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Influence Rebranded: The African Initiative

  • Writer: CRC
    CRC
  • Jun 30, 2025
  • 9 min read

Updated: Jul 3, 2025

Matryoshka doll on African map background, CRC branding. Text: Blog "Influence Rebranded: The African Initiative," dated 01-07-2025.

1. Introduction

This week, we will examine a recent VIGINUM report (June 2025), which analyzes the activities and organizational structure of the "African Initiative," an organization operating across several African countries. We will explore only selected aspects of the piece in more detail. You may find the full report here.



2. Origins

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, led to Moscow’s growing international isolation. As a result, Africa gained new importance in the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda. With the strategic shift outlined in Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, there was a notable expansion of activities related to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) on the African continent. (1)


Initially, Russia pursued two parallel influence strategies: one overt, through state-controlled media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, and the other covert, via operations like “Project Lakhta.” These efforts were planned and executed under the leadership of PMC Wagner. However, following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23, 2023, and the partial dismantling of the Wagner Group, control over the existing influence infrastructure was transferred to various Russian state actors.


According to a New York Times investigation, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has taken control of Project Lakhta. The PMC Wagner’s activities are now closely monitored by the Russian military intelligence service (GRU), notably through the creation of the “Africa Corps” (Afrikansky Korpus). Alongside Africa Corps, a new Russian media outlet named "African Initiative" has emerged. This entity was established as a Moscow-based "news agency" in September 2023, with the self-declared mission to create an “information bridge between Russia and Africa,” which is a euphemistic way of describing the systematic dissemination of anti-Western and pro-Kremlin propaganda. (2)


Diagram detailing African Initiative's structure: shows executives, country flags (Niger, Mali), NGOs, and connections to Russian services.
Fig.1 - Structure and members of the African Initiative, Courtesy of Viginum (3)

 

A central figure within the African Initiative is Artyom Kureyev, who serves as the organization’s editor-in-chief. The European Union has linked him to coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting both Europe and Africa. He is believed to be a former officer associated with the Russian intelligence services (RIS). Kureyev previously worked with Russian "think tanks" that functioned as front organizations for European influence operations. (4)


Another key individual is Viktor Lukovenko, known by the alias Viktor Vasilyev. A former operative involved in Project Lakhta, which has been active in propaganda efforts in Ukraine and across Africa, utilizing Telegram channels and collaborating with Russian cultural institutions. According to his statements, he is no longer part of the African Initiative. (5)


The African Initiative benefits from strong personnel links to the Russian state apparatus, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and various intelligence agencies (see the biographies of the executive team at 7. Appendices).(6) These connections undoubtedly provide operational support, granting access to resources, networks, and expertise within Russia’s broader sphere of influence.



3. Overt Activities

Outwardly, the African Initiative presents itself as a non-governmental organization (NGO) that recruits influencers, journalists, and grassroots activists to disseminate and amplify pro-Russian narratives among local populations. The initiative employs a dual strategy, combining both online and offline presence. By expanding its reach and establishing a local presence in strategically important regions, the initiative aims to establish and strengthen Russian influence across the African continent. Operational offshoots and affiliated structures have been identified in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. (7)


These influence operations are continually advanced in close coordination with the state-run agency Rossotrudnichestvo and the network of "Russian Houses." A key element of the initiative’s offline structure is the creation of a network of local NGOs, bloggers, artists, activists, and civil society groups, primarily in Burkina Faso. These actors reinforce and circulate pro-Russian narratives at the regional level. (8)


In addition, the Initiative organizes various sporting, cultural, religious, health-related, and educational events designed to integrate into communities and build trust. By encouraging local ownership of these projects, it fosters a social environment that operates independently of its media platform, likely serving as a buffer against external criticism. (9)


The Online Structure operates through messaging services, websites, and social media platforms, using multilingual channels tailored to different target audiences.


The African Initiative’s website, [afrinz.ru], was registered on September 13, 2023. It publishes articles in Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Arabic. As of April 30, 2025, 18,127 articles had been published across all languages. However, VIGINUM describes the platform’s overall reach and impact as limited, according to data from SimilarWeb, the site recorded only 104,818 unique visits between December 2024 and February 2025. (10)


In addition to its website, the African Initiative operates a network of six “official” Telegram channels, which republish the site’s content in Russian, English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Arabic. These channels collectively reach 69,720 subscribers. (11)


A Facebook page, a VK account, and two Rutube channels further support this digital ecosystem. The African Initiative also operates an TikTok account targeting Spanish-speaking audiences, expanding its multilingual outreach strategy across diverse social media platforms. (12)



4. Covert Activities

In addition to its overt media presence and cultural outreach, the African Initiative appears to be deeply involved in covert digital disinformation operations. Investigations have uncovered an information manipulation network known as “AI-Freak” (also referred to as “StopNews”), which serves as a technological extension of the African Initiative’s broader influence ecosystem and operates primarily out of public view. (13)


