top of page
CRC logo (2).png

Weekly Report: Cyber based influence campaigns 30th June - 06th July 2025

  • Writer: CRC
    CRC
  • Jul 9
  • 11 min read

Updated: Jul 17

Weekly Media Update by CRC, on Cyber-Based Influence. Kid with lightbulb helmet. Weekly Report: Cyber based influence campaigns 30th June - 06th July 2025.

[Listen to the Podcast]


[Report Highlights]

> TABLE OF CONTENTS <

DIGITAL HOSTILE INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
STATE ACTORS

  • [Russia]

  • [The War in Ukraine]  

  

  • [Iran]

GENERAL REPORTS
FRAMEWORKS TO COUNTER DISINFORMATION
STATE ACTORS

[Russia]

The Waiting Zone: Strategic Neglect on Europe’s Eastern Edge

RAND reports that Russia is attempting to exert influence over Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, three states without a clear EU accession timeline. In Moldova, it spreads disinformation, interferes in elections, and stirs unrest in the separatist region of Transnistria. Georgia is burdened by an authoritarian government that increasingly leans toward Russia, suppresses the opposition, and undermines civil society. In Armenia, Moscow uses the aftermath of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crisis to retain military presence and increase pressure through the threat of further Azerbaijani attacks.


These countries are especially vulnerable because their path to the EU remains uncertain, and key Western actors, such as USAID, NED, and Radio Free Europe, have scaled back or suspended their support. This has created a vacuum that Russia exploits through disinformation and coercion. Moscow has nothing to offer, no functioning economy, no absolute security guarantees, and no vision for development.


The EU could respond with measures, including granting candidacy status to Armenia, accelerating integration steps for Moldova, and taking a clear stance against democratic backsliding in Georgia. However, internal divisions, particularly vetoes from Hungary or Slovakia, hinder unified action.


That’s why national responses matter. Countries like the United Kingdom, though no longer part of the EU, retain global diplomatic networks, financial leverage, and strategic partnerships in the region. With targeted sanctions, media support, and financial aid, they could help strengthen pro-European forces. “History has also shown that any compromise, appeasement, or apathy in the response to Vladimir Putin's strategic ambitions on the continent only encourages further aggression.”


Source:  

In the Shadow of Matryoshka: Disinformation Ahead of the EU-Summit

In recent coverage, EUvsDisinfo has traced the latest surge in Russian information warfare surrounding the 2025 EU-Moldova Summit back to the “Matryoshka network”,  which has been active since 2023. The disinformation network operates in two stages:


First, it produces fake content, including manipulated videos, fabricated news stories, and counterfeit imitations of Western media content. In the second phase, a swarm of affiliated accounts (“quoters”) amplifies the material by replying to posts from public figures or media outlets, often tagging them to draw attention.


A central target is Moldova's President Maia Sandu, who is attacked through fabricated scandals and conspiracy theories, particularly in the lead-up to national elections and the EU-Moldova Summit in Chișinău. EU countries, such as Estonia, Romania, and France, have also been drawn into the campaign through fabricated content designed to suggest diplomatic conflicts and security threats.


Source:  

Russia's Cognitive Warfare: A Strategic Threat

A recent study by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) examines the nature, purpose, and methods of cognitive warfare as a central threat to U.S. national security. Cognitive warfare is defined as the deliberate manipulation of an opponent’s thinking, decision-making, and behavior to achieve strategic objectives without resorting to direct military force. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea use this method systematically against the United States and its allies, with Russia identified as the leading actor and a model for others.


Russia’s approach goes far beyond traditional disinformation. It relies on half-truths and selective messaging to construct a false sense of reality. These narratives are disseminated through media outlets, social networks, diplomatic channels, international institutions, and individual influencers. The information campaign is reinforced by physical actions such as cyberattacks, sabotage, and military posturing. Russia’s operations are long-term, and narratives are adapted, paused, and reactivated over the years.


The aim is to influence foreign decision-making in Russia’s favor by fostering confusion, passivity, or distorted perceptions of threats. Moscow employs cognitive warfare to bridge the gap between its ambitions and its limited military and economic capabilities.


The author warns that simply debunking false claims is insufficient. What matters is identifying and rejecting the underlying assumptions that the Kremlin seeks to implant in Western thinking. Only by countering these embedded narratives can cognitive warfare be effectively neutralized. This is not a war of weapons, but a war over perception and reasoning, and it is already underway.


