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[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 15th to the 21st of June 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Russian Narrative Adaptation in the Global South Gallant Boar Exercise Falsely Framed as Kaliningrad Invasion The War in Ukraine Putin’s “Denazification” Narrative EU Expands Sanctions Targeting Russian Operations [AI Related Articles] AI-Generated Screenshots Involving Eric Trump Benchmark for Detecting AI-Generated Videos Deepfake Detection in the Post-Artifact Era Deepfakes and Disinformation Targeting West Papua Activists AI Deepfakes Proliferate in 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections Despite Regulatory Efforts [General Reports] False Claims About Hirings at the Obama Presidential Center Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Sanctions Over Interference in Moldova Danish Parliamentary Election with No Sign of Significant Disinformation [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to an article by Atlantic Council, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to frame the war against Ukraine through the goal of “denazification”, presenting it as a central war aim rather than a justification for territorial gains. A report by Public First examined AI’s societal perception in 2026 and its potential risks. According to an article by CyberNews, a controversy emerged after UFC commentator Daniel Cormier posted screenshots that allegedly showed messages from Eric Trump asking whether any fights were "rigged" for betting purposes. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, in the weeks leading up to the opening of the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, several conservative social media accounts claimed that the Obama Foundation had hired only Black contractors to work on the project. Foreign Interference documents over 2,800 AI-generated deepfakes deployed in 2026 U.S. midterm election contexts despite the TAKE IT DOWN Act entering FTC enforcement and state-level AI disclosure laws. The Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 finds overall news trust at a record low of 37% across 48 surveyed countries, with social media and video networks surpassing all other sources as the primary global news channel for the first time. Weekly AI chatbot use for news rose to 10%, with AI-generated pink slime content farms set to proliferate further. An analysis published by EU vs. Disinfo monitored TikTok activity around Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election and found no evidence of large-scale Russian disinformation efforts. [ Report Summary] A study published by Post-Soviet Affairs examined how Russian state-sponsored media outlets adapt their messaging for different audiences across the Global South. According to an article by Atlantic Council, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to frame the war against Ukraine through the goal of “denazification”, presenting it as a central war aim rather than a justification for territorial gains. EUvsDisinfo's weekly review documents Kremlin-aligned outlets reframing NATO's Gallant Boar 2026 exercise in the Suwalki Gap as offensive preparation for a Kaliningrad invasion, a false claim portraying Belarus as a peaceful victim of Ukrainian aggression, and Bulgaria's EU fiscal obligations recast as political punishment. The European Union has published that it has adopted a new package of sanctions against Russia in response to its war against Ukraine, hybrid activities, and human rights violations. According to an article by CyberNews, a controversy emerged after UFC commentator Daniel Cormier posted screenshots that allegedly showed messages from Eric Trump asking whether any fights were "rigged" for betting purposes. A paper published by The Digital Library introduced “Chameleon”, a new benchmark dataset that is designed to detect whether a video is AI-generated and trace generated videos back to their source materials. A review published in the Digital Library examined how advances in AI video generation have made synthetic videos increasingly realistic. According to an article by ABC News, West Papuan activists have raised concerns about the growing use of AI-generated content and online disinformation to undermine their advocacy. Foreign Interference documents over 2,800 AI-generated deepfakes deployed in 2026 U.S. midterm election contexts despite the TAKE IT DOWN Act entering FTC enforcement and state-level AI disclosure laws. The report finds that regulatory deterrence is outpaced by the low cost and high availability of AI content generation tools. The Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 finds overall news trust at a record low of 37% across 48 surveyed countries, with social media and video networks surpassing all other sources as the primary global news channel for the first time. Weekly AI chatbot use for news rose to 10%, with AI-generated pink slime content farms set to proliferate further. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, in the weeks leading up to the opening of the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, several conservative social media accounts claimed that the Obama Foundation had hired only Black contractors to work on the project. The European Union announced it has imposed sanctions on six individuals accused of activities aimed at undermining Moldova’s sovereignty, independence, and democratic processes. An analysis published by EU vs. Disinfo monitored TikTok activity around Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election and found no evidence of large-scale Russian disinformation efforts. [State Actors] Russia Russian Narrative Adaptation in the Global South A study published by Post-Soviet Affairs examined how Russian state-sponsored media outlets, particularly RT and Sputnik, adapt their messaging for different audiences across the Global South. Focusing on narratives about multipolarity and neocolonialism, Russian messaging is not uniform but tailored to specific regional contexts. Through analysis of English, French, and Spanish-language content, the study showed that Russia adjusts its narratives to resonate with local historical experiences, political concerns, and existing beliefs. The most significant differences emerge between Africa and Latin America. French-language content aimed at African audiences places strong emphasis on colonial legacies, portraying France as a former colonial oppressor while presenting Russia as a supporter of sovereignty and a multipolar world order. In contrast, Spanish-language content targeting Latin America links neocolonialism more closely to US influence, capitalism, and interventionism, while often portraying China rather than Russia as the leading force behind a multipolar future. These adaptations draw on distinct regional memories and grievances to increase the narratives' appeal. Source: Taylor & Francis Online. [Article DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2026.2690912]. [online journal article] Published 2026. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1060586X.2026.2690912 (tandfonline.com). Top Of Page Gallant Boar Exercise Falsely Framed as Kaliningrad Invasion A weekly disinformation review published by EU vs Disinfo states that Kremlin-aligned outlets reframed NATO's Gallant Boar 2026 military exercise, a defensive training operation in the Suwalki Gap involving multiple allied forces, as an offensive preparation for an invasion of Russia's Kaliningrad exclave. The false narrative, widely circulated on Russian state media and amplified on Telegram, illustrates the Kremlin's consistent pattern of inverting the defensive character of NATO activities to sustain a warmongering West narrative among domestic and Global South audiences. A weekly disinformation review published by EUvsDisinfo states that Bulgaria's obligations under EU fiscal rules were simultaneously reframed as political punishment for the country's pro-EU governance, and that a false claim portraying Ukraine as planning a military assault on Belarus was introduced across pro-Kremlin channels during the reporting period. The review identifies the Belarus narrative as part of a coordinated effort to destabilise Minsk-Kyiv relations by attributing aggressive intent to Ukraine while obscuring Belarus's documented military buildup along its Ukrainian border since at least April 2026. Source: EUvsDisinfo. Warmongering NATO, Peaceful Belarus and Bulgaria’s Punishment. [online] Published 18 June 2025. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/warmongering-nato-peaceful-belarus-and-bulgarias-punishment/ (euvsdisinfo.eu). Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Putin’s “Denazification” Narrative According to an article by Atlantic Council, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to frame the war against Ukraine through the goal of “denazification”, presenting it as a central war aim rather than a justification for territorial gains. This narrative reflects a broader rejection of Ukrainian statehood and helps explain the lack of progress in peace negotiations. The article traces the origins of the “Nazi Ukraine” narrative to Soviet-era portrayals of Ukrainian nationalist movements and argues that the Kremlin has revived and expanded this theme in the years leading up to and during the full-scale invasion. Russian state media and official rhetoric have consistently portrayed Ukrainian patriotism and independence as forms of extremism, while using the “denazification” concept to delegitimize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. This narrative has been challenged by international institutions and historians. Ukraine’s 2019 elections, where President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a Russian-speaking Jewish candidate, won by a large margin, showed that the characterization of Ukraine as a Nazi state lacks support. The “denazification” narrative also functions as a powerful propaganda theme within Russia. Repeated references to an alleged Nazi threat have been used to justify the invasion and sustain public support for the war, despite the absence of credible evidence for such claims. Source: Atlantic Council. Putin’s Obsession With ‘Denazifying’ Ukraine Makes Peace Impossible. [online] Published 18 June 2026. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-obsession-with-denazifying-ukraine-makes-peace-impossible/ (atlanticcouncil.org). Top Of Page EU Expands Sanctions Targeting Russian Operations The European Union has published that it has adopted a new package of sanctions against Russia in response to its war against Ukraine, hybrid activities, and human rights violations. The measures target 34 individuals and 47 entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial sector, energy exports, sanctions evasion networks, and influence operations. According to the EU, the sanctions are intended to reduce Russia’s ability to sustain the war, limit revenues from its “shadow fleet” of oil transport companies, and counter activities that threaten European security. A notable part of the package focuses on individuals and organizations accused of spreading narratives that support or justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The EU sanctioned several media figures, commentators, and public personalities whom it describes as involved in foreign information manipulation and interference. These individuals are accused of promoting narratives that justify the war, dehumanize Ukrainians, or distort historical events. The sanctions also include the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives and a senior Russian Orthodox Church bishop, both cited for their role in supporting pro-Kremlin messaging. The package additionally includes sanctions related to the persecution and death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, as well as the renewal of restrictions connected to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Russia’s War of Aggression Against Ukraine: New EU Sanctions Target Energy Revenues, the Military-Industrial Complex, Propaganda and Human Rights Violations. [online] Published 18 June 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/russia%E2%80%99s-war-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-sanctions-target-energy-revenues-military-industrial_en (eeas.europa.eu). Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] AI-Generated Screenshots Involving Eric Trump According to an article by CyberNews, a controversy emerged ahead of the UFC Freedom 250 event after UFC commentator Daniel Cormier posted screenshots that allegedly showed messages from Eric Trump asking whether any fights were "rigged" for betting purposes. Cormier deleted the post within 15 minutes, while Eric Trump publicly denied ever communicating with him and stated that the screenshots were fake and AI-generated. According to later reporting, Trump also reiterated that he had never spoken to Cormier. Even so, the incident quickly sparked debate online, with some questioning why Cormier would share screenshots if the conversation never occurred, while others noted that screenshots alone are increasingly difficult to verify in an era of advanced AI-generated content. The discussion was further amplified by responses on X, including comments about the challenges of determining authenticity when digital content can be easily manipulated. Source: Cybernews. Eric Trump Claims Rigged UFC Event Texts Were Actually AI Deepfakes. [online] Published 15 June 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/news/eric-trump-ufc-polymarket-deepfake/ (cybernews.com). Top Of Page Benchmark for Detecting AI-Generated Videos The rapid advancement of AI video generation has made it easier to create highly realistic synthetic videos, raising concerns about fraud, privacy violations, and the misuse of fabricated content in public virtual spaces. A paper published in the Digital Library introduced “Chameleon”, a new benchmark dataset containing 1,700 AI-generated videos created using commercial closed-source models. Chameleon includes high-resolution videos with strong temporal and spatial consistency, making them more representative of real-world AI-generated content. The dataset is designed to evaluate two key challenges: detecting whether a video is AI-generated and tracing generated videos back to their source materials. To support this, the researchers collected real videos from domains vulnerable to manipulation and generated corresponding synthetic versions using text-to-video and image-to-video methods. This approach allows researchers not only to assess detection performance but also to investigate the origins of manipulated content. The authors argued that existing benchmarks no longer reflect the capabilities of modern video generation systems and that improved detection and source-tracing tools are needed to address challenges posed by increasingly realistic AI-generated videos. Source: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '24). [online] Published 2024. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/full/10.1145/3805622.3810862 (dl.acm.org). Top Of Page Deepfake Detection in the Post-Artifact Era A review published in the Digital Library examined how advances in AI video generation have made synthetic videos increasingly realistic, with modern models capable of producing high-resolution, minute-long clips featuring coherent motion and complex scenes. As video quality improves, many of the visual artifacts that earlier detection systems relied on, such as facial inconsistencies, unnatural blinking, or frequency distortions, are disappearing, making it more difficult to distinguish AI-generated content from authentic footage. To address this challenge, the authors proposed a forensic framework based on five assumptions: physiological integrity, temporal coherence, geometric consistency, semantic consistency, and provenance signals. Comparing several detection approaches, they found that current evaluation benchmarks often focus on accuracy while giving less attention to trustworthiness, robustness, and real-world deployment. The review also highlights broader societal concerns associated with increasingly convincing synthetic media, including privacy violations, non-consensual deepfake content, and other forms of misuse. Therefore, future detection systems should move beyond searching for technical artifacts and instead combine multiple sources of evidence, stronger provenance mechanisms, and more comprehensive evaluation methods to improve resilience against rapidly evolving AI-generated video technologies. Source: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). [Article in the Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT ’24)]. [online] Published 2024. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/full/10.1145/3810988.3812659 (dl.acm.org). Top Of Page Deepfakes and Disinformation Targeting West Papua Activists According to an article by ABC News, West Papuan activists have raised concerns about the growing use of AI-generated content and online disinformation to undermine their advocacy. Koteka Wenda, daughter of independence leader Benny Wenda, discovered a deepfake video falsely portraying her as criticizing a documentary about deforestation and indigenous land exploitation in West Papua. She warned that such content could mislead supporters and damage the credibility of activists. Another prominent activist, Veronica Koman, reported similar experiences, including manipulated videos falsely showing her praising the Indonesian government. The article highlighted broader concerns about information manipulation in Indonesia. An Amnesty International report argued that disinformation campaigns have increasingly been used to target government critics, discredit dissenting voices, and influence public debate (for further information, see W21 May Cyfluence Report). These tactics have become a significant tool for attacking critics online, while activists and human rights advocates describe them as part of a longer pattern of repression. Researchers have also documented previous coordinated online campaigns related to West Papua, including the use of misleading content and automated social media accounts to promote pro-government narratives and weaken activist voices. Activists argue that AI-generated deepfakes represent a new challenge in this information environment, making it harder for the public to distinguish authentic messages from fabricated ones. Source: ABC News. AI-generated content targeting West Papuan activists. [online] Published 21 June 2026. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-21/ai-generated-content-targeting-west-papuan-activists/106760046 (abc.net.au). Top Of Page AI Deepfakes Proliferate in 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections Despite Regulatory Efforts A report published by Foreign Interference states that AI-generated deepfakes targeting the 2026 U.S. midterm elections have proliferated significantly despite federal and state-level regulatory interventions, with tracking indicating over 2,800 documented cases of synthetic media deployed to manipulate electoral discourse across social media platforms. The report identifies that the TAKE IT DOWN Act, signed into law in May 2025 with FTC enforcement beginning 19 May 2026, has not materially reduced production volumes due to the low cost and high availability of AI content generation tools accessible to both state and non-state actors. A report published by Foreign Interference states that the supply-side economics of AI deepfake production -- where a single actor can generate thousands of synthetic media assets at near-zero marginal cost -- have outpaced the deterrent capacity of existing legislation and platform enforcement mechanisms. The report notes that despite New York State's AI influencer disclosure law taking effect on 9 June 2026 and the EU Code of Practice on AI-generated content marking published 10 June 2026, the global regulatory patchwork creates arbitrage opportunities for foreign and domestic influence operators to route production through unregulated jurisdictions while targeting regulated audiences. Source: Foreign Interference Research Center. AI Deepfakes Proliferate in 2026 U.S. Midterm Elections Despite Regulatory Efforts. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://foreigninterference.org/post/ai-deepfakes-proliferate-in-2026-u-s-midterm-elections-despite-regulatory-efforts (foreigninterference.org). Top Of Page [General Reports] False Claims About Hirings at the Obama Presidential Center According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, in the weeks leading up to the opening of the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, several conservative social media accounts claimed that the Obama Foundation had hired only Black contractors to work on the project. These posts framed the alleged hiring practices as racial discrimination and linked them to broader criticism of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. The claims gained significant attention online, accumulating hundreds of thousands of views. However, available information does not support the assertion that only Black contractors were involved in the project. The center’s construction was managed by Lakeside Alliance, a joint venture that includes leaders and member companies from diverse backgrounds. Publicly available records and company information indicate that both Black-owned and non-Black-owned firms participated in the project. Confusion around unpaid subcontractor disputes appears to have been combined with inaccurate claims about contractor demographics. According to Lakeside Alliance’s latest published report, 40% of subcontracts were awarded to minority-owned businesses, indicating that a majority of contracts went to other companies. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. False Claims of Racism at the Obama Administration / Related Viral Misinformation Debunked. [online] Published 2023. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/false-claims-of-racism-at-the-obama (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026 A report published by Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism states that overall news trust across 48 surveyed countries has fallen to a record low of 37%, with 38 of 48 countries recording declining trust in news over the past year. For the first time in the survey's history, social media and video networks surpassed all other sources as the most widely used channel for news globally, with 54% of audiences now reaching news primarily through social and video platforms, representing a 13-percentage point gain over television since 2020. The report states that weekly use of AI chatbots for news rose from 7% in 2025 to 10% in 2026, with growth concentrated in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Southern and Eastern Europe -- regions with historically weaker institutional media infrastructure and higher vulnerability to AI-generated disinformation. The report warns that AI-powered pink slime content farms are set to proliferate further as platforms struggle to distinguish synthetic from legitimate news content, raising structural risk that the architecture of public information ecosystems will increasingly reward low-cost synthetic production over credible editorial standards. Source: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Digital News Report 2026. [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026 (reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk). Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] EU Sanctions Over Interference in Moldova The European Union announced it has imposed sanctions on six individuals accused of activities aimed at undermining Moldova’s sovereignty, independence, and democratic processes. According to the EU, the individuals were involved in Russian-funded efforts to influence Moldova’s September 2025 parliamentary elections, including vote-buying schemes and coordinated influence campaigns. Some of those sanctioned are linked to organizations and political networks associated with businessman Ilan Shor and the Russia-based NGO Evrazia. With these additions, EU restrictive measures now apply to 29 individuals and five entities connected to activities viewed as destabilizing Moldova. The sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans Among those listed are political figures and Russian nationals accused of organizing election-related activities, facilitating illicit funding, and coordinating influence operations. These efforts included the dissemination of propaganda, the mobilization of local networks, and attempts to shape voter behavior through coordinated campaigns. The sanctions also cite the use of religious and community structures to support political messaging and collect personal data. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Republic of Moldova: Council lists six individuals for actions destabilising the country. [online] Published 16 June 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/republic-moldova-council-lists-six-individuals-actions-destabilising-country_en (eeas.europa.eu). Top Of Page Danish Parliamentary Election with No Sign of Significant Disinformation According to Danish authorities and independent analyses, there was no major foreign disinformation campaign targeting Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election. An analysis published by EU vs. Disinfo monitored TikTok activity across more than 40 political and media channels, specifically looking for coordinated inauthentic behavior, bot networks, and AI-amplified influence operations. While election-related content increased as expected, investigators found no evidence of large-scale Russian disinformation efforts or systematic bot activity aimed at influencing public opinion. The findings suggested that Denmark’s resilience against disinformation stems from several factors, including high public trust in government and media, free press, broad political consensus on key issues such as support for Ukraine, and proactive warnings from Danish intelligence services. Additionally, it showed that Russian influence operations are selective rather than universal, with resources directed toward countries where political divisions make influence campaigns more likely to succeed. As a result, Denmark may have been viewed as a low-return target compared with countries facing greater polarization and weaker information resilience. Source: EUvsDisinfo. The dog that didn’t bark: What the Danish election reveals about Russian influence operations. [online] Published 27 May 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-dog-that-didnt-bark-what-the-danish-election-reveals-about-russian-influence-operations/ (euvsdisinfo.eu). Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 08th to the 14th of June 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [Social Media Platforms] YouTube YouTube Channels Linked to Sanctioned Iranian Entities [State Actors] Russia Russian Narratives Target NATO Unity and Baltic Security Georgia’s Balancing Act Between Western Partnerships and Non-Western Ties Misinformation Targeting Macron Ahead of World Cup Fact-Checking Claims Made by Putin at SPIEF FIMI Operations Targeting Armenia’s 2026 Elections The War in Ukraine Russian Distorted Messaging on Canada–Ukraine Partnership ODNI Release Revives Claims About Ukrainian Biolabs The Russia–Ukraine Conflict in the Media Battlefield China AI-Generated Influence Campaigns Target U.S. Technology Debates Autism Misunderstandings and Information Challenges in Chinese Communities Iran Iran’s Evolving Information Strategy AI Chatbots Show Greater Vulnerability to False Claims About the Iran War [AI Related Articles] German Court Holds Google Liable for False AI-Generated Search Overviews [General Reports] False Claims About California's 2026 Primary Elections BlackCore Linked to Digital Interference Campaigns Across Multiple Countries [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NATO Exercise Examines Responses to Information Campaigns During Crises Democratic Preparations for Election Interference and Information Threats Workshop on Hybrid Threats, Disinformation, and Cyber Influence in Somalia [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, the possibility of a Russian attack on the Baltic states remains uncertain, but a growing Russian narrative that questions NATO’s willingness and ability to defend its members is perceived. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as the World Cup begins in North America, a widely shared online narrative falsely claimed that French football star Kylian Mbappé had accused French President Emmanuel Macron of years of sexual harassment. According to an article by Stop Fake, during a meeting with international news agencies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin made several misleading claims regarding the war in Ukraine, Russian military operations, European energy policy, and regional politics. According to an article by Disinfo Watch, a recently declassified slide deck from the U.S. ODNI has drawn attention for reviving debate around long-standing claims about U.S.-supported laboratories in Ukraine. OpenAI reported the disruption of two clusters of ChatGPT accounts that were allegedly used to support covert online influence activities linked to actors likely originating from China. An essay published in The Journal of Autistic Culture argued that public understanding of autism in many Chinese communities is shaped by a combination of misconceptions and inaccurate information. As stated in an article by CFR, Iran has developed a highly effective online communication strategy that relies on humor, memes, and AI-generated content rather than traditional propaganda. As published by EEAS, a workshop held in Nairobi focused on strengthening Somalia’s ability to address hybrid threats, disinformation, and foreign interference. [ Report Summary] A report by the Tech Transparency Project found that YouTube hosted and displayed advertisements on dozens of channels connected to Iranian individuals, organizations, and government entities subject to U.S. sanctions. According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, the possibility of a Russian attack on the Baltic states remains uncertain, but a growing Russian narrative that questions NATO’s willingness and ability to defend its members is perceived. According to an article by The Jamestown Foundation, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has expressed interest in restoring the suspended U.S.-Georgia strategic partnership while insisting that improved relations should not require changes to its domestic or foreign policies. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as the World Cup begins in North America, a widely shared online narrative falsely claimed that French football star Kylian Mbappé had accused French President Emmanuel Macron of years of sexual harassment. According to an article by Stop Fake, during a meeting with international news agencies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin made several misleading claims regarding the war in Ukraine, Russian military operations, European energy policy, and regional politics. Research by the EEAS and CheckFirst found that Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections became a major target for foreign information manipulation campaigns, particularly from Kremlin-linked networks. As published in a DisinfoWatch analysis, a statement by Russian state media outlet TASS criticized a new Canada–Ukraine drone production arrangement and framed it as evidence of Canada’s growing involvement in the war. According to an article by Disinfo Watch, a recently declassified slide deck from the U.S. ODNI has drawn attention for reviving debate around long-standing claims about U.S.-supported laboratories in Ukraine. A paper published in the International Journal of Social and Economic Development examined how the Russia–Ukraine war is represented in modern media. OpenAI reported the disruption of two clusters of ChatGPT accounts that were allegedly used to support covert online influence activities linked to actors likely originating from China. An essay published in The Journal of Autistic Culture argued that public understanding of autism in many Chinese communities is shaped by a combination of misconceptions and inaccurate information. As stated in an article by CFR, Iran has developed a highly effective online communication strategy that relies on humor, memes, and AI-generated content rather than traditional propaganda. A May 2026 audit by NewsGuard found that leading AI chatbots were more likely to repeat false claims related to the Iran war than misinformation on other news topics. According to The Decoders’ publication, a German court ruled that Google can be held directly responsible for false statements generated by its AI search overviews, finding that these summaries are Google's own content rather than traditional search results. As published in NewsGuard’s Reality Check, following California's June 2026 primary elections, several conservative figures, including President Donald Trump, claimed that the results were being manipulated to benefit Democratic candidates. As published by Reuters, France’s digital interference watchdog Viginum reported that the Israeli-linked influence firm BlackCore is suspected of conducting digital interference operations in political campaigns in France, New York City, Scotland, Angola, and Togo. As published by the Financial Times, NATO recently conducted a simulation in Poland to test how allied countries might respond to information campaigns during major crises. According to a Politico article, Senate Democrats are preparing legal and communications strategies for a range of potential election-related disruptions ahead of the midterm elections. As published by EEAS, a workshop held in Nairobi focused on strengthening Somalia’s ability to address hybrid threats, disinformation, and foreign interference. [Social Media Platforms] YouTube YouTube Channels Linked to Sanctioned Iranian Entities A report by the Tech Transparency Project (TTP) found that YouTube hosted and displayed advertisements on dozens of channels connected to Iranian individuals, organizations, and government entities subject to U.S. sanctions. According to the investigation, 56 channels were associated with Treasury-designated sanctioned actors, while 28 others were linked to the Iranian government. YouTube may be providing services to sanctioned entities and potentially generating revenue from their content, although TTP could not determine whether the channels themselves received a share of advertising income. Following media inquiries, Google stated that it is committed to sanctions compliance and removed many of the identified channels. Among the channels identified were accounts linked to organizations and individuals connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), sanctioned businesses, banks, state media outlets, government ministries, and senior political figures. The investigation also noted that some of the identified media outlets have previously been sanctioned by the United States for activities including propaganda, distorted reporting, or other actions cited by U.S. authorities. However, the central focus is not the content of the channels, but the broader question of whether YouTube's platform and advertising infrastructure are being used by entities that U.S. sanctions are intended to restrict. The findings raise questions about YouTube’s compliance with sanctions regulations and the effectiveness of safeguards designed to prevent sanctioned actors from using the platform. Source: Tech Transparency Project. YouTube Profits Off U.S.-Sanctioned Iranians Amid Middle East Conflict. [online] Published 11 June 2026. Available at: https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/youtube-profits-off-u.s.-sanctioned-iranians-amid-middle-east-conflict (techtransparencyproject.org). (campaignforaccountability.org) Top Of Page [State Actors] Russia Russian Narratives Target NATO Unity and Baltic Security According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, the possibility of a Russian attack on the Baltic states remains uncertain. Still, a growing Russian narrative that questions NATO’s willingness and ability to defend its members is perceived. Senior Russian officials have argued that if a conflict were to occur, the Baltic states would be responsible for provoking it and therefore could not rely on NATO’s collective defense commitments. The article also described a broader pattern of Russian statements and media activity concerning the Baltic region. Remarks by Russian officials and claims circulated by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that Latvia is involved in preparations for attacks against Russia. Latvian experts quoted in the text argued that these claims are unsupported and are part of an effort to portray the Baltic states as participants in a conflict rather than potential targets of Russian pressure. Russian state and state-affiliated media outlets amplified these narratives, while channels targeting Baltic audiences further spread them. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Moscow Tells Baltics NATO Will Not Come to Their Rescue. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/moscow-tells-baltics-nato-will-not-come-to-their-rescue/ (jamestown.org). Top Of Page Georgia’s Balancing Act Between Western Partnerships and Non-Western Ties According to an article by The Jamestown Foundation, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has expressed interest in restoring the suspended U.S.-Georgia strategic partnership while insisting that improved relations should not require changes to its domestic or foreign policies. At the same time, Tbilisi has expanded cooperation with the People’s Republic of China and maintained engagement with Iran and Russia, prompting increased scrutiny from Washington. Recent U.S. legislative initiatives and official statements have focused on concerns regarding foreign influence and Georgia’s broader political trajectory. The debate has increasingly extended into the information sphere as U.S. officials and critics of the Georgian government have raised concerns that growing ties with China, Russia, and Iran could increase external influence in Georgia. Georgian Dream argued that such claims exaggerate the scale and significance of these relationships, and the government continues to present itself as a defender of national sovereignty against outside pressure, even as it seeks renewed engagement with Washington. At the same time, foreign actors, including Iranian representatives, have become more visible participants in Georgia’s public discourse, contributing to competing narratives about the country’s direction and international partnerships. As a result, Tbilisi faces the challenge of balancing its pursuit of diversified foreign relations with maintaining trust with its traditional Western partners. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Georgian Dream Seeking U.S. Reset While Resisting Requisite Reforms. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/georgian-dream-seeking-u-s-reset-while-resisting-requisite-reforms/ (jamestown.org). Top Of Page Misinformation Targeting Macron Ahead of World Cup According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, as the World Cup begins in North America, a widely shared online narrative falsely claimed that French football star Kylian Mbappé had accused French President Emmanuel Macron of years of sexual harassment. The story circulated through a video and article designed to resemble content from Eurosport and gained significant attention on social media, generating millions of views in multiple languages within days. The content originated from a website impersonating Eurosport rather than the legitimate broadcaster. The purported article was falsely attributed to a Eurosport journalist, who publicly rejected the claim and confirmed that neither he nor Eurosport had any connection to the story. The accompanying audio, presented as Mbappé’s voice, showed signs of manipulation, including unnatural speech patterns and inaccuracies that cast doubt on its authenticity. No credible evidence was presented to support the allegations against Macron. Researchers cited in the article linked the campaign to a network previously associated with anti-Macron narratives, particularly in response to France’s support for Ukraine. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Russia Plays Dirty at the World Cup. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/russia-plays-dirty-at-the-world-cup (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page Fact-Checking Claims Made by Putin at SPIEF According to an article by Stop Fake, during a meeting with international news agencies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), Vladimir Putin made several claims regarding the war in Ukraine, Russian military operations, European energy policy, and regional politics. The article argues that a number of these statements were inaccurate or misleading when compared with publicly available data and official records. The article challenged Putin’s claims about the extent of Russian territorial control in Ukraine, the scale of desertion in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the condition of Ukraine’s air defense network. For example, while Ukraine faces shortages in air defense coverage and interceptor missiles, it continues to operate an integrated, multi-layered air defense system. The review also highlighted inconsistencies between Putin’s recent description of an Oreshnik missile strike near Bila Tserkva as a test against a non-military target and earlier Russian official statements that described the strike as a successful attack on military infrastructure. Additionally, Russia’s own actions contributed significantly to the decline in gas supplies, as opposed to Putin’s characterization of Europe’s reduction of Russian energy imports. Source: StopFake. «Просто ударили туда, где было удобно посмотреть результаты». 7 фейков Путина на встрече с руководителями зарубежных информагентств. [online] Published 8 June 2026. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/ru/prosto-udarili-tuda-gde-bylo-udobno-posmotret-rezultaty-7-fejkov-putina-na-vstreche-s-rukovoditelyami-zarubezhnyh-informagentstv/ (stopfake.org). (stopfake.org) Top Of Page FIMI Operations Targeting Armenia’s 2026 Elections Research by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and CheckFirst found that Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections became a major target for foreign information manipulation campaigns, particularly from Kremlin-linked networks. Following Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s efforts to strengthen ties with the European Union and reduce dependence on Russia, coordinated influence operations portrayed him as an EU puppet, an ally of Azerbaijan, or a leader working against Armenia’s interests. These narratives were spread across social media, messaging apps, and networks linked to Russian influence operations such as Overload, Pravda, and Storm-1516. The investigation documented a broad ecosystem of manipulated content, including AI-generated videos, fake news websites, impersonated media outlets, and coordinated social media activity. At least 72 websites connected to the Storm-1516 network were identified, many of which published false stories about Pashinyan and promoted pro-Russian narratives. French TikTok users searching for Pashinyan were exposed mainly to hostile content originating from Kremlin-linked actors, members of the Armenian diaspora, or Azerbaijani sources. Russian state-affiliated media and influence actors also amplified these narratives through French-language content and messaging platforms. Findings showed Russia conducted a multi-layered effort to influence Armenian public opinion and undermine support for pro-Western political leaders. Evidence from leaked documents and domain registration patterns suggested coordination between influence networks operating in Armenia and similar campaigns previously observed in Europe, and Researchers noted that actors from the Armenian diaspora and Azerbaijan contributed to the online criticism of Pashinyan. Source: CheckFirst. Noise Without Effect. [online PDF] Published June 2026. Available at: https://checkfirst.network/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/NOISE_WITHOUT_EFFECT_11.pdf (checkfirst.network). Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Russian Distorted Messaging on Canada–Ukraine Partnership As published in a DisinfoWatch analysis, a statement by Russian state media outlet TASS, quoting Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, criticized a new Canada–Ukraine drone production arrangement and framed it as evidence of Canada’s growing involvement in the war. Even though the statement was based on a real Canadian government announcement, the report argues that Russian officials used this announcement to advance broader narratives portraying Canada as a direct participant in the conflict, questioning the legitimacy of Ukraine’s government, and suggesting that support for Ukraine makes foreign partners responsible for the war. The most notable element of the statement was a threat to publish the addresses of Canadian production facilities connected to the project. The analysis highlighted several recurring themes in Russian messaging, including describing Ukraine as the “Kiev regime”, portraying defensive military support as aggression, characterizing Ukrainian military activity as terrorism, and suggesting that Canada is profiting from the conflict. These claims are presented without evidence or omit key context about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and appear intended to discourage support for Ukraine and increase pressure on Canadian organizations involved in defence cooperation. Source: DisinfoWatch. Russian Spokeswoman Threatens Canada Over Drone Manufacturing. [online] Published 9 June 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/russian-spokeswoman-threatens-canada-over-drone-manufacuring/ (disinfowatch.org). Top Of Page ODNI Release Revives Claims About Ukrainian Biolabs According to an article by Disinfo Watch, a recently declassified slide deck from the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), released under Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, has drawn attention for reviving debate around long-standing claims about U.S.-supported laboratories in Ukraine. While the slides contain information about public health laboratories, biosafety programs, and international scientific cooperation, they present it in a way that could be interpreted as supporting allegations of biological weapons activity. The documents do not provide evidence of a biological weapons program but instead use language and framing that may encourage such conclusions. Attention is given to references to pathogen storage, laboratory networks, and connections between Ukrainian institutions and U.S. organizations. However, dangerous pathogens are commonly stored and studied in public health and veterinary laboratories for disease surveillance and research, and the presence of such facilities does not indicate the development of biological weapons. Following the release, Russian state media outlets cited the documents as support for their long-standing narrative about Ukrainian “biolabs,” despite the absence of direct evidence in the slides themselves. The significance of the release lies less in the information it contains and more in how that information is framed. The report noted that international organizations and public-health experts have previously stated that there is no credible public evidence of a U.S.-backed biological weapons program in Ukraine. Source: DisinfoWatch. Tulsi Gabbard Biolab Report Feeds Russian State Anti-Ukraine Media Narratives. [online] Published 16 June 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/tulsi-gabbard-biolab-report-feeds-russian-state-anti-ukraine-media-narratives/ (disinfowatch.org). Top Of Page The Russia–Ukraine Conflict in the Media Battlefield A paper published in the International Journal of Social and Economic Development examined how the Russia–Ukraine war is represented in modern media. It argued that disinformation can play a role in warfare that is as significant as military force, as media narratives shape public understanding of the conflict and influence perceptions of reality. Drawing on the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz, we see how war becomes a media spectacle in which audiences form judgments based on information provided by the media. The research highlighted the risks associated with war reporting, particularly in an environment where audiences are vulnerable to misinformation. The political, technological, and psychological foundations of media coverage strongly affect the interpretation of war. Source: Indonesian Journal of Sociology, Education and Development (IJSED). [Article Title]. [online] Published 30 June 2021. Available at: http://ijsedjournal.com/index.php/ijsed/article/view/68/56 (ijsedjournal.com). Top Of Page China AI-Generated Influence Campaigns Target U.S. Technology Debates OpenAI reported the disruption of two clusters of ChatGPT accounts that were allegedly used to support covert online influence activities linked to actors likely originating from China. The accounts generated social media content designed to shape public discussions around U.S. technology and AI-related policies. The campaigns focused on existing public concerns, including the impact of AI data centers on electricity prices and debates surrounding U.S. trade and technology policies. The first campaign, referred to as "Data Center Bandwagon", produced comments and images claiming that AI data center expansion was driving up energy costs for American households. The second campaign, "Tech and Tariffs", generated content criticizing U.S. tariffs and promoting narratives about technological competition. OpenAI also linked this activity to a network of likely inauthentic social media accounts that spread false claims alleging that ChatGPT user data had been compromised. The campaigns did not achieve significant public reach beyond their own activity. However, they illustrate how foreign actors may use AI tools to participate in and influence legitimate public debates while concealing their identity and objectives. Source: OpenAI. PRC-linked Influence Operations Are Targeting AI Debates in the US. [online] Published 10 June 2026. Available at: https://openai.com/index/prc-linked-influence-operations-ai-debates/ (openai.com). Top Of Page Autism Misunderstandings and Information Challenges in Chinese Communities An essay published in The Journal of Autistic Culture argued that public understanding of autism in many Chinese communities is shaped by a combination of misconceptions, inaccurate information, and, in some cases, deliberately misleading claims. Cultural pressures related to competition and conformity can reinforce negative perceptions of autism. As a result, autism is frequently viewed through a deficit-based lens, and inaccurate narratives can become widely accepted and difficult to challenge. A major issue is the role of language, social media, and professional authority in shaping public perceptions. Chinese terms for autism are often interpreted literally, leading many people to associate autism with loneliness, emotional withdrawal, or temporary social difficulties rather than a lifelong neurodevelopmental condition. Social media platforms further amplify misleading claims, including stories suggesting that autism can be "cured" through increased social interaction. Furthermore, some medical and educational professionals continue to promote outdated classifications, unsupported theories, and commercialized treatments, including claims that autism can be cured through rehabilitation programs or traditional remedies. These misunderstandings have significant consequences, including discrimination, delayed diagnosis, and inadequate support for autistic individuals, particularly those with higher support needs. The author called for greater awareness of autism, as well as cultural stereotypes from outside Chinese communities. Source: Timpe, K. What are Intended as Systems of Support become Systems of Struggle. Ought: The Journal of Autistic Culture. [online] Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Article 8, 2021. Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/ought/vol3/iss1/8 (scholarworks.gvsu.edu). Top Of Page Iran Iran’s Evolving Information Strategy As stated in an article by CFR, Iran has developed a highly effective online communication strategy that relies on humor, memes, and AI-generated content rather than traditional propaganda. Iranian officials and pro-Iranian content creators increasingly use internet culture, sarcastic social media exchanges, and AI-produced videos to respond to U.S. messaging and engage audiences. This content is designed to function as entertainment first and political messaging second, making it more difficult to counter through conventional responses. This approach presents a challenge because existing tools were largely developed to address covert influence operations or deceptive AI content. Openly published satire and AI-generated memes do not fit neatly into those categories, and traditional fact-checking or content labeling is often ineffective when the message is primarily humorous. Iranian content has achieved significant engagement online, so much so that other countries may study and adopt similar techniques. To respond, the author recommends improving threat monitoring, increasing transparency from AI companies, disrupting covert influence networks when they are identified, and strengthening the United States’ own public diplomacy and soft power. At the same time, the article argues that the United States should avoid conducting its own covert influence campaigns, as this could undermine public trust and ultimately damage democratic institutions. Source: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Iran’s Trolling Caught the U.S. Off Guard. Here’s How to Push Back. [online] Published 10 June 2026. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/articles/irans-trolling-caught-the-u-s-off-guard-heres-how-to-push-back (cfr.org). (cfr.org) Top Of Page AI Chatbots Show Greater Vulnerability to False Claims About the Iran War A May 2026 audit by NewsGuard found that leading AI chatbots were more likely to repeat false claims related to the Iran war than misinformation on other news topics. Across all tested claims, chatbots provided false responses in about 15 percent of cases, but that rate increased to 25 percent for prompts related to the Iran conflict. This may be due to coordinated influence efforts that generate large volumes of content around specific narratives, increasing the likelihood that AI systems encounter and repeat those claims. One of the most frequently repeated false stories claimed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps destroyed an Israeli military satellite communications center. In reality, the strike targeted a civilian commercial facility and was attributed to Hezbollah, not the IRGC. Ten of the eleven chatbots repeated at least part of the false claim when presented with leading prompts. Several models cited Iranian state-linked or pro-Iranian media outlets, including Tasnim News, Mehr News, and the Tehran Times, when generating inaccurate responses. The report also found that chatbots sometimes relied on state-controlled media from Iran, Russia, and China when answering news-related questions. Many AI systems still struggle to assess source credibility effectively, allowing false or misleading narratives to influence their outputs. While some models improved compared with previous audits, the findings highlight ongoing challenges in preventing AI tools from amplifying inaccurate information that originates from coordinated influence networks. Source: NewsGuard. Quarterly AI False Claim Monitor — May 2026: Quarterly Audit of the 11 Leading Generative AI Tools and Their Propensity to Repeat False Claims on Controversial Topics in the News. [online] Published 8 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/ai-monitor/may-2026/ (newsguardtech.com). (newsguardtech.com) Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] German Court Holds Google Liable for False AI-Generated Search Overviews According to The Decoders’ publication, a German court ruled that Google can be held directly responsible for false statements generated by its AI search overviews, finding that these summaries are Google's own content rather than traditional search results. The case involved AI-generated responses that incorrectly linked two publishing companies to scams, subscription traps, and other questionable business practices. According to the court, the AI combined information from unrelated sources, created connections that did not exist in the cited material, and presented them as factual claims. Because the AI generated new statements instead of simply displaying third-party content, the court concluded that Google bears responsibility for the accuracy of those claims. The ruling rejected Google's argument that users can verify AI summaries by checking the linked sources themselves. The court noted that the overviews are presented as complete, standalone answers and may contain claims that do not appear in any source. It also found that existing legal protections for search engines do not apply because AI overviews actively interpret, summarize, and generate content. As a result, victims of false statements should be able to seek legal remedies directly from Google, rather than from the websites referenced by the AI. Source: The Decoder. Landmark German Ruling Declares Google's AI Overviews Are Google's Own Words and Makes It Liable for False Answers. [online] Published 9 June 2026. Available at: https://the-decoder.com/landmark-german-ruling-declares-googles-ai-overviews-are-googles-own-words-and-makes-it-liable-for-false-answers/ (the-decoder.com). (the-decoder.com) Top Of Page [General Reports] False Claims About California's 2026 Primary Elections As published in NewsGuard’s Reality Check, following California's June 2026 primary elections, several conservative figures, including President Donald Trump, claimed that the results were being manipulated to benefit Democratic candidates. These allegations focused on the slow pace of vote counting and the large number of mail-in ballots, with critics arguing that late-counted votes unfairly changed the standings of Republican candidates in the gubernatorial and Los Angeles mayoral races. However, election officials and voting experts noted that California's counting process routinely extends beyond Election Day because state laws allow mail-in ballots to arrive after Election Day if postmarked on time. Mail-in ballots also tend to be counted later and have historically favored Democratic candidates, a pattern observed in previous elections. As a result, shifts in vote totals after Election Day are not, by themselves, evidence of fraud. The controversy reflects the continued spread of election-related misinformation and unsubstantiated fraud claims that have persisted since the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Election Denial, California Edition. [online] Published 12 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/election-denial-california-edition (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page BlackCore Linked to Digital Interference Campaigns Across Multiple Countries As published by Reuters, France’s digital interference watchdog, Viginum, reported that the Israeli-linked influence firm BlackCore is suspected of conducting digital interference operations not only in France’s 2025 municipal elections, but also in political campaigns in New York City, Scotland, Angola, and Togo. According to Viginum, the company allegedly used networks of fake or coordinated online accounts to target political figures and influence public debate, although investigators have not identified who may have commissioned these activities. French authorities said technical analysis connected BlackCore to an online smear campaign against candidates from the French left-wing party La France Insoumise. Similar tactics were reportedly observed in Scotland, where accounts linked to the operation targeted John Swinney and the Scottish National Party during election campaigns. The report highlighted growing concerns about the commercial market for influence operations, where private firms allegedly offer services designed to shape narratives and manipulate online discussions. While France has asked Israel for assistance in identifying those behind the campaigns, investigators say the sponsors remain unknown. BlackCore, which previously described itself as a company specializing in influence, cyber, and information warfare services, has not responded to requests for comment. Source: Reuters. Israeli Firm BlackCore Also Suspected of Meddling in NYC, Scotland Votes, French Official Says. [online] Published 11 June 2026. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/israeli-firm-blackcore-also-suspected-meddling-nyc-scotland-votes-french-2026-06-11/ (reuters.com). Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NATO Exercise Examines Responses to Information Campaigns During Crises As published by the Financial Times, NATO recently conducted a simulation in Poland to test how allied countries might respond to information campaigns during major crises. Using a fictional scenario in which an authoritarian neighboring state launched a cyberattack on an energy grid, participants faced coordinated online messaging designed to exploit public fear, undermine trust in authorities, and create social divisions. Additional scenarios included a major flood and a cyberattack on the banking system. Ukrainian officials played the role of the hostile actor, using AI-generated content and social media campaigns to spread narratives blaming government incompetence and corruption while presenting the fictional adversary as a source of assistance. The exercise highlighted how coordinated messaging can be used during emergencies to influence public perceptions, complicate crisis response efforts, and challenge official communications. Participants countered these efforts with messages promoting public trust, social stability, and national unity. The idea drew heavily on Ukraine’s experience since Russia’s full-scale invasion and reflected broader efforts within NATO to improve resilience against hostile information activities. Participants noted that while simulations help strengthen coordination and preparedness, they cannot fully replicate the pace and complexity of real-world wartime environments, and Ukrainian officials emphasized that adversaries often adapt their narratives rapidly. Source: Financial Times. Nato narrowly beats Russia-style NATO rece enemy in cyber attack simulation. [online]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/cda17cca-a651-41c5-9ac7-75dcde998c66?syn-25a6b1a6=1 (ft.com). Top Of Page Democratic Preparations for Election Interference and Information Threats According to a Politico article, Senate Democrats are preparing legal and communications strategies for a range of potential election-related disruptions ahead of the midterm elections. In a recent tabletop exercise led by Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, lawmakers and election experts discussed responses to scenarios such as ballot seizures, federal agents at polling places, and foreign influence operations. A key focus was coordinating messaging to counter misinformation that could undermine public confidence in election results. One scenario examined the impact of a foreign influence campaign using AI-generated deepfakes alongside efforts to suppress reporting on false narratives. Another explored how unsubstantiated claims of widespread election fraud could encourage armed citizens to monitor polling sites and potentially justify increased federal involvement at voting locations. The exercises reflect concerns among Democratic officials about election integrity and public confidence. Participants emphasized the need for rapid legal action and collaboration with state and local authorities to address misleading information and ensure that voters remain confident that elections will be conducted fairly and that legitimate votes will be counted. Source: Politico. How Senate Democrats Are Planning to Push Back on Potential Election Interference. [online] Published 11 June 2026. Available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/11/how-senate-democrats-are-planning-to-push-back-on-potential-election-interference-00957663 (politico.com). (美轮美换 The American Roulette). Top Of Page Workshop on Hybrid Threats, Disinformation, and Cyber Influence in Somalia As published by EEAS, a workshop held in Nairobi by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia, the European Union Delegation to Somalia, and partner organizations focused on strengthening Somalia’s ability to address hybrid threats, disinformation, and foreign interference. The initiative introduced participants to key principles of cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity, while building expertise in cyber resilience, critical information infrastructure protection, and the detection of influence operations in the digital space. The training also guided the EU’s legal and policy framework for cybersecurity, helping Somali institutions improve national strategies, legislation, governance, and coordination mechanisms. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Somalia Advances Cybersecurity and Cyber Diplomacy Through EU-Supported Training on Hybrid Threats. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eucap-som/somalia-advances-cybersecurity-and-cyber-diplomacy-through-eu-supported-training-hybrid-threats_en (eeas.europa.eu). Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

