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This week, we are also reviewing the latest VIGINUM report . While it presents few new insights, it offers a structured overview of key Russian hostile influence activities in the context of the war in Ukraine since February 24, 2022. The influence campaigns identified target various geographical regions, including France, Europe, Ukraine (as well as Russian-occupied territories), and Africa. Both state-affiliated actors and private organizations carry out these operations. (1) Hostile Influence Targeting France and Europe Following the French President’s speech on February 26, 2024, in which the deployment of French troops to Ukraine was discussed, the intensity of Russian influence activities significantly increased. (2) “Reliable Recent News” (RRN) A key influence operation targeting France (and other European countries) is the campaign known as RRN —also referred to as Doppelgänger or Ruza Flood . It utilizes a network of several hundred disinformation websites that imitate the domains of established media outlets (e.g., Le Monde, The Washington Post, Der Spiegel ) and institutions (e.g., NATO, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) through typosquatting. The campaign also includes “ Pseudo-media” , which focuses on themes such as sports, lifestyle, or EU politics. Dissemination occurs primarily via X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and TikTok , with support from inauthentic accounts and  sponsored content networks . To increase visibility, one tactic involves posting links in the comment sections of prominent accounts to redirect users to controlled sites. Another involves the “ Undercut ” network, which distributes short anti-Ukrainian videos using trending hashtags. Despite being publicly exposed —most notably by the U.S. Department of Justice  in September 2024—RRN remains active. The network employs sophisticated redirection techniques to evade detection by social media platforms. (3) “Stop Erdogan” Actions and Fake Anti-Ukraine Protests In March 2023, VIGINUM identified a campaign involving staged content, such as graffiti in Paris, Nazi salutes, and a provocative anti-Erdogan banner. The material was disseminated via Facebook groups targeting the Turkish diaspora in Europe. Staged protests were also held in cities such as Paris, The Hague, Brussels, and Madrid and were broadcast on Facebook and YouTube. The aim was to discredit Ukraine, the EU, and Turkey. Despite their high logistical and financial effort, the operations achieved minimal reach, mainly due to poor organization and unreliable execution by the individuals involved. (4) Screenshot of staged Protest; VIGINUM Report: War in Ukraine Report, page 7; Courtesy of VIGINUM Targeting Ukraine and Occupied Territories Since February 24, 2022, Russia has sought to establish propaganda-driven media  in Ukrainian territories under its occupation. By June 2022, pro-Russian actors had already launched local television stations in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia , later expanding to websites with regime-aligned content. Portal Kombat VIGINUM highlights the website pravda-fr[.]com , launched in September 2023, as part of the IMS known as "Portal Kombat". The network comprises more than 200 websites that do not generate original content but instead disseminate large volumes of pro-Russian material from sources such as Telegram, state-run Russian media, and "military correspondents." The aim is to foster pro-Russian sentiment among Russian-speaking Ukrainians and dominate the regional information space. Ukrainian cities targeted by the Portal Komat websites; VIGINUM Report: War in Ukraine Report, page 8; Courtesy of VIGINUM Following public condemnation by the foreign ministers of France, Poland, and Germany in February 2024, the network expanded, targeting EU countries as well as African and Asian states and prominent political figures. It aligns its content with major political events such as the 2024 European elections, the Paris Olympics, or elections in Moldova. (5) The Mriya Project Mriya  (Ukrainian for “dream”) is a Russian-language aggregator of Telegram channels that launched a website at the end of 2022. It disseminated pro-Russian content aimed at Ukrainian users, particularly in occupied territories. The project was run by Ukrainian influencers sympathetic to Russian narratives. It was amplified by RRN bot networks  on X, serving as the media front for the "Representative Office of the Ukrainian People" (ROUP), a separatist organization led by Dmytro Vasilets. Internal documents from the Russian firm SDA reveal that Telegram channels of ROUP members, including Maksym Chikhaliiev, were utilized by “Center S”, an internal SDA unit responsible, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, for information operations targeting Ukraine. (6) “Project Lakhta” in Africa In response to its growing international isolation, Russia intensified  its efforts in Africa, seeking to undermine Western, mainly French, influence on the continent. A central actor is Project Lakhta , also known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA), founded in 2013 by Yevgeny Prigozhin. The network has been particularly active in Francophone Africa, conducting disinformation  campaigns that support the Wagner Group. One prominent campaign targeted the African diaspora in France. (7) Screenshots of sponsored publications on Project Lakhta’s pages; VIGINUM Report: War in Ukraine Report, page 10; Courtesy of VIGINUM Between April 2024 and February 2025, fake accounts on Facebook and X circulated false claims that France was planning to send African migrants to fight in Ukraine. (10) Among the disinformation materials was a forged recruitment ad from  the French employment agency France Travail, allegedly seeking "database analysts and explosives engineers" for deployments in Cameroon. Fake screenshot of a France Travail job advert; VIGINUM Report: War in Ukraine Report, page 11; Courtesy of VIGINUM and France Travail The campaign combined digital manipulation (sponsored posts and fake accounts) with real-world elements, including staged demonstrations and paid media placements. (8) Conclusion Despite substantial technical, financial, and human resources, VIGINUM assesses the impact of Russian influence campaigns as limited—primarily due to technical shortcomings, poor content quality, and restricted reach. Although some disinformation narratives briefly gained traction, the overarching objective of these operations – namely, to deepen social divisions and exploit existing tensions – was ultimately not achieved. Nevertheless, most campaigns continue unabated despite repeated public attribution, sanctions, closures, and bans. This raises the critical long-term question of countering hostile influence operations effectively, sustainably, and strategically. [Footnotes] (1) Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – VIGINUM, 2025.  War in Ukraine: Three years of Russian information operations, p. 3.  [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-02/20250224_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_War%20in%20Ukraine_Three%20years%20of%20Russian%20information%20operations_1.0_VF.pdf   [Accessed 2nd of April 2025] (2) Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – VIGINUM, 2025.  War in Ukraine: Three years of Russian information operations, p. 4.  [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-02/20250224_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_War%20in%20Ukraine_Three%20years%20of%20Russian%20information%20operations_1.0_VF.pdf   [Accessed 2nd of April 2025] (3) Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – VIGINUM, 2025.  War in Ukraine: Three years of Russian information operations, p. 4.  [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-02/20250224_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_War%20in%20Ukraine_Three%20years%20of%20Russian%20information%20operations_1.0_VF.pdf   [Accessed 2nd of April 2025] (4) Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – VIGINUM, 2025.  War in Ukraine: Three years of Russian information operations, p. 7.  [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-02/20250224_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_War%20in%20Ukraine_Three%20years%20of%20Russian%20information%20operations_1.0_VF.pdf   [Accessed 2nd of April 2025] (5) Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – VIGINUM, 2025.  War in Ukraine: Three years of Russian information operations, p. 8.  [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-02/20250224_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_War%20in%20Ukraine_Three%20years%20of%20Russian%20information%20operations_1.0_VF.pdf   [Accessed 2nd of April 2025] (6) Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – VIGINUM, 2025.  War in Ukraine: Three years of Russian information operations, p. 9.  [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-02/20250224_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_War%20in%20Ukraine_Three%20years%20of%20Russian%20information%20operations_1.0_VF.pdf   [Accessed 2nd of April 2025] ] (7) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 10. [online] Available at:  https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf  [Accessed 31 March 2025] (8) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 11. [online] Available at:  https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf  [Accessed 31 March 202525]

