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Cyber based influence campaigns 18th - 24th May 2026 Report

  • Writer: CRC
    CRC
  • May 28
  • 21 min read
Cover Image- Text: Weekly Media Update: Information Operations


[Introduction]


Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW).

Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. 

Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. 

We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc.

During the 18th to the 24th of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities.



[Contents]



[State Actors]


Russia 


The War in Ukraine

China

[AI Related Articles]

[General Reports]


[Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation]




[ Report Highlights]


  • According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia’s effort to control its digital environment has evolved from simply restricting foreign platforms to building a state-managed communication ecosystem.

  • According to a Le Monde report, leaked documents reveal a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign in France that combines traditional online propaganda with “hybrid” operations in public spaces to provoke outrage and social division.

  • According to an article by DisinfoWatch, a false narrative promoted by Glenn Diesen claimed that Russia has the right to attack NATO following a large Ukrainian drone strike on targets near Moscow.

  • The MIGS report argues that Chinese state-linked influence networks systematically exploit political, economic, and local governance vulnerabilities across G7 countries through elite cultivation, economic pressure, and coordinated interference operations designed to shape policy and public discourse.

  • A study by three Malaysian researchers examined Facebook discussions on Malaysian media pages during the diplomatic tensions between China and Japan.

  • NewsGuard’s Reality Check examined baseless claims spread on social media following the deadly shooting at The Islamic Center of San Diego, where two teenagers killed three people before taking their own lives.

  • According to a publication by The Conversation, science teachers can no longer separate science from politics and social issues, especially as misinformation and conspiracy-driven content spread online.

  • Radio France Internationale announced it has launched its eighteenth language service with the opening of an Armenian-language newsroom in Paris.


[ Report Summary]

  • According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia’s effort to control its digital environment has evolved from simply restricting foreign platforms to building a state-managed communication ecosystem.

  • As published by NewsGuard, Pro-Kremlin propagandists launched a campaign falsely claiming that hantavirus was spreading rapidly across France and overwhelming the country’s healthcare system.

  • In a recent statement, the Presidents of the Baltic States, together with many others, have condemned recent airspace violations from Russia and Belarus, as well as attempts to spread false narratives and undermine regional stability.

  • According to a Le Monde report, leaked documents reveal a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign in France that combines traditional online propaganda with “hybrid” operations in public spaces to provoke outrage and social division.

  • A Euronews article reports that a pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign in Armenia is using AI-generated content and coordinated online amplification to spread fear-based narratives and undermine pro-Western political forces ahead of the elections.

  • According to an article by DisinfoWatch, a false narrative promoted by Glenn Diesen claimed that Russia has the right to attack NATO following a large Ukrainian drone strike on targets near Moscow.

  • Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service reported that it has obtained Russian documents revealing plans to destabilize Ukraine and weaken international support through a coordinated disinformation campaign.

  • The MIGS report argues that Chinese state-linked influence networks systematically exploit political, economic, and local governance vulnerabilities across G7 countries through elite cultivation, economic pressure, and coordinated interference operations designed to shape policy and public discourse.

  • A RSF article argues that Chinese influence operations in Albania rely on subtle narrative shaping, media partnerships, and exploitation of weak media structures to normalize pro-Beijing messaging rather than using overt disinformation alone.

  • An article in The Hill suggested that digital technology is transforming political debate faster than democratic institutions can adapt.

  • According to a report by CyberNews, the first arrests under the Take It Down Act have been made, involving two men accused of creating and sharing AI-generated explicit images of around 140 women without their consent.

  • An investigation by Alliance4Europe and Doublethink Lab examined a coordinated network of at least 29 YouTube accounts that published more than 7,300 AI-generated geopolitical videos between March and December 2025.

  • A study by three Malaysian researchers examined Facebook discussions on Malaysian media pages during the diplomatic tensions between China and Japan.

  • According to a report by The Conversation, concerns are growing over whether key federal election security programs are fully operational.

  • NewsGuard’s Reality Check examined baseless claims spread on social media following the deadly shooting at The Islamic Center of San Diego, where two teenagers killed three people before taking their own lives.

