This week's intelligence landscape was dominated by Russia's influence operations. Russia employed a spectrum of tactics, from sophisticated AI-generated fakes targeting European diplomacy to imposter news sites aimed at destabilizing Armenia.

This week’s review spans Russia’s projection strategy in Alaska, spoofing of NewsGuard, AI-driven fake media, and smear campaigns in Canada. It also covers Poland’s FIMI-targeted election, disinformation as a systemic platform issue, identity-based narratives fueling extremism, and Bulgaria’s political decay enabling EU-wide disinfo threats.

The China cyber militia model shows how civilian, state, and military actors are fully interconnected. Rather than outsourcing, Beijing embeds information operations within this system, blurring boundaries and ensuring all parts can be mobilized as extensions of state power.

China tends to respond to accusations of information operations in a recurring pattern. A recent example is the Ministry of State Security’s reaction to Australian espionage allegations, which once again reflected this established approach.

Singapore’s public attribution of cyber intrusions to UNC3886 marks a shift in its stance toward China, departing from past discretion. The move highlights the role of attribution as both technical evidence and strategic messaging. China’s swift counteraccusations illustrate a pattern in hostile influence, redirecting attention and reframing narratives to challenge Singapore’s position and shape international perception.

This week’s review: Information solidified as the key battlespace. States embed influence operations into core strategy, Russia’s refined destabilization in Kursk, Moldova, and Latvia; Iran’s rapid cyber–kinetic fusion in conflict with Israel; African mercenaries pairing lethal drones with disinformation. From UK riots amplified by social media algorithms to great-power wargames in Latin America, modern conflict is increasingly fought in the information domain.