AI-Freak primarily targets English- and French-speaking audiences in Africa through a coordinated disinformation strategy. It employs artificial intelligence to produce text, imagery, and video content, which is then distributed via fake news websites, inauthentic social media accounts, and manipulative search engine optimization tactics ("Black Hat SEO"). (14)


Diagram shows "AI-Freak" info manipulation, using fake accounts and blogs, linked to Russian SEO and "African Initiative."
Fig. 2 - Diagram of the „AI-Freak” Network, Courtesy of VIGINIUM (15)

As part of the so-called “Africa Cluster,” the website Newstop Afrique [newstop.Africa] plays a central role within a pro-Russian influence ecosystem, specifically targeting African audiences. The French-language site was registered on December 19, 2023, and is hosted on a server located in South Africa. According to its self-description, it presents itself as a “trusted source of information” covering sports, music, and cinema topics. (16)


Despite this seemingly benign appearance, the website shows several signs of inauthenticity. Although it claims to be based in Niger, it uses a telephone number with Nigeria’s country code (+234) instead of Niger’s proper code (+227). Furthermore, open-source searches for the provided contact email address [info@newstop.africa] yield no verifiable information about the actual operators behind the site. In addition to the website itself, Newstop Afrique maintains a presence across several social media platforms, including X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, and Telegram. (17)


Activities with a European connection are also being conducted through the “UK Cluster” (see Fig. 2). VIGINUM demonstrates this through technical analysis, including favicon matching and URLScan investigations (see graphics below). (18)


Websites Newstop UK, British Attitudes, and British Talks described. Screenshots of homepages shown; identical features noted. Text explains server details.
Fig 3 - The "UK Cluster", Courtesy of VIGINUM; (19)
Fig 3 - Redirection observed via the URLScan service; Courtesy of Viginum; (20)
Fig 3 - Redirection observed via the URLScan service; Courtesy of Viginum; (20)

The image below displays the Open Graph code [og_tags] from the WordPress settings of [newstop.africa] and [britishtalks.com]. In both cases, the variable [og_locale] is set to "ru_RU," indicating that the respective admin interface's default language is Russian. While this technical setting is invisible to readers, it reveals the site operators' linguistic and likely personnel origin.


Section 5.3 screenshot showing analysis of WordPress settings on sites like newstop.africa, highlighting Russian language use, with technical links.
Fig. 4 - WordPress administration language, Courtesy of VIGINUM; (21)

The following image (Fig. 5) shows a snippet from the HTML source code of the contact page on [britishtalks.com]. Here, too, the language attribute is set to "ru-RU". Additionally, the form label contains the Russian term “Контактная форма” (contact form). The use of Cyrillic characters within what is intended to be an English-language interface further indicates a Russian origin configuration.


Highlighted source code shows "Контактная форма" in red, indicating Cyrillic characters in britishtalks.com contact form section.
Fig 5 - Source Code Analysis Sample, Courtesy of Viginum; (22)
5. Conclusion

The report delivers a clear and well-researched overview of the African Initiative’s setup and operations. With solid technical analysis and a firm grasp of the broader context, it shows how Russia systematically builds local influence networks across Africa. The findings provide valuable insights for anyone addressing foreign interference, information security, or African policy. Beyond that, the report provides a solid foundation for deeper exploration and encourages both professionals and interested readers to take a closer look.


Footnotes:

(1) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.4. [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250612_TLP-CLEAR_VIGINUM_FCDO_EEAS_Report_African_Initiative_EN.pdf


(2) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.4. [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250612_TLP-CLEAR_VIGINUM_FCDO_EEAS_Report_African_Initiative_EN.pdf


(3) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.24. [online] Available at:


(4) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.6. [online] Available at: https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250612_TLP-CLEAR_VIGINUM_FCDO_EEAS_Report_African_Initiative_EN.pdf


(5) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. pp.6 -7. [online] Available at:


(6) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. 7 Appendices, pp. 41–45 [online], Available at:

 

(7) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.4. [online] Available at:


(8) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.3. [online] Available at:


(9) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.16. [online] Available at:


(10) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.3. [online] Available at:


(11) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.5. [online] Available at:


(12) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.5. [online] Available at:


(13) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.4. [online] Available at:


(14) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. pp. 25-28. [online] Available at:


(15) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.25. [online] Available at:


(16) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.36. [online] Available at:


(17) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.26. [online] Available at:


(18) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.27. [online] Available at:


(19) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.27 [online] Available at:


(20) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.28 [online] Available at:


(21) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.34 [online] Available at:


(22) SGDSN, VIGINUM, FCDO & EEAS, 2025. African Initiative: From Public Diplomacy to Covert Influence Operations. p.34 [online] Available at:


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