Influence in Czechia: Digital Battles Ahead of the 2025 Elections

On 3–4 October 2025, the Czech Republic will hold parliamentary elections. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Czech government has supplied weapons, training, and financial support to Kyiv. President Petr Pavel has consistently argued for continued backing. 

Czechia is also an important EU economy, closely tied to European supply chains in industry and energy. A change in government could affect both its Ukraine policy and its role within the EU. This election follows other recent cases where foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) was more than just visible. In Romania, digital campaigns contributed to the annulment of the presidential vote (for a deep dive analysis, see our report here). In Moldova, pro-EU parties won the parliamentary elections in September 2025, despite significant interference (for more information, see our blog here). Now, it is Czechia’s turn to face similar challenges to its democratic processes and discourse. 

The Czechia Country Election Risk Assessment (CERA)ⁱ provides a detailed examination of how hostile influence networks operate within the Czech information space, encompassing coordinated Telegram ecosystems, disinformation portals, and financing structures. It also identifies structural vulnerabilities such as low trust in institutions, susceptibility to conspiracy narratives, and gaps in regulation. Taken together, these findings give one of the clearest pictures of the pressures shaping the 2025 elections. The report can be found here. 

Political Context 

The contest is dominated by three main actors:  

• The populist ANO movement of Andrej Babiš. 

• The governing conservative coalition SPOLU, led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala. 

• The far-right SPD of Tomio Okamura. 

Yet the situation is more complex. Smaller political forces, from the Pirates to protest parties like Stačilo! or the Motorists, exist on the fringes. This fragmentation is likely to complicate coalition-building and raises the stakes for every percentage point that digital influence campaigns might shift.ⁱⁱ  

External Influence Networks 

Russia remains the central external actor. For years, Moscow has invested in disinformation, cyber operations, and covert funding. Following the EU's ban on channels like Sputnik in 2022, activity shifted to the digital domain. Telegram channels, such as neČT24, distribute translated Kremlin content daily, while the Pravda network aggregates posts from more than 7,000 channels into Czech debates.ⁱⁱⁱ Parallel structures, such as Voice of Europe, operated from Prague with Russian financing. 

China is less visible but still relevant, particularly through TikTok. Just days before the election, investigators uncovered around 300 fake TikTok accounts spreading pro-Russian synthetic propaganda. These profiles generated millions of views weekly, surpassing the combined reach of the official accounts of leading Czech politicians.^iv 

Figure 1 – Potentially inauthentic TikTok accounts, identified by The Center for Online Risk Research 

Campaigns and Platforms 

The Czech information environment is hybrid. Traditional outlets, such as Seznam Zprávy or public service broadcasting, enjoy high levels of trust, but alongside them, an ecosystem of problematic portals and Telegram channels operates. From Parlamentní listy to fringe groups, narratives are orchestrated and mutually amplified. Digital mobilization often spills into physical actions: protests under the Stačilo! banner directly channels narratives first spread on Telegram into the streets. 

Figure 2 – Sources of news, courtesy of FDEI project^v 

Narratives and Their National Resonance 

Hostile influence campaigns (HICs) in Czechia revolve around dominant narratives: electoral fraud, delegitimization of security institutions, anti-Ukraine frames, and anti-EU/anti-Western frames.^vi Their resonance derives from deep-rooted domestic fault lines. Mistrust of electoral integrity runs deep: over half of Czech citizens believe the government could manipulate election results.^vii Anti-Ukraine narratives play on war fatigue and economic hardship, while many consider support for Kyiv as excessive. Anti-EU narratives also resonate strongly: 54% of the population views EU decisions critically, making claims of alleged “Brussels dictate” highly effective.^viii These narratives are not simply imported; they exploit existing anxieties, reinforcing them until they erode trust in the country’s democratic trajectory. 