Several reports published recently have highlighted a noteworthy technique increasingly employed by hybrid threat actors in hostile influence campaigns (HICs). As most Influence Defense practitioners and researchers know, the effectiveness of HICs often depends not only on the proliferated content itself, but also on the perceived credibility of the entity producing it. While clear propaganda can be easier to identify, entities that resemble research institutes, news outlets, or open-source investigation platforms may be viewed as more trustworthy by targeted audiences. As a result, the inherent legitimacy associated with these institutions is increasingly exploited and used to increase the reach and impact of malign narratives. In this context, it is worth defining credibility as the perceived reliability of information; While legitimacy refers to the perceived authority or institutional standing of the actor producing it. This blog examines three different models of influence-driven entities that exploit borrowed legitimacy, highlights the similarities between them, and their operational importance to cognitive attack-chains. OSINT Investigation Platforms In April 2026, the FDD published a detailed report on a Qatar-linked influence operation called “Eekad”.[1] Active since 2020, Eekad presents itself as the Arab World’s first open-source intelligence (OSINT) platform. It operates across platforms including X/Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram, producing content that mimics the conventions of OSINT work: satellite imagery analysis, social network visualizations, geolocation investigations, and debunking of viral content. Eekad's outputs are designed to appear credible and methodologically sound, regardless of the accuracy or integrity of the underlying analysis. Figure 1 – An EekadFacts network graph showing “proof” of Israeli-linked accounts, allegedly amplifying anti-Hamas content online. According to the FDD report, Eekad has repeatedly promoted misleading or false claims which were aligned with Qatari political interests: defending Qatar, targeting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, and promoting the post-Assad Syrian government. Its Meta ads showed payments made in Qatari currency, with many ads removed for violating political advertising rules. The FDD analysis linked the operation to a professional PR firm and pointed to financial resources that appeared inconsistent with those of an independent investigative outlet of its stated size. Eekad derives much of its perceived credibility from its presentation of investigative methodology. Rather than simply making claims, it presents them through investigative methods and formats that resemble established OSINT practices. For many audiences, this can create an impression of legitimacy. The FDD report goes into granular detail, mapping Eekad’s connections to Qatari state-media, its associated technical assets, inauthentic amplification of its output, and the ways in which it seems to be embedded within a broader influence infrastructure. ‘Pink Slime’ and Impersonated News Outlets A second model is that of news outlets which look and function like normal media organizations. However, their published content is systematically shaped by a political or state figure operating in the background. The now-infamous Russian hostile influence campaign codenamed Operation Doppelgänger provides a clear example of this model.[2] Its core tactic was the coordinated creation of look-alike websites that visually mimicked legitimate European news outlets. These high-profile influence assets consistently published pro-Kremlin content that appeared to originate from trusted sources. Doppelgänger operators employed webpage cloning tactics, allowing them to impersonate dozens of reputable European news outlets, including prominent European outlets such as Der Spiegel and Bild, as well as major US publications including The Washington Post and Fox News. Doppelgänger relied on audiences, associating familiar journalistic brands with credibility and legitimacy. Figure 2 - A fake Spiegel article, attributed to Russian influence campaign Doppelganger (Courtesy of CORRECTIV).[3] A 2025 report by Logically Facts provides yet another example of trust abuse, in the form of an alleged “Pink Slime” network used to proliferate Russian propaganda through the Dubai-listed Big News Network FZ LLC (BNN) and its subsidiary entities (Midwest Radio Network and The Mainstream Media). This extensive network of “eNewspapers” is suspected of enabling sanction evasion for Russian state media outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today).[4] A recent CRC investigation has mapped over 2,340 distinct domains linked to BNN’s infrastructure. Figure 3 - Big News Network eNewspapers, suspected of spreading reporting by the EU-sanctioned Russia state media outlet RT.[5] What these inauthentic news entities share is their reliance on familiar journalistic features to appear credible. Bylines, publication dates, editorial sections, and professional layouts can all contribute to an impression of legitimacy before the content is even seen. Research Institutes and Intellectuals A third model of credibility abuse consists of pseudo think tanks and research institutes that spread state-dictated narratives under the guise of analytical observations. Audiences exposed to the content generated by these seemingly independent entities might be unaware of the underlying agendas. The approach taken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regarding the South China Sea public discourse serves as a clear example of this technique in action. A recent CRC report mapped an emerging influence infrastructure comprised of multiple PRC-linked entities that present themselves as research organizations. However, these organizations consistently promote narratives that support Beijing’s territorial claims in the region. The discovered influence campaign was observed employing networks of amplification assets on X/Twitter to proliferate the PRC-aligned narratives accusing Western powers and other regional actors as the primary aggressors in the contested region, while diverting attention from repeated Chinese violations of international maritime law.[6] Figure 4 – X accounts linked to PRC-aligned research institutions forming an emerging influence infrastructure. Crucially, ongoing PRC influence operations continue to demonstrate a centrally coordinated approach, integrating both authentic and inauthentic behavior, together with civilian, academic, and state actors, within a multi-layered influence architecture. Inspired by Soviet and Russian political warfare doctrines, recently-identified PRC information manipulation and interference efforts highlight the growing operational complexity of modern cognitive threats. Figure 5 – A structural mapping of the emerging PRC-attributed influence infrastructure, consisting of three inter-connected activity clusters (content generators, amplifiers, and research institutions) The Operational Role of Exploited Credibility The above-mentioned models all exhibit the same operational logic. They maximize their efficacy by abusing pre-existing trust, the veneer of credible information outlets, and the perceived legitimacy assigned to inauthentic operational assets posing as trustworthy entities. “Independent” OSINT research teams, viewed as credible data verification platforms, are leveraged to spread misleading or biased narratives. Meanwhile, impersonation of legitimate and reputable news sources helps threat actors spread information disorder and sow distrust in media coverage. The employment of state-aligned research institutes and individual intellectuals provides a solid base of validity to multi-layered influence architectures. To counter these highly effective adversarial TTPs, counter-influence efforts must dissect documented cases of credibility abuse and apply scrutiny to all kinds of information sources, media outlets and research entities. Defensive measures, including cognitive resilience capacity building, must be scaled and adapted to better inform targeted audiences of novel cognitive threats as they emerge. Reinforcing societal resiliency means providing vulnerable information to consumers with basic awareness and sufficient tools to critically evaluate claims, fighting the common instinct to trust an outdated notion of legitimacy. [References:] Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Qatar Influence Operations: Unmasking a Suspected Network. [online] Published 27 April 2026. Available at: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/04/27/qatar-influence-operations-unmasking-a-suspected-network/ (fdd.org) Cyfluence Research. Visibility as Victory: The Strategic Logic of Doppelgänger. [online] Published 12 May 2025. Available at: https://www.cyfluence-research.org/post/visibility-as-victory-the-strategic-logic-of-doppelg%C3%A4nger CORRECTIV. Inside Doppelganger: How Russia Uses EU Companies for Its Propaganda. [online] Published 22 July 2024. Available at: https://correctiv.org/en/fact-checking-en/2024/07/22/inside-doppelganger-how-russia-uses-eu-companies-for-its-propaganda/ (correctiv.org) Logically Facts. Behind the Network of Pink Slime Sites Sharing Sanctioned Content to EU Readers. [online] Published 28 May 2025. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20250528135617/https://www.logicallyfacts.com/en/analysis/behind-the-network-of-pink-slime-sites-sharing-sanctioned-content-to-eu-readers Big News Network. Big News Network – Global News Service, Web Directory. [online] Available at: https://www.bignewsnetwork.net/ Cyfluence Research Center (CRC). From Pseudo-Research to Narrative Superiority: Mapping an Emerging PRC Influence Campaign in the South China Sea. [online] Published 11 May 2026. Updated 12 May 2026. Available at: https://www.cyfluence-research.org/post/from-pseudo-research-to-narrativesuperiority-mapping-an-emerging-prc-influencecampaign-in-the-south

Background A recent OCCRP investigation revealed leaked documents related to the Social Design Agency (SDA), a Russian firm and long-time hostile influence campaigns (HICs) contractor executing “cognitive strikes” against Western countries. The investigation focused in part on a September 2025 Islamophobic incident in which several mosques and cultural centers in and around Paris reported pig heads marked with the word “Macron” left outside their entrances. These attacks appeared to extend beyond the physical act itself. Following online amplification, it drew extensive media attention and fed existing societal tensions and political polarization. The newly leaked documents demonstrate how hybrid threats, such as multi-dimensional influence efforts, increasingly integrate physical and digital aspects into a single operational structure. Rather than functioning only through online platforms, hostile influence campaigns (HICs) instigate and exploit real-world events to continuously destabilize adversaries. Revisiting The Russian Cognitive Warfare Playbook The reported operations align closely with established patterns of Russian hostile influence activity. One of the most prominent remains the DSA-linked Doppelgänger campaign coordinated information operations with the orchestration of antisemitic incidents in Paris to amplify social polarization. The uncovered modus operandi reflects the persistent rationale behind Russian HICs: the exploitation of existing societal fault lines surrounding immigration, nationalism, religion, identity politics and institutional distrust. Instead of creating an entirely new narrative, Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations are designed to intensify pre-existing tensions within targeted democratic and western societies. Importantly, the convergence between cognitive and physical effects is increasingly visible within urban environments. Hostile FIMI activities, including the instigation and exploitation of racial, religious or politically-charged incidents, mostly occur within urban environments. They are aimed against high-value managed contested spaces (MCSs), such as major cities, demonstrating how local communities and municipal authorities are in fact the front lines of hybrid geopolitical conflict, a dynamic that is central to the CRC’s Urban Cyfluence Framework initiative. The leaked material also provides a valuable behind-the-scenes view, in the form of internal SDA chats. These shed new light on the organizational structure behind the firm’s operations, particularly through the role of Sofia Zakharova, a Russian senior official who appeared under the name of “Kristin Kiler”. The exposed conversations suggest that Zakharova operated as a coordinating figure between the SDA and senior administration officials, overseeing operational updates, funding discussions, and broader project management across multiple campaigns. Zakharova was previously sanctioned by several Western countries due to her involvement in previous Russian influence operations. Figure 1 - EU sanctions designation of Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, issued in December 2024, citing her continued involvement in hostile Russian information manipulation and interference activities, including the Doppelganger campaign. 1, 2 The internal documents further suggest that these activities were not isolated operations, but part of wider and ongoing destabilization efforts. Plans for 2026 included projects focused on monitoring Western opinion leaders, creating media platforms, and expanding AI-assisted informational capabilities across several European information environments. The leaked documents thus highlight the emphasis on operational continuity, connecting past, present and to-be-executed narrative attacks. While the methods continue to adapt across different platforms and environments, the long-term strategic objective remains consistent. Multi-Dimensional Operations One of the most important aspects of the reported activities was the operational fusion between the physical, digital and cognitive layers. The pig-head attacks were not just physical provocations, but were meant to drive online discourse, attract media attention, and trigger political reactions. This operational hybridity – recently defined by the Cyfluence Security Paradigm – reflects an increasingly common model for influence operations: A provocative physical act generates emotional reactions. Visual content from the incident is being circulated across online platforms. Media coverage and coordinated inauthentic activity amplify and reframe narratives. Polarized public and political discourse affect societal cohesion. The HICs described in the leaked documents demonstrate how hostile influence efforts increasingly function as multi-dimensional threats. These threats are not limited to fictitious narratives or synthetic propaganda proliferated online. Instead, physical acts of provocation and online amplification are used as core components that elevate the sophistication of modern hybrid threats. Implications for Cognitive Security and Defensive Cyfluence Although this operational structure complicates influence defense efforts, the exposure of ongoing Russian FIMI activities targeting Western communities and MCSs through the opportunistic exploitation and orchestration of hate crimes demonstrates the value of proactive defensive cyfluence operations. Much like the exposure of Russian proxy interference efforts surrounding the Moldovan elections – where a timely hack-and-leak operation revealed the operational architecture of Ilan Shor’s FIMI apparatus – this case, alongside previous SDA leaks (which were likely cyber-enabled rather than HUMINT-derived), underscores the strategic importance of publicly exposing adversarial methods, infrastructure, and objectives. Regardless of the information’s source, these crucial disclosures help in neutralizing future narrative attacks, while supporting the cognitive resilience of targeted communities against hybrid threats. [References:] https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/171196 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403188#:~:text=3.-,Sofia%20Avraamovna%20ZAKHAROVA,-(Russian%3A%20%D0%A1%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%90%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 01st to the 07th of June 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Turkish Propaganda Amplifies Russian Misinformation About the Armenian Elections Russian Information Campaigns Ahead of Armenia’s Elections False Narratives Surrounding the Baltic Drone Incursions Abu Dhabi-Based Video News Agency Links to RT The War in Ukraine FSB’s “Matryoshka” Cyberespionage Campaign Against Ukraine China Congressional Concerns Over Foreign Influence on U.S. AI Development Misinformation About Anthropic’s Access in China Iran Handala Brand Threat Expands to Support MOIS Operations [AI Related Articles] 2026 U.S. Midterm Election Threat Outlook Uncensored AI Accelerates the Spread of Conspiracy Theories Online Disinformation About London AI Use in Political Campaigns Gemini Omni Generates Videos Advancing False Online Claims AI-Generated Police “Drag Queen Raid” Story Misleads Global Media [General Reports] 2026 FIFA World Cup Threat Outlook NATO’s Defence Strategic Communications Journal Modeling the Strategic Logic of Disinformation Governance NSO Group Breaks Court Order, Targets Journalists and Officials via WhatsApp [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] Using TrustOps in Governments' Fight Against Deepfakes and Disinformation Tools for Addressing Climate Misinformation in Reporting Training Platform to Investigate Online Influence Campaigns [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to an article by DFR Lab, following drone incursions into Latvia and Estonia in March 2026 and another incident in Latvia in May, pro-Russia media and officials promoted claims that the Baltic states had opened their airspace to support Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia. A three-part investigation by Sekoia reconstructed the cyberespionage group Gamaredon’s 2026 infection chain and clarified its malware ecosystem through a unified taxonomy. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, pro-China social media accounts have circulated claims that American AI company Anthropic has begun allowing users in China to access its Claude chatbot. According to a report by Insikt Group, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence has likely expanded its use of the Handala brand beyond cyber activities to include physical threat actors and influence operations targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. Research by CIR, assisted by other research, found a growing volume of online content portraying London as unsafe, lawless, and in decline. A survey of campaign professionals found that AI has become a routine part of political operations, with 87% using it daily or several times a week. A NewsGuard assessment found that Google’s text-to-video model, Gemini Omni, was able to generate realistic videos illustrating several false claims that have circulated online. Song Xiaoyu's article, published in Scientific Reports, proposes a behavioral game-theoretic model that shows that effective disinformation governance requires penalties severe enough to cross a psychological loss-aversion threshold that shifts platforms from passive to active content moderation. [ Report Summary] A NewsGuard investigation identified Turkish freelance journalist Okay Deprem as a significant source of false narratives circulated ahead of Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections. According to an article by DFR Lab, following drone incursions into Latvia and Estonia in March 2026 and another incident in Latvia in May, pro-Russia media and officials promoted claims that the Baltic states had opened their airspace to support Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia. A Bellingcat investigation examined the relationship between Viory, an Abu Dhabi-based video news agency that promotes itself as a “video news agency of the Global South,” and Ruptly, a video agency connected to Russian state media outlet RT. A three-part investigation by Sekoia reconstructed the cyberespionage group Gamaredon’s 2026 infection chain and clarified its malware ecosystem through a unified taxonomy. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s letter has raised concerns about evidence suggesting that foreign influence campaigns may be attempting to slow U.S. artificial intelligence development and the infrastructure needed to support it. According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, pro-China social media accounts have circulated claims that American AI company Anthropic has begun allowing users in China to access its Claude chatbot. According to a report by Insikt Group, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence has likely expanded its use of the Handala brand beyond cyber activities to include physical threat actors and influence operations targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. As stated in a Check Point publication, the 2026 U.S. midterm election cycle will likely see increased cyber-related activity targeting the election ecosystem, including campaigns, media organizations, and government services. As published in a NewsGuard Reality Check, “Uncensored AI” is a chatbot that promotes itself as a source of “unfiltered” and “objective” information, positioning itself as an alternative to mainstream AI models. Research by CIR, assisted by other research, found a growing volume of online content portraying London as unsafe, lawless, and in decline. A survey of campaign professionals found that AI has become a routine part of political operations, with 87% using it daily or several times a week. A NewsGuard assessment found that Google’s text-to-video model, Gemini Omni, was able to generate realistic videos illustrating several false claims that have circulated online. As revealed by CyberNews, an AI-generated image shared on a Thai police Facebook page falsely depicted officers dressed as drag queens during a drug raid, leading to widespread media coverage of what appeared to be a real undercover operation. Song Xiaoyu's article, published in Scientific Reports, proposes a behavioral game-theoretic model that shows that effective disinformation governance requires penalties severe enough to cross a psychological loss-aversion threshold that shifts platforms from passive to active content moderation. According to Recoded Future’s paper, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is expected to face a complex threat environment across the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The new Defence Strategic Communications journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence argued that societies need new, credible narratives to address political, economic, and technological transformation. Meta published that despite a permanent court injunction, NSO Group continued spear phishing operations against journalists, officials, and civil society actors via WhatsApp, prompting Meta to seek a federal contempt order and publish threat indicators. As published by the Global Government Forum, Gartner predicted that by 2028, 40% of government organizations will establish dedicated “TrustOps” functions to address growing risks from deepfakes and other forms of disinformation. A webinar organized by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) focused on helping journalists identify and respond to misleading climate-related claims. Check First introduced “Tutki”, a training platform developed to provide realistic OSINT and online investigation exercises based on real-world cases and information environments. [State Actors] Russia Turkish Propaganda Amplifies Russian Misinformation About the Armenian Elections A NewsGuard investigation identified Turkish freelance journalist Okay Deprem as a significant source of false narratives circulated ahead of Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections. According to the report, 17 of the 43 claims promoted by the pro-Kremlin influence operation Storm-1516 originated with Deprem. These allegations targeted Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and included claims about constitutional changes, personal scandals, and concessions to Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Rather than relying on fake websites, many of these stories were first published in established Turkish media outlets, allowing them to appear more credible before spreading across social media and regional news networks. Armenia has become a major focus of Russian influence efforts as Pashinyan continues to pursue closer ties with the European Union and the West. Researchers found that Storm-1516 directed more narratives at Armenia over the past year than at Ukraine, reflecting Moscow’s concern over Armenia’s geopolitical trajectory. Analysts described the campaign as more sophisticated than previous efforts, combining political messaging with personal attacks designed to influence undecided voters ahead of the election. Several examples highlighted in the investigation involve claims that were later denied or contradicted by available evidence, including allegations concerning Pashinyan’s wife and reports of government approval for an LGBTQ parade. Such stories moved from Turkish media outlets to pro-Kremlin social media accounts and regional news platforms, amplifying their reach. Source: NewsGuard. How a Turkish Propagandist Powers a Russian Campaign Targeting Armenia’s Elections. [online] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/how-a-turkish-propagandist-powers-a-russian-campaign-targeting-armenias-elections/ (newsguardtech.com) Top Of Page Russian Information Campaigns Ahead of Armenia’s Elections According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, ahead of Armenia’s 07th June parliamentary elections, Russia has pursued a broad campaign to weaken support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party. According to the article, Moscow’s strategy focuses less on securing victory for a single opposition candidate and more on strengthening multiple opposition forces to prevent Civil Contract from achieving a dominant parliamentary position. The elections are widely viewed as a choice between maintaining Armenia’s current pro-Western course and preserving closer ties with Russia. A central element of this effort has been an extensive information campaign. Reports cited in the article state that pro-Kremlin media channels and the “Matryoshka” network have circulated hundreds of videos and messages targeting Pashinyan, including claims about his health, his policies, and Armenia’s relations with Russia. Many of these narratives portray Pashinyan as endangering Armenia’s stability, risking conflict with Russia, or undermining the country’s national identity, while presenting opposition figures as better suited to maintain relations with Moscow. These messaging efforts have been accompanied by economic pressure. Russia has warned Armenia about the costs of deeper integration with the European Union, threatened higher gas prices, and imposed restrictions on several Armenian exports. Adding to this subject, a joint investigation by DFRLab and CivilNet examined the activities of the Russian NGO Evrazia in Armenia ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections. Evrazia, which has been sanctioned by the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom, is replicating methods previously observed in Moldova. Through humanitarian aid programs, educational initiatives, church-related campaigns, and online platforms, the organization has sought to build networks of influence and mobilize public support around political and social issues. Researchers also highlighted Evrazia’s cooperation with figures linked to the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Moscow Nervous About Armenian Parliamentary Elections. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/moscow-nervous-about-armenian-parliamentary-elections/ (jamestown.org). Top Of Page False Narratives Surrounding the Baltic Drone Incursions According to an article by DFR Lab, following drone incursions into Latvia and Estonia in March 2026 and another incident in Latvia in May (for further information, see W21 May Cyfluence Report), pro-Russia media and officials promoted claims that the Baltic states had opened their airspace to support Ukrainian drone attacks against Russia. These allegations originated in Kremlin-linked media and were later amplified by Russian state television, senior officials, and pro-Kremlin online networks. Baltic governments repeatedly rejected the accusations, stating that their territories and airspace had not been used for attacks on Russia. The article also documented several false stories that emerged after the 07th May drone incident in Latvia, including claims that a drone had struck a passenger train, hit an apartment building, and caused multiple deaths. Researchers found that these reports were based on unrelated events or unsupported allegations but were widely circulated through Telegram channels, social media accounts, and pro-Kremlin information networks. An analysis of international coverage found that Russia-linked sources generated substantial attention to the drone incidents, particularly in Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian-language information spaces. While the narrative gained limited traction among mainstream audiences in NATO countries, it reached wider audiences in parts of Latin America and Africa through a network of media outlets, social media accounts, and republished content. Source: DFRLab. Russian Narratives about Baltic Drone Incursions Miss Europe, Land in Global South. [online] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://dfrlab.org/2026/06/04/russian-narratives-about-baltic-drone-incursions-miss-europe-land-in-global-south/ (dfrlab.org). Top Of Page Abu Dhabi-Based Video News Agency Links to RT A Bellingcat investigation examined the relationship between Viory, an Abu Dhabi-based video news agency that promotes itself as a “video news agency of the Global South”, and Ruptly, a video agency connected to Russian state media outlet RT. Viory has rapidly expanded its international presence through partnerships with media organizations, universities, and government institutions across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. However, the investigation identifies multiple technical connections between Viory and Ruptly, despite both organizations denying any formal relationship. These links include shared IP addresses, the use of a security certificate associated with Ruptly on a Viory-related website, and Ruptly domains sending technical performance data to Viory-controlled infrastructure. In the broader context of international media influence, Analysts cited in the report note that Viory provides news content and training to media organizations across the Global South and that its coverage often features prominent reporting on Russia, China, and Russia–China cooperation. RT has been sanctioned by the European Union for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives and supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine, and while Viory maintains that it is an independent media company, technical evidence raises questions about its relationship with Ruptly and the transparency of its operations. Source: Bellingcat. Tracing Digital Links Between Viory and Ruptly. [online] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2026/06/04/viory-ruptly-rt-russia-uae-propaganda-video-news/ (bellingcat.com). Top Of Page The War in Ukraine FSB’s “Matryoshka” Cyberespionage Campaign Against Ukraine Gamaredon, a cyberespionage group operated by Russia’s FSB, continues to conduct long-term intrusion operations against Ukrainian government, military, and critical infrastructure networks. A three-part investigation by Sekoia reconstructed the group’s 2026 infection chain and clarified its malware ecosystem. The first part of the investigation examined Gamaredon, an FSB-linked cyberespionage group targeting Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure networks, focusing on its malware ecosystem, phishing operations, USB-based propagation, and long-term persistence techniques. In the second part and the third parts, researchers analyzed GammaLoad, a multi-layered in-memory loader used to deploy malware while avoiding detection, and GammaSteel, a data-collection tool that monitors drives, USB devices, and active files to gather intelligence from compromised systems. Combined with fileless execution, extensive use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams, registry-based payload staging, and encrypted storage mechanisms, these capabilities demonstrate a significant evolution in Gamaredon’s tradecraft and provide the group with a resilient platform for long-term espionage against Ukrainian targets. Sources: Sekoia.io. FSB’s Matryoshka #1/3 – Gamaredon’s Gifts That Keeps Unpacking – GammaPhish and GammaWorm. [online] Published 1 June 2026. Available at: https://blog.sekoia.io/fsbs-matryoshka-1-3-gamaredons-gifts-that-keeps-unpacking-gammaphish-and-gammaworm/ (blog.sekoia.io). Sekoia.io. FSB’s Matryoshka #2/3 – Gamaredon’s Gifts That Keeps Unpacking – GammaLoad. [online] Published 2 June 2026. Available at: https://blog.sekoia.io/fsbs-matryoshka-2-3-gamaredons-gifts-that-keeps-unpacking-gammaload/ (blog.sekoia.io). Sekoia.io. FSB’s Matryoshka #3/3 – Gamaredon’s Gifts That Keeps Unpacking – GammaSteel. [online] Published 3 June 2026. Available at: https://blog.sekoia.io/fsbs-matryoshka-3-3-gamaredons-gifts-that-keeps-unpacking-gammasteel/ (blog.sekoia.io). Top Of Page China Congressional Concerns Over Foreign Influence on U.S. AI Development The House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s letter has raised concerns about evidence suggesting that foreign influence campaigns may be attempting to slow U.S. artificial intelligence development and the infrastructure needed to support it. Reports from the Bitcoin Policy Institute and Power the Future show that international actors, particularly from China, are working through state media organizations, nonprofit networks, and other channels to shape public opinion and policy discussions related to AI and data center expansion. According to the reports referenced in the letter, these efforts are accompanied by funding networks that support activist campaigns opposing data center projects and related energy infrastructure. Some groups have sought to delay or block projects through litigation, regulatory challenges, and campaigns targeting the financial mechanisms used to fund infrastructure development. The letter also raises concerns about limited transparency regarding the sources of funding behind some of these activities. Maintaining U.S. leadership in the AI sector requires continued investment in data centers and supporting infrastructure. Therefore, the committee has requested a briefing from the Trump Administration on how it is investigating alleged foreign influence efforts and what steps are being taken to address activities that could hinder the growth of the U.S. AI ecosystem. Source: U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Letter to PCAST and FBI on Foreign Influence and AI Data Centers. [online PDF] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/2026_06_04_Letter_to_PCAST_and_FBI_on_Foreign_Influence_AI_Data_Centers_99f6aa6cda.pdf (cloudfront.net). Top Of Page Misinformation About Anthropic’s Access in China According to NewsGuard’s Reality Check, pro-China social media accounts have circulated claims that American AI company Anthropic has begun allowing users in China to access its Claude chatbot, portraying the alleged move as evidence that U.S. technology firms cannot ignore the Chinese market despite national security concerns. The narrative was supported by a widely shared screenshot that appeared to show Claude accepting Chinese phone numbers during account registration. However, the claim is false. Anthropic confirmed that China is not a supported region and that users in China cannot access its products or create Claude accounts using Chinese phone numbers. NewsGuard found no evidence that the company had changed its policy, and multiple China-based users reported being unable to register with Chinese numbers. The authenticity of the viral screenshot could not be verified and may have been manipulated or artificially generated. Anthropic continues to restrict access in China and has previously acted against Chinese state-linked accounts accused of misusing its services. Other major U.S. AI companies, including OpenAI and Google, also do not operate in China for similar national security reasons. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. Anthropic’s Fictional Entry into the … [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/anthropics-fictional-entry-into-the (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page Iran Handala Brand Threat Expands to Support MOIS Operations According to a report by Insikt Group, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) has likely expanded its use of the Handala brand beyond cyber activities to include physical threat actors and influence operations targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. The report identified a newly emerged persona, the Handala Popular Resistance Front (HPRF), along with three influence-operation networks that appear to be linked to MOIS through coordinated online activity, cross-promotion, and shared messaging. These entities support a common objective of recruiting individuals for espionage, sabotage, and other operations directed at U.S. and Israeli personnel and assets. Combining cyber, physical, and influence activities under a single recognizable brand increases the reach and effectiveness of MOIS’s external operations. Handala-linked actors are believed to use online platforms to solicit recruits, amplify operational claims, and promote their capabilities. Looking ahead, Insikt Group assessed that coordination among these different personas may enable more sophisticated operations by integrating cyber intrusions, intelligence gathering, and physical activities into a single campaign. MOIS and other Iranian intelligence and military entities will likely continue conducting cyber, influence, espionage, and physical operations against U.S. and Israeli targets regardless of developments in the Iran War. Source: Recorded Future, Insikt Group. TA-IR-2026-0602. [online PDF] Published 2 June 2026. Available at: https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2026/TA-IR-2026-0602.pdf Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] 2026 U.S. Midterm Election Threat Outlook As stated in a Check Point publication, the 2026 U.S. midterm election cycle will likely see increased cyber-related activity targeting the election ecosystem, including campaigns, media organizations, and government services. Rather than focusing primarily on voting systems, threat actors are expected to target trusted accounts, public-facing platforms, and information channels that play a key role in shaping public trust and communications. A major concern is the growing use of phishing, impersonation, and coordinated misinformation campaigns. Election-themed websites, fraudulent donation pages, AI-generated content, and more misleading online narratives are expected to be used to influence public perception. These tactics are relatively inexpensive and can generate significant political and psychological effects without directly compromising election infrastructure. In the foreign influence field, Russia, Iran, and China were identified as the principal state-linked actors associated with risks of foreign interference. Overall, the most significant threat to the 2026 election environment is the cumulative impact of disruption and manipulation across the channels that voters, campaigns, media outlets, and public institutions rely on for accurate information. Source: Check Point Research. 2026 U.S. Midterm Election Threat Outlook. [online PDF] Published June 2026. Available at: https://checkpoint.cyberint.com/hubfs/2026%20U.S.%20Midterm%20Election%20Threat%20Outlook.pdf (checkpoint.cyberint.com). Top Of Page Uncensored AI Accelerates the Spread of Conspiracy Theories As published in a NewsGuard Reality Check, “Uncensored AI” is a chatbot that promotes itself as a source of unfiltered and objective information, positioning itself as an alternative to mainstream AI models. Although its user base is relatively small, its responses have been widely shared by prominent conservative social media influencers, giving visibility to claims about topics such as the 2020 U.S. election, assassination attempts against President Trump, and the killing of commentator Charlie Kirk. According to NewsGuard, several influencers cited Uncensored AI as an authoritative source when sharing claims that contradict established findings and official investigations. Examples include assertions that the 2020 election was rigged, that Trump assassination attempts were staged, and that Israeli intelligence was involved in Kirk’s murder. These claims lack supporting evidence and conflict with conclusions reached by law enforcement, courts, and other official investigations. NewsGuard also tested the chatbot on several well-known conspiracy theories and found that it endorsed claims that the 1969 moon landing was faked, that the 11th of September attacks involved Mossad and elements of the U.S. government, and that COVID-19 vaccines caused millions of deaths. Chatbot-generated responses can be presented as independent analysis, potentially increasing the perceived credibility of claims when they are amplified by influential online accounts. Sources: NewsGuard Reality Check. Uncensored AI Chatbot Pushes Conspiracy Theories. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/uncensored-ai-chatbot-pushes-conspiracy (newsguardrealitycheck.com). (euronews.com) Top Of Page Online Disinformation About London Research by CIR, assisted by other research, found a growing volume of online content portraying London as unsafe, lawless, and in decline. Across platforms including X, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, posts frequently use misleading, exaggerated, or decontextualized information to link crime, social disorder, and cultural change to immigrant and minority communities. The study identified five recurring themes: London as unsafe, anti-immigration narratives, Islamophobia, “Great Replacement” conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for a perceived better past. One of the findings was the widespread use of AI-generated content to reinforce these narratives. Examples included fabricated scenarios depicting immigrants receiving special treatment, fictional futures in which London is “taken over” by specific ethnic groups, and staged “street interviews” that present misleading claims about migrants and asylum seekers. By mimicking authentic footage or citizen journalism, this content makes false narratives appear more credible to online audiences. These narratives are often amplified through comment sections, where users repeat claims about demographic change, crime, and cultural decline, sometimes alongside extremist rhetoric or calls for action. The narratives even extend beyond UK audiences and are increasingly reaching international users. Misleading content about London is frequently intertwined with anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and conspiracy-based themes, contributing to social polarization and reinforcing perceptions of conflict between different communities. Sources: InfoRes (Centre for Information Resilience). London Has Fallen: How Online Disinformation Distorts Perceptions of Safety in the Capital. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.info-res.org/cir/articles/london-has-fallen-how-online-disinformation-distorts-perceptions-of-safety-in-the-capital/ (info-res.org). Top Of Page AI Use in Political Campaigns A survey of campaign professionals found that AI has become a routine part of political operations, with 87% using it daily or several times a week. The most common applications are internal functions such as research, news monitoring, and drafting content rather than direct voter engagement. At the same time, 75% of respondents identified inaccurate or misleading AI outputs as their biggest concern, reflecting broader worries about the reliability of AI-generated information in political contexts. Results showed growing attention to how AI systems handle political information and civic questions. AI companies are taking steps to improve the quality of election-related responses and direct users to authoritative sources, but concerns remain about transparency, source selection, and the accuracy of information provided to voters. The survey also found a gap between voter expectations and campaign practices regarding AI transparency. While most voters consider disclosure of AI-generated content important, only a small share of campaigns consistently disclose such use, and one-third of campaign professionals report having no formal AI policy. According to the author, more public disclosure is needed regarding how AI companies make decisions about political content and what measures they use to address errors and misinformation. Additionally, campaigns should develop clear governance and disclosure frameworks as AI becomes more deeply integrated into political research, communications, voter outreach, and campaign operations. Sources: Anchor Change. What Campaign Professionals Told Us About AI-Generated Content. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://anchorchange.substack.com/p/what-campaign-professionals-told (anchorchange.substack.com). (anchorchange.com). Top Of Page Gemini Omni Generates Videos Advancing False Online Claims A NewsGuard assessment found that Google’s text-to-video model, Gemini Omni, was able to generate realistic videos illustrating several false claims that have circulated online. In seven out of ten tested prompts, the model produced videos depicting inaccurate narratives related to topics such as the Iran war, migration, international shipping, and geopolitical events. The examples included videos portraying a false claim that Somalia had blocked Israeli ships from passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a fabricated story about migrants receiving free PlayStations in the UK, and so on. The model also generated videos connected to inaccurate narratives about military events and major companies. At the same time, the report found that some safeguards were effective. Gemini Omni consistently refused requests involving false health-related claims and generally declined to generate videos depicting specific public figures. While the model has stronger protections than some earlier AI image and video generators, the findings suggested that realistic AI-generated videos can still be used to create persuasive visual content around inaccurate claims, particularly on political, geopolitical, and social issues. Sources: NewsGuard Reality Check. Google’s New AI Video Model Churns Out Misinformation. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/googles-new-ai-video-model-churns (newsguardrealitycheck.com). Top Of Page AI-Generated Police “Drag Queen Raid” Story Misleads Global Media As revealed by CyberNews, an AI-generated image shared on a Thai police Facebook page falsely depicted officers dressed as drag queens during a drug raid, leading to widespread media coverage of what appeared to be a real undercover operation. The viral post showed five men and one woman in costumes surrounding a detained suspect and was picked up by major outlets, including The Sun, The Telegraph, The Mirror, and The New York Post, before being revealed as fake. Thai police later confirmed that the image was AI-generated and not an authentic depiction of the arrest, although the underlying drug arrest itself was real. The post originated from a local police station administrator who reportedly intended it as a humorous way to make police work seem more approachable. However, because it came from an official source, it was widely accepted as genuine and quickly spread across international media. Experts noted that the image contained inconsistencies that could have raised suspicion, but its official origin helped it appear credible at first glance, demonstrating how authority can amplify the impact of synthetic media. Sources: Cybernews. Thai Police Use AI-Generated “Drag Raid” Photo in Anti-Drug Campaign Hoax. [online] Published 6 June 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/thai-police-ai-drag-raid-photo-hoax/ (cybernews.com). Top Of Page [General Reports] 2026 FIFA World Cup Threat Outlook According to Recoded Future’s paper, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is expected to face a complex threat environment across the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Physical security remains the primary concern due to the scale of the event and the concentration of large crowds. Cybercriminal activity is also expected to increase as the tournament approaches. The report also assessed that Russian, Chinese, and Iranian state-sponsored groups may use the tournament as an intelligence-gathering opportunity. World Cup-related influence activity observed so far has been largely overt and driven through state media and diplomatic messaging, focusing on issues such as host-country legitimacy, public safety, immigration, visa access, ticketing, and Iran’s participation. While covert activity has remained limited, it could increase in response to geopolitical developments or major news events during the tournament. Source: Recorded Future, Insikt Group. CTA-2026-0604. [online PDF] Published 4 June 2026. Available at: https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2026/CTA-2026-0604.pdf (recordedfuture.com). Top Of Page NATO’s Defence Strategic Communications Journal The new Defence Strategic Communications journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence reflected on growing concerns about the decline of the post-World War II liberal international order. It argued that societies need new, credible narratives to address political, economic, and technological transformation. Drawing on discussions from the Knowledge Economy Transition by 2045 dialogue at Cambridge, participants emphasized the importance of legitimacy, strategic communication, and long-term storytelling in shaping future political and economic systems. Effective narratives must be rooted in authentic ideas and practical solutions rather than slogans, particularly as societies confront challenges such as geopolitical competition, AI, climate change, and declining trust in institutions. A significant place was given to the changing information environment. The foreword highlighted concerns about AI, algorithmic influence, microtargeting, and emerging neurotechnology's, arguing that these developments are reshaping how people form opinions, build consensus, and understand reality. It also noted the growing role of state-sponsored influence campaigns and information manipulation, particularly through the concept of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), which emerged in response to systematic efforts by state actors to shape public perceptions and political discourse. Strategic communication should help societies develop shared understanding and legitimacy during periods of disruption. Several contributions to the journal explored topics including foreign information manipulation, international cooperation against influence operations, hybrid threats, media objectivity, and the role of narratives in democratic resilience. The authors stress the need for stronger frameworks to understand how information, technology, and political power interact in an increasingly contested global environment. Source: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 15, Spring 2025. [online] Published 4 June 2025. Available at: https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/defence-strategic-communications-volume-15-spring-2025/322 (stratcomcoe.org). (stratcomcoe.org) Top Of Page Modeling the Strategic Logic of Disinformation Governance Song Xiaoyu's article, published in Scientific Reports (2026), proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze strategic behavior in online disinformation governance. The three actors modeled are regulators, social media platforms, and self-media operators, the last referring to independent or semi-professional content producers who function as primary vectors for disinformation spread. The core methodological contribution is the integration of Prospect Theory into the game-theoretic framework, replacing the standard assumption of rational utility maximization with a behaviorally grounded model that accounts for loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity to outcomes. This allows the model to capture how subjective perception of risk and loss, rather than objective cost-benefit calculation, drives each actor's strategic choices in an environment characterized by high uncertainty, such as an unfolding public opinion crisis. The paper maps the disinformation ecosystem as a dynamic equilibrium problem. Self-media operators choose between truthful, verified reporting and false or unverified reporting, with the latter driven by traffic incentives, urgency, and low verification costs. Platforms choose between active content moderation and passive response, with governance inertia explained not as irresponsibility but as rational risk-aversion under insufficient regulatory pressure. Regulators choose between proactive information disclosure and silence, with silence producing credibility erosion, and public distrust. The model's replicator dynamics equations demonstrate that the system converges to an ideal cooperative equilibrium, where all three actors adopt proactive strategies, only under specific parameter conditions: sufficiently high reward-penalty intensity, strong initial participation willingness, and a loss aversion coefficient exceeding a critical threshold of approximately 2.25. Below this threshold, platforms default to passive governance; above it, fear of reputational and legal consequences outweighs the costs of active moderation. Numerical simulations conducted in MATLAB confirm several policy-relevant findings. First, initial willingness across actors significantly accelerates convergence toward cooperative governance, suggesting that norm-building and pre-crisis coordination have structural effects on disinformation resilience. Second, the relationship between loss aversion and platform behavior is non-monotonic: moderate loss aversion reinforces passivity, while high loss aversion triggers proactive moderation, a dynamic with direct implications for regulatory design, since sanctions must cross a perceptual threshold to alter platform behavior. Third, reward-penalty intensity must reach what the paper terms a "perceived tipping point" to achieve synchronized responses across all three actors. The model's limitations include reliance on theoretically assumed rather than empirically calibrated parameters and a simplified treatment of platform-regulator interaction that does not fully account for legal-obligation structures or dynamic content-moderation costs. Source: Nature Portfolio. A Prospect-Theoretic Evolutionary Game Approach for Disinformation Governance in Social-Media Ecosystems. Scientific Reports. [online] Published 3 June 2026. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-026-53697-9 (nature.com). Top Of Page NSO Group Breaks Court Order, Targets Journalists and Officials via WhatsApp Meta published that WhatsApp's June 2026 update discloses that NSO Group, a commercial spyware firm placed on the US government's Entity List for activities contrary to national security, continued offensive cyber operations against WhatsApp users despite a permanent federal injunction barring it from doing so. The tactics employed included spear phishing via malicious links that redirected targets to external websites outside the WhatsApp environment, consistent with previously documented one-click phishing campaigns associated with NSO's Pegasus platform. NSO-linked actors also created fraudulent test accounts and groups on WhatsApp as part of their targeting infrastructure. WhatsApp is now seeking a federal contempt order against NSO and has published three malicious domains used in the operation as threat indicators. NSO's CEO confirmed in court that the company actively seeks access vectors beyond WhatsApp, targeting browsers, operating systems, and other applications, with a reported target set that includes journalists, government officials, military personnel, and humanitarian organizations, a profile consistent with state-adjacent surveillance operations designed to suppress information flows and enable intelligence gathering against civil society. The article frames commercial spyware as a structural threat to secure communications infrastructure and argues that no single platform can counter it unilaterally. WhatsApp's response centers on a multi-stakeholder coalition of security researchers, digital rights organizations, and legal advocates, alongside financial support to the Spyware Accountability Initiative, positioning coordinated institutional action across legal, technical, and civil society domains as the necessary framework for defense. Source: Meta. Fighting Spyware: An Update from WhatsApp. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://about.fb.com/news/2026/06/fighting-spyware-an-update-from-whatsapp/ (about.fb.com). Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] Using TrustOps in Governments' Fight Against Deepfakes and Disinformation According to a Global Government Forum publication, Gartner predicted that by 2028, 40% of government organizations will establish dedicated “TrustOps” functions to address growing risks posed by deepfakes, impersonation, social engineering, and other forms of disinformation. To counter these threats, Gartner recommended creating trust-focused governance structures, strengthening high-risk business processes, and implementing procedures to verify the content. The firm also highlighted technologies such as the C2PA standard, which can help authenticate the origin and integrity of digital content through cryptographic provenance data. These measures are intended to help governments move from reacting to false information toward proactively building trust in official communications. Concerns about AI-generated disinformation are already influencing public policy and debates. In the UK, efforts are underway to develop frameworks to detect harmful deepfakes, while recent research in London identified a sharp increase in online narratives portraying the city as unsafe or in decline. The analysis found signs of coordinated activity, including repetitive posting and AI-generated content used to amplify misleading claims, with some activity linked to extremist groups and accounts aligned with foreign state interests. Source: Global Government Forum. Growth of Government ‘TrustOps’ Predicted in Fight Against Deepfakes and Disinformation. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.globalgovernmentforum.com/growth-of-government-trustops-predicted-in-fight-against-deepfakes-and-disinformation/ (globalgovernmentforum.com). Top Of Page Tools for Addressing Climate Misinformation in Reporting A webinar organized by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) focused on helping journalists identify and respond to misleading climate-related claims. Climate scientist Emmanuel Vincent of Science Feedback emphasized that media outlets are often targeted because they remain trusted sources of information. Using examples such as the claim that “global warming stopped for 18 years”, he demonstrated how the selective use of data can create misleading narratives that ignore broader scientific evidence and long-term trends. The session highlighted practical resources journalists can use to verify climate-related information. Recommended sources included the IPCC, NASA, NOAA, Carbon Brief, and Climate Brink for scientific information, as well as fact-checking and research tools such as the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), InfluenceMap, DeSmog’s Climate Disinformation Database, Retraction Watch, and PubPeer. Vincent also stressed the importance of evaluating the credibility of sources, checking for conflicts of interest, and investigating the background of individuals making climate-related claims. Speakers also warned against “false balance” in reporting, arguing that presenting climate science and climate skepticism as equally supported positions can mislead audiences. Journalists were encouraged to challenge inaccurate claims with evidence and prepare thoroughly before interviews. Source: International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). Climate: Tips and Tools to Help Journalists Counter Disinformation. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/unesco-climate/article/climate-tips-and-tools-to-help-journalists-counter-disinformation (ifj.org). Top Of Page Training Platform to Investigate Online Influence Campaigns Check First introduced “Tutki”, a training platform developed to provide realistic OSINT and online investigation exercises based on real-world cases and information environments. The platform allows trainers to create custom scenarios or use templates inspired by actual influence campaigns, helping participants develop practical investigative skills. It supports multiple languages and has been used in contexts such as election-related information environments, including work with Armenian civil society organizations. A key feature of Tutki is its simulation of social media platforms. Instead of relying on live content, which may be deleted, moderated, or contain harmful material, the platform recreates realistic online environments where participants can safely investigate posts, accounts, and networks. This approach improves consistency across training sessions and reduces exposure to graphic or disturbing content while preserving the experience of conducting authentic online investigations. Tutki also includes professional OSINT tools such as cross-platform search, timeline analysis, network visualization, and coordinated inauthentic behavior detection. In 2026, it was used in a training exercise for Radio France journalists involving a fictional foreign interference scenario linked to local elections. The platform is designed both for organizations seeking tailored training and for independent trainers who want to run their own investigation exercises. Source: CheckFirst. Introducing Tutki: We Simulated Social Media to Teach How It Gets Weaponised. [online] Published 5 June 2026. Available at: https://checkfirst.network/introducing-tutki-we-simulated-social-media-to-teach-how-it-gets-weaponised/ (checkfirst.network). (checkfirst.network) Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