  • An Amnesty International report discovered how coordinated disinformation campaigns in Indonesia have been used to silence critics, intimidate civil society, and justify violence against human rights defenders under President Prabowo Subianto.

  • According to a publication by The Conversation, science teachers can no longer separate science from politics and social issues, especially as misinformation and conspiracy-driven content spread online.

  • An investigation published by GPTZero introduced its Hallucination Check tool, designed to detect “vibe citing”: fabricated or inaccurate references created through large language model hallucinations.

  • Radio France Internationale announced it has launched its eighteenth language service with the opening of an Armenian-language newsroom in Paris.

[State Actors]


Russia

The Kremlin’s Expanding Digital Control

According to a report by EU vs. Disinfo, Russia’s effort to control its digital environment has evolved from simply restricting foreign platforms to building a state-managed communication ecosystem. Earlier attempts to block apps, such as Telegram, failed. By 2026, however, the Kremlin shifted strategy by promoting the state-backed messenger MAX while disrupting access to platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram. This created conditions where citizens and institutions increasingly depend on government-approved channels.


MAX is presented as a secure and convenient communication platform, but its structure reveals broader ambitions. The app is deeply connected to Russian state systems, including digital identity and government service databases. Through verified accounts and the collection of behavioral and technical data, the platform merges communication, identity verification, and state oversight into a single infrastructure. While these features are framed as modernization, they also increase the state’s ability to monitor information flows and shape public narratives. This development is significant for disinformation because control over communication infrastructure allows the Kremlin to influence not only what information is censored, but also how information is distributed and consumed. Rather than relying solely on overt propaganda or bans, the state is creating an environment in which official platforms become the default channels for communication and information exchange. An article by DFR Lab highlighted concerns about how MAX could affect users both inside and outside Russia.


Sources: 


Russian Propaganda Exploits Hantavirus Fears in France

As published by NewsGuard, Pro-Kremlin propagandists launched a campaign falsely claiming that hantavirus was spreading rapidly across France and overwhelming the country’s healthcare system. The operation used fabricated articles and videos designed to imitate trusted media outlets such as CNN, BBC, France 24, and The Guardian. The campaign appears aimed at damaging the reputation of French President Emmanuel Macron, a major supporter of Ukraine, while also spreading fear about a deadly virus outbreak.

The false reports, linked to the Russian “Matryoshka” influence campaign, claimed that hundreds of people in France had been infected, hospitals were collapsing under pressure, and the country lacked sufficient testing because of sanctions against Russia. These fabricated stories circulated widely on X. French authorities confirmed only one hantavirus case in the country as of the 20th of May. The media organizations whose names and logos were misused publicly stated that the reports were entirely fake.


Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. “Hantavirus Is Overrunning France” and Other False Claims Spread Online Amid Viral Outbreak. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/hantavirus-is-overrunning-france (rtl.fr)


Condemnation of Russian Allegations Against the Baltic States

In a recent statement, the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have condemned recent airspace violations involving unmanned aerial systems entering Baltic airspace from Russia and Belarus, and strongly rejected Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaign, including false accusations that the Baltic States have allowed their territories to be used for drone attacks against Russia. They also condemned threats against Latvia at a recent UN Security Council meeting, describing these claims as deliberate attempts to spread false narratives and undermine regional stability.


According to the statement, Russia is using disinformation to divert international attention from its unlawful war against Ukraine and to weaken support for Ukraine’s right to self-defence under international law. The Baltic States reaffirmed their full solidarity with Ukraine and called on Russia to end its aggression, while emphasizing that countering disinformation remains essential to preserving NATO unity and regional security. In its publication, the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents expressed full solidarity with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and called on EU institutions and NATO partners to strengthen airspace surveillance and strategic communication efforts to better respond to disinformation. Many other countries rejected Russia’s campaign, such as Canada (in an official post) and Finland.


