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The Romanian presidential elections – a “gold mine” still waiting to be mined
- CRC
- Jul 8
- 1 min read
Hostile influence operations in Romania fell on fertile ground. Years of growing distrust toward the West, a sense of political marginalisation, economic dependency, and cultural alienation created the conditions. The annulment of Romania’s 2024 presidential election was not the beginning, but a culmination of that development.
In this article, Prof. Alina Bârgăoanu examines the long-running Russian influence efforts that helped shape this outcome. The technical investigation was carried out with her team. The Findings: a digital influence network of more than 70 Facebook pages and 75 clickbait websites, linked via comment-layer tactics, powered by inauthentic or AI-generated accounts, and algorithmically amplified. The reach exceeded 28 million, far more than the number of Romanian-speaking users.
Bârgăoanu does not stop at a purely technical analysis. She argues how existing narratives and social vulnerabilities were systematically exploited: national grievance, loss of control, and the “little man against the system”, a theme explicitly echoed and intensified in Călin Georgescu's campaign. This is not about short-term manipulation effort, but the construction of a long-term digital climate, supported by technical infrastructures that can be reactivated at any time and flexibly repurposed for almost any issue. Sleeper networks: thematically adaptable, structurally resilient. This is the logic of cyfluence: durable influence operations in the cognitive domain, not aimed at direct control, but at reshaping the very conditions under which trust, public discourse, and democratic decision-making become possible.
We also recommend our research report from March 2025, The Romanian Presidential Elections 2024: Analysis of Information Operations and Long-term Influence Efforts, available [here].
[Download Full Report here]