This article highlights a significant blind spot in existing counterintelligence frameworks: unresolved integration trauma as a distinct psychological vulnerability exploited by foreign intelligence services. Critically engaging with the Swedish Defence Research Agency's 2026 "Spies Among Us" report, the author argues that while the study acknowledges "divided loyalties" among recruited agents, it treats these as static demographic markers rather than active psychological mechanisms. The dominant MICE model (Money, Ideology, Coercion, Ego) has no category for the emotional experience of failed integration, the chronic sense of non-belonging that leaves individuals open to manipulation. Drawing on social psychology research on belonging and acculturation stress, the author argues that when integration fails, the resulting psychological state is a structural vulnerability. An offer of belonging from an intelligence-linked recruiter operates at a more fundamental level than ideological persuasion, making such recruits harder to identify through conventional screening, and less likely to recognize themselves as being recruited at all. The article further argues that influence operations systematically priming diaspora communities with narratives of grievance and Western betrayal are not separate from HUMINT recruitment, but part of a deliberate, coordinated strategy. The policy implication cuts across both intelligence and social policy: genuine integration may be the most effective long-term countermeasure, and integration quality should be understood as directly intersecting with national cognitive security. Author: Tamara Klevova (The author’s name has been changed at their request to protect their privacy. The author’s identity has been verified by the CRC’s editorial board) [Download PDF Here]

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 25th to the 31st of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Russian-Linked Conspiracy Theories Amplified by Political Figures Disinformation Through Hacked Bluesky Accounts Matryoshka Launches Campaign Targeting Armenia’s Elections The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation Campaigns About Ukrainian Refugees China China’s Influence Campaign Against Japan [AI Related Articles] New “NewsBench” Tool to Evaluate AI-Based News Reliability AI in California Courts Raises Concerns Over Accuracy and Fairness AI-Generated Influencers Spread Political Propaganda [General Reports] Australia’s Defence Strategy in Facing Foreign Misinformation Diphtheria Outbreak and Public Misinformation Challenges in Australia Hidden Polarisation on Malaysian TikTok Addressing Misinformation in the Public Health Field Investigation into the Cuban Influence Network in the United States The Sandygate Affair Raises Disputed Evidence and Public Trust in Cyprus [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] OpenAI’s Measures to Safeguard Elections Information and Transparency Exposing Fake AI Content YouTube’s New AI Content Labels RESIST Framework to Create Resilience to Disinformation Fighting Climate Disinformation [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to a report by TechXplore, researchers have uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign that hacked hundreds of Bluesky accounts to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda. A report by First Monday examined Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian refugees in Europe and argued that these campaigns are effective not only because they imitate credible media sources, but because they activate existing cultural prejudices and social anxieties. According to a publication by The Jamestown Foundation, since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office in late 2025, Beijing has increased political, economic, and military pressure on Japan in response to Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its security policies. According to an article by EDMO, a traditional weakness of ideological movements has been the gap between what their leaders preach and how they behave in private. As published by ASPI, Australia’s defence strategy is being challenged by the growing importance of information environments in modern conflict. YouTube announced it is introducing new updates to improve transparency around AI-generated content. As published by the Council of Europe, it developed the RESIST framework to help countries understand and strengthen their resilience to disinformation while respecting democratic principles, human rights, and freedom of expression. [ Report Summary] According to a report by DisinfoWatch, recent claims promoted by far-right conspiracy theorist Alex Jones and convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout represent a clear example of disinformation designed to spread fear and uncertainty. According to a report by TechXplore, researchers have uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign that hacked hundreds of Bluesky accounts to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda. As revealed in a NewsGuard report, the Russia-linked influence operation Matryoshka launched a coordinated disinformation campaign against Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections. A report by First Monday examined Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian refugees in Europe and argued that these campaigns are effective not only because they imitate credible media sources, but because they activate existing cultural prejudices and social anxieties. According to a publication by The Jamestown Foundation, since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office in late 2025, Beijing has increased political, economic, and military pressure on Japan in response to Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its security policies. A large independent evaluation of more than 12,500 chatbot responses found significant weaknesses in how major AI models handle news and current events. According to an article by CyberNews, California’s largest courts are testing an AI tool called Learned Hand to assist judges and court staff with drafting legal orders, summarizing motions, and conducting legal research. According to an article by EDMO, a traditional weakness of ideological movements has been the gap between what their leaders preach and how they behave in private. As published by ASPI, Australia’s defence strategy is being challenged by the growing importance of information environments in modern conflict. As stated in an article by ABC News, health authorities in Western Australia’s far north are responding to an ongoing diphtheria outbreak while addressing confusion and misinformation surrounding the disease and vaccination. A study published by University Sains Islam Malaysia states that polarizing and disinformation-adjacent content circulates widely on Malaysian TikTok through strategically neutral captions and identity-coded moral framing, not through overt hostility. As published by Health Policy Watch, recent disease outbreaks, including hantavirus, Ebola, and COVID-19, have been accompanied by false claims about the causes of diseases, vaccines, and treatments. An article by Fox News examined allegations that U.S. authorities are investigating a network of nonprofit organizations, activist groups, media platforms, and political organizations that coordinate activities supportive of the Cuban government. As reported by MEDDMO, an influential media event named the “Sandygate affair” began with serious allegations of sexual abuse, corruption, and influence involving prominent figures in Cyprus. As published by OpenAI, as major elections approach in 2026, efforts are focused on helping people access accurate voting information and strengthening trust in election-related content. According to an article by The Conversation, the rapid growth of online images and videos has made disinformation more convincing and harder to detect. YouTube announced it is introducing new updates to improve transparency around AI-generated content. As published by the Council of Europe, it developed the RESIST framework to help countries understand and strengthen their resilience to disinformation while respecting democratic principles, human rights, and freedom of expression. An essay published by The Union of Concerned Scientists argued that periods of extreme weather and climate-related disasters depend on a strong “safety chain”, which connects scientific data, weather forecasting, trusted communication, public understanding, and effective preparation and response. [State Actors] Russia Russian-Linked Conspiracy Theories Amplified by Political Figures According to a report by DisinfoWatch, recent claims promoted by far-right conspiracy theorist Alex Jones and convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout represent a clear example of disinformation designed to spread fear and uncertainty. The segment falsely presents Bout as a credible Russian military expert while omitting his criminal background, and it makes unverified claims that Vladimir Putin has announced plans to attack NATO sites and devastate major Ukrainian cities. There is no independent evidence to support these claims, making them best understood as escalation propaganda rather than factual reporting. While Russia has engaged in nuclear signaling and military exercises with Belarus, credible reporting does not confirm any official plan for imminent strikes on NATO or global nuclear war. NATO has consistently described its actions as defensive support for Ukraine’s self-defence, while Russia continues its documented attacks on Ukrainian civilians, with the UN reporting a significant rise in civilian casualties in 2026. Another publication by DisinfoWatch stated that recent claims amplified by Alex Jones falsely portray Canada as forcibly committing political critics and using medically assisted death (MAiD) as a tool of state punishment. These allegations are based on an uncorroborated individual case that is misleadingly expanded into sweeping accusations of government abuse. The claims that more than 100,000 people were “medically murdered” in the past year and that psychiatrists can force people into MAiD are demonstrably false and unsupported by official data. Sources: DisinfoWatch. Russia’s “Merchant of Death” Threatens Nuclear War Against NATO on Alex Jones Show. [online] Published 26 May 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/russias-merchant-of-death-threatens-nuclear-war-against-nato-on-alex-jones-show/ (disinfowatch.org) DisinfoWatch. Alex Jones “Canada Death-State” Conspiracy Promotes MAiD Panic. [online] Published 26 May 2026. Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/alex-jones-canada-death-state-conspiracy-promotes-maid-panic/ (DisinfoWatch) Top Of Page Disinformation Through Hacked Bluesky Accounts According to a report by TechXplore, researchers have uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign that hacked hundreds of Bluesky accounts to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda. Instead of creating fake profiles, the operation used real accounts belonging to journalists, academics, and other public figures, making the false information appear more credible and harder to detect. Many of the compromised accounts were used to share anti-Ukraine narratives before the posts were removed. The campaign was linked to the Moscow-based Social Design Agency and the broader influence operation known as Matryoshka, which has previously used impersonation, stolen media logos, and AI-generated voice cloning to spread misleading content. Although Bluesky removed thousands of accounts connected to state-backed influence activity, researchers believe the real scale of the operation may be larger. However, experts emphasized that the campaign’s impact was limited, as most posts received little attention. They argued that its main goal was not direct persuasion, but creating the perception of widespread support for false narratives. Source: Tech Xplore. Bluesky accounts hijacked in pro-Russia propaganda campaign. [online] Published 29 May 2026. Available at: https://techxplore.com/news/2026-05-bluesky-accounts-hijacked-pro-russia.html (techxplore.com) Top Of Page Matryoshka Launches Campaign Targeting Armenia’s Elections As revealed in a NewsGuard report, the Russia-linked influence operation Matryoshka launched a coordinated disinformation campaign against Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections. The campaign spread dozens of fabricated reports designed to damage his credibility, falsely portraying him as abusive, corrupt, and preparing for conflict with Russia. These fake stories were made to look like they came from trusted international and Armenian media outlets, increasing their appearance of legitimacy. The campaign used anonymous social media accounts and AI-generated content to make false claims more convincing. Some videos copied real news broadcasts and used cloned voices of journalists to present fabricated accusations, including false reports about Pashinyan’s health, personal misconduct, and election fraud. The operation also exploited celebrity names and even impersonated media monitoring organizations to amplify misleading narratives and create confusion among voters. Researchers say this is one of the most extensive disinformation efforts linked to Armenia’s election, with hundreds of fake reports produced over several months. Source: NewsGuard. Russia Takes Aim at Armenia. [online] Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/russia-takes-aim-at-armenia/ (newsguardtech.com) Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation Campaigns About Ukrainian Refugees A report by First Monday examined Russian disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian refugees in Europe and argued that these campaigns are effective not only because they imitate credible media sources, but because they activate existing cultural prejudices and social anxieties. False narratives portraying refugees as violent, dishonest, or dependent on welfare circulated widely in countries such as Germany, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. According to the authors, these messages sought to weaken public support for refugees and increase social division within European societies. The paper paid particular attention to the role of racial and ethnic prejudice in these campaigns, especially regarding Roma refugees, as disinformation resonates more easily when audiences already hold fears or negative stereotypes about migrants or minority groups. Rather than viewing disinformation simply as false information entering an otherwise healthy public sphere, the authors suggest that these narratives build upon long-standing social inequalities, nationalism, and distrust already present in society. To counter this, responses such as fact-checking or prebunking may help, but addressing disinformation also requires confronting the deeper cultural and political conditions that allow such narratives to spread and gain support. Source: First Monday. [Article title unavailable from URL alone]. [online] Available at: https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/14649/12443 Top Of Page China China’s Influence Campaign Against Japan According to a publication by The Jamestown Foundation, since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office in late 2025, Beijing has increased political, economic, and military pressure on Japan in response to Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its security policies. China has imposed export restrictions, sanctioned Japanese officials, and increased activity near Japanese territory, while state media has strongly criticized Japan’s defense expansion. The article highlighted how Beijing is using media influence operations to shape public opinion inside Japan. Chinese state media amplified small anti-missile protests and presented them as broader national opposition to government policy. These efforts focus on exploiting real public concerns, such as local frustration over missile deployments, to influence debate without confrontation. Japan’s internal communication gaps make it more vulnerable to external influence campaigns, as selective reporting and pressure tactics can undermine trust and affect public opinion on key national security decisions. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Cognitive Warfare Against Japan’s Security Normalization. [online] By Sze-Fung Lee. Published 29 May 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/cognitive-warfare-against-japans-security-normalization/ (jamestown.org) Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] New “NewsBench” Tool to Evaluate AI-Based News Reliability A large independent evaluation of more than 12,500 chatbot responses found significant weaknesses in how major AI models handle news and current events. About 30% of responses contained factual errors, including incorrect dates, figures, and policy details, while nearly one in four failed neutrality checks. These issues were especially noticeable in election-related prompts, where mistakes appeared in responses about voting procedures, public opinion, and major political issues. The study also highlighted differences between models. ChatGPT showed the highest overall accuracy, while other systems had much higher error rates. Responses varied in political framing, with some models showing stronger left-leaning patterns and others more right-leaning tendencies. Examples included inconsistent answers to politically sensitive questions and responses that appeared to shift depending on how a prompt was framed. Another key finding was source quality - many responses cited state-controlled foreign outlets or commercial sources when answering public-policy and foreign-affairs questions. As AI becomes a more common tool for accessing news, these issues raise important concerns about accuracy, neutrality, and source selection. Source: ForumAI. Introducing NewsBench. [online] Published on Substack. Available at: https://forumai.substack.com/p/introducing-newsbench Top Of Page AI in California Courts Raises Concerns Over Accuracy and Fairness According to an article by CyberNews, California’s largest courts are testing an AI tool called Learned Hand to assist judges and court staff with drafting legal orders, summarizing motions, and conducting legal research. The pilot program, launched by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, is part of an effort to improve efficiency and reduce growing case backlogs by providing faster research and drafting support. However, the program has raised significant concerns among judges and legal professionals. Critics warn that AI systems are prone to inaccuracies, including hallucinated facts and false legal citations, problems that have already affected real court cases. Some judges argue that relying on AI in legal decision-making could undermine human judgment, especially in complex cases involving social dynamics and racial bias appeals under California’s Racial Justice Act. Opponents also stress that AI lacks the human understanding and empathy required for fair judicial evaluation, and that its use could lead to a “one-size-fits-all” approach to justice and reduce public confidence in the fairness of the courts. Sources: Cybernews. California courts are secretly testing AI to help decide criminal cases, including racial bias appeals. [online] Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/california-court-ai-criminal-cases-racial-bias/ (cybernews.com) Top Of Page AI-Generated Influencers Spread Political Propaganda According to an article by EDMO, a traditional weakness of ideological movements has been the gap between what their leaders preach and how they behave in private. Public figures often lose credibility when their actions contradict their stated values. AI-generated characters can continuously produce content, engage with large audiences, and promote a consistent ideological message without the personal flaws, contradictions, or behavioral scandals that affect real people. In an online environment where algorithms reward outrage and polarization, such synthetic figures could become increasingly influential tools for spreading political propaganda and mobilizing supporters. As an example, the article discusses “Danny Bones”, an AI-generated rapper created by The Node Project and funded by Advance UK. Although the character does not exist, he has attracted followers through anti-immigration and racist content. The risk is that some audiences either do not realize or do not care that the figure is artificial, focusing instead on the message being delivered. Sources: European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). AI Political Influencers: The New Gods of Propaganda and Disinformation? [online] Available at: https://edmo.eu/publications/ai-political-influencers-the-new-gods-of-propaganda-and-disinformation/ Top Of Page [General Reports] Australia’s Defence Strategy in Facing Foreign Misinformation As published by ASPI, Australia’s defence strategy is being challenged by the growing importance of information environments in modern conflict. Adversaries increasingly use digital platforms, algorithmic amplification, and emotionally charged content to shape how crises are interpreted by the public and decision-makers. Examples such as Russian influence operations related to Ukraine and Chinese narrative-shaping efforts around Taiwan and COVID-19 show how information campaigns are used to create confusion and influence responses during moments of strategic tension. While Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy acknowledges the information domain, these issues are still treated as secondary to conventional military planning. This creates risks, including strategic disadvantages against actors that prioritise influence operations and slower responses to rapidly evolving information campaigns. Interference and online influence efforts could exploit social divisions and intensify uncertainty before any direct military confrontation occurs. The article called for Australia to strengthen national resilience through coordinated government action, media literacy initiatives, and stronger public communication systems, and suggested integrating information warfare scenarios into defence planning and building closer cooperation between government agencies, technology platforms, and media organizations. Source: The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute). Australia is not prepared for the war over perception. [online] By Daniel Baldino. Published 25 May 2026. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-is-not-prepared-for-the-war-over-perception/ Top Of Page Diphtheria Outbreak and Public Misinformation Challenges in Australia As stated in an article by ABC News, health authorities in Western Australia’s far north are responding to an ongoing diphtheria outbreak while addressing confusion and misinformation surrounding the disease and vaccination. The outbreak has contributed to rising case numbers across Western Australia, the Northern Territory, and Queensland, with at least one reported death. Health officials noted that diphtheria, which had not been detected in the Kimberley region for decades, has spread more rapidly due to socio-economic pressures and limited healthcare access in remote communities. A major challenge has been public uncertainty about diphtheria’s symptoms, transmission, and prevention. Some residents were unfamiliar with the disease, while others expressed scepticism about vaccines and Western medicine. As a result, authorities had to fight disinformation and misconceptions to contain the outbreak. Source: ABC News. Diphtheria vaccine push in WA's north as authorities battle ‘disease of the past’ disinformation. [online] By Giulia Bertoglio. Published 29 May 2026. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-05-29/diphtheria-vacine-push-wa-north-disinformation/106732378 (abc.net.au) Top Of Page Hidden Polarisation on Malaysian TikTok A study published by University Sains Islam Malaysia analysed 1,841 publicly accessible Malaysian TikTok videos (2023–2025) using a Digital Humanities computational workflow combining sentiment modelling, thematic clustering, and engagement metrics to map digital polarisation. The key finding is that 86.1% of captions are neutral in sentiment, yet polarising content still circulates through “moderated affect”, where identity boundary-making is embedded in everyday sociocultural discourse rather than overt hostility. Disinformation and hoax framings account for 8.09% of themes and mainly act as credibility-contest tools. In this context, calling something fake works less as a factual check and more as a way to delegitimise claims and mobilise audiences, in line with information disorder frameworks. The study did not identify organised or state-led campaigns, but it shows how TikTok’s platform design, algorithmic recommendations, hashtag clustering, and short-form formats like stitches, duets, and “receipt” videos allow decentralised users to produce boundary work at scale. Religious discourse shows the highest concentration of explicitly antagonistic signals, making religion a key site for loyalty signalling and out-group suspicion. Political content relies more on satire, insinuation, and indirect framing than confrontation, while racial and ethnic polarisation often emerges through recontextualised historical references used as proof-like narratives to reinforce communal grievance. The study showed a fragmented system where platform incentives reward subtle, identity-coded content rather than open hostility. This allows disinformation-adjacent narratives and credibility disputes to circulate widely while still appearing normal within platform norms. Source: Research Square. [Title unavailable from URL alone]. [online] Available at: https://www.researchsquare.com/article/rs-9268897/v1 Top Of Page Addressing Misinformation in the Public Health Field As published by Health Policy Watch, recent disease outbreaks, including hantavirus, Ebola, and COVID-19, have been accompanied by false claims about the causes of diseases, vaccines, and treatments. Speakers at the World Health Assembly noted that misinformation and disinformation have become increasingly visible in health-related discussions and are spreading rapidly through social media, AI tools, and online platforms. Examples mentioned in the article include false claims about vaccine safety, infertility, contraceptives, and public health guidance. Participants argued that these narratives affect how people understand health information, whether they seek medical care, and how they respond to public health recommendations. Several speakers linked the issue to declining trust in health authorities and governments, and highlighted cases in which misleading information influenced attitudes toward vaccination and other health measures in different countries. The discussion focused on the need to improve access to reliable health information, strengthen communication between health institutions and communities, and respond more quickly to false claims. Source: Health Policy Watch. How to Treat the Disinformation ‘Virus’ Undermining Health and Democracy. [online] By Kerry Cullinan. Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://healthpolicy-watch.news/how-to-treat-the-disinformation-virus-undermining-health-and-democracy/ Top Of Page Investigation into the Cuban Influence Network in the United States An article by Fox News examined allegations that U.S. authorities are investigating a network of nonprofit organizations, activist groups, media platforms, and political organizations that coordinate activities supportive of the Cuban government. One example is the rapid response that followed the indictment of Cuban leader Raúl Castro, when several organizations and individuals quickly published messages criticizing the charges and expressing support for Cuba. Investigators are examining whether certain groups coordinated lobbying, messaging, fundraising, delegations, and political organizing efforts with Cuban government officials. The inquiry involves organizations connected to labor activism, socialist and solidarity movements, travel delegations, media platforms, and humanitarian aid campaigns. Additionally, the article discussed possible investigations under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and U.S. sanctions regulations. Authorities are examining whether any organizations moved beyond independent advocacy into activities directed by or coordinated with the Cuban government, including fundraising efforts, aid shipments, and political campaigns. In response, Cuban officials deny any improper conduct and state that their diplomatic activities comply with international law and standard diplomatic practice. Source: Fox News. DOJ, Treasury investigate nonprofits and leaders allegedly coordinating with Cuba in influence campaign. [online] By Asra Q. Nomani. Published 23 May 2026. Available at: https://www.foxnews.com/politics/doj-treasury-investigate-nonprofits-leaders-allegedly-coordinating-cuba-influence-campaign Top Of Page The Sandygate Affair Raises Disputed Evidence and Public Trust in Cyprus As reported by MEDDMO, an influential media event named the “Sandygate affair” began with serious allegations of sexual abuse, corruption, and influence involving prominent figures in Cyprus. The claims were made public by journalist and parliamentary candidate Makarios Drousiotis and were largely based on messages, photographs, audio recordings, and other digital material allegedly provided by a source known as “Sandy”. As the case gained political attention during the 2026 election campaign, the focus gradually shifted from the allegations themselves to the reliability of the evidence used to support them. Several Cypriot media outlets conducted independent verification of the digital material and identified significant inconsistencies. Journalists traced some images to unrelated websites, linked a key audio recording to a previously published documentary, and raised questions about the authenticity of videos and translated messages. At the same time, investigators reportedly examined additional concerns involving disputed files, timelines, and digital records. These findings did not resolve whether the original allegations were true or false, but they increased scrutiny of the evidence and its authenticity. The case became a major topic in the election campaign and broader public debate, demonstrating the importance of journalistic fact-checking, as media organizations went beyond reporting claims and examined the supporting material themselves. Rather than providing clear answers, Sandygate exposed how difficult it can be to assess sensitive allegations when key evidence remains disputed or unauthenticated. Source: MEDDMO (Mediterranean Digital Media Observatory). “Sandygate”: How journalists’ investigations shook up the election campaign and public debate in Cyprus. [online] By Théophile Bloudanis. Published 25 May 2026. Available at: https://meddmo.eu/sandygate-how-journalists-investigations-shook-up-the-election-campaign-and-public-debate-in-cyprus/ Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] OpenAI’s Measures to Safeguard Elections Information and Transparency As published by OpenAI, as major elections approach in 2026, efforts are focused on helping people access accurate voting information and strengthen trust in election-related content. The measures include directing users to reliable sources for voter registration, voting locations, deadlines, and live election results, while continuing to improve the quality of information provided on election topics and breaking news. Another important priority is increasing transparency around AI-generated content. New tools such as digital watermarks, metadata standards, and public verification systems are being introduced to help people identify whether images have been created or modified using AI. These measures are intended to make online content more traceable and to support informed decision-making during election periods. In addition, strict safeguards are in place to prevent the misuse of AI tools for election interference or other deceptive activities. Ongoing monitoring also aims to ensure political neutrality in responses to election-related questions, while continued collaboration with public institutions and election authorities supports secure and resilient election processes. Source: OpenAI. Election Information and Safeguards in 2026. [online] Published 27 May 2026. Available at: https://openai.com/index/election-safeguards-2026/ Top Of Page Exposing Fake AI Content According to an article by The Conversation, the rapid growth of online images and videos has made disinformation more convincing and harder to detect. AI-generated content, including fake celebrity photos and realistic deepfake videos, can spread quickly and mislead large audiences before fact-checkers have time to verify it. As synthetic media becomes more advanced, traditional verification methods are becoming less effective, increasing the risk of false information shaping public opinion. The article gives three keys to fighting disinformation. First, people need to develop stronger media literacy skills and get familiar with examples of fake and distorted content. Then, it is important to inspect the article very closely and carefully examine visual details such as unnatural textures, distorted movements, inconsistent shadows, and unrealistic perspective. The third note is to look at the wide context: the source of the content in comparison with trusted reports, and whether credible evidence supports the claims. All these are used by fact-checkers to verify whether content is real or fake. However, these clues are not always reliable. Even older or “verified” accounts can spread false information, since platforms like Facebook and X allow users to pay for verification. This is why people should carefully question online content instead of trusting it immediately. Source: The Conversation. Three ways to avoid being fooled by AI slop. [online] By Silvia Montaña-Niño and T.J. Thomson. Published 26 May 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/three-ways-to-avoid-being-fooled-by-ai-slop-282974 Top Of Page YouTube’s New AI Content Labels YouTube announced it is introducing new updates to improve transparency around AI-generated content. Since 2024, the platform has required creators to label videos made with AI tools, and it is now making these disclosures more visible and easier for viewers to notice. For long-form videos, labels will appear directly below the video player, while for Shorts, they will appear as an overlay on the video itself. Less significant or unrealistic AI edits will continue to be disclosed in the expanded description. Starting in May 2026, YouTube will also begin using automatic detection systems to identify significant photorealistic AI-generated content. If creators fail to disclose AI use, YouTube may automatically apply a label. Creators can challenge incorrect labels through YouTube Studio, although disclosures will remain permanent for videos created with YouTube’s AI tools or those containing metadata that confirms full AI generation. YouTube clarified that AI disclosure labels will not affect a video’s recommendations or monetization, reflecting the platform’s goal of providing clear information to viewers rather than limiting AI-generated content. Source: YouTube. Improving AI Labels for Viewers and Creators. [online] Published 27 May 2026. Available at: https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/improving-ai-labels-viewers-creators/ Top Of Page RESIST Framework to Create Resilience to Disinformation As published by the Council of Europe, the RESIST framework was developed by the Council to help countries understand and strengthen their resilience to disinformation while respecting democratic principles, human rights, and freedom of expression. Rather than measuring countries through rankings, the framework provides a structured way to examine how societies are exposed to disinformation and how well institutions and communities are prepared to address it. The methodology is based on three complementary levels of analysis. The first examines structural conditions that may influence resilience to disinformation, such as education, media, information literacy, youth, and culture. The second assesses the legal frameworks, policies, coordination mechanisms, and governance arrangements that governments have in place. The third focuses on how these measures are experienced in practice by civil society organizations and practitioners. By comparing these three dimensions, the framework aims to identify gaps between policy design and real-world implementation. The results are intended to support evidence-based policy discussions, cooperation between governments and civil society, and the development of long-term approaches to strengthening democratic resilience against disinformation. Source: Council of Europe. Report on the Methodology to Assess Societal Vulnerabilities and Strengths to Disinformation (RESIST Methodology). [online] Published 2026. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-methodology-to-assess-societal-vulnerabilities-and-stren/48802b8213 Top Of Page Fighting Climate Disinformation An essay published by The Union of Concerned Scientists argued that periods of extreme weather and climate-related disasters depend on a strong “safety chain,” which connects scientific data, weather forecasting, trusted communication, public understanding, and effective preparation and response. According to the author, this chain is weakened when climate research is reduced, scientific expertise is lost, or misleading information about climate science and disaster risks circulates in public debate. Disinformation can disrupt public understanding and decision-making during disasters. It identifies several recurring patterns, including false explanations for disasters, misleading claims about responsibility, attacks on the credibility of public institutions, messages that downplay risks, and efforts to link disaster response to divisive political issues. These narratives can reduce trust in official information and affect how people respond to warnings and emergencies. Therefore, the article encouraged individuals to verify information before sharing it, rely on trusted sources for weather and emergency updates, and pay attention to misleading narratives that emerge during extreme weather events. Source: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). Your Anti-Disinformation Safety Chain for Danger Season. [online] By Kate Cell. Published 28 May 2026. Available at: https://blog.ucs.org/kate-cell/your-anti-disinformation-safety-chain-for-danger-season/ Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

Since the outbreak of the Iran War (Operation Epic Fury) on 28 February 2026, the conflict has emerged as a landmark case study in modern hybrid warfare, one defined not just by airstrikes and military force, but by the seamless integration of cyber operations and information warfare into a unified offensive strategy. Cyfluence Research Center (CRC) examines what analysts are calling "cyfluence" operations: the coordinated fusion of cyber capabilities with influence campaigns designed to shape perceptions, sow confusion, and degrade morale. Key incidents documented include the compromise of Iran's BadeSaba prayer app, which was hijacked on the first day of strikes to push surrender messages to millions of Iranian users, and the simultaneous kinetic strike and broadcast hijack of state television network IRIB, through which messages from Israeli PM Netanyahu and President Trump were beamed directly to Iranian audiences. Beyond these high-profile operations, the report details Iranian-linked disinformation efforts, including networks of sockpuppet accounts impersonating Chinese, Russian, and North Korean state media, alongside the prolific hack-and-leak activities of the Iran-aligned hacktivist group Handala, whose claimed targets ranged from Israeli universities to FBI Director Kash Patel's personal email. The report concludes that cyfluence is no longer a peripheral tactic, it has become the operational logic of modern warfare, where controlling how events are perceived may matter as much as controlling territory. Key Takeaways The current war in Iran and the wider Middle East (also known as Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion) has demonstrated a remarkably close integration between varied forms of kinetic and hybrid warfare, including combined cyber-enabled influence (cyfluence) operations, employed in tandem to maximize strategic effects. As such, Hostile Influence Campaigns (HICs) and Coordinated Information Disorder (CID) increasingly function as Primary Offensive Efforts (POEs) alongside the use of military force. Russia and China – Iran’s most powerful allies – have played an important role during the conflict, providing continuous diplomatic backing, supplying tactical intelligence, and executing supportive offensive information operations, while exploiting newly-created cognitive attack surfaces. AI-assisted DISARM mapping is employed throughout this report to render cyfluence attack chains analytically tractable, building on methodologies for agentic AI operationalization of influence operation analysis frameworks. Author: The CRC Team [Download PDF Here]

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 18th to the 24th of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia The Kremlin’s Expanding Digital Control Russian Propaganda Exploits Hantavirus Fears in France Condemnation of Russian Allegations Against the Baltic States Russian Hybrid Disinformation Operations in France Pro-Kremlin AI Disinformation Targets Armenia’s Elections The War in Ukraine Kremlin Falsely Claims Russia Has the Right to Attack NATO Ukraine Reveals Russian Disinformation Campaign Against Ukraine China China Shapes Narratives Through Subtle Media Influence in Albania Chinese Influence Operations Exploit G7 Local Vulnerabilities and Elite Networks [AI Related Articles] AI-Influenced Politics and Democracy First Arrests Under the Take It Down Act Over Deepfake Pornography AI-Generated Influence Operations on YouTube [General Reports] Suspected Inauthentic Facebook Activity in Malaysian Media Discussions Concerns Over U.S. Election Security Ahead of the 2026 Midterms False Claims Following the San Diego Mosque Shooting Disinformation as a Tool of Repression in Indonesia [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] Countering Online Misinformation in Science Education Detecting AI-Generated False Contents RFI Launches Armenian-Language Service to Strengthen Verified Reporting [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia’s effort to control its digital environment has evolved from simply restricting foreign platforms to building a state-managed communication ecosystem. According to a Le Monde report, leaked documents reveal a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign in France that combines traditional online propaganda with “hybrid” operations in public spaces to provoke outrage and social division. According to an article by DisinfoWatch, a false narrative promoted by Glenn Diesen claimed that Russia has the right to attack NATO following a large Ukrainian drone strike on targets near Moscow. The MIGS report argues that Chinese state-linked influence networks systematically exploit political, economic, and local governance vulnerabilities across G7 countries through elite cultivation, economic pressure, and coordinated interference operations designed to shape policy and public discourse. A study by three Malaysian researchers examined Facebook discussions on Malaysian media pages during the diplomatic tensions between China and Japan. NewsGuard’s Reality Check examined baseless claims spread on social media following the deadly shooting at The Islamic Center of San Diego, where two teenagers killed three people before taking their own lives. According to a publication by The Conversation, science teachers can no longer separate science from politics and social issues, especially as misinformation and conspiracy-driven content spread online. Radio France Internationale announced it has launched its eighteenth language service with the opening of an Armenian-language newsroom in Paris. [ Report Summary] According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia’s effort to control its digital environment has evolved from simply restricting foreign platforms to building a state-managed communication ecosystem. As published by NewsGuard, Pro-Kremlin propagandists launched a campaign falsely claiming that hantavirus was spreading rapidly across France and overwhelming the country’s healthcare system. In a recent statement, the Presidents of the Baltic States, together with many others, have condemned recent airspace violations from Russia and Belarus, as well as attempts to spread false narratives and undermine regional stability. According to a Le Monde report, leaked documents reveal a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign in France that combines traditional online propaganda with “hybrid” operations in public spaces to provoke outrage and social division. A Euronews article reports that a pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign in Armenia is using AI-generated content and coordinated online amplification to spread fear-based narratives and undermine pro-Western political forces ahead of the elections. According to an article by DisinfoWatch, a false narrative promoted by Glenn Diesen claimed that Russia has the right to attack NATO following a large Ukrainian drone strike on targets near Moscow. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service reported that it has obtained Russian documents revealing plans to destabilize Ukraine and weaken international support through a coordinated disinformation campaign. The MIGS report argues that Chinese state-linked influence networks systematically exploit political, economic, and local governance vulnerabilities across G7 countries through elite cultivation, economic pressure, and coordinated interference operations designed to shape policy and public discourse. A RSF article argues that Chinese influence operations in Albania rely on subtle narrative shaping, media partnerships, and exploitation of weak media structures to normalize pro-Beijing messaging rather than using overt disinformation alone. An article in The Hill suggested that digital technology is transforming political debate faster than democratic institutions can adapt. According to a report by CyberNews, the first arrests under the Take It Down Act have been made, involving two men accused of creating and sharing AI-generated explicit images of around 140 women without their consent. An investigation by Alliance4Europe and Doublethink Lab examined a coordinated network of at least 29 YouTube accounts that published more than 7,300 AI-generated geopolitical videos between March and December 2025. A study by three Malaysian researchers examined Facebook discussions on Malaysian media pages during the diplomatic tensions between China and Japan. According to a report by The Conversation, concerns are growing over whether key federal election security programs are fully operational. NewsGuard’s Reality Check examined baseless claims spread on social media following the deadly shooting at The Islamic Center of San Diego, where two teenagers killed three people before taking their own lives. An Amnesty International report discovered how coordinated disinformation campaigns in Indonesia have been used to silence critics, intimidate civil society, and justify violence against human rights defenders under President Prabowo Subianto. According to a publication by The Conversation, science teachers can no longer separate science from politics and social issues, especially as misinformation and conspiracy-driven content spread online. An investigation published by GPTZero introduced its Hallucination Check tool, designed to detect “vibe citing”: fabricated or inaccurate references created through large language model hallucinations. Radio France Internationale announced it has launched its eighteenth language service with the opening of an Armenian-language newsroom in Paris. [State Actors] Russia The Kremlin’s Expanding Digital Control According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia’s effort to control its digital environment has evolved from simply restricting foreign platforms to building a state-managed communication ecosystem. Earlier attempts to block apps, such as Telegram, failed. By 2026, however, the Kremlin shifted strategy by promoting the state-backed messenger MAX while disrupting access to platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram. This created conditions where citizens and institutions increasingly depend on government-approved channels. MAX is presented as a secure and convenient communication platform, but its structure reveals broader ambitions. The app is deeply connected to Russian state systems, including digital identity and government service databases. Through verified accounts and the collection of behavioral and technical data, the platform merges communication, identity verification, and state oversight into a single infrastructure. While these features are framed as modernization, they also increase the state’s ability to monitor information flows and shape public narratives. This development is significant for disinformation because control over communication infrastructure allows the Kremlin to influence not only what information is censored, but also how information is distributed and consumed. Rather than relying solely on overt propaganda or bans, the state is creating an environment in which official platforms become the default channels for communication and information exchange. An article by DFR Lab highlighted concerns about how MAX could affect users both inside and outside Russia. Sources: EUvsDisinfo. The Digital Iron Curtain 2.0: How the MAX Messenger is Reshaping Russia’s Communication Space. [online] Published 25 May 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-digital-iron-curtain-2-0-how-the-max-messenger-is-reshaping-russias-communication-space/ (stopfake.org) Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab). The domestic Russian ‘super-app’ that could create cross-border security risks. [online] Published 21 May 2026. Available at: https://dfrlab.org/2026/05/21/the-domestic-russian-super-app-that-could-create-cross-border-security-risks/ (dfrlab.org) Top Of Page Russian Propaganda Exploits Hantavirus Fears in France As published by NewsGuard, Pro-Kremlin propagandists launched a campaign falsely claiming that hantavirus was spreading rapidly across France and overwhelming the country’s healthcare system. The operation used fabricated articles and videos designed to imitate trusted media outlets such as CNN, BBC, France 24, and The Guardian. The campaign appears aimed at damaging the reputation of French President Emmanuel Macron, a major supporter of Ukraine, while also spreading fear about a deadly virus outbreak. The false reports, linked to the Russian “Matryoshka” influence campaign, claimed that hundreds of people in France had been infected, hospitals were collapsing under pressure, and the country lacked sufficient testing because of sanctions against Russia. These fabricated stories circulated widely on X. French authorities confirmed only one hantavirus case in the country as of the 20th of May. The media organizations whose names and logos were misused publicly stated that the reports were entirely fake. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. “Hantavirus Is Overrunning France” and Other False Claims Spread Online Amid Viral Outbreak. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/hantavirus-is-overrunning-france (rtl.fr) Top Of Page Condemnation of Russian Allegations Against the Baltic States In a recent statement, the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have condemned recent airspace violations involving unmanned aerial systems entering Baltic airspace from Russia and Belarus, and strongly rejected Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaign, including false accusations that the Baltic States have allowed their territories to be used for drone attacks against Russia. They also condemned threats against Latvia at a recent UN Security Council meeting, describing these claims as deliberate attempts to spread false narratives and undermine regional stability. According to the statement, Russia is using disinformation to divert international attention from its unlawful war against Ukraine and to weaken support for Ukraine’s right to self-defence under international law. The Baltic States reaffirmed their full solidarity with Ukraine and called on Russia to end its aggression, while emphasizing that countering disinformation remains essential to preserving NATO unity and regional security. In its publication, the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents expressed full solidarity with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and called on EU institutions and NATO partners to strengthen airspace surveillance and strategic communication efforts to better respond to disinformation. Many other countries rejected Russia’s campaign, such as Canada (in an official post) and Finland. Sources: President of the Republic of Estonia. Joint Statement of the President of the Republic of Estonia, the President of the Republic of Latvia and the President of the Republic of Lithuania on the situation on NATO’s Eastern Flank. [online] Published 21 May 2026. Available at: https://president.ee/en/official-duties/statements/58511-joint-statement-president-republic-estonia-president-republic-latvia-and-president-republic (president.ee) European External Action Service (EEAS). Russia’s unfounded allegations: EP leaders express full solidarity with the Baltic states. [online] Published 22 May 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/russia%E2%80%99s-unfounded-allegations-ep-leaders-express-full-solidarity-baltic-states_en (eeas.europa.eu) Global Affairs Canada. Canada rejects Russia’s destabilizing disinformation campaign targeting the Baltic states. [online] Facebook post published May 2026. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/CanadaFP/posts/canada-rejects-russias-destabilizing-disinformation-campaign-targeting-the-balti/1429803895852584/ Top Of Page Russian Hybrid Disinformation Operations in France According to a Le Monde report, leaked documents reveal a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign in France that combines traditional online propaganda with “hybrid” operations in public spaces to provoke outrage and social division. One documented case involved pig heads marked with the name “Macron” being placed outside mosques in Paris in September 2025, an act designed to inflame tensions and generate widespread media attention. Investigators later linked the operation to individuals acting on behalf of Russian intelligence. The files showed that the planned operations included defacing synagogues, staging anti-immigrant spectacles, and creating false-flag incidents. The leak highlights a shift in Russian disinformation tactics toward real-world provocations that generate immediate media coverage and public reaction. According to the documents, these physical acts proved more effective at spreading confusion and amplifying false narratives than traditional digital propaganda. Source: Le Monde. Pig heads, green synagogues and inflatable sex dolls: Inside the Russian disinformation operations targeting France. [online] Published 24 May 2026. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2026/05/24/pig-heads-green-synagogues-and-inflatable-sex-dolls-inside-the-russian-disinformation-operations-targeting-france_6753777_13.html Top Of Page Pro-Kremlin AI Disinformation Targets Armenia’s Elections A Euronews article reports that Armenia is facing a large-scale pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign ahead of its parliamentary elections, involving coordinated efforts to manipulate public opinion and undermine pro-Western political forces. According to researchers cited in the report, the operation is linked to the “Matryoshka” network, a pro-Kremlin influence structure that uses artificial intelligence to produce fabricated videos and deceptive online content at scale. The campaign promotes narratives portraying Armenia’s closer alignment with Europe as a threat to national security, warning that support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and pro-European actors could provoke conflict with Russia. The operation reportedly seeks to exploit fears of instability and geopolitical insecurity to influence voter perceptions and electoral behavior. The article further highlights that the campaign relies on AI-generated media, coordinated amplification across digital platforms, and emotionally charged geopolitical messaging designed to polarize Armenian society and weaken trust in democratic processes. Researchers describe the tactics as consistent with broader Kremlin-linked influence operations previously observed in other countries, particularly Moldova. The report frames the campaign as a deliberate effort to shape Armenia’s political trajectory by leveraging disinformation, fear-based narratives, and digitally amplified manipulation ahead of a critical election period. Source: Euronews. Pro-Kremlin actors launch large-scale disinformation campaign targeting Armenia’s elections. [online] Published 20 May 2026. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/20/pro-kremlin-actors-launch-large-scale-disinformation-campaign-targeting-armenias-elections (euronews.com) Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Kremlin Falsely Claims Russia Has the Right to Attack NATO According to an article by DisinfoWatch, a false narrative promoted by Glenn Diesen claimed that Russia has the right to attack NATO following a large Ukrainian drone strike on targets near Moscow. Diesen suggested that because Ukraine attacked Russia, Moscow now has “every right” to retaliate against NATO. This argument portrays NATO as the true aggressor in the war and falsely presents Ukraine as merely a proxy controlled by the West. Although Russian authorities reported that more than 1,000 drones were intercepted during the 17th of May attack, there is no independent evidence that NATO was involved in the operation. Ukraine’s actions fall under its internationally recognized right to self-defense, which NATO and international law, including Article 51 of the UN Charter, support. The claim also ignores evidence that Russia itself has endangered NATO territory. Latvian authorities reported that Russian electronic warfare redirected Ukrainian drones into Latvia, causing them to crash on Latvian soil. Source: DisinfoWatch. Russia Has No Right to Attack NATO or Ukraine. [online] Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/russia-has-no-right-to-attack-nato-or-ukraine/ Top Of Page Ukraine Reveals Russian Disinformation Campaign Against Ukraine Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service reported that it has obtained Russian documents revealing plans to destabilize Ukraine and weaken international support through a coordinated disinformation campaign. According to the materials, the effort is driven by Russia’s failed spring offensive and growing economic difficulties. The campaign is reportedly being directed by the Russian presidential administration and focuses on undermining trust in Ukraine’s mobilization efforts, military leadership, and political leadership, including attempts to damage the reputation of President Zelenskyy and his team. The strategy includes the creation and distribution of fake documents falsely presented as official Ukrainian government materials, the amplification of politically sensitive narratives, and efforts to keep selected media controversies active in the public sphere. The plan also seeks to involve former Ukrainian officials, political figures, and experts to give false narratives greater credibility. The documents further indicate that Russia intends to spread these narratives through a network of proxy media outlets targeting Western audiences. More than 15 such outlets are expected to participate in amplifying false or misleading claims. Source: Служба зовнішньої розвідки України (Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine). Telegram post no. 1702. [online] Telegram. Available at: https://t.me/FISUkraine/1702 (linkbaza.com) Top Of Page China China Shapes Narratives Through Subtle Media Influence in Albania A Reporters Without Borders (RSF) article argues that Chinese influence operations in Albania rely less on overt disinformation and more on sustained propaganda, narrative management, and structural penetration of the local media ecosystem. According to Albanian researcher Blerjana Bino, the tactics employed by Chinese actors focus on embedding favorable narratives into coverage of issues relevant to Albanian audiences, including economic development, technology, and geopolitics, rather than spreading easily identifiable falsehoods. Chinese state-linked media, particularly China Radio International, are described as consistently promoting positive portrayals of China while subtly advancing Beijing’s political messaging. The article emphasizes that these influence efforts exploit vulnerabilities within Albania’s media environment, including concentrated ownership, weak editorial independence, and financial fragility. The article further highlights that the effectiveness of these campaigns stems from the interaction between foreign influence operations and domestic structural weaknesses. Rather than relying primarily on fabricated content, the campaigns seek to normalize pro-China narratives over time through strategic communication, media partnerships, and indirect amplification mechanisms. The report also notes broader concerns regarding foreign information manipulation in the Western Balkans, where external actors exploit weak information ecosystems to shape public discourse and influence political perceptions. Overall, the article presents Albania as a case study in how modern influence campaigns increasingly operate through subtle narrative integration and long-term informational influence rather than through traditional high-visibility disinformation campaigns. Source: Reporters Without Borders (RSF). “When it comes to China, we’re not dealing with classic disinformation campaigns”: How Albania’s information space became vulnerable to Chinese influence. [online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/when-it-comes-china-we-re-not-dealing-classic-disinformation-campaigns-how-albania-s-information Top Of Page Chinese Influence Operations Exploit G7 Local Vulnerabilities and Elite Networks A report by the Montreal Institute for Global Security (MIGS) characterizes Chinese interference across all G7 countries as “systemic” and deeply embedded within political, economic, and local governance structures. According to the report, the Chinese Communist Party’s influence apparatus, particularly the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), conducts coordinated influence and interference operations designed to bypass national-level safeguards by targeting subnational actors such as municipalities, provinces, and regional governments. The report argues that these local institutions are especially vulnerable due to lower awareness, limited institutional protections, and economic incentives tied to foreign partnerships. Tactics attributed to Chinese influence efforts include political co-option, elite cultivation, economic pressure, indirect intimidation, and narrative shaping through diplomatic, academic, and commercial relationships. The report highlights multiple cases across G7 states involving alleged electoral interference, political influence operations, espionage, and strategic economic engagement. Examples cited include electoral interference in Canada, political corruption concerns in the United States, influence over political figures in France and the United Kingdom, promotion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Italy, and institutional vulnerabilities in Japan. The study also describes subtler coercive methods, including implied economic retaliation linked to political decisions and the cultivation of influential elites through access, status, and ideological alignment rather than direct financial inducement. MIGS recommends establishing a permanent G7 task force to coordinate intelligence sharing, monitor proxy networks and United Front-linked organizations, and strengthen cooperation between national and local authorities to counter foreign interference and political warfare more systematically. Source: Intelligence Online. Chinese interference in G7 countries ‘systemic’, report warns. [online] Published 21 May 2026. Available at: https://www.intelligenceonline.com/asia-pacific/2026/05/21/chinese-interference-in-g7-countries--systemic--report-warns,110769520-art Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] AI-Influenced Politics and Democracy Former U.S. Senator Ben Sasse argued that Congress is failing to address major issues related to the rapid pace of technological change. An article in The Hill suggested that digital technology is transforming political debate faster than democratic institutions can adapt and warned that traditional political divisions are becoming less important than a deeper question about whether democratic norms and a shared understanding of reality can still be maintained. The article pointed to growing concerns over AI-generated political content, including deepfake videos, fabricated images, and synthetic audio designed to influence voters. One example involved manipulated content targeting congressional candidate Stefany Shaheen in New Hampshire. Modern campaign tools now allow political actors to rapidly create and distribute highly targeted messages across digital platforms, increasing the speed and scale at which misleading or fabricated material can spread. While acknowledging that new campaign technologies are not inherently harmful, AI does make fabrication more convincing and easier to distribute. If political campaigns increasingly rely on synthetic media, public trust in elections and political communication could weaken. Democracy depends on a shared understanding of reality and on maintaining transparency and clear boundaries in political communication. Source: The Hill. Technology accelerates distortion in politics. [online] Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/5883845-technology-accelerates-distortion-politics/ Top Of Page First Arrests Under the Take It Down Act Over Deepfake Pornography According to a report by CyberNews, the first arrests under the Take It Down Act have been made, involving two men accused of creating and sharing AI-generated explicit images of around 140 women without their consent. The manipulated content included both celebrities and private individuals and gained millions of views online. Authorities described the case as a serious form of digital abuse. Recent technological advances have made it much easier to generate realistic deepfake pornography, allowing users with little technical skill to create explicit fake images and videos. AI tools such as Grok reportedly allow users to generate manipulated images of real people before restrictions were introduced. Additionally, there is a real-world impact on victims, including psychological distress and reputational harm, even when the images are entirely fake. The new law requires platforms to remove reported non-consensual intimate content within 48 hours and holds both creators and platforms accountable. While arrests are an important legal step, stronger action is still needed as AI-generated abuse becomes more widespread. Sources: Cybernews. US makes first two arrests after men caught spreading viral deepfake pornography. [online] Published 22 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/first-men-arrested-deepfake-porn/ (cybernews.com) Top Of Page AI-Generated Influence Operations on YouTube An investigation by Alliance4Europe and Doublethink Lab examined a coordinated network of at least 29 YouTube accounts that published more than 7,300 AI-generated geopolitical videos between March and December 2025. The operation relied on automated production tools, including the InVideo platform, AI-generated narration, synthetic thumbnails, stock footage, and templated formats, allowing channels to publish content at a very high frequency. The investigation identified two closely related account clusters targeting different audiences while promoting recurring geopolitical narratives. Some videos included false claims, such as reports of naval clashes between the Philippines and Malaysia that were later denied by both navies. The content was also amplified beyond YouTube through Facebook and external blogs, extending its reach across platforms. Additionally, the paper showed clear signs of coordinated and automated behaviour, although no direct link to a specific state actor has been established. This type of AI-enabled content laundering presents a systemic challenge for online platforms because it can manipulate recommendation systems and evade traditional moderation methods by reproducing similar content with small variations. Removing individual accounts is not sufficient, and broader platform-level measures are recommended, such as detecting semantically similar content and coordinated posting patterns. Sources: Alliance4Europe. The Infinite Slop Machine. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://alliance4europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/The-Infinite-Slop-Machine.pdf Top Of Page [General Reports] Suspected Inauthentic Facebook Activity in Malaysian Media Discussions A study by three Malaysian researchers examined Facebook discussions on Malaysian media pages during the diplomatic tensions between China and Japan following remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about Taiwan. Focusing on comments posted between November and December 2025, the researchers identified at least 30 accounts showing signs of potentially inauthentic behaviour across the Facebook pages of Oriental Daily and The Star. These accounts appeared during periods of intense discussion about Japan–China relations, and many later became inactive or disappeared, making further verification difficult. The study identified several recurring characteristics among the accounts, including recent creation dates, limited personal posting history, unusual profile details, and the use of stock, AI-generated, or celebrity profile images. Some accounts used similar Malaysian-Chinese slang styles in usernames and showed high-frequency engagement in politically sensitive discussions. Repetitive anti-Japanese narratives were observed across multiple posts, although they did not establish proof of coordinated behaviour. The report emphasized patterns rather than firm conclusions. Many of the accounts later became inactive or disappeared, which limited verification but added to researchers’ concerns about unusual account behavior. However, noting that the findings do not provide conclusive evidence of organized activity. Source: Doublethink Lab. Tracking suspicious Facebook accounts after Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks. [online] Published on Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/doublethinklab/tracking-suspicious-facebook-accounts-after-takaichis-taiwan-remarks-c1265553cded Top Of Page Concerns Over U.S. Election Security Ahead of the 2026 Midterms According to a report by The Conversation, as the 2026 U.S. midterm elections approach, concerns are growing about whether key federal election security programs are fully operational. The Election Security Group, a joint effort led by the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, had not yet been publicly activated as of mid-May 2026. At the same time, the Trump administration’s 2025 decision to defund the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center reduced coordination and threat-sharing support for local election officials. The report reviewed how concerns about foreign election interference grew after Russian operations during the 2016 election, including social media campaigns linked to the Internet Research Agency and cyberattacks targeting political organizations and state election systems. In response, the U.S. government created several election security initiatives, including the Election Security Group, which later expanded its focus beyond Russia to include threats from countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea. These programs aim to detect cyber threats, share intelligence, and respond quickly to false claims or online influence operations targeting elections. The current election cycle may face additional risks from AI-generated content, cyberattacks, and reduced coordination between federal agencies and local officials. Without fully functioning election security programs, state and local authorities may have fewer resources to respond to emerging threats during the 2026 elections. Source: The Conversation. For the first time in a decade, the next election could be less secure than the one preceding it. [online] Published 20 May 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/for-the-first-time-in-a-decade-the-next-election-could-be-less-secure-than-the-one-preceding-it-282107 (ctpost.com) Top Of Page False Claims Following the San Diego Mosque Shooting NewsGuard’s Reality Check examined baseless claims spread on social media following the deadly shooting at The Islamic Center of San Diego, where two teenagers killed three people before taking their own lives. Shortly after the attack, several anti-Islam commentators, including Laura Loomer, falsely claimed the shooting was a “false flag” staged to generate sympathy for Muslim Americans. These claims were widely shared online despite no evidence being presented to support them. However. authorities identified the suspects as two teenagers with no reported ties to Islam. Available evidence, including a manifesto reviewed by investigators and social media activity linked to the suspects, points instead to possible white supremacist motives. It was noted that similar unfounded theories have followed other high-profile shootings, illustrating how misinformation can spread rapidly and shape public discussion even when official investigations contradict them. Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. “San Diego mosque shooting” another false narrative spreads online. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/san-diego-mosque-shooting-another Top Of Page Disinformation as a Tool of Repression in Indonesia An Amnesty International report discovered how coordinated disinformation campaigns in Indonesia have been used to silence critics, intimidate civil society, and justify violence against human rights defenders under President Prabowo Subianto. A central case is the acid attack on human rights defender Andrie Yunus, which was preceded by sustained online disinformation portraying him as a “foreign agent.” These false narratives were spread through coordinated social media campaigns involving accounts linked to military and state-aligned actors, aiming to discredit his activism and undermine public trust in civil society organizations. A broader pattern was identified, in which “foreign agent” accusations are deliberately used as a disinformation strategy to frame dissent, protests, and independent journalism as externally orchestrated threats to national stability. Amnesty found evidence of deceptive coordination across social media platforms, with synchronized posting of identical false content designed to mislead audiences, delegitimize critics, and create an environment where intimidation and violence become easier to justify. According to the findings, this disinformation has contributed to Indonesia’s growing authoritarian trend by suppressing civic space and discouraging public criticism. The report also criticized major platforms such as Meta, TikTok, YouTube, and X for failing to effectively limit the spread of harmful false narratives, allowing coordinated disinformation to go viral and amplify threats to human rights and democratic freedoms. Source: Amnesty International. “Building Up Imaginary Enemies”: Misinformation, Disinformation and ‘Foreign Agent’ Allegations in President Prabowo’s Indonesia. [online] Published 19 May 2026. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Amnesty-Building-Up-Imaginary-Enemies.pdf (amnesty.org) Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] Countering Online Misinformation in Science Education According to a publication by The Conversation, science teachers can no longer separate science from politics and social issues, especially as misinformation and conspiracy-driven content spread online. Topics such as climate change, vaccines, and artificial intelligence are increasingly debated in classrooms, influenced by social media and broader political tensions. Avoiding these discussions may leave students less prepared to evaluate conflicting claims and understand how scientific knowledge is produced. The authors highlighted the importance of teaching the history of science to help students understand that science has always been shaped by social, political, and cultural factors. Examples such as eugenics, the exclusion of women from scientific recognition, and the treatment of Indigenous knowledge systems show how science can be connected to power and inequality. Additionally, some actors intentionally spread distrust and confusion around science, making it harder for the public to distinguish reliable research from misleading claims. Therefore, examining these historical contexts can help students better understand why some communities may distrust scientific institutions today. Teachers play an important role in helping students critically evaluate information, recognize the social dimensions of science, and participate in democratic discussions. Source: The Conversation. How teaching the history of science can help equip students to face polarized times. [online] Published 20 May 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/how-teaching-the-history-of-science-can-help-equip-students-to-face-polarized-times-280332 (educationnewscanada.com) Top Of Page Detecting AI-Generated False Contents An investigation published by GPTZero introduced its Hallucination Check tool, designed to detect “vibe citing”: fabricated or inaccurate references created through large language model hallucinations. GPTZero has developed an automated system to scan public reports from major institutions, arguing that this problem has become widespread across research, consulting, and academic publishing. The company stated that the findings presented are part of a broader ongoing investigation, with additional cases expected to be published to reveal the scale of the issue. As one of its findings, the article examined a 2025 cybersecurity report by Ernst & Young Canada, where Hallucination Check allegedly detected multiple fabricated citations, contradictory statistics, and signs of AI-generated content. The analysis found several examples of contradictory data and fabricated sources. In one case, a false citation appeared to have been copied from a low-quality fintech blog and then presented as evidence in a major consulting report. The article warned that false citations can have wider consequences beyond a single report. Once published online, inaccurate claims may be repeated in media coverage, cited in future research, and incorporated into AI search tools, creating a cycle of information contamination. This phenomenon weakens public trust in research and highlights the growing need for stronger verification processes to prevent AI-generated disinformation from entering professional and academic knowledge systems. Source: GPTZero. Investigation: Hallucinations in Ernst & Young Report on Loyalty Fraud. [online] Published 14 May 2026. Available at: https://gptzero.me/investigations/ey (gptzero.me) Top Of Page RFI Launches Armenian-Language Service to Strengthen Verified Reporting Radio France Internationale (RFI) announced it has launched its eighteenth language service with the opening of an Armenian-language newsroom in Paris. The new digital-only service, staffed by eight journalists, will produce content in Eastern Armenian and focus on reaching younger audiences through social media platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok. Its main goal is to provide news coverage through innovative formats while verifying information and reporting directly from Armenia. The launch comes at a significant time as Armenia prepares for the upcoming legislative elections. According to the newsroom’s editors, the elections are already being targeted by false and misleading narratives linked to regional political tensions. In response, fact-checking will play a central role in the service’s work, with the team aiming to provide reliable reporting and help audiences better identify false information in a fragile media environment. By producing exclusively in Eastern Armenian, RFI aims to speak directly to citizens of the Republic of Armenia while also engaging wider Armenian-speaking audiences. Source: Radio France Internationale (RFI). RFI launches Armenian-language desk targeting youth and disinformation. [online] Published 25 May 2026. Available at: https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260525-rfi-launches-armenian-language-desk-targeting-youth-and-disinformation Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page

[Introduction] Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW). Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc. During the 11th to the 17th of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities. [Contents] [Introduction] [Report Highlights] [Report Summary] [State Actors] Russia Kremlin Indoctrination in the Russian Education System Russian Influence Amid Georgian Patriarch Election The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation About the Deportation of Ukrainian Children Pro-Russian Disinformation Targeting Ukraine and the EU Russian Network Warfare in Ukraine [AI Related Articles] AI Disinformation Growth in Australia AI-Driven Misinformation in the UK Election Politics Halupedia AI-Generated Misinformation New Pentagon-Linked Media Network [Cyfluence Attack] AI-Backed Cyber Threats and Influence [General Reports] Disinformation Around the Hantavirus Outbreak Conspiracy Theories Around Attempts on Donald Trump’s Life The Rise of Citizen Journalism and Its Effects on The Information Landscape AI-Generated Election Content in India Taiwan Security Bureau Records 60 Percent Surge in Inauthentic Social Accounts East Asian Disinformation Campaigns Foreshadow Future Global Threats [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NewsGuard’s Tool to Check and Evaluate Chatbots False Information FTC Targets AI-Generated Intimate Disinformation and Deepfake Abuse [CRC Glossary] [ Report Highlights] As published by The Jamestown Foundation, the election of Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) as the new head of the Georgian Orthodox Church has sparked intense controversy, with critics accusing the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-Kremlin networks of influencing the process. A Small Wars Journal analysis evaluates Russia's integrated cognitive and network warfare model across four domains, finding a persistent gap between strategic intent and battlefield execution. AEI's China-Taiwan Update documents a 60 percent increase in inauthentic social media accounts identified by Taiwan's National Security Bureau, as Beijing increasingly outsources influence operations to IT contractors relying on AI-generated content to scale cognitive warfare campaigns. A new report from Google Threat Intelligence Group warned that cybercriminals and state-backed actors are increasingly using artificial intelligence to strengthen cyberattacks and automate malicious operations. The Belfer Center report argues that disinformation campaigns in Taiwan and South Korea demonstrate how state and non-state actors exploit digital platforms, political polarization, and foreign influence operations to manipulate democratic societies and shape public opinion. The FTC’s Take It Down Act guidance requires online platforms to rapidly remove AI-generated and nonconsensual intimate content and adopt measures to prevent its amplification and redistribution. [ Report Summary] According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, the Kremlin has expanded propaganda throughout the Russian education system to shape children into loyal supporters of the state and the war in Ukraine. As published by The Jamestown Foundation, the election of Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) as the new head of the Georgian Orthodox Church has sparked intense controversy, with critics accusing the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-Kremlin networks of influencing the process. According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia has faced growing international accusations over the forced deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children since the invasion of Ukraine. According to a report by EEAS, during the winter of 2025 - 2026, Russia intensified disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening Ukrainian morale and damaging support for Ukraine within the European Union. A Small Wars Journal analysis evaluates Russia's integrated cognitive and network warfare model across four domains, finding a persistent gap between strategic intent and battlefield execution. As stated in a report by ASPI, a growing number of Australians believe the online information environment is becoming unreliable and manipulative, with disinformation now seen as a major national security concern. As published by CyberNews, false online claims recently spread that George Boyd, a newly elected councilor from the UK’s Reform UK party, was not a real person but an AI-generated identity. As published by CyberNews, Halupedia is an experimental website that creates endless fictional encyclopedia articles generated entirely by AI. A recent investigation by former researchers involved in the 2022 “Unheard Voice” report examined a newer generation of Pentagon-linked media websites operating in multiple languages across the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. AEI's China-Taiwan Update documents a 60 percent increase in inauthentic social media accounts identified by Taiwan's National Security Bureau, as Beijing increasingly outsources influence operations to IT contractors relying on AI-generated content to scale cognitive warfare campaigns. A new report from Google Threat Intelligence Group warned that cybercriminals and state-backed actors are increasingly using artificial intelligence to strengthen cyberattacks and automate malicious operations. As revealed in a Wired article, following the hantavirus outbreak aboard the MV Hondius cruise ship, social media was quickly flooded with conspiracy theories and misinformation. A recent poll by NewsGuard and YouGov found that a significant number of Americans believe conspiracy theories claiming that assassination attempts against Donald Trump were staged. An article by The Hill argued that public trust in traditional media has sharply declined, with a 2025 Gallup poll showing only 28% of Americans trust mainstream news for accurate reporting, largely as a result of their perceived bias and selective reporting. A study published by ISSN explored how AI-generated political content affected first-time voters during India’s 2024 General Elections, with a particular focus on the state of Rajasthan. The Belfer Center report argues that disinformation campaigns in Taiwan and South Korea demonstrate how state and non-state actors exploit digital platforms, political polarization, and foreign influence operations to manipulate democratic societies and shape public opinion. NewsGuard announced it has upgraded its browser extension to work directly inside AI chatbots such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google Gemini, allowing users to see reliability scores for the sources cited in AI-generated answers. The FTC’s Take It Down Act guidance requires online platforms to rapidly remove AI-generated and nonconsensual intimate content and adopt measures to prevent its amplification and redistribution. [State Actors] Russia Kremlin Indoctrination in the Russian Education System According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, the Kremlin has expanded propaganda throughout the Russian education system to shape children into loyal supporters of the state and the war in Ukraine. Russian schools now combine patriotic rituals, military-style activities, and rewritten textbooks that promote the Kremlin’s version of history and justify the invasion of Ukraine. Authorities are also tightening ideological control in occupied Ukrainian territories, where thousands of children are being educated under Russian narratives designed to erase Ukrainian identity. An important example of this campaign is the mandatory class "Conversations about Important Things", introduced in 2022 and focused on patriotism and militarization. The program includes propaganda themes such as glorifying Russian victories, promoting "digital sovereignty", and presenting war participants as heroes. The Oscar-winning documentary Mr. Nobody Against Putin exposed these practices, showing pro-war indoctrination and visits from Wagner mercenaries before being banned in Russia in 2026. Beginning in 2026 and 2027, the Kremlin plans to deepen this influence by targeting even younger children with new classes such as "Good Games", "My Family", and "Spiritual and Moral Culture". While presented as lessons about family values and morality, these programs promote nationalist messaging, loyalty to the state, and traditional Russian values. Critics argue that the Kremlin is using schools to normalize propaganda from early childhood. Source: EUvsDisinfo. From preschool to adolescence: expanding ideological control in Russian schools. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/from-preschool-to-adolescence-expanding-ideological-control-in-russian-schools/ Top Of Page Russian Influence Amid Georgian Patriarch Election As published by The Jamestown Foundation, the election of Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) as the new head of the Georgian Orthodox Church has sparked intense controversy, with critics accusing the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-Kremlin networks of influencing the process. Allegations of pressure on bishops, coordinated pro-Shio media campaigns, and the presence of pro-Russian figures at the church council fueled claims that the election lacked transparency and independence. These concerns deepened political polarization in Georgia and raised fears that the Church could become more vulnerable to Russian influence. Information manipulation played a major role throughout the election period. Pro-government media and coordinated social media accounts promoted Shio as the “natural” successor, while opposition groups and clergy accused authorities of running a hidden campaign to secure his victory. Concerns about Russian influence were amplified by Shio’s theological education in Moscow, his reported ties to the pro-Russian businessman Levan Vasadze, and the rapid congratulations from Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. At the same time, government officials dismissed accusations of interference as politically motivated attacks and "black propaganda". Critics fear the Kremlin may use religious institutions and disinformation networks to preserve influence in Georgia and weaken pro-European sentiment. Although there is no direct evidence proving Shio holds pro-Russian views, the opaque election process and competing narratives have damaged public trust and intensified divisions within both Georgian society and the Church itself. Source: Jamestown Foundation. Georgian Patriarch Election Fuels Kremlin Interference Claims. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/georgian-patriarch-election-fuels-kremlin-interference-claims/ (jamestown.org) Top Of Page The War in Ukraine Russian Disinformation About the Deportation of Ukrainian Children According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia has faced growing international accusations over the forced deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children since the invasion of Ukraine. While international organisations, investigators, and human rights groups describe these actions as war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Kremlin has launched a large-scale disinformation campaign to present them as humanitarian "rescues" or evacuations. Russian officials and state media repeatedly claim that children were saved from war zones, while denying allegations of kidnapping, forced assimilation, and unlawful deportation. The campaign even claims that these children are "naturally Russian" and belong within Russia’s cultural sphere. The Kremlin spreads these narratives through official statements, state-controlled media, and pro-Russian online networks. Different messages are tailored for different audiences - Russian citizens hear stories of heroic evacuations, while international audiences are told that Russia is protecting vulnerable children. At the same time, Russia attempts to discredit institutions such as the International Criminal Court by calling investigations politically motivated. Evidence gathered by international bodies, however, shows that many children were transferred without parental consent, separated from their families, and placed in Russian camps, schools, or adoptive families where Ukrainian identity is suppressed, and Russian patriotism is promoted. An article by Stop Fake even revealed that Russia has been accused of obstructing repatriation while promoting misleading claims that family reunification is simple and ongoing. Many parents were forced to search for their children independently, often relying on volunteers and charities because Russian authorities concealed the children’s location. Sources: EUvsDisinfo. How Russia lies about the stolen Ukrainian children. [online] Published 11 May 2026. Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/how-russia-lies-about-the-stolen-ukrainian-children/ (stopfake.org) StopFake. Fake: Russia did not engage in the “forced transfer” of Ukrainian children, but “evacuated” them. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/ru/fejk-polpredstva-rossii-v-es-rossiya-ne-zanimalas-prinuditelnym-peremeshheniem-ukrainskih-detej-a-evakuirovala-ih/ (StopFake) Top Of Page Pro-Russian Disinformation Targeting Ukraine and the EU According to a report by EEAS, during the winter of 2025 - 2026, Russia intensified disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening Ukrainian morale and damaging support for Ukraine within the European Union. As Russian attacks caused severe energy shortages and humanitarian difficulties in Ukraine, pro-Kremlin networks on Telegram, Facebook, and regional news sites spread manipulative narratives designed to exploit fear, exhaustion, and uncertainty. These campaigns portrayed Ukraine as a burden on EU countries and framed European integration as dangerous for Ukrainian society. The report found that Russian and pro-Russian actors promoted false claims about Ukrainian refugees, EU corruption, and declining European support for Ukraine. Disinformation narratives accused the EU of supporting forced mobilization, planning discriminatory actions against Ukrainians, etc. Some campaigns used gender-related disinformation, while other messages attempted to damage relations between Ukraine and Poland by spreading rumors about visas and historical conflicts. Researchers also documented fake stories about financial aid, property confiscation, and crimes allegedly committed by Ukrainian refugees. In occupied territories, propagandists created "mirror" narratives that copied Russia’s own practices while falsely blaming Ukraine or the EU. Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). Quarterly monitoring report on pro-Russian disinformation targeting EU–Ukraine relations (December 2025 – February 2026). [online] Published 7 May 2026. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/quarterly-monitoring-report-pro-russian-disinformation-targeting-eu%E2%80%93ukraine-relations-december-2025_en (eeas.europa.eu) Top Of Page Russian Network Warfare in Ukraine An analysis published by Small Wars Journal states that Russian network warfare strategy, rooted in Soviet-era doctrines of reflexive control and strategic deception (maskirovka), seeks to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of adversary systems across four integrated operational domains: computer network operations, AI-enabled information operations, electronic warfare, and space-based capabilities, with the Ukraine conflict serving as the primary live laboratory for testing and refining this integrated doctrine. An analysis published by Small Wars Journal states that despite initial technical successes such as the Viasat satellite communication attack in the opening hours of the invasion, Moscow significantly underestimated commercial resilience, including SpaceX's Starlink network, and Ukraine's adaptive defense, revealing a persistent and structurally significant gap between Russia's ambitious network-centric design and its actual operational execution in the field. Source: Small Wars Journal. Assessing Russian Network Warfare Through the Lens of the Ukraine Conflict. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/05/12/assessing-russian-network-warfare/ (smallwarsjournal.com) Top Of Page [AI Related Articles] AI Disinformation Growth in Australia As stated in a report by ASPI, a growing number of Australians believe the online information environment is becoming unreliable and manipulative, with disinformation now seen as a major national security concern. Research by economist Joseph Stiglitz and Maxim Ventura-Bolet argued that online markets naturally reward disinformation because sensational and emotional content generates more engagement and user attention than accurate reporting. Social media platforms and AI systems have changed how people consume information. Instead of visiting original news sources, users increasingly rely on social media feeds or AI-generated summaries. This weakens traditional journalism by reducing revenue for professional news organizations, while platforms profit from keeping users engaged for as long as possible. According to the study, algorithms favor provocative and polarizing content, regardless of whether it is true, creating an environment where disinformation spreads faster and more widely than verified information. The report warned that AI could accelerate this downward spiral by quickly producing large volumes of low-quality or misleading content, relying on unreliable data sources. As audiences become more polarized, they seek information that confirms their existing beliefs and further damages trustworthy journalism. Market forces alone will not solve the problem and call for stronger government regulation, such as platform accountability, measures against coordinated disinformation campaigns, and protections for quality news producers. Source: The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute). How AI rots the information environment: a Nobel economist has modelled it. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-ai-rots-the-information-environment-a-nobel-economist-has-modelled-it/ Top Of Page AI-Driven Misinformation in the UK Election Politics As published by CyberNews, false online claims recently spread that George Boyd, a newly elected councilor from the UK’s Reform UK party, was not a real person but an AI-generated identity. The rumors were fueled by social media users and amplified by the AI chatbot Grok, which suggested that Boyd’s campaign photo was "very likely" AI-generated because of its overly polished appearance. These claims quickly became an example of how AI tools and online speculation can contribute to disinformation during elections. In reality, Boyd is a real person who successfully won a local election in Norfolk, England. Journalists from the BBC confirmed his identity directly through interviews. The confusion began because AI had been used to create a countryside background for his campaign image, while the original photo itself was genuine. Party officials explained that the edited image was intended only to improve the design of campaign materials, not to create a fake candidate. Sources: Cybernews. “I am not AI:” elected Reform UK councilor denies rumor spread by Grok. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/ai-elected-reform-uk-councilor-grok/ (cybernews.com) Top Of Page Halupedia AI-Generated Misinformation As published by CyberNews, Halupedia is an experimental website that creates endless fictional encyclopedia articles generated entirely by AI. Inspired by Wikipedia, the platform produces convincing but completely fabricated entries the moment users click on a topic. The articles imitate the style of academic writing, making the false information appear credible and realistic. The platform demonstrates how AI hallucinations can create fake historical events, institutions, and references that sound believable despite having no basis in reality. One example mentioned is the “Great Pigeon Census of 1887,” an invented, detailed but entirely fictional event. Because the format closely resembles trusted sources like Wikipedia, users may instinctively believe the content, even when it is inaccurate or misleading. Critics also pointed to problems with offensive and prejudicial content appearing on the site, highlighting the difficulty of moderating AI-generated material. Sources: Cybernews. Halupedia: Wikipedia fights AI hallucinations with its own AI. [online] Published 14 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/halupedia-wikipedia-ai-hallucination/ (cybernews.com) Top Of Page New Pentagon-Linked Media Network A recent investigation by former researchers involved in the 2022 “Unheard Voice” report examined a newer generation of Pentagon-linked media websites operating in multiple languages across the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. Earlier operations relied heavily on fake personas, coordinated social media activity, and AI-generated profile images. According to the latest report, the newer network appears to use a different approach, relying more on paid advertising and outlet-branded content distributed through platforms such as X and Meta. The report identified several connected websites, including Arabic, Farsi, Russian, Spanish, and English-language outlets covering topics such as regional security, China’s role in Latin America, Iran, Ukraine, and space policy. Researchers found links between the sites through shared technical infrastructure, advertising activity, and design similarities connected to earlier U.S. military-funded media projects. While many articles were based on real events and verifiable sources, the investigation argued that the editorial focus consistently emphasized themes such as corruption, foreign influence, organized crime, and geopolitical rivalry. The analysis also explored how audiences reacted to the content online. Some users questioned the framing of articles or asked AI tools like Grok to verify claims. Researchers noted that many discussions focused on whether individual claims were accurate, while broader questions about sponsorship, editorial selection, and audience targeting were harder to identify through standard fact-checking methods. Sources: Lawfare. Fewer Bots, More Ads: The Pentagon’s Evolving Online Influence Campaigns. [online] Published 13 May 2026. Available at :https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/fewer-bots--more-ads--the-pentagon-s-evolving-online-influence-campaigns (lawfaremedia.org) Top Of Page [Cyfluence Attack] AI-Backed Cyber Threats and Influence A new report from Google Threat Intelligence Group warned that cybercriminals and state-backed actors are increasingly using artificial intelligence to strengthen cyberattacks and automate malicious operations. Tools such as the AI-powered malware "PROMPTSPY" can independently analyze systems, generate commands, and manipulate victim devices in real time. Cybercriminals are also using AI-generated "decoy logic" and code obfuscation to hide malicious activity and evade security detection. Researchers identified what they believe is the first AI-assisted zero-day exploit, designed to bypass security protections and potentially support large-scale attacks. The report also found that threat actors linked to China, North Korea, and Russia are actively using AI for vulnerability research, malware development, and cyber espionage. A major concern indeed is the growing role of AI in influence operations. Pro-Russian campaigns such as "Operation Overload" use AI-generated media, including deepfakes and synthetic content, to create false narratives and manipulate public opinion. AI allows threat actors to produce fake videos and voices and coordinated propaganda at a large scale, making disinformation campaigns faster, cheaper, and more difficult to identify. Researchers warn that AI is becoming both a powerful weapon for attackers and a critical challenge for global cybersecurity and information integrity. Sources: Google Cloud Blog (Google Threat Intelligence Group). Adversaries leverage AI for vulnerability exploitation, augmented operations, and initial access. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ai-vulnerability-exploitation-initial-access (tildes.net) Top Of Page [General Reports] Disinformation Around the Hantavirus Outbreak As revealed in a Wired article, following the hantavirus outbreak aboard the MV Hondius cruise ship, social media was quickly flooded with conspiracy theories and misinformation. Some online influencers and conspiracy theorists compared the outbreak to the Covid-19 pandemic, falsely claiming it was part of a global control agenda or caused by Covid-19 vaccines. Others promoted unproven treatments such as ivermectin, often using fear surrounding the outbreak to market emergency medical kits and alternative health products. Health disinformation spread rapidly through platforms such as X, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, amplified by prominent anti-vaccine activists, wellness influencers, and political figures. False claims included accusations that pharmaceutical companies intentionally created the virus for profit and baseless theories linking the outbreak to Israel through antisemitic narratives. Some theories even suggested that the outbreak was caused by 6G technology, according to an article by NewsGuard. Experts noted that many of these conspiracy theories reused the same patterns and networks that became widespread during the COVID-19 pandemic, even when the claims directly contradicted one another. Public health experts warn that social media now functions as a fast-moving disinformation ecosystem where misleading narratives can spread before evidence-based medical information reaches the public. Organizations such as the World Health Organization responded by clarifying that there is no scientific evidence supporting claims that ivermectin treats hantavirus or that Covid vaccines cause the disease. Source: WIRED. Hantavirus conspiracy theories are already spreading online. [online] Published 12 May 2026. Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/hantavirus-conspiracy-theories-are-already-spreading-online/ (wired.com) Top Of Page Conspiracy Theories Around Attempts on Donald Trump’s Life A recent poll by NewsGuard and YouGov found that a significant number of Americans believe conspiracy theories claiming that assassination attempts against Donald Trump were staged (for further information, see W19 May Cyfluence Report). According to the survey, 30 percent of respondents believed at least one of the three incidents was fake, while only 38 percent believed all three were genuine. Investigators found no evidence that any of the attacks were staged, and authorities stated that the alleged attackers acted independently without links to Trump or his administration. The false narratives spread rapidly across social media after each incident. Conspiracy theorists claimed that Trump used "blood pills", staged shootings for political gain, or created distractions from political controversies. Many of the same accounts that promoted these theories after the 2024 Pennsylvania rally shooting also spread similar claims following later incidents. Researchers found that social media platforms helped amplify the narratives, allowing misinformation to continue circulating long after the events occurred. The poll also revealed strong political and generational divisions in belief in these conspiracy theories. Democrats and younger Americans were more likely to believe the events were staged compared to Republicans and older groups. Source: NewsGuard. 30 percent of Americans think at least one Trump assassination attempt was staged. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/30-percent-of-americans-think-at-least-one-trump-assassination-attempt-was-staged Top Of Page The Rise of Citizen Journalism and Its Effects on The Information Landscape An article by The Hill argued that public trust in traditional media has sharply declined, with a 2025 Gallup poll showing only 28% of Americans trust mainstream news for accurate reporting, largely as a result of their perceived bias and selective reporting. The article linked this distrust to what it described as media-driven “panic” during events like the COVID-19 pandemic and other major political controversies. In this environment, "citizen journalism" has emerged as an alternative source of information, using examples of independent creators who publish viral investigations on social media. These cases are presented as evidence that individuals outside traditional media can expose fraud or hold institutions accountable. At the same time, legacy outlets are criticized for allegedly misreporting or downplaying major events, therefore contributing to public skepticism. The piece also reflected broader debates about disinformation in the modern media landscape. While it praised independent reporting for increasing transparency, critics argue that the same ecosystem can spread misinformation quickly without editorial oversight. It highlighted competing narratives about trust, suggesting a shift from centralized journalism toward decentralized, digital-first reporting, where both verified information and misleading claims circulate more easily, and audiences must decide what to believe. Source: The Hill. Citizen journalism rise restores trust in media. [online] Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/5873753-citizen-journalism-rise-trust/ (archive.ph) Top Of Page AI-Generated Election Content in India A study published by ISSN explored how AI-generated political content affected first-time voters during India’s 2024 General Elections, with a particular focus on the state of Rajasthan. Researchers examined the spread of deep fakes and AI-assisted political messaging on platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook, especially in semi-urban and rural communities where digital and political awareness are still developing. According to the study, AI-driven online communication has changed the electoral environment faster than regulatory systems can respond. First-time voters were especially vulnerable to misleading political narratives because of low digital literacy and heavy reliance on social media. These factors strongly influenced political awareness, trust in institutions, and voting behaviour among young voters. Using case studies, policy analysis, and regional media discussions, the paper examined how AI-generated content shaped local political experiences during the elections. To protect democratic participation in the digital age, researchers recommended introducing clearer laws on AI use during elections, improving electoral oversight, expanding fact-checking systems in local languages, and developing community-based digital literacy programs. The paper particularly emphasizes the importance of grassroots education in helping voters critically evaluate online political content. Source: Lyceum India. Electoral Misinformation. by Dimple Oza. [online] Available at: https://repository.lyceumindia.in/wp-content/uploads/Electoral-Misinformation.-by-Dimple-Oza.pdf Top Of Page Taiwan Security Bureau Records 60 Percent Surge in Inauthentic Social Accounts A report published by American Enterprise Institute states that Taiwan's National Security Bureau has recorded a 60 percent increase in inauthentic social media accounts between 2024 and 2025 and tracked over 2 million instances of disinformation within the same period, a 74 percent increase since 2023, as Beijing increasingly outsources its influence operations to Chinese IT and marketing companies that rely on automation and AI-generated content to scale cognitive warfare campaigns targeting Taiwanese audiences. The report also states that Beijing's four core strategic goals for Taiwan influence operations, exacerbating internal divisions, weakening Taiwanese will to resist, influencing allied willingness to support Taiwan, and winning international support for Chinese standards, are being pursued through a sophisticated multi-domain framework blending economic incentives, AI-generated social media content, and coordinated cognitive pressure at a scale that increasingly challenges Taiwan's detection and response infrastructure. Source: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). China–Taiwan Update: May 15, 2026. [online] Published 15 May 2026. Available at: https://www.aei.org/articles/china-taiwan-update-may-15-2026/ Top Of Page East Asian Disinformation Campaigns Foreshadow Future Global Threats The Belfer Center report analyzes how disinformation has become an increasingly sophisticated instrument of political influence in Taiwan and South Korea, offering lessons for future threats to democratic systems. The report highlights that both state and non-state actors exploit digital platforms to disseminate false or misleading information, manipulate public opinion, and deepen social and political divisions. Taiwan’s experience demonstrates how foreign interference campaigns leverage evolving communication channels and culturally tailored narratives to influence elections and public discourse, while South Korea illustrates how domestic political environments can normalize rumors, speculation, and misinformation as recurring elements of political competition. The study warns that lowered technological and logistical barriers now enable a broader range of actors to conduct influence operations on a scale. The report emphasizes that disinformation campaigns rely on coordinated amplification across social media ecosystems, exploitation of societal polarization, and manipulation of trust in institutions and media. It identifies foreign influence operations, election-related disinformation, and digitally amplified misinformation as central threats to democratic resilience. The analysis further stresses that no single sector can effectively counter these campaigns alone: governments face civil-liberty constraints, technology companies lack sufficient incentives to aggressively moderate harmful content, and civil society organizations often lack scale and access. As a result, the report advocates for cross-sector coordination involving governments, technology platforms, researchers, journalists, and civil society actors to improve transparency, strengthen public awareness, enhance detection capabilities, and build resilience against hostile information manipulation campaigns. Source: Crowley, B. J., Corcoran, C., and Johnson, R. Disinformation Threat Watch. [online] Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Published May 2019. Available at: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/disinformation-threat-watch (belfercenter.org) Top Of Page [Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation] NewsGuard’s Tool to Check and Evaluate Chatbots False Information NewsGuard announced it has upgraded its browser extension to work directly inside AI chatbots such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google Gemini, allowing users to see reliability scores for the sources cited in AI-generated answers. The tool shows whether a source is trustworthy or linked to disinformation, propaganda, or false reporting. For example, if a chatbot cites the Russian state media outlet TASS, NewsGuard displays a warning and its low trust score, helping users recognize potentially misleading information. The update responds to growing concerns that AI chatbots can unintentionally spread disinformation by relying on unreliable websites and low-quality content farms. According to NewsGuard’s research, leading AI chatbots repeated false or misleading claims nearly 29% of the time when asked about controversial topics, including narratives linked to Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence operations. Researchers found that users often cannot distinguish between credible journalism and manipulated or false content because chatbots present all sources equally. NewsGuard argued that transparency about sources is essential as AI tools become a major way people access news and information. Its system uses journalist-reviewed ratings and detailed "Nutrition Labels" to explain why a source may be unreliable, including cases involving health misinformation, election falsehoods, or state propaganda. The goal is to help users better identify disinformation and critically evaluate the information provided by AI systems. Source: NewsGuard. NewsGuard’s reliability ratings now appear in ChatGPT and Gemini responses, displaying the trustworthiness of AI chatbots’ news sources. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/press/newsguards-reliability-ratings-now-appear-in-chatgpt-and-gemini-responses-displaying-the-trustworthiness-of-ai-chatbots-news-sources/ Top Of Page FTC Targets AI-Generated Intimate Disinformation and Deepfake Abuse The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stakeholder letter regarding the Take It Down Act (TIDA) outlines new compliance obligations for online platforms in response to the growing spread of nonconsensual intimate imagery, including AI-generated “digital forgeries” and manipulated media. The document frames such content as a significant online harm facilitated by social media, messaging services, image-sharing platforms, and other user-generated content environments. It emphasizes that digitally altered or AI-generated intimate content can be rapidly disseminated across platforms, contributing to harmful information manipulation and reputational damage. The FTC identifies online platforms as key actors responsible for mitigating the spread of this content through mandatory notice-and-removal systems and proactive detection measures. The letter details several countermeasures intended to limit the amplification and recirculation of manipulated or nonconsensual content. Platforms are required to establish accessible reporting mechanisms, remove reported material and identical copies within 48 hours, and implement technologies such as hashing to prevent reuploads. The guidance also encourages coordination with organizations such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and StopNCII.org to improve cross-platform detection and suppression efforts. The FTC warns that failure to comply with these requirements may result in substantial civil penalties, underscoring a broader regulatory effort to address AI-enabled abuse, deceptive digital content, and the viral spread of harmful manipulated media online. Source: Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Take It Down Act – Template Letter. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/TIDA-Stakeholder-Letter.pdf (ftc.gov) Top Of Page [CRC Glossary] The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult. To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence. As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website. Top Of Page