Tonga Before the Election: Influence and the Information Space

Background

On 20 November 2025, Tongans will head to the polls to directly elect 17 representatives to the Legislative Assembly, while the country’s nobles choose another nine members. The final composition of parliament will include these and up to 4 additional seats determined through the established procedure.[i] As the only constitutional monarchy in the Pacific, Tonga blends democratic governance with deeply rooted traditional structures, where the monarchy retains significant influence over national affairs.

Despite its small population of roughly 105,000, Tonga holds strategic importance in the South Pacific.[ii] It sits at the crossroads of a tense China-U.S. rivalry, with Australia and New Zealand playing a key role. Tonga’s strategic location and information environment make it an interesting case study for understanding information flows and cognitive resilience in small island democracies.

Influence Vectors

Tonga’s internal dynamics and international relations are shaped by a combination of financial dependence, migration trends, regional security cooperation, and diaspora engagement.

At the same time, the country’s media landscape has largely shifted to the digital realm[iii], where outlets face mounting challenges as social media increasingly dominates public discourse. This environment has made Tonga more vulnerable to information disorder[iv], illustrated by incidents such as deepfake audio clips[v], fabricated political letters[vi], and COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Although these cases have largely been domestic and organic rather than coordinated foreign operations, they underscore the country’s vulnerability to information manipulation. Efforts to strengthen resilience are emerging, exemplified by local fact-checkers such as “Supa Mario”[vii], who has gained attention for his debunking work, and by education programs supported by international partners like ASPI–ROI[viii]. Nevertheless, systematic monitoring and institutional frameworks to counter information disorder remain scarce.

 

Economic and Development Assistance

Recently, the United States has reduced its direct presence in the Pacific, while Australia, Japan, and New Zealand remain Tonga’s primary security, development, and disaster-response partners. They maintain military and police cooperation programs that provide training, capacity-building, and regional security coordination.

  Figure 1 – Development financing by partner, Courtesy of Lowy Institute[ix]

Meanwhile, China’s role is increasingly apparent: roughly two-thirds of Tonga’s foreign debt (≈USD 195 million) is owed to Beijing. Loan servicing consumes about 4% of GDP annually[x], raising concerns about long-term strategic dependency.[xi] Chinese aid projects and infrastructure investments have increased visibly in the run-up to the 2025 elections, including a new agricultural agreement signed in October 2025.[xii]

Aid, Physical Support, and On-the-Ground Presence

Tonga’s 150th Constitution celebrations, held from 31 October to 4 November 2025, illustrated how external actors employ visible, on-the-ground engagement to assert presence.

The Chinese Embassy sponsored the official fireworks display and supported the participation of over 300 members of the Chinese community in the float parade. 

Figure 2 – Posts of the Chinese Embassy in Tonga, Courtesy of Facebook 

Australia demonstrated its presence through the largest float parade, combining official and community representation to underline partnership and historical connection.

Both governments extended these actions to digital platforms, where their embassies documented and circulated images, official statements, and hashtags. This online communication amplified the reach of their physical presence, turning local acts of participation into enduring digital signals of influence and engagement.

Figure 3 – Posts of the Australian Embassy in Tonga, Courtesy of Facebook 

Migration and the Local Economy

In recent years, Chinese immigrants have transformed Tonga’s small business landscape. Although consumers benefit from lower prices and greater availability of goods, many local businesses struggle to compete with Chinese-owned shops. Public opinion is therefore divided, with some Tongans expressing concerns over the country’s financial sovereignty.[xiii]

Diaspora Influence

Tonga’s diaspora, which is larger[xiv] than its domestic population, plays an outsized role in shaping opinions back home. Communities in Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. frequently engage in online debates about domestic politics, often injecting or amplifying narratives from afar.

In contrast, external actors’ ability to leverage coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) is limited. Tonga’s tight-knit social networks and small population size make it harder to utilize sockpuppet accounts and operational assets effectively.

