top of page

Cyber based influence campaigns 3rd – 9th August 2026 Report

  • Writer: CRC
    CRC
  • 4 hours ago
  • 16 min read
Cover Image- Text: Weekly Media Update: Information Operations


[Introduction]


Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW).

Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. 

Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. 

We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc.

During the 3rd to 9th August 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities.



[Contents]





Russia 


Ukraine


China



[Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation]





[ Report Highlights]


  • Storm-1516 fabricated a video using forged Deutsche Welle and Handelsblatt branding to falsely claim German Chancellor Friedrich Merz planned to resign, attributed by German security services to Russian military intelligence, while Ukraine's Foreign Ministry documented over 1,500 pro-Russian articles exploiting Spain's Ceuta migration crisis. The Russian SVR distributed a statement claiming Ukraine has no EU prospects across 510 resources in 20 languages in its second summer 2026 propaganda wave.

  • FDD identified a China-linked network of at least 50 coordinated assets across 10 platforms deploying hashtags including #USBiolabs and #DTRASecrets to claim U.S. biological laboratories caused COVID-19, with accounts posting identical content within hours of each other, reviving a longstanding operation to shift pandemic blame to Washington while incorporating sub-narratives targeting U.S.-Taiwan relations.

  • The IRGC issued a statement praising Iranian revolutionary media for countering adversary "hybrid and cyber warfare including AI" while asserting that the US and Israel suffered strategic defeat in recent conflicts with Iran.

  • Research testing five major AI chatbots across 50 propaganda narratives in three languages found 16.6% of responses engaged with content from the Foundation to Battle Injustice, an EU-sanctioned outlet founded by deceased Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, reproducing claims including that Ukraine reused soldier corpses for meat products, with only 52% of responses rejecting the false claims and the vulnerability attributed to generative engine optimisation techniques designed to embed propaganda into AI training data.

  • EU AI Act transparency enforcement commenced 02-08-2026, requiring chatbots to disclose AI status at first contact, deepfakes to carry labels, and AI-generated content to include machine-readable markers; investigations were opened against OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and X, with the European Commission publishing a list of over 180 organisations signed to the Code of Practice on transparency of AI-generated content and penalties of up to EUR 15 million or 3% of global annual turnover for non-compliance.

  • A Gallup poll of more than 23,000 U.S. voters found 67% concerned that political leaders will pressure election officials to change election outcomes, the highest-ranked of six tested concerns, with at least 40% expressing concern about each tested aspect of election integrity and Trump's net approval rating at -20.6 points, the lowest of his second term.

[ Report Summary]

  • German security services attributed to Storm-1516, a Russia-linked operation assessed as probably connected to Russian military intelligence, a fabricated video using forged Deutsche Welle and Handelsblatt branding to claim falsely Chancellor Friedrich Merz planned to resign; both outlets confirmed the fabrication, Merz's office stated the claims were completely invented and designed to confuse and unnerve the public, while France's Viginum agency has documented Storm-1516 conducting at least 77 disinformation operations targeting Western countries between late 2023 and March 2025.

  • Ukraine's Foreign Ministry identified a coordinated Russian propaganda network exploiting Spain's Ceuta migration crisis, with pro-Russian outlets Pravda and RT publishing over 1,500 articles including approximately 300 in Spanish targeting European audiences; Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga stated Russia has for years weaponised migration and socially sensitive topics to systematically destabilise Europe and called for complete bans on Russian propaganda platforms within European jurisdictions.

  • The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service on 03-08-2026 issued a statement claiming Ukraine has no EU membership prospects and accusing the EU of stoking the war; Ukraine's Center for Strategic Communications documented over 750 distributions across 510 resources in 20 languages targeting audiences in Russia, the USA, Europe, Africa, and Asia, the second such SVR propaganda wave of summer 2026, while the EU's diplomatic arm found 80 of 500 investigated information manipulation incidents between January 2025 and May 2026 were linked to Ukraine's EU accession process.

