cultures, and political systems, thereby complicating efforts to counter disinformation and contribute to broader instability in democratic information environments. Source: International Journal of Communication. [online] Available at: https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/26038/5302 Top Of Page Disinformation Exploits Algorithms and Human Vulnerabilities to Erode Trust An article published in Healthcare MDPI analyses disinformation as a systemic and intentional form of information manipulation embedded within digital ecosystems and amplified by algorithm-driven platforms. It identifies digital platforms and social media networks as the primary enablers of disinformation dissemination, where algorithms prioritize emotionally charged, sensationalist, and polarizing content to maximize engagement, regardless of accuracy. These dynamics facilitate the rapid and large-scale spread of false or misleading narratives, often outpacing information. Tactics include algorithmic amplification, exploitation of echo chambers and filter bubbles, and repeated exposure to false claims, which increases perceived credibility through familiarity effects. Disinformation actors, though not always explicitly named, operate through digitally mediated environments, leveraging platform structures and user behavior to propagate misleading content and shape public perception. The article further highlights how disinformation campaigns exploit psychosocial vulnerabilities, including political beliefs, social identity, and emotional responses, to increase acceptance and diffusion of false narratives. Techniques such as confirmation bias, identity-based messaging, and emotionally manipulative content reinforce group alignment and polarization. At the same time, repeated exposure contributes to the “illusory truth effect”, making false information more likely to be believed. The cumulative impact of these tactics includes erosion of trust in media and institutions, distortion of risk perception, and behavioral influence in areas such as public health decision-making. Disinformation is thus framed as a coordinated influence process that operates across cognitive, emotional, and social dimensions, creating feedback loops of distrust and increased susceptibility within the information environment. Source: MDPI. Effect of Muscle Energy Technique on Hamstring Flexibility: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. [online] Published 11 April 2023. Available at: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9032/11/8/1089 Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Called for Stronger Action on Information Integrity In a statement at the UN Committee on Information, the European Union reaffirmed its support for efforts to promote accurate, reliable, and accessible information worldwide. It praised the UN Department of Global Communications for advancing initiatives to counter disinformation and hate speech, including the implementation of the Global Principles for Information Integrity. The EU emphasized the importance of protecting independent media, strengthening media literacy, and ensuring transparency and accountability from digital platforms. At the same time, the EU warned that disinformation, particularly foreign information manipulation, poses a growing threat to democratic societies, international cooperation, and human rights, with risks amplified by the rise of AI. It also highlighted operational challenges facing the UN, including funding constraints that limit its ability to reach global audiences effectively. It stressed that reforms, including the use of AI, should complement rather than replace core communication functions. The EU further underscored the importance of multilingual communication and the protection of journalists, especially in conflict zones. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). EU Statement – 48th session of the UN Committee on Information: Informal briefing with USG of the Department of Global Communications. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-48th-session-un-committee-information-informal-briefing-usg-department-global_en Top Of Page Ofcom Founds Additional Online Safety Measures Ofcom announced that it will take new regulatory steps to combat the spread of illegal intimate images online, including non-consensual content and explicit deepfakes. One of their proposals is the use of "hash matching" technology, which allows platforms to detect and block harmful images before they are widely shared. The decision has been fast-tracked due to the urgent need to better protect users from online abuse. The measures also address the growing role of disinformation in this space. Deepfake technology can be used to create and spread manipulated intimate images and cause serious harm to victims. By stopping such content at the source, regulators aim to limit both the abuse itself and the spread of deceptive digital material that can damage reputations and distort reality. According to Ofcom, the proposed rules are expected to be finalized soon and could take effect within months, with additional protections planned later. Source: Ofcom. Ofcom fast-tracks decision on measures to block illegal intimate images. [online] Published 18 February 2026. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/ofcom-fast-tracks-decision-on-measures-to-block-illegal-intimate-images Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