Sources: 


Russian Hybrid Disinformation Operations in France

According to a Le Monde report, leaked documents reveal a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign in France that combines traditional online propaganda with “hybrid” operations in public spaces to provoke outrage and social division. One documented case involved pig heads marked with the name “Macron” being placed outside mosques in Paris in September 2025, an act designed to inflame tensions and generate widespread media attention. Investigators later linked the operation to individuals acting on behalf of Russian intelligence.


The files showed that the planned operations included defacing synagogues, staging anti-immigrant spectacles, and creating false-flag incidents. The leak highlights a shift in Russian disinformation tactics toward real-world provocations that generate immediate media coverage and public reaction. According to the documents, these physical acts proved more effective at spreading confusion and amplifying false narratives than traditional digital propaganda.


Source: Le Monde. Pig heads, green synagogues and inflatable sex dolls: Inside the Russian disinformation operations targeting France. [online] Published 24 May 2026. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2026/05/24/pig-heads-green-synagogues-and-inflatable-sex-dolls-inside-the-russian-disinformation-operations-targeting-france_6753777_13.html


Pro-Kremlin AI Disinformation Targets Armenia’s Elections

A Euronews article reports that Armenia is facing a large-scale pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign ahead of its parliamentary elections, involving coordinated efforts to manipulate public opinion and undermine pro-Western political forces. According to researchers cited in the report, the operation is linked to the “Matryoshka” network, a pro-Kremlin influence structure that uses artificial intelligence to produce fabricated videos and deceptive online content at scale. The campaign promotes narratives portraying Armenia’s closer alignment with Europe as a threat to national security, warning that support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and pro-European actors could provoke conflict with Russia. The operation reportedly seeks to exploit fears of instability and geopolitical insecurity to influence voter perceptions and electoral behavior.


The article further highlights that the campaign relies on AI-generated media, coordinated amplification across digital platforms, and emotionally charged geopolitical messaging designed to polarize Armenian society and weaken trust in democratic processes. Researchers describe the tactics as consistent with broader Kremlin-linked influence operations previously observed in other countries, particularly Moldova. The report frames the campaign as a deliberate effort to shape Armenia’s political trajectory by leveraging disinformation, fear-based narratives, and digitally amplified manipulation ahead of a critical election period.


Source: Euronews. Pro-Kremlin actors launch large-scale disinformation campaign targeting Armenia’s elections. [online] Published 20 May 2026. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/20/pro-kremlin-actors-launch-large-scale-disinformation-campaign-targeting-armenias-elections (euronews.com)


The War in Ukraine

Kremlin Falsely Claims Russia Has the Right to Attack NATO

According to an article by DisinfoWatch, a false narrative promoted by Glenn Diesen claimed that Russia has the right to attack NATO following a large Ukrainian drone strike on targets near Moscow. Diesen suggested that because Ukraine attacked Russia, Moscow now has “every right” to retaliate against NATO. This argument portrays NATO as the true aggressor in the war and falsely presents Ukraine as merely a proxy controlled by the West.


Although Russian authorities reported that more than 1,000 drones were intercepted during the 17th of May attack, there is no independent evidence that NATO was involved in the operation. Ukraine’s actions fall under its internationally recognized right to self-defense, which NATO and international law, including Article 51 of the UN Charter, support. The claim also ignores evidence that Russia itself has endangered NATO territory. Latvian authorities reported that Russian electronic warfare redirected Ukrainian drones into Latvia, causing them to crash on Latvian soil.


Source: DisinfoWatch. Russia Has No Right to Attack NATO or Ukraine. [online] Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/disinfo/russia-has-no-right-to-attack-nato-or-ukraine/


Ukraine Reveals Russian Disinformation Campaign Against Ukraine

Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service reported that it has obtained Russian documents revealing plans to destabilize Ukraine and weaken international support through a coordinated disinformation campaign. According to the materials, the effort is driven by Russia’s failed spring offensive and growing economic difficulties. The campaign is reportedly being directed by the Russian presidential administration and focuses on undermining trust in Ukraine’s mobilization efforts, military leadership, and political leadership, including attempts to damage the reputation of President Zelenskyy and his team.


