Targeting Taiwan: An Influence Campaign with Benefits

Between March and April 2025, Taiwan’s government found itself again under considerable internal and external pressure. Intensified military exercises[i] by the People’s Republic of China and a tense post-election atmosphere placed significant strain on the newly elected administration of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Mounting criticism, calls for the resignation of individual lawmakers, and resurgent street protests added to the political volatility.[ii]  The social media platform Threads, already prominent during the 2024 Taiwan elections, once again emerged as a focal point of political discourse, particularly among younger users.[iii]

Coordinated Influence Campaign Against Taiwan

In this climate, Doublethink Lab uncovered what it classified as a coordinated hostile influence campaign.[iv] Researchers identified 51 inauthentic accounts posing as Taiwanese citizens. These accounts posted identical anti-DPP content. The slogan “I am Taiwanese and I oppose the Pan-Greens” appeared over 1,000 times, 91 of those posts traced directly to the identified accounts. Through high-frequency repetition and bot-like coordination, the campaign appeared aimed at simulating organic protest and public dissent.

Technical Structure of the Manipulation

The technical analysis revealed a layered structure. The accounts used stolen profile pictures of Asian influencers (T0145.001), consistently generated localized content by Fabricated Persona (T0101, T0143.002), and posted protest encouragements against the DPP (T0138). Posts were often published in identical form within tightly clustered time windows, strong evidence of automation and orchestration (T0049.003, T0084.001).[v]

Figure 1 - A plot showing how many times each account posted content that was also posted by at least 10 other accounts., The right side shows 12 different accounts made 13 posts with the same content within 20 minutes. Translation: “I was gonna say, let; Courtesy of Doublethink Lab[vi]

Attribution Clues and Indicators

Attribution rests on three main indicators. First, 23 accounts used simplified Chinese characters in 71 posts, some partially, others entirely. Second, forensic tracing of password-reset vectors linked the accounts to phone numbers in Hong Kong and Poland. Third, the use of identical tracking links and highly structured posting behavior resembled centralized infrastructure seen in past campaigns, notably during the U.S. elections. Based on its reach and distribution, Doublethink Lab rates the campaign a 2 out of 6 on the breakout scale, because the content managed to achieve some organic engagement, but remained confined to the platform Threads.

Dual Use of the Network

Interestingly, political content constituted only a fraction of the total output. Of more than 7,000 posts, just 290 were political, 275 of them verbatim anti-DPP posts. A curious detail: five posts followed the same template but targeted the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) instead. Whether this was a copy-paste error or a crude attempt at camouflage remains unclear. Still, the idea that a few mistimed clicks might unintentionally reverse a campaign’s ideological thrust carries its kind of irony.

Even more striking: the campaign was saturated with sexually suggestive material, often linking to dating websites disguised via URL shorteners (T0153.002). Doublethink Lab flagged 1,122 such posts. While political posts saw significantly higher average engagement (506 likes versus 143 for non-political), the most visible content by far was those promoting physical allure, garnering over 18,000 likes. The juxtaposition of flesh and faction adds a layer of tragicomedy: when political persuasion competes with thirst traps, the algorithm may well crown the latter.

Figure 2 - Showing Sexual Suggestive Content, Courtesy of DoubleThink Lab[vii]

Conclusion

The campaign’s structure points to external amplification providers, so-called “influence-for-hire” actors, operating modular infrastructures that serve both political and commercial clients. This outsourcing trend is becoming increasingly visible. Social media ecosystems, each with its logic and audiences, demand tailored delivery and contractors who can navigate these spaces efficiently. For attribution efforts, this creates serious challenges. Responsibility chains grow murky as state-linked influence efforts are increasingly executed through deniable intermediaries.

Doublethink Lab’s report stands out for its methodological rigor, analytical restraint, and transparency. Their investigation is ongoing and deserves close attention; well worth reading.

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Footnotes:

[i]Institute for the Study of War & American Enterprise Institute, Sperzel, M., Shats, D., O’Neil, A., Wugang, K., Han, A., Blustajn, N., Turek, A., Chung, Y. & Chou, A., 2025. China–Taiwan Weekly Update, April 18, 2025. [online] Published April 18, 2025. Available at: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-april-18-2025

[ii] Taiwan News, Thomson, J., 2025. Government protest takes place in Taipei. [online]. Available at: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6095464

[iii] Taiwan News, Thomson, J., 2024. Threads, Instagram emerge as key info sources for Taiwan legislature protests. [online] Published 18 June 2024. Available at: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5892100

[iv] Doublethink Lab (Digital Intelligence Team), 2025. Inauthentic Accounts Impersonate Taiwanese to Attack Political Party. [online] Available at: https://medium.com/doublethinklab/inauthentic-accounts-impersonate-taiwanese-to-attack-political-party-c7d04d5e1e13

[v] Doublethink Lab (Digital Intelligence Team), 2025. Inauthentic Accounts Impersonate Taiwanese to Attack Political Party. [online] Available at: https://medium.com/doublethinklab/inauthentic-accounts-impersonate-taiwanese-to-attack-political-party-c7d04d5e1e13

[vi] Doublethink Lab (Digital Intelligence Team), 2025. Inauthentic Accounts Impersonate Taiwanese to Attack Political Party. [online] Available at: https://medium.com/doublethinklab/inauthentic-accounts-impersonate-taiwanese-to-attack-political-party-c7d04d5e1e13

[vii] Doublethink Lab (Digital Intelligence Team), 2025. Inauthentic Accounts Impersonate Taiwanese to Attack Political Party. [online] Available at: https://medium.com/doublethinklab/inauthentic-accounts-impersonate-taiwanese-to-attack-political-party-c7d04d5e1e13

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