  • The IRGC issued a statement praising Iranian revolutionary media for countering adversary "hybrid and cyber warfare including AI" while asserting that the US and Israel suffered strategic defeat in recent conflicts with Iran.

  • FDD's Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation identified at least 50 coordinated assets operating across 10 platforms including TikTok, Facebook, YouTube, and X, spreading claims that U.S. biological laboratories developed bioweapons causing COVID-19, deploying hashtags including #USBiolabs, #DTRASecrets, and #AmericanBioHazard; accounts posted identical or near-identical content within hours of each other, reviving a longstanding Chinese effort to shift pandemic blame to Washington while incorporating sub-narratives targeting U.S.-Taiwan relations.

  • Research testing five major language models, xAI's Grok, OpenAI's GPT, Anthropic's Claude, Google Gemini, and Mistral AI, across 50 propaganda narratives in three languages found 16.6% of responses engaged with content from the Foundation to Battle Injustice (r-FBI), an EU-sanctioned outlet founded by deceased Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin; specific models reproduced claims about Ukrainian soldiers' corpses being processed for meat and Zelenskyy's cryptocurrency mining, with only 52% of responses rejecting the false claims outright.

  • EU AI Act transparency enforcement commenced on 02-08-2026, requiring chatbots to identify themselves as automated systems, deepfakes to carry labels, and AI-generated content to include machine-readable markers; general-purpose AI model providers must publish training data summaries covering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risks, with penalties of up to EUR 15 million or 3% of global annual turnover, and investigations open against OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and X.

  • Futurism documented AI-generated fake influencer accounts on Facebook and Instagram deploying sexually suggestive video personas to attract male users who appear unaware the figures are artificial, with individual posts drawing close to 1,000 comments; the accounts systematically exploit a post-COVID loneliness epidemic and one account's file name referenced an AI music generation tool, illustrating that years of public discourse about AI-generated media have not produced meaningful general user skepticism.

  • 1Password researchers testing OpenAI's ChatGPT 5.5 and Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.8 on six high-impact CVEs found a 47% overall success rate for complete vulnerability patching without introducing new problems; models frequently addressed only a subset of vulnerable code paths or added fragile guard code, and Veracode's separate testing of 100 models found 44% introduced a detectable OWASP Top 10 vulnerability into the codebase, while newer frontier models with advanced cybersecurity capabilities are being distributed to key industries before open-source alternatives can compete.

  • Researchers by the UK Ministry of Defense developed an AI system that detects online discourse manipulation by measuring how far actual replies deviate from expected conversational responses, achieving 77% accuracy, roughly twice existing methods.

  • A Gallup poll of more than 23,000 voters conducted April 24 through June 10 found 67% concerned that political leaders will pressure election officials to change election outcomes, the top-ranked of six tested threats,  followed by 57% worried about improper ballot handling, 52% about voter intimidation, and 50% that their ballots will not be counted; CFR's James M. Lindsay noted that at least 40% expressed concern about each tested aspect and that Trump's net approval rating reached -20.6 points, the lowest of his second term.

  • The European Commission began enforcing the AI Act's first binding obligations on 2 August 2026, covering rules on prohibited AI practices (effective February 2026) and new requirements for general-purpose AI models including transparency obligations for providers of AI systems classified as presenting systemic risk; enforcement is led by the AI Office within the Commission, with national competent authorities designated across EU member states, and fines reaching up to 35 million euros or 7% of global annual turnover for the most serious violations.

  • An interview published by Jonathon W. Penney (Osgoode Law School/Citizen Lab) argues chilling effects — self-censorship from surveillance or legal threats — stem from psychological conformity, not rational calculation, making First Amendment doctrine inadequate. He cites four amplifiers (observation, uncertainty, personalization, power asymmetry) and evidence like Wikipedia traffic drops post-Snowden. He links this to democratic withdrawal, inequality, and extremist polarization, and calls for structural reforms (antitrust, transparency, surveillance limits) before narrower fixes like anti-SLAPP laws.