The strategy includes the creation and distribution of fake documents falsely presented as official Ukrainian government materials, the amplification of politically sensitive narratives, and efforts to keep selected media controversies active in the public sphere. The plan also seeks to involve former Ukrainian officials, political figures, and experts to give false narratives greater credibility. The documents further indicate that Russia intends to spread these narratives through a network of proxy media outlets targeting Western audiences. More than 15 such outlets are expected to participate in amplifying false or misleading claims.


Source: Служба зовнішньої розвідки України (Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine). Telegram post no. 1702. [online] Telegram. Available at: https://t.me/FISUkraine/1702 (linkbaza.com)


China

China Shapes Narratives Through Subtle Media Influence in Albania

A Reporters Without Borders (RSF) article argues that Chinese influence operations in Albania rely less on overt disinformation and more on sustained propaganda, narrative management, and structural penetration of the local media ecosystem. According to Albanian researcher Blerjana Bino, the tactics employed by Chinese actors focus on embedding favorable narratives into coverage of issues relevant to Albanian audiences, including economic development, technology, and geopolitics, rather than spreading easily identifiable falsehoods. Chinese state-linked media, particularly China Radio International, are described as consistently promoting positive portrayals of China while subtly advancing Beijing’s political messaging. The article emphasizes that these influence efforts exploit vulnerabilities within Albania’s media environment, including concentrated ownership, weak editorial independence, and financial fragility.


The article further highlights that the effectiveness of these campaigns stems from the interaction between foreign influence operations and domestic structural weaknesses. Rather than relying primarily on fabricated content, the campaigns seek to normalize pro-China narratives over time through strategic communication, media partnerships, and indirect amplification mechanisms. The report also notes broader concerns regarding foreign information manipulation in the Western Balkans, where external actors exploit weak information ecosystems to shape public discourse and influence political perceptions. Overall, the article presents Albania as a case study in how modern influence campaigns increasingly operate through subtle narrative integration and long-term informational influence rather than through traditional high-visibility disinformation campaigns.


Source: Reporters Without Borders (RSF). “When it comes to China, we’re not dealing with classic disinformation campaigns”: How Albania’s information space became vulnerable to Chinese influence. [online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/when-it-comes-china-we-re-not-dealing-classic-disinformation-campaigns-how-albania-s-information


Chinese Influence Operations Exploit G7 Local Vulnerabilities and Elite Networks

A report by the Montreal Institute for Global Security (MIGS) characterizes Chinese interference across all G7 countries as “systemic” and deeply embedded within political, economic, and local governance structures. According to the report, the Chinese Communist Party’s influence apparatus, particularly the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), conducts coordinated influence and interference operations designed to bypass national-level safeguards by targeting subnational actors such as municipalities, provinces, and regional governments. The report argues that these local institutions are especially vulnerable due to lower awareness, limited institutional protections, and economic incentives tied to foreign partnerships. Tactics attributed to Chinese influence efforts include political co-option, elite cultivation, economic pressure, indirect intimidation, and narrative shaping through diplomatic, academic, and commercial relationships.


The report highlights multiple cases across G7 states involving alleged electoral interference, political influence operations, espionage, and strategic economic engagement. Examples cited include electoral interference in Canada, political corruption concerns in the United States, influence over political figures in France and the United Kingdom, promotion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Italy, and institutional vulnerabilities in Japan. The study also describes subtler coercive methods, including implied economic retaliation linked to political decisions and the cultivation of influential elites through access, status, and ideological alignment rather than direct financial inducement. MIGS recommends establishing a permanent G7 task force to coordinate intelligence sharing, monitor proxy networks and United Front-linked organizations, and strengthen cooperation between national and local authorities to counter foreign interference and political warfare more systematically. 


Source: Intelligence Online. Chinese interference in G7 countries ‘systemic’, report warns. [online] Published 21 May 2026. Available at: https://www.intelligenceonline.com/asia-pacific/2026/05/21/chinese-interference-in-g7-countries--systemic--report-warns,110769520-art


[AI Related Articles]


AI-Influenced Politics and Democracy

Former U.S. Senator Ben Sasse argued that Congress is failing to address major issues related to the rapid pace of technological change. An article in The Hill suggested that digital technology is transforming political debate faster than democratic institutions can adapt and warned that traditional political divisions are becoming less important than a deeper question about whether democratic norms and a shared understanding of reality can still be maintained.


