This week in Cyfluence: Russia weaponizes grief with AI-generated "ghost" soldiers, China uses chatbots for espionage, and coordinated disinformation campaigns target democratic processes and alliances globally. Our weekly review breaks down the latest in hostile cyber influence.

During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). This weeks report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

During the 22nd to the 28th of September 2025, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints of information related to these campaigns. The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events from this period.

Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect. During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect. During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

Persistent Russian campaigns targeting European states occurred alongside reported US-linked activities including a domestic covert influencer network, as well as an alleged hostile operation in Greenland. Concurrently, state responses are growing more assertive, evidenced by Indonesia’s heightened regulatory pressure on tech platforms and Denmark's formal diplomatic summons.

Persistent Russian campaigns targeting European states occurred alongside reported US-linked activities including a domestic covert influencer network, as well as an alleged hostile operation in Greenland. Concurrently, state responses are growing more assertive, evidenced by Indonesia’s heightened regulatory pressure on tech platforms and Denmark's formal diplomatic summons.

This week's intelligence landscape was dominated by Russia's influence operations. Russia employed a spectrum of tactics, from sophisticated AI-generated fakes targeting European diplomacy to imposter news sites aimed at destabilizing Armenia.

This week’s review spans Russia’s projection strategy in Alaska, spoofing of NewsGuard, AI-driven fake media, and smear campaigns in Canada. It also covers Poland’s FIMI-targeted election, disinformation as a systemic platform issue, identity-based narratives fueling extremism, and Bulgaria’s political decay enabling EU-wide disinfo threats.

This week’s review: Information solidified as the key battlespace. States embed influence operations into core strategy, Russia’s refined destabilization in Kursk, Moldova, and Latvia; Iran’s rapid cyber–kinetic fusion in conflict with Israel; African mercenaries pairing lethal drones with disinformation. From UK riots amplified by social media algorithms to great-power wargames in Latin America, modern conflict is increasingly fought in the information domain.

This week’s developments span a broad spectrum of influence operations and digital information warfare, with three dominant themes emerging: the intensification of AI-generated disinformation across global conflicts, the increasing use of state-aligned platforms to manipulate geopolitical narratives, and the shifting responsibilities of tech companies as frontline moderators.

The week’s reporting illuminates a strategic tension between rapidly advancing disinformation capabilities, often state-aligned, and the slower-moving, fractured responses of democracies and institutions tasked with defending truth. China's AI chatbots echo state lines with near-automated efficiency, while Russia’s hybrid warfare blends digital deception with kinetic force. Western platforms and governments appear either unwilling or ill-equipped to mount an equally agile def

This week's review highlights the convergence of cyber, information, and cognitive warfare domains. The EU's sanctioning of a Russian military unit for GPS jamming underscores the kinetic potential of hybrid threats, while multinational operations target pro-Kremlin hacktivist groups. Simultaneously, actors leverage AI and inauthentic networks to inflame domestic political tensions from Europe to Asia.

The Weeckly Review focuses on information operations and cyber-based influence campaigns observed between July 7th and 13th, 2025. It highlights examples, such as Russian efforts blending physical sabotage with online disinformation in Europe, Iran's alleged cyberattack and threats against dissident media, and Qatar's increased outreach to U.S. conservative media outlets.

Between June 30th and 06th of July 2025, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns, including Cyfluence attacks.

Between the 23rd and 29th of June 2025, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns, including Cyfluence attacks.

Between the 16th and 22nd of June 2025, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns, including Cyfluence attacks.

Between the 09th and 15th of June - 2025, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns, including Cyfluence attacks.

Between the 02nd 08th of June, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns, including Cyfluence attacks.

Between 26th May - 01th of June 2025, we observed, collected, and analyzed endpoints related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns, including