Source:

[The War in Ukraine]

Once Upon a Time in the Classroom: Russia’s New History Textbooks

According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia’s newly issued state-approved history textbooks for grades 10 and 11 represent a significant escalation in the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign. Written in part by Putin’s aide Vladimir Medinsky, these books include entire chapters on the still-ongoing war in Ukraine, which is framed not as aggression but as a noble “special military operation.” Far from offering historical analysis, the textbooks promote propaganda, recasting the invasion as a civilizational defense and portraying Ukraine as both a threat and an artificial construct. Emotional language, conspiracy theories, and aggressive revisionism serve to indoctrinate students with a distorted, state-approved worldview.


Disinformation is at the heart of this educational overhaul. The books glorify war, create a cult of heroism around known war criminals, and push the narrative that Russia is under constant threat from the West. They claim that NATO and the U.S. orchestrated everything from the fall of Yugoslavia to the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, with the aim of “dismembering” Russia. These narratives are presented not only as historical facts but also as urgent truths for young Russians to internalize and reflect upon. The language urges students to “draw their conclusions,” while steering them firmly toward Kremlin-approved ideology.


Perhaps most striking is the erasure of Ukrainian identity itself. Ukrainians are repeatedly referred to as “Little Russians,” and their statehood is depicted as the product of Western manipulation. Ukraine is presented as a puppet of hostile powers, with its nationalism portrayed as a manufactured tool to harm Russia.


Source:

A Question of Faith: False Claims Against Ukraine

DisinfoWatch has identified a false claim made by U.S. Representative Anna Paulina Luna, who stated on X that the Ukrainian government under Zelensky has banned the Orthodox Church entirely. She invoked this Kremlin-aligned disinformation narrative to argue for ending U.S. military aid to Ukraine.


In reality, no such blanket ban exists. The law, enacted in 2024 and titled “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations,” allows the government to restrict religious groups affiliated with aggressor states. It is grounded in national security concerns, not in religious suppression. The measure has been widely understood to apply to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which has played a well-documented role in promoting Kremlin propaganda, legitimizing the war against Ukraine, and spreading anti-Western conspiracy narratives.


Source:

From Russia with Funds: Australia Sanctions Pravfond’s 

According to an article by ABC News, Australia has sanctioned Pravfond, a Russian-backed organization, which is accused of supporting disinformation and espionage. Australia’s measures followed an investigation by ABC and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). Pravfond, officially the "Foundation to Support and Defend the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad," has funded the legal defenses of high-profile figures such as alleged pro-Putin propagandist Simeon Boikov ("Aussie Cossack"), Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, and convicted assassin Vadim Krasikov. The investigation uncovered thousands of internal emails revealing Pravfond’s direct financial and political support for Boikov, who has promoted Russian propaganda while sheltering in Sydney’s Russian consulate.


Authorities say Pravfond operates under the guise of humanitarian aid while enabling Russia’s influence operations abroad, including disinformation campaigns linked to the Ukraine war. The Australian government’s sanctions freeze the organization’s assets and bar any financial dealings, citing its role in manipulating public opinion in favor of Russia’s illegal invasion. Despite these findings, Pravfond and Russian officials have dismissed the claims as “fake stories,” framing the organization as a legitimate human rights group unfairly targeted by Western governments.


Sources:

[Iran]

Covered Hostilities: Iran’s Disinformation War in the UK

The Telegraph reports that the United Kingdom has long been the target of a covert influence campaign by the Islamic Republic of Iran. This shadow war includes disinformation, ideological manipulation, cyber operations, regime-linked NGOs, and concealed financial networks.


A central propaganda tool was the state-controlled broadcaster Press TV, whose UK license was revoked in 2012. Nevertheless, it continues to spread anti-British content online. Programmes like Palestine Declassified have glorified Hamas’s armed resistance.


In recent years, Iran has increasingly shifted its efforts online. Between 2013 and 2014, Iranian-linked actors ran a Facebook page promoting separatist views ahead of the Scottish independence referendum, mirroring Russian disinformation strategies. Similar Iranian activity reappeared during the 2021 Scottish parliamentary elections.


These campaigns are reinforced by regime-affiliated organisations such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), which organises annual Quds Day rallies and has reportedly supported Palestine Action, a group involved in sabotage against Israeli-linked sites in the UK. Despite documented ties to Tehran, the IHRC remains active.


Iran’s financial networks also play a key role. Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, both linked to the financing of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Kataib Hezbollah, still maintain offices in London’s financial district.


Although officials, such as MI5’s director and senior politicians, have acknowledged the threat, concrete responses remain limited.