The article pointed to growing concerns over AI-generated political content, including deepfake videos, fabricated images, and synthetic audio designed to influence voters. One example involved manipulated content targeting congressional candidate Stefany Shaheen in New Hampshire. Modern campaign tools now allow political actors to rapidly create and distribute highly targeted messages across digital platforms, increasing the speed and scale at which misleading or fabricated material can spread. While acknowledging that new campaign technologies are not inherently harmful, AI does make fabrication more convincing and easier to distribute. If political campaigns increasingly rely on synthetic media, public trust in elections and political communication could weaken. Democracy depends on a shared understanding of reality and on maintaining transparency and clear boundaries in political communication.


Source: The Hill. Technology accelerates distortion in politics. [online] Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/5883845-technology-accelerates-distortion-politics/


First Arrests Under the Take It Down Act Over Deepfake Pornography

According to a report by CyberNews, the first arrests under the Take It Down Act have been made, involving two men accused of creating and sharing AI-generated explicit images of around 140 women without their consent. The manipulated content included both celebrities and private individuals and gained millions of views online. Authorities described the case as a serious form of digital abuse.


Recent technological advances have made it much easier to generate realistic deepfake pornography, allowing users with little technical skill to create explicit fake images and videos. AI tools such as Grok reportedly allow users to generate manipulated images of real people before restrictions were introduced. Additionally, there is a real-world impact on victims, including psychological distress and reputational harm, even when the images are entirely fake. The new law requires platforms to remove reported non-consensual intimate content within 48 hours and holds both creators and platforms accountable. While arrests are an important legal step, stronger action is still needed as AI-generated abuse becomes more widespread.


Sources: Cybernews. US makes first two arrests after men caught spreading viral deepfake pornography. [online] Published 22 May 2026. Available at: https://cybernews.com/ai-news/first-men-arrested-deepfake-porn/ (cybernews.com)


AI-Generated Influence Operations on YouTube

An investigation by Alliance4Europe and Doublethink Lab examined a coordinated network of at least 29 YouTube accounts that published more than 7,300 AI-generated geopolitical videos between March and December 2025. The operation relied on automated production tools, including the InVideo platform, AI-generated narration, synthetic thumbnails, stock footage, and templated formats, allowing channels to publish content at a very high frequency.


The investigation identified two closely related account clusters targeting different audiences while promoting recurring geopolitical narratives. Some videos included false claims, such as reports of naval clashes between the Philippines and Malaysia that were later denied by both navies. The content was also amplified beyond YouTube through Facebook and external blogs, extending its reach across platforms. Additionally, the paper showed clear signs of coordinated and automated behaviour, although no direct link to a specific state actor has been established. This type of AI-enabled content laundering presents a systemic challenge for online platforms because it can manipulate recommendation systems and evade traditional moderation methods by reproducing similar content with small variations. Removing individual accounts is not sufficient, and broader platform-level measures are recommended, such as detecting semantically similar content and coordinated posting patterns.


Sources: Alliance4Europe. The Infinite Slop Machine. [online] Published May 2026. Available at: https://alliance4europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/The-Infinite-Slop-Machine.pdf


[General Reports]


Suspected Inauthentic Facebook Activity in Malaysian Media Discussions

A study by three Malaysian researchers examined Facebook discussions on Malaysian media pages during the diplomatic tensions between China and Japan following remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about Taiwan. Focusing on comments posted between November and December 2025, the researchers identified at least 30 accounts showing signs of potentially inauthentic behaviour across the Facebook pages of Oriental Daily and The Star. These accounts appeared during periods of intense discussion about Japan–China relations, and many later became inactive or disappeared, making further verification difficult.