Impact Assessment 

The impact of HICs is less about measurable vote shifts than about long-term erosion. The CERA report highlights three risks:  

• The normalization of mistrust. If 54% believe fraud is possible, the legitimacy of any future government is undermined.  

• Discouraging participation in voting, using the demobilization of pro-European voters, along with repeated claims of corruption and stolen elections.  

• Amplifying social and political fragmentation, so that smaller protest parties benefit disproportionately from digital influence and intervention efforts, thereby pushing themselves into mainstream debates.  

Together, these dynamics create an electoral environment in which populist and pro-Russian forces gain strength without a single ballot being hacked.^ix 

Figure 3 – Key Issues Shaping Voter Sentiment in the Czech Republic, courtesy of FDEI project^x 

Responses and Limitations 

Authorities have sought to push back: the Ministry of the Interior has launched public information campaigns, the BIS intelligence service monitors disinformation networks, and cooperation with TikTok has been initiated.^xi Yet structural deficits remain. 

The Digital Services Act (DSA), which obliges platforms to monitor manipulative content, ensure algorithmic transparency, and remove harmful material swiftly, has been in force at the EU level since 2024. But the Czech Republic has been slow in transposing and implementing the framework nationally.^xii As a result, a critical tool for curbing FIMI remains blunt. 

Election authorities face similar limits: their resources are designed for physical ballot management, not real-time counter-disinformation. Coordination across agencies is often fragmented, with warnings being issued in parallel rather than centrally. 

Conclusion 

The Czech parliamentary elections are more than a domestic event. They are another link in an ongoing chain of growing friction between EU domestic forces and geopolitical rival powers alike.  Digital influence campaigns aim to weaken pro-European actors, empower populist currents, and challenge Czechia’s Western orientation. 

Resilience in the information space is therefore crucial. Platforms must be held accountable, opaque Telegram networks cannot remain blind spots, and state institutions need a coordinated strategic communication (StratCom) approach. Clear rules on political financing are also essential to prevent covert external funding. 

The recent elections in Romania, Moldova, and the Czech Republic confirm that digital information manipulation is already an inherent challenge. Europe’s response in building up resilience and implementing countermeasures will determine whether democratic trust can withstand the culminating pressure. 

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[Footnotes:]

[i] FIMI Response Team (FRT‑24), Debunk.org, EU DisinfoLab, GLOBSEC, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2025. Czechia: Country election risk assessment. [online] Available at: https://fimi-isac.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FRT-24_Czechia-Country-Election-Risk-Assessment-CERA_FINAL.pdf

[ii] Ibid. pp. 9-10

[iii] Ibid. pp. 28-32

[iv] Radio Prague International, Jakub Ferenčík, 2025. Russian propaganda is spreading on Czech TikTok ahead of elections. [online] Published 30 September 2025. Available at: https://english.radio.cz/russian-propaganda-spreading-czech-tiktok-ahead-elections-8864264;

[v] FIMI Response Team (FRT‑24), Debunk.org, EU DisinfoLab, GLOBSEC, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2025. Czechia: Country election risk assessment. [online] p.15 Available at: https://fimi-isac.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FRT-24_Czechia-Country-Election-Risk-Assessment-CERA_FINAL.pdf

[vi] Ibid. pp. 20-24

[vii] Ibid. p. 21

[viii] Ibid. p. 19

[ix] Ibid. pp. 18-22

[x] Ibid. p. 14

[xi] Radio Prague International, Jakub Ferenčík, 2025. Russian propaganda is spreading on Czech TikTok ahead of elections. [online] Published 30 September 2025. Available at: https://english.radio.cz/russian-propaganda-spreading-czech-tiktok-ahead-elections-8864264;

[xii] FIMI Response Team (FRT‑24), Debunk.org, EU DisinfoLab, GLOBSEC, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2025. Czechia: Country election risk assessment. [online] pp. 46-47 Available at: https://fimi-isac.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FRT-24_Czechia-Country-Election-Risk-Assessment-CERA_FINAL.pdf