In essence, diaspora-based involvement acts as a force multiplier in Tonga’s digital information ecosystem, primarily through Facebook, which reaches over 64% of the population.[xv]

 

Conclusion

Tonga’s 2025 elections will unfold in an information environment inherently different from that of European nations, where foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities have had a significant impact. Notable examples include the recent elections in Czechia and Moldova, which are attributed to Russia.

Ahead of the upcoming election, there are a few key takeaways for stakeholders, particularly Cyfluence Defence practitioners:

• Although there’s currently no evidence indicating ongoing coordinated FIMI efforts targeting the Pacific nation and its democratic processes, past misinformation incidents exhibit nascent vulnerabilities.

• The limited analytical and monitoring capacity within Tonga’s media and civil society means potential influence activities could go undetected.

• Empowering local institutions, including independent investigative journalism, is crucial. Media literacy and cognitive resilience must be seen as strategic assets that are essential to safeguard trust in public institutions and electoral integrity, and to ensure societal cohesion.

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[Footnotes:]

[i] Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2025. Tonga – Legislative Assembly (Fale Alea). [online] Available at: https://data.ipu.org/parliament/TO/TO-LC01/

[ii] Congressional Research Service, J. G. Tupuola, 2025. Tonga: Background and Issues for Congress. [online] pp. 1-2 Published 11 September 2025. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12866/IF12866.3.pdf

[iii] ABC International Development, 2025. State of the Media: Tonga, 2025. [online] Published 4 March 2025. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/abc-international-development/state-of-the-media-tonga-2025/105005712 

[iv] ABC International Development, T. Kami Enoka & P.’Ulikae’eva Havili, 2023. Tonga’s Star Fact-Checker Helps Fight COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation and Government Corruption. [online] Published 14 March 2023; updated 16 March 2023. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/abc-international-development/pacmas-tonga-fact-checking/102073118

[v] Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), B. Johnson, F. Fakafanua & S. Vikilani, 2024. As technology distorts information, Pacific governments and media must cooperate. [online] Published 17 July 2024. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/as-technology-distorts-information-pacific-governments-and-media-must-cooperate/#:~:text=In%20Tonga%2C%20we%20have%20also,the%20reputation%20of%20those%20involved 

[vi] Radio New Zealand (RNZ), 2017. Tonga police investigate letter claiming to be from PM. [online] Published 24 February 2017. Available at: https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/325222/tonga-police-investigate-letter-claiming-to-be-from-pm 

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Royal Oceania Institute, 2024. Training Program for Tonga: “Disinformation: Government and Media Challenges”. [online] Published 8 May 2024. Available at: https://royaloceaniainstitute.org/2024/05/08/training-program-for-tonga-disinformation-government-and-media-challenges/ 

[ix] Lowy Institute, 2025. Tonga – Pacific Aid Map. [online] Available at: https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/country/tonga/

[x] Congressional Research Service, J. G. Tupuola, 2025. Tonga: Background and Issues for Congress. [online] pp. 1-2 Published 11 September 2025. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12866/IF12866.3.pdf

[xi] Pacific Media Network, A. Vailala, 2025. No debt forgiveness from China, analyst warns as Tonga faces repayment pressure. [online] Published 30 April 2025. Available at: https://pmn.co.nz/read/political/no-debt-forgiveness-from-china-analyst-warns-as-tonga-faces-repayment-pressure

[xii] Radio New Zealand (RNZ), C. Rovoi, 2025. Tonga bets on China deal to modernise farming ahead of general election. [online] Published 30 October 2025. Available at: https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/577307/tonga-bets-on-china-deal-to-modernise-farming-ahead-of-general-election

[xiii] Tonga Independent News, 2025. ‘Trust Is More Important Than Money’: Inside One Chinese Businessman’s Vision for Tonga. [online] Published 14 August 2025. Available at: https://tongaindependent.com/trust-is-more-important-than-money-inside-one-chinese-businessmans-vision-for-tonga/

[xiv] United Nations, 2022. The Kingdom of Tonga: National Voluntary GCM Review – Implementing the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. [online] Published 2022. Available at: https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/imrf-tonga.pdf

[xv] DataReportal, n.d. Digital 2024: Tonga. [online] Published 2024. Available at: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-tonga