The study identified several recurring characteristics among the accounts, including recent creation dates, limited personal posting history, unusual profile details, and the use of stock, AI-generated, or celebrity profile images. Some accounts used similar Malaysian-Chinese slang styles in usernames and showed high-frequency engagement in politically sensitive discussions. Repetitive anti-Japanese narratives were observed across multiple posts, although they did not establish proof of coordinated behaviour. The report emphasized patterns rather than firm conclusions. Many of the accounts later became inactive or disappeared, which limited verification but added to researchers’ concerns about unusual account behavior. However, noting that the findings do not provide conclusive evidence of organized activity.


Source: Doublethink Lab. Tracking suspicious Facebook accounts after Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks. [online] Published on Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/doublethinklab/tracking-suspicious-facebook-accounts-after-takaichis-taiwan-remarks-c1265553cded


Concerns Over U.S. Election Security Ahead of the 2026 Midterms

According to a report by The Conversation, as the 2026 U.S. midterm elections approach, concerns are growing about whether key federal election security programs are fully operational.  The Election Security Group, a joint effort led by the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, had not yet been publicly activated as of mid-May 2026. At the same time, the Trump administration’s 2025 decision to defund the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center reduced coordination and threat-sharing support for local election officials.


The report reviewed how concerns about foreign election interference grew after Russian operations during the 2016 election, including social media campaigns linked to the Internet Research Agency and cyberattacks targeting political organizations and state election systems. In response, the U.S. government created several election security initiatives, including the Election Security Group, which later expanded its focus beyond Russia to include threats from countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea. These programs aim to detect cyber threats, share intelligence, and respond quickly to false claims or online influence operations targeting elections. The current election cycle may face additional risks from AI-generated content, cyberattacks, and reduced coordination between federal agencies and local officials. Without fully functioning election security programs, state and local authorities may have fewer resources to respond to emerging threats during the 2026 elections.


Source: The Conversation. For the first time in a decade, the next election could be less secure than the one preceding it. [online] Published 20 May 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/for-the-first-time-in-a-decade-the-next-election-could-be-less-secure-than-the-one-preceding-it-282107 (ctpost.com)



False Claims Following the San Diego Mosque Shooting

NewsGuard’s Reality Check examined baseless claims spread on social media following the deadly shooting at The Islamic Center of San Diego, where two teenagers killed three people before taking their own lives. Shortly after the attack, several anti-Islam commentators, including Laura Loomer, falsely claimed the shooting was a “false flag” staged to generate sympathy for Muslim Americans. These claims were widely shared online despite no evidence being presented to support them.


However. authorities identified the suspects as two teenagers with no reported ties to Islam. Available evidence, including a manifesto reviewed by investigators and social media activity linked to the suspects, points instead to possible white supremacist motives. It was noted that similar unfounded theories have followed other high-profile shootings, illustrating how misinformation can spread rapidly and shape public discussion even when official investigations contradict them.


Source: NewsGuard Reality Check. “San Diego mosque shooting” another false narrative spreads online. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/san-diego-mosque-shooting-another


Disinformation as a Tool of Repression in Indonesia

An Amnesty International report discovered how coordinated disinformation campaigns in Indonesia have been used to silence critics, intimidate civil society, and justify violence against human rights defenders under President Prabowo Subianto. A central case is the acid attack on human rights defender Andrie Yunus, which was preceded by sustained online disinformation portraying him as a “foreign agent.” These false narratives were spread through coordinated social media campaigns involving accounts linked to military and state-aligned actors, aiming to discredit his activism and undermine public trust in civil society organizations.


A broader pattern was identified, in which “foreign agent” accusations are deliberately used as a disinformation strategy to frame dissent, protests, and independent journalism as externally orchestrated threats to national stability. Amnesty found evidence of deceptive coordination across social media platforms, with synchronized posting of identical false content designed to mislead audiences, delegitimize critics, and create an environment where intimidation and violence become easier to justify. According to the findings, this disinformation has contributed to Indonesia’s growing authoritarian trend by suppressing civic space and discouraging public criticism. The report also criticized major platforms such as Meta, TikTok, YouTube, and X for failing to effectively limit the spread of harmful false narratives, allowing coordinated disinformation to go viral and amplify threats to human rights and democratic freedoms.