Russia’s Use of genAI in Disinformation and Cyber Influence: Strategy, Use Cases and Future Expectations Author: Dr. Christopher Nehring Intelligence Director at the Cyberintelligence Institute in Frankfurt, Germany. Dr. Christopher Nehring , a recognized disinformation and security communication expert, examines the role of generative artificial intelligence (genAI)  in Russian disinformation and influence operations. His analysis focuses on the extent to which state and state-affiliated Russian actors employ genAI in digital information environments and for what strategic purposes . The study explores specific applications — such as deepfakes , automated text generation, and algorithmic dissemination — and the range of actors involved, from intelligence services to seemingly civilian networks. Particular attention is paid to the degree of automation , the effectiveness  of these activities, and the presence or absence of coherent strategic intent. Through selected case studies , the report provides a structured overview of current uses of genAI in the context of informational influence. At the same time, it reflects on the dynamics , capabilities , and limitations  of this development — especially given the future role of AI in geopolitical conflict  and hybrid warfare .

Table of Contents: Hostile Influence Campaigns State Actors Russia The Role of the Social Design Agency in Spreading Disinformation The War in Ukraine Disinformation Surrounding Russia’s Continued Attacks on Ukraine Russian Disinformation Targeting Canada and Ukraine China Disinformation on the Platform RedNote ahead of Australia’s 2025 election Graphika Highlights Coordinated Disinformation by Pro-China Network Chinese Malinformation in Okinawa AI Related Articles The Growing Threat of Deepfakes Deepfake Trump Audio Spreads Widely General Reports Disinformation Campaign on U.S. Biological Experiments in Armenia Foreign Influence Operations Targeting U.S. Corporations Intensify Anti-Israeli Disinformation on Wikipedia The Rise of Disinformation and Its Impact on Journalism in Brazil Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation The EEAS Efforts to Combat Disinformation

Table of Contents: Hostile Influence Campaigns State Actors Russia Russian Disinformation and Election Interference in Eastern Europe The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation Campaign Targets Incoming Prime Minister Mark Carney China China Accuses Australian Think Tank of Spreading U.S.-Funded Disinformation China Imposes AI Content Labeling to Combat Disinformation AI Related Articles CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2025 General Reports The Pravda Network and the Embedding of Disinformation in Public Platforms Decentralized Social Media Faces Disinformation Syria: Multi-Level Disinformation in a Fragmented Conflict Foreign Disinformation in the Pacific Hacktivist Groups Exploit Disinformation for Cyber Attack Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation NewsGuard Launches Service to Shield AI from Foreign Disinformation Misinformation Training and Its Effectiveness in Countering Disinformation

