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China’s Recurring Pattern in Responding to Foreign Attribution
China tends to respond to accusations of information operations in a recurring pattern. A recent example is the Ministry of State Security’s reaction to Australian espionage allegations, which once again reflected this established approach.
Aug 21, 2025


Singapore Drops the Name, Shifting the Game
Singapore’s public attribution of cyber intrusions to UNC3886 marks a shift in its stance toward China, departing from past discretion. The move highlights the role of attribution as both technical evidence and strategic messaging. China’s swift counteraccusations illustrate a pattern in hostile influence, redirecting attention and reframing narratives to challenge Singapore’s position and shape international perception.
Aug 14, 2025


Targeting Taiwan: An Influence Campaign with Benefits
Between March and April 2025, Doublethink Lab identified a coordinated influence campaign on Threads involving 51 fake accounts posing as Taiwanese users, spreading anti-DPP narratives alongside sexually suggestive content. The operation showed signs of outsourced amplification, blending political messaging with dating spam.
Aug 8, 2025


Influence Rebranded: The African Initiative
Examiniation of a recent VIGINUM report (June 2025), which analyzes the activities and organizational structure of the "African Initiative," an organization operating across several African countries.
Jul 1, 2025


Meta Takes Down Global CIB Operations from Iran, China, and Romania
Meta’s latest Adversarial Threat Report details the detection and dismantling of three global Coor-dinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) campaigns attributed to actors based in China, Iran, and Romania.
Jun 9, 2025


Visibility as Victory: The Strategic Logic of Doppelgänger
This week’s post highlights key findings from Beyond Operation Doppelgänger: A Capability Assessment of the Social Design Agency (Pamment & Tsurtsumia, 2025), published by the Psychological Defence Agency at Lund University. Drawing on over 3,100 leaked internal documents, the study offers new insights into the structure, strategy, and objectives of the Russian influence campaign known as “Doppelgänger.”
May 30, 2025


Storm-1516: VIGINUM Report Insights
VIGINUM Report
Storm-1516 is a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign targeting Western democracies. It uses AI, deepfakes, and fake media outlets—often distributed via the CopyCop network—and follows a five-phase operational model. Evidence points to potential links with GRU Unit 29155 and broader state-backed influence networks.
May 18, 2025


Commercial Hostile Influence Networks: Anthropic’s Findings on Multi-Client Operations
Anthropic uncovers and disrupts four coordinated influence operations in April 2025, run by a commercial "Influence-as-a-Service" provider. These AI-driven disinformation campaigns—unlinked to any specific state actor—underscore the rising threat of private sector influence operations in digital security, social media manipulation, and global information warfare.
May 9, 2025


Years of Deception: ClearSyksec´s Report on a Houthi-Yemeni Influence Network
This week on our blog, we are presenting a new report by ClearSkySec that highlights a compelling case of a long-term influence operation.
Apr 29, 2025


Codebreakers Hack Sepah Bank: Financial Motive or Influence Operation?
This week, we examine the recent developments involving the hackergroup "Codebreakers" and the Iranian Sepah Bank, which have surprisingly not made international headlines yet.
Apr 17, 2025


VIGINUM REPORT: WAR IN UKRAINE
This week, we are also reviewing the latest VIGINUM report . While it presents few new insights, it offers a structured overview of key...
Apr 2, 2025


Norway´s Threat Assessment Report 2025
This week, we examine Norway’s most recent national threat assessment (1) , which delineates key developments and emerging dynamics...
Apr 1, 2025


Countermeasures and Defense Against AI-Driven Disinformation
Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the world at a rapid pace, increasingly shaping various aspects of life. With its...
Mar 3, 2025


Deepfakes and Multilingual Misinformation: The Challenges of Tracking AI-generated Disinformation
The rapid advancement of AI-generated content has transformed the landscape of disinformation, making it harder than ever to detect and...
Feb 23, 2025


Google’s Report: The AI Use for Disinformation and Information Operations
State-linked actors from Iran, China, and Russia use AI tools like Google’s Gemini to enhance disinformation and information operations...
Feb 10, 2025


Meta’s Ad Transparency: Progress or Propaganda
A new report reveals how sanctioned Russian entities are exploiting Meta’s ad platform to spread state-sponsored propaganda. Despite...
Feb 4, 2025


Russian Disinformation Campaign Aims at German Federal Election
Ahead of Germany’s 2025 federal election, 102 fake news websites were discovered spreading pro-Russian disinformation to influence public...
Feb 4, 2025


Parsian Afzar Rayan Borna, a Key Instrument of Iran’s Disinformation Campaigns
A new report by Iran International raises allegations against the Iranian IT company Parsian Afzar Rayan Borna. According to the report,...
Jan 28, 2025


China´s Influence Operations (IO) in Taiwan
A recent report by Taiwan's National Security Bureau illuminates the escalating influence operations (IO) conducted by the Chinese...
Jan 21, 2025


Fact-checking and its Limitations to Combat Influence Campaigns
Meta’s shift from independent fact-checkers to user-driven “community notes” sparks debate over the effectiveness of moderating...
Jan 21, 2025
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