[State Actors]


Russia

Storm-1516 Fabricated Video 

An article published by The Local states that German security services attributed to Storm-1516, a Russia-linked operation assessed as probably connected to Russian military intelligence, a fabricated video using forged Deutsche Welle and Handelsblatt branding to claim falsely Chancellor Friedrich Merz planned to resign; both media outlets confirmed the fabrication, the CDU party dismissed it as nonsense, and Merz's office stated the claims were completely invented and designed to confuse and unnerve the public.


The article states that Germany's domestic intelligence agency assessed Storm-1516 to follow political developments in Germany and exploit them opportunistically closely, with France's Viginum agency having documented the group conducting at least 77 disinformation operations targeting Western countries between late 2023 and March 2025, including prior operations during Germany's February 2025 general election that brought Merz to power, consistent with the network's documented pattern of targeting electoral and political transition periods.


Source: The Local. Russia-linked group blamed for fake Merz resignation video. [online] Published 8 August 2026. Available at: https://www.thelocal.com/20260808/russia-linked-group-blamed-for-fake-merz-resignation-video


Ukraine Identifies Russian Propaganda Network

A report published by UA.NEWS states that Ukraine's Foreign Ministry identified a coordinated Russian propaganda network exploiting Spain's Ceuta migration crisis, with pro-Russian outlets Pravda and RT deploying over 1,500 articles including approximately 300 in Spanish targeting European audiences; Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga characterised the strategy as exploiting topics that evoke strong emotions in society to manufacture social discord, stating the Kremlin has for years weaponised migration and similar socially sensitive topics to systematically destabilise Europe.


The report states that the Ukrainian assessment characterised the campaign as a pattern of systemic destabilisation rather than an isolated incident, the network functioning as a coordinated amplification system designed to manufacture the appearance of organic European public concern over migration and called for European nations to escalate counteraction including complete bans on Russian propaganda platforms operating within European jurisdictions.


Source: UA.NEWS. Ukraine has exposed a new Russian disinformation campaign in Europe. [online] Published 31 July 2026. Available at: https://ua.news/en/world/ukrayina-vikrila-novu-informatsiinu-kampaniiu-rf-u-evropi


Ukraine

Russian SVR Distributes Second Summer 2026 Propaganda Wave

A report published by UNN.ua states that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service on 03-08-2026 issued a statement claiming Ukraine has no prospects for EU membership and accusing the EU of stoking the war, with Ukraine's Center for Strategic Communications monitoring over 750 distributions across 510 resources in 20 languages targeting audiences in Russia, the USA, Europe, Africa, and Asia, the second such SVR propaganda wave of summer 2026, following a prior statement distributed on June 19th.


The report states that between January 2025 and May 2026, 80 of 500 foreign information manipulation incidents investigated by the EU's diplomatic arm were linked to Ukraine's EU accession, with the EU identifying steady patterns of narrative alignment between Russian state channels and assets that launder, repurpose, and amplify Kremlin talking points, including narratives that the EU is prolonging the war to weaken Russia, that some EU countries want to partition Ukraine, and that European and Ukrainian values are fundamentally incompatible.


Source: UNN. Russia has launched a new wave of propaganda against Ukraine’s accession to the EU. [online] Available at: https://unn.ua/en/news/russia-has-launched-a-new-wave-of-propaganda-against-ukraine-s-accession-to-the-eu


China

China-Linked Network Deploys Bioweapon Narrative Targeting U.S. 

An analysis published by FDD states that FDD's Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation identified at least 50 coordinated assets across 10 platforms, including TikTok, Tumblr, Facebook, YouTube, Blogspot, X, Quora, and Pixiv, spreading claims that U.S. biological laboratories developed bioweapons responsible for COVID-19, deploying hashtags including #USBiolabs, #DTRASecrets, and #AmericanBioHazard while alleging the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency manages a covert military laboratory network for infectious disease development; accounts repeatedly posted identical or near-identical text, hashtags, cartoons, videos, and images within hours of each other.