Index Hostile Influence Campaigns State Actors Russia Russian Disinformation: Allegations of U.S. Bioweapon Labs in Kazakhstan Moscow’s Pravda Network Manipulates AI to Spread Disinformation Kremlin Disinformation Targets Canada-US Relations Pro-Russian Telegram Network Spreads AI-Driven Disinformation in Moldova The War in Ukraine Study Examines Russia’s Disinformation Tactics in the Ukraine War Kremlin’s Disinformation Campaign Against Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy AI Related Articles Graphika Reveals How Online Communities Create Dangerous AI Personas General Reports CISA Funding Cuts Could Leave Elections More Vulnerable The Growing Threat of AI-Enabled Disinformation

Index Hostile Influence Campaigns State Actors Russia France Withdraws from Sahel as Russian Influence Rises Russian AI-Powered Disinformation Campaigns Spread Across Social Media The War in Ukraine Kremlin’s Disinformation Tactics During the War Russia Exploits Nuclear Fears to Spread Disinformation on Ukraine China Foreign Influence in South Korea: Yoon’s Warnings on China’s Role AI Related Articles Analysis of AI Chatbots and Disinformation Risks OpenAI Highlights Evolving Threats in Influence Campaigns General Reports Fact-Checking Challenges in Indonesia

Index Hostile Influence Campaigns Social Media Platforms X Elon Musk’s Disinformation on X State Actors Russia Disinformation: Lavrov Accuses Western Countries of Neocolonialism The War in Ukraine The Evolution of Disinformation in the Russia-Ukraine War AI Related Articles AI in Right-Wing Disinformation Campaigns U.S. Signals Shift from AI Safety to Deregulation General Reports Trump’s False Ukraine Claims Follow Russian Disinformation Patterns Disinformation in Germany’s 2025 Election Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service Public Report 2025 Philippines 2025 Elections: Marcos-Duterte Feud Drives Digital Misinformation Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation Deepfakes and Disinformation: Legal Approaches to Combat AI-Driven Deception Commission Tightens Disinformation Rules in the Digital Services Act (DSA)

Index Hostile Influence Campaigns Social Media Platforms X  EU Investigates X for Disinformation and Election Interference State Actors Russia Disinformation Targeting the 2025 German Federal Elections The War in Ukraine Propaganda Fuels False Economic Narratives in Russia Russian Disinformation Targets Germany with False Zelensky Claims General Reports Disinformation Officials at CISA Placed on Administrative Leave Disinformation Campaigns Ahead of Germany Federal Elections Disinformation: No USAID Funding for Politico or Jeffrey Epstein Vance Criticizes European Censorship While Downplaying Russian Disinformation Taiwan Uses AI to Counter Rising Chinese Disinformation Campaigns U.S. Aid Freeze Weakens Europe’s Defense Against Russian Disinformation Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation Integration of the Code of Practice on Disinformation into the Digital Services Act EEAS Job, Methods, and Approach

Index Hostile Influence Campaigns Social Media Platforms Meta Meta’s Policy Shift Disrupts Media Balance X Musk Spreads Debunked COVID-19 Claims on USAID Tiktok Disinformation Risks Linked to TikTok’s Algorithmic Bias TikTok’s Role in Spreading Harmful Narratives in Hungary State Actors Russia Disinformation Concerning the Fights in Congo Russian Disinformation Operation Doppelgänger Expands to Bluesky Russian Disinformation Amplifies Hybrid Attacks in the EU Kremlin’s Disinformation Campaigns Surround Putin-Trump Summit The War in Ukraine AI-Generated Pictures Amplify Russian Propaganda Russian Disinformation Campaign Using Deepfakes to Target Ukrainian Refugees Russia’s Disinformation Campaign Spread Through Social Media AI Related Articles Disinformation Through Deepfakes Targeting Journalists Higher Misinformation Rates in Russian and Chinese Responses from AI Chatbots Google Report: AI Fuels Misinformation General Reports The Impact of Climate Disinformation and Its Dangers Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation Online Safety Regulation and the Disinformation Dilemma on Social Media

Index Hostile Influence Campaigns State Actors Russia Russian Disinformation Campaigns Targeting Poland Kremlin's Disinformation Tactics Kremlin's Information Influence Operations in Africa The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation on Ukrainian Organ Harvesting Manipulating History: Russia’s Disinformation Disinformation Framing: Russia’s False Peace Narrative China Chinese State-Linked Influence Operations DeepSeek Chatbot Amplifies Disinformation in Favor of the Chinese Government Chinese Disinformation Campaigns on X AI Related Articles Deepfake Disinformation Threatens Elections General Reports Cybersecurity Trends and Disinformation in 2024 Disinformation in Ethiopia Mapping Disinformation: Visual Assessment of CIB Disinformation Spread After Crash Near U.S. Capitol Climate Disinformation Challenges in the MENA Region