Not All-Powerful: A Granular Perspective on Influence Networks

In many security policy debates, hostile influence campaigns by authoritarian states like China are often portrayed as hyper-efficient, strategically orchestrated, and almost omnipotent. The report "Baybridge – Anatomy of a Chinese Information Influence Ecosystem," published by the French military research center IRSEM in October 2025, challenges this general perception.ⁱ  

The notion of a uniformly centralized and effective Chinese disinformation apparatus is inaccurate because such a unified structure does not exist. Instead, a diverse range of actors operate within this ecosystem. These include private, commercially driven entities that act on behalf of the state or maintain links to state resources, which act without strategic coherence, professional execution, or operational efficiency. To assess influence operations strategically, the report calls for a deeper understanding of the specific actors, structures, interests, and operational logics involved by using a specific analytical approach.ⁱⁱ 

The Actor-Specific, Granular Approach 

The actor-specific, granular analytical approach does not view digital influence campaigns as complex networks of concrete actors with varying interests, capabilities, and motivations. At its core, the approach asks: Who is actually acting, within what organizational framework, using what tools, and to what end? It focuses on digital assets such as websites, social media profiles, and technical infrastructures, examining their connections, modes of control, and content strategy. This allows for the identification of the individuals, companies, or organizations involved and their actual roles and motives within the broader campaign. 

The approach follows a multi-step process: first, the network structure is mapped and technical linkages are revealed. Next, digital traces are attributed to real-world actors, and their interests are analyzed. Simultaneously, the content is assessed for coherence, professionalism, and resonance with target audiences. Finally, the campaign’s actual impact is evaluated: Does it exert meaningful strategic influence, or is it merely an exercise in high-volume, low-impact output? 

Case Study: The Network Around Haimai and Haixun 

By using this approach Baybridge report examines a Chinese digital influence ecosystem centered on two companies: Shenzhen Haimai Yunxiang Media Co., Ltd. (Haimai) and Shanghai Haixun Technology Co., Ltd. (Haixun).

Both market PR and media packages, run multilingual websites with seemingly journalistic content and share identical infrastructure. The report findings imply that this operation is not a centrally planned and applied influence operation but a network that functions as a commercial system with propagandistic features. 

Figure 1 – Infrastructure Overviewⁱⁱⁱ, Courtesy of IRSEM

At the core are Wu Yanni, co-founder of Haimai and member of Shenzhen’s Municipal Party Committee Propaganda apparatus, and Zhu Haisong, owner of Haixun and member of Guangdong’s Propaganda Department. 

Figure 2 - Activities of Wu Yanni & Zhu Haisong in the public & private sectors^iv, Courtesy of IRSEM 

The IRSEM report concludes that they are not strategic propagandists, but rather local entrepreneurs leveraging political ties for commercial gain. Their motivations appear to be primarily financial, including contract acquisition, rent-seeking, and fulfilling bureaucratic performance metrics such as article volume and reach. 

Why the “Baybridge-Network” is Inefficient 

Despite significant technical resources, the network exhibits major deficiencies in technical, structural, and content areas. Much of the content appears machine-translated, riddled with character encoding issues, and lacks editorial oversight. The result is an incoherent visual and linguistic output that undermines credibility and consistency. 

An identified core flaw lies in the coexistence of contradictory narratives: Chinese content promotes “Positive Energy,” a state-endorsed messaging style that emphasizes harmony, optimism, and trust, while the same platforms often disseminate aggressive, conflict-driven Russian rhetoric critical of Western democracies.^v This juxtaposition, described in the report as a “narrative cacophony,” creates tonal contradictions that cancel each other out. This incoherence is particularly damaging during moments of symbolic significance for China, such as diplomatic visits, where simultaneously aggressive Russian-led messaging seems to undercut Beijing’s intended messaging.^vi 

Conclusion 

The IRSEM report demonstrates that Chinese information operations are neither uniformly structured nor consistently effective. The “Baybridge” case study highlights a particular model in which private-sector actors with close ties to the state carry out influence operations on behalf of government entities. However, their activities are primarily shaped by commercial incentives and bureaucratic performance indicators. Within this logic, quantitative metrics such as content volume, geographic reach, and language variation are prioritized, while actual strategic impact on target audiences is secondary. 

This setup can lead to inefficient campaigns: technically elaborate but strategically incoherent and lacking in persuasive quality. The core issue lies not in the absence of central coordination, but in the disconnect between political objectives, operational execution, and content effectiveness. These shortcomings are not unique to China, but they manifest in distinctive ways within authoritarian systems. 

Rather than assuming a centralized and uniformly professional influence apparatus, the report suggests an actor-specific, granular analytical approach that enables differentiation. By mapping concrete actors, structures, and operational logics, it becomes possible to evaluate the actual relevance of an influence operation and to allocate security resources more effectively and proportionally.^vii 

[Footnotes:]

[i] IRSEM / Tadaweb & P. Charon, 2025. Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese information influence ecosystem – Focus no. 3. [online]. pp.78-79 Published October 2025. Available at: https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/10/focus-3-charon-a4-ok.pdf

[ii] IRSEM / Tadaweb & P. Charon, 2025. Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese information influence ecosystem – Focus no. 3. [online]. p. 79 Published October 2025. Available at: https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/10/focus-3-charon-a4-ok.pdf

[iii] IRSEM / Tadaweb & P. Charon, 2025. Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese information influence ecosystem – Focus no. 3. [online]. p.18 Published October 2025. Available at: https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/10/focus-3-charon-a4-ok.pdf

[iv] IRSEM / Tadaweb & P. Charon, 2025. Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese information influence ecosystem – Focus no. 3. [online]. p.42 Published October 2025. Available at: https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/10/focus-3-charon-a4-ok.pdf

[v] IRSEM / Tadaweb & P. Charon, 2025. Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese information influence ecosystem – Focus no. 3. [online]. p.56-61 Published October 2025. Available at: https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/10/focus-3-charon-a4-ok.pdf

[vi] IRSEM / Tadaweb & P. Charon, 2025. Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese information influence ecosystem – Focus no. 3. [online]. pp.69-70 Published October 2025. Available at: https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/10/focus-3-charon-a4-ok.pdf

[vii] IRSEM / Tadaweb & P. Charon, 2025. Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese information influence ecosystem – Focus no. 3. [online]. p.79 Published October 2025. Available at: https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/10/focus-3-charon-a4-ok.pdf