The analysis states that the network revives a longstanding Chinese effort to shift pandemic blame to Washington, incorporating sub-narratives tailored to divide Washington and Taipei, including a 2023 Chinese state media amplification of a forged document falsely claiming the U.S. directed Taiwan to build a biological-weapons laboratory, while other posts alleged U.S.-supported facilities stored high-risk pathogens and destroyed samples in Ukraine to conceal evidence, illustrating a multi-theatre narrative architecture deploying distinct regional sub-narratives from a single coordinated asset base.


Source: Foundation for Defense of Democracies. China-Linked Social Media Network Seeks To Shift COVID Responsibility From China to U.S. [online] Published 7 August 2026. Available at: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/08/07/china-linked-social-media-network-seeks-to-shift-covid-responsibility-from-china-to-u-s/ 


Iran

IRGC Praises Iranian State Media as Counter-Disinformation Frontline

An article published by Tasnim News states that the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps stated on August 8th, 2026,  praising Iranian revolutionary media outlets for countering what the IRGC characterized as adversary deployment of "hybrid and cyber warfare capabilities, including artificial intelligence" to distort facts and create division between the Iranian public and the Islamic Republic, framing Iranian state media as a frontline instrument in an active information conflict against the United States and Israel.


The article states that the IRGC statement claimed the United States and Israel failed to achieve their objectives in recent conflicts with Iran, that international media acknowledged US "failure" and described Trump's actions as a "defeat", and that post-conflict understandings amounted to an "American surrender document", claims presented without independent verification and consistent with IRGC information operations framing; the statement is notable as a primary source document revealing how Iran officially positions its state media apparatus as a counter-disinformation instrument while simultaneously using that apparatus to propagate unverified narratives about adversary strategic failure.


Source: Tasnim News Agency. IRGC Lauds Iranian Media for Countering Enemy Disinformation. [online] Published 8 August 2026. Available at: https://www.tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/08/08/3665982/irgc-lauds-iranian-media-for-countering-enemy-disinformation 


[AI Related Articles]


Five Major AI Chatbots Reproduced Content Of EU-Sanctioned Outlet 

An investigation published by Euronews states that researchers testing five major language models, xAI's Grok, OpenAI's GPT, Anthropic's Claude, Google Gemini, and Mistral AI, across 50 propaganda narratives in three languages (English, German, French) found 16.6% of responses engaged with material from the Foundation to Battle Injustice (r-FBI), an EU-sanctioned outlet founded in 2021 by deceased Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin that presents itself as a human rights NGO; 30.9% of responses addressed the topics without disclosing the sanctioned source, while only 52% rejected or debunked the false claims.


The investigation states that the underlying vulnerability involves generative engine optimization, techniques designed to influence AI training data, paralleling search engine optimization methods, with specific examples including OpenAI's GPT 4.1 Mini citing r-FBI articles supporting claims about Ukrainian soldiers' corpses being processed for meat products, and Mistral Small 3.2 endorsing allegations about President Zelenskyy's cryptocurrency ventures causing Ukraine's energy crisis, identifying AI training data infiltration as an emerging hostile influence vector distinct from direct content injection.


Source: Euronews. AI chatbots citing Russian propaganda sourced from EU-sanctioned outlet. [online] Published 27 July 2026. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/07/27/ai-chatbots-citing-russian-propaganda-sourced-from-eu-sanctioned-outlet


EU AI Act Transparency Enforcement Begins August 2nd

An analysis published by Help Net Security states that EU AI Act transparency enforcement commenced on August 2nd, 2026, requiring chatbots to identify themselves as automated systems at first contact, deepfakes to carry labels, and AI-generated or altered content to include machine-readable markers; general-purpose AI model providers must document information for competent authorities, implement copyright policies, and publish training data summaries addressing risks including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, loss of control, cyber offences, harmful manipulation, and fundamental rights threats, with penalties of up to EUR 15 million or 3% of worldwide annual turnover for non-compliance.