Sources:

GENERAL REPORTS


NewsGuard Launches Reality Gap Index

On July 1st, 2025, NewsGuard introduced the Reality Gap Index, the first ongoing metric designed to track how effectively false claims circulating online are penetrating American public belief. Developed in collaboration with YouGov, the Index surveys a representative sample of 1,000 Americans each month to assess belief in three of the most widespread false claims identified through NewsGuard’s False Claim Fingerprints database. The June 2025 survey found that 49% of Americans believed at least one of the month’s top false claims.


The selected false claims for June included widely debunked narratives: that bricks were planted to arm protesters during anti-deportation demonstrations in Los Angeles, that U.S. senators spent $800,000 of taxpayer money on hotels during a Ukraine trip, and that white South Africans are being systematically killed in a so-called "white genocide." Only 7% of respondents were able to identify all three statements as false information, while 74% were unsure about at least one of them.


The Reality Gap Index will be updated monthly and published in NewsGuard’s Reality Check newsletter. NewsGuard co-CEO Steven Brill emphasized that while misinformation efforts are constantly tracked, the new index uniquely measures the extent to which these falsehoods influence public opinion.


Source:  

FRAMEWORKS TO COUNTER DISINFORMATION


EU Sanctions Fight Russian Disinformation

The European Union announced it has renewed its sweeping sanctions against Russia until January 2026 in response to the Kremlin’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine. Originally imposed in 2014 and expanded significantly since the 2022 invasion, these measures target key sectors, including trade, finance, energy, and technology. Crucially, they also include bans on Russian state-backed media outlets known for spreading disinformation, as well as measures to prevent circumvention of sanctions.


Russian disinformation has played a central role in its war efforts, not only justifying its invasion but also seeking to destabilize European unity and public opinion. The EU recognized that this information warfare violates the principles of international law just as severely as military aggression. To counter this, sanctions are being used not only to restrict Russia’s economic capacity but also to silence channels that propagate state-sponsored lies and conspiracy theories.


Source:

UK launches Foreign Influence Registration Scheme

According to a report by the GOV. On July 1st, 2025, the UK officially launched the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) as part of its Plan for Change, aiming to protect national security and democratic integrity from covert foreign interference. Introduced under the National Security Act 2023, FIRS creates transparency around political activities conducted on behalf of foreign powers, particularly those of adversarial states such as Iran and Russia, which have been placed under the scheme’s most stringent “enhanced tier.”


FIRS is a two-tier scheme: a political tier, which requires the registration of political influence activities such as lobbying and communications, and an enhanced tier that mandates strict reporting for activities directed by hostile states, including their military and intelligence services. Failure to register can result in criminal prosecution, although registration itself does not imply illegitimacy or the need to cease the activity.


The UK government emphasized that while legitimate foreign engagement is welcome, covert manipulation of the political system will not be tolerated. To ensure the scheme is proportionate, FIRS includes exemptions, including for recognized news publishers, legal professionals acting during legal proceedings or providing legal advice, diplomats and their families, and arrangements involving the UK government.


Source:

UK Government, Jarvis, D.; MBE MP, 2025. UK launches Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. [online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-launches-foreign-influence-registration-scheme

EU's Push for Accountability to Counter Disinformation

A report by Tech Policy states that Europe’s Code of Conduct on Disinformation officially came into effect on July 1, 2025, as part of the Digital Services Act (DSA). Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) are now required to meet stricter transparency and auditing obligations. This includes annual independent audits to ensure that disinformation risks are adequately addressed. Full compliance with the Code is considered a key risk mitigation tool and a benchmark for DSA compliance. Through these measures, the EU holds platforms more accountable to create a safer and more transparent online environment.


Criticism primarily comes from the United States, especially from MAGA-aligned politicians and tech companies. They accuse the EU of censorship, fearing that the Code and DSA could restrict freedom of expression and establish global standards for content moderation. The concern is that content might be systematically removed or suppressed, leading to increased monitoring and control of speech.


The European Commission firmly rejects these accusations. It emphasizes that the Code is not a tool for censorship, but a framework that promotes transparency, fairness, and safety online while upholding fundamental rights, including freedom of expression. The focus is on systemic accountability of platforms rather than removing individual pieces of content. In particular, the aim is to combat opaque recommendation algorithms and advertising networks that amplify polarizing and manipulated content.


While the Code was initially voluntary, adherence to it is now part of the DSA’s risk mitigation measures. DSA obligations are legally binding, whereas compliance with the Code remains voluntary but is taken into consideration during audits. Experts warn that without clear audit frameworks and transparent data access, the effectiveness of these measures will suffer. Overall, the pressure on platforms to take responsibility is increasing, as the EU strives to balance security with freedom of expression.


Source:

[Download Report]

 
 
bottom of page