Source: Amnesty International. “Building Up Imaginary Enemies”: Misinformation, Disinformation and ‘Foreign Agent’ Allegations in President Prabowo’s Indonesia. [online] Published 19 May 2026. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Amnesty-Building-Up-Imaginary-Enemies.pdf (amnesty.org)


[Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation]


Countering Online Misinformation in Science Education

According to a publication by The Conversation, science teachers can no longer separate science from politics and social issues, especially as misinformation and conspiracy-driven content spread online. Topics such as climate change, vaccines, and artificial intelligence are increasingly debated in classrooms, influenced by social media and broader political tensions. Avoiding these discussions may leave students less prepared to evaluate conflicting claims and understand how scientific knowledge is produced.


The authors highlighted the importance of teaching the history of science to help students understand that science has always been shaped by social, political, and cultural factors. Examples such as eugenics, the exclusion of women from scientific recognition, and the treatment of Indigenous knowledge systems show how science can be connected to power and inequality. Additionally, some actors intentionally spread distrust and confusion around science, making it harder for the public to distinguish reliable research from misleading claims. Therefore, examining these historical contexts can help students better understand why some communities may distrust scientific institutions today. Teachers play an important role in helping students critically evaluate information, recognize the social dimensions of science, and participate in democratic discussions.


Source: The Conversation. How teaching the history of science can help equip students to face polarized times. [online] Published 20 May 2026. Available at: https://theconversation.com/how-teaching-the-history-of-science-can-help-equip-students-to-face-polarized-times-280332 (educationnewscanada.com)


Detecting AI-Generated False Contents

An investigation published by GPTZero introduced its Hallucination Check tool, designed to detect “vibe citing”: fabricated or inaccurate references created through large language model hallucinations. GPTZero has developed an automated system to scan public reports from major institutions, arguing that this problem has become widespread across research, consulting, and academic publishing. The company stated that the findings presented are part of a broader ongoing investigation, with additional cases expected to be published to reveal the scale of the issue.


As one of its findings, the article examined a 2025 cybersecurity report by Ernst & Young Canada, where Hallucination Check allegedly detected multiple fabricated citations, contradictory statistics, and signs of AI-generated content. The analysis found several examples of contradictory data and fabricated sources. In one case, a false citation appeared to have been copied from a low-quality fintech blog and then presented as evidence in a major consulting report. The article warned that false citations can have wider consequences beyond a single report. Once published online, inaccurate claims may be repeated in media coverage, cited in future research, and incorporated into AI search tools, creating a cycle of information contamination. This phenomenon weakens public trust in research and highlights the growing need for stronger verification processes to prevent AI-generated disinformation from entering professional and academic knowledge systems.


Source: GPTZero. Investigation: Hallucinations in Ernst & Young Report on Loyalty Fraud. [online] Published 14 May 2026. Available at: https://gptzero.me/investigations/ey (gptzero.me)



RFI Launches Armenian-Language Service to Strengthen Verified Reporting

Radio France Internationale (RFI) announced it has launched its eighteenth language service with the opening of an Armenian-language newsroom in Paris. The new digital-only service, staffed by eight journalists, will produce content in Eastern Armenian and focus on reaching younger audiences through social media platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok. Its main goal is to provide news coverage through innovative formats while verifying information and reporting directly from Armenia.


The launch comes at a significant time as Armenia prepares for the upcoming legislative elections. According to the newsroom’s editors, the elections are already being targeted by false and misleading narratives linked to regional political tensions. In response, fact-checking will play a central role in the service’s work, with the team aiming to provide reliable reporting and help audiences better identify false information in a fragile media environment. By producing exclusively in Eastern Armenian, RFI aims to speak directly to citizens of the Republic of Armenia while also engaging wider Armenian-speaking audiences.


Source: Radio France Internationale (RFI). RFI launches Armenian-language desk targeting youth and disinformation. [online] Published 25 May 2026. Available at: https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260525-rfi-launches-armenian-language-desk-targeting-youth-and-disinformation


[CRC Glossary]


The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult.


To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence.


As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website.










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