An analysis published by Help Net Security states that enforcement is being pursued against OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and X among others, with over 180 organisations having signed the Code of Practice on transparency of AI-generated content; subsequent enforcement milestones include a December 2nd, 2026 ban on non-consensual AI-generated sexually explicit content and child sexual abuse material, a December 2nd, 2027 deadline for high-risk AI systems, and a August 2nd, 2028 deadline for high-risk systems built into regulated products, marking a phased escalation from transparency requirements to systemic risk regulation.


Source: Help Net Security. EU Begins Enforcing AI Act, Putting AI Models Under the Microscope. [online] Published 4 August 2026. Available at: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/04/eu-ai-act-enforcement-ai-models/


AI-Generated Fake Influencer Accounts 

A report published by Futurism states that Meta's platforms are filling with AI-generated video of nonexistent young women deployed by fake influencer accounts, including accounts called Grace the Gymnast, Kylie Blaze, and Issy Dexan, that use sexually suggestive language to lure in male users who appear unaware the personas are artificial, with individual posts drawing close to 1,000 comments; the accounts systematically exploit a post-COVID loneliness epidemic, with experts finding that social media use makes users lonelier rather than fostering human connection.


A report published by Futurism states that the AI-generated fake influencer schemes represent a convergence of easy-to-use video generation tools with social engineering techniques targeting basic psychological instincts, with the operations growing more sophisticated since 2023, moving from still images to AI video, and the widespread unaware engagement illustrating that years of public discourse about AI-generated media have not produced the population-level skepticism that media literacy initiatives predicted.


Source: Futurism. Boomers on Facebook Are Leaving Comments That Make It Clear That They Have No Idea That AI-Generated Thirst Traps Aren’t Real. [online] Published 4 August 2026. Available at: https://futurism.com/artificial-intelligence/boomers-facebook-ai-thirst-traps


More Than Half of AI-Generated Security Patches Are Broken

An article published by CyberScoop states that 1Password researchers testing OpenAI's ChatGPT 5.5 and Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.8 on six high-impact, high-complexity CVEs found an overall success rate of 47% for complete vulnerability patching without introducing new problems, below a coin flip, with models frequently addressing only a subset of vulnerable code paths, adding fragile guard code that satisfied tests while failing to address the vulnerability's root cause, and sometimes introducing subtle changes in application behaviour while patching the immediate issue.


The article states that Veracode's separate testing of 100 models found 44% introduced a detectable OWASP Top 10 vulnerability into the codebase, with most models showing stagnation in security patching despite enormous strides in crafting workable code; a Veracode vice president noted that AI tools remain unreliable for cybersecurity patching without knowledgeable humans in the loop, and that some kind of automated code review will be necessary, preferably not by the same automation tool that produced the code, in a world where AI agents generate exponentially more code than human defenders can review.


Source: CyberScoop. More than half of AI-generated patches are broken. [online] Published 7 August 2026. Available at: https://cyberscoop.com/ai-code-patching-security-risks/


Researchers Develop AI Detection System That Identifies Discourse Derailment in Online Comments

An article published by The Conversation states that researchers at Cardiff University and the University of Sheffield, funded by the UK Ministry of Defense Science and Technology Laboratory, developed a detection system for AI-assisted discourse derailment in online comment sections, finding that 65% of identified manipulative comments contained non sequiturs, 36% red herrings, and 20% personal attacks,  with derailing comments significantly less likely to acknowledge prior messages or demonstrate empathy,  based on manual analysis of over 1,600 comments beneath BBC News YouTube videos labeled against 25 discussion features.


The article states that the detection system works by measuring divergence between actual replies and a set of AI-generated expected responses, with substantial deviation flagging potential discourse manipulation rather than scanning for suspicious vocabulary; the system achieved approximately 77% accuracy, roughly twice the effectiveness of existing word-level sentiment analysis systems and matching human researcher agreement levels, with the authors noting that as AI lowers the cost and raises the volume of synthetic disinformation, detection methods capable of identifying manipulation through conversational pattern rather than content alone become operationally significant.