The Urban Cyfluence Framework begins from the concept of Cyfluence, a hybrid paradigm that captures the convergence of cyber threats and influence operations, rather than treating urban systems in isolation. While existing research tends to remain fragmented—focusing separately on smart-city innovation, municipal cybersecurity, or information manipulation, this approach highlights how these domains increasingly overlap. Evidence from multiple regions shows that as cities become more digitally dependent, cyber-attacks and influence campaigns no longer operate independently. Instead, they intersect across urban services, communication channels, and, critically, public trust. The key gap is not a lack of research on cyber risks or influence operations individually, but the absence of an integrated framework that explains how physical, digital, and cognitive dimensions interact in urban environments. The Urban Cyfluence Framework is designed to address this gap by providing a more holistic lens for understanding emerging urban threats. Key Takeaways An appropriate point of departure for the understanding of the Urban Cyfluence Framework is the newly-established, hybrid paradigm of Cyfluence, rather than urban centers in isolation. This is because Cyfluence captures the growing convergence between cyber-attacks for influence and information manipulation in support of cyber threats. Current research remains conceptually segmented; Smart-city research continues to prioritize optimization, innovation, and digital enablement; municipal cybersecurity studies often remain confined to technical governance or organizational resilience; while foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and hostile cognitive threats research, is still largely oriented toward state competition, elections, or platform ecosystems. Comparative evidence from North America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Pacific indicates a recurring pattern: as urban governance becomes increasingly dependent on digital infrastructures, cyber threats and hostile influence cease to function as separate categories of disruption. Instead, they intersect through service environments, communication channels, and the production or erosion of public trust. The primary research gap, therefore, is not the absence of work on cyber risk or influence operations individually. Rather, it is the absence of a comprehensive analytical framework capable of explaining how physical, digital, and cognitive effects interact within the urban context. It is this epistemic gap that led to the development of the Urban Cyfluence Framework. Author: CRC Urban Cyfluence Lab Team [Download PDF Here]

Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, U.S. college campuses became the stage for over 3,700 demonstrations and 1,150 encampments across 35 states, the largest student protest wave since the 1960s. This comprehensive multi-disciplinary study applies digital forensics, network analysis, field observations and open-source intelligence (OSINT) in order to examine Columbia University as a prime case study in contemporary hybrid cognitive threats targeting the United States.  The research explores the mechanism by which grassroots activism was embedded within, and largely exploited by, a layered influence-driven ecosystem comprising domestic organizers, digital aggregators, inauthentic amplification clusters, and foreign-linked actors. To conclude, we review possible remediation strategies and practical approaches to address the increased threat posed to Managed Contested Spaces (MCSs) by hostile influence and information disorder efforts. Key Takeaways   Integrated Hybrid Influence Architecture:  Columbia’s protest waves operated as tightly coupled physical–digital phenomena in which templated national toolkits and real-time messaging platforms synchronized mobilization and logistics, while an integrated physical–digital ecosystem enabled rapid scaling, narrative shaping, and the manufacture of perceived consensus. Bidirectional Mobilization:  Protest escalation was driven by recursive information flows: bottom-up amplification transformed localized incidents into nationally salient narratives, while top-down externally generated narratives were injected into campus organizing cycles, often shaping both framing and timing of physical actions. Detection and Attribution of Inauthentic Amplification Activity:  CRC researchers have mapped an array of impersonation assets, designated as Inauthentic Journalists Persona Cluster (IJPC). Currently, we assess it is a Nigeria-based influence-for-hire narrative amplification effort. Protecting Managed Contested Spaces (MCSs): High-profile targeted institutions must adopt a proactive,  whole-of-institution approach  against hybrid threats. This requires the integration of detection solutions, resilience-building programs, collaboration interfaces, and deploying Cognitive Security Posture Management  (CoSPM) visibility and response capabilities across multiple dimensions (physical–cognitive–digital), in accordance with the Cyfluence Security Paradigm. Author: Eliana Aiken and The CRC Team [Full Report Below]