Source: The Conversation. AI is making disinformation harder to spot, but we’ve found a new way to catch it. [online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/ai-is-making-disinformation-harder-to-spot-but-weve-found-a-new-way-to-catch-it-288671


[General Reports]


Political Leaders Will Pressure Officials to Change Election Outcomes 

An analysis published by CFR states that a Gallup poll of more than 23,000 voters conducted from April 24th, 2026 through June 10th, 2026 found 67% of Americans concerned that political leaders will pressure election officials to change election outcomes, the top-ranked threat, followed by 57% worried about improper ballot handling, 52% worried about voter intimidation near polling places, and 50% worried their ballots will not be counted; at least 40% of the public expressed concern about each of the six tested aspects of elections, with a majority concerned about four of them.


According to the analysis, Trump's net approval rating now stands at -20.6 points, the lowest of his second term, while Democrats hold a 6.4-point edge on the generic congressional ballot; Larry Sabato's Crystal Ball projects 20 House seats as toss-ups, 15 currently or formerly Republican-held, up from April 13th as seats shift from leans Republican to toss-up, with CFR's Lindsay noting that democracy cannot succeed if the governed doubt that election results reflect their will.


Source: Council on Foreign Relations. Voters Worry About Election Integrity. [online] Published 3 August 2026. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/articles/voters-worry-about-election-integrity 


[Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation]


European Commission Begins Enforcing AI Act Obligation

An announcement published by the European Commission states that the AI Act's first binding obligations began enforcement on August 2nd, 2026, covering rules on prohibited AI practices that took effect in February 2026 and new requirements for general-purpose AI models including transparency obligations for providers of systems classified as presenting systemic risk; enforcement is led by the AI Office within the Commission, with national competent authorities designated across EU member states and fines reaching up to 35 million euros or 7% of global annual turnover for the most serious violations.


The announcement states that general-purpose AI model providers must now document their training data, energy consumption, and safety evaluations and submit these to the AI Office; providers of models designated as systemic-risk AI, defined as models trained with more than 10^25 floating-point operations, face additional adversarial testing, incident reporting, and cybersecurity requirements, with the Commission indicating it has already initiated formal evaluation processes against several major providers.


Source: European Commission. Commission starts enforcing AI Act rules and new transparency requirements on 2 August. [online] Published 31 July 2026. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-starts-enforcing-ai-act-rules-and-new-transparency-requirements-2-august


Roadmap for Addressing Effects of Censorship, Surveillance, and New Technology on Civil Society

An interview published by TechPolicy.Press states that Jonathon W. Penney, York Research Chair in AI, Data Governance and the Law at Osgoode Law School and research fellow at Citizen Lab argues that chilling effects, defined as self-censorship and behavioral restraint triggered by awareness of surveillance, legal threats, or personal targeting, operate through deep psychological conformity mechanisms rather than rational legal calculation, rendering conventional First Amendment doctrine structurally inadequate; Penney identifies four amplifying factors, observation, uncertainty, personalization, and power asymmetry and supports the framework with population-scale empirical data including Wikipedia traffic declines following the 2013 Snowden disclosures and Google search behavior shifts for sensitive terms.


The interview states that Penney identifies secondary harms flowing from chilling effects including democratic withdrawal, entrenchment of inequality through disproportionate surveillance of marginalized populations, and polarization within extremist subgroups where conformity mechanisms amplify rather than suppress hostile behavior; his policy framework prioritizes structural reform, antitrust enforcement against tech consolidation, government transparency, and surveillance restriction as preconditions before piecemeal measures such as expanded anti-SLAPP statutes, disclosure requirements, and personalized-targeting restrictions can be effective, framing the underlying problem as one of power: "privacy is about power... chilling effects is also a struggle over power, information, and broader structural power relationships in society".


Source: Tech Policy Press. A Roadmap for Confronting the Chilling Effects of Censorship, Surveillance and New Technology. [online] Published 26 July 2026. Available at: https://www.techpolicy.press/a-roadmap-for-confronting-the-chilling-effects-of-censorship-surveillance-and-new-technology/


[CRC Glossary]


The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult.


To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence.


As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website.










 
 
bottom of page