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Report Highlights: 01: PRC consular officials in the U.S. held “pop-up” events and social media propaganda campaigns for cognitive warfare, potentially violating international laws. 02: The majority of residents in Cyprus's unrecognized northern region believe Russian propaganda narratives about the war in Ukraine. 03: The annual EU DisinfoLab conference, attended by 583 participants, emphasized the urgent need to combat disinformation in an increasingly complex political landscape. 04: A Global Witness investigation revealed that TikTok, YouTube, and Facebook failed to adequately detect harmful disinformation just weeks before the U.S. presidential election. 05: The 2024 Freedom on the Net report marks the 14th consecutive year of declining global internet freedom, with conditions worsening in 27 of 72 countries. 06: Cyberscoop reported that Latino and Hispanic voters in the U.S. face significant disinformation, as both parties vie for support in key battleground states. 07: A Politico article highlighted how partisan media and echo chambers make it easier for politicians to spread misinformation, complicating fact-checking efforts.

Report Highlights: 01 - The Valdai Discussion Club is a key instrument in Russia’s information operations. 02 - Russian intelligence recruited an Irish lawmaker. 03 Experts warn that disinformation during hurricane season poses significant public safety risks . 04 - Interactive tool, “Spitting Images,” providing insights into the potential for disinformation. 05 - Brazil will implement strict regulations for using artificial intelligence (AI), but there are notable gaps in detecting and reporting AI-generated disinformation. 06 - The European Union introduced a new framework against individuals and entities involved in destabilizing activities targeting the EU and its member states.

The Romanian Presidential Elections 2024: Analysis of Information Operations and Long-term influence Efforts: On November 24, 2024, Romania held the first round of its presidential elections. In a historic and unprecedented decision, the Constitutional Court annulled the election on December 6, 2024, citing allegations of Russian influence operations that may have affected the vote. This ruling marks a first for Romania and the European Union, and it carries far-reaching implications. In this report, the CRC adopts a research-driven approach, deliberately refraining from commenting on the decision-making process behind the annulment. We aim to provide a neutral, fact-based analysis that can serve as a foundation for informed discussion, helping stakeholders and policymakers understand the information dynamics that contributed to the current situation.

A new report reveals how sanctioned Russian entities are exploiting Meta’s ad platform to spread state-sponsored propaganda. Despite Meta’s efforts at transparency, investigations show that paid ads from Kremlin-linked firms, like the Social Design Agency (SDA), continue to evade sanctions and push disinformation campaigns.

State-linked actors from Iran, China, and Russia use AI tools like Google’s Gemini to enhance disinformation and information operations (IO). The report highlights how AI aids in content manipulation, translation, and strategic messaging, signaling a shift in how technology is leveraged for influence in digital spaces.

Ahead of Germany’s 2025 federal election, 102 fake news websites were discovered spreading pro-Russian disinformation to influence public opinion. The operation targets established parties like the Greens and CDU while promoting right-wing populists such as AfD. Using AI-generated content and coordinated social media tactics, the campaign spreads false narratives about Germany’s economy, migration, and the Ukraine war.

What Germany could learn from the US Election Author: Ari Ben Am, Florian Frank With Germany’s snap elections set for February 2025, the challenge of identifying and countering foreign interference is becoming increasingly relevant. In recent years, multiple cases of election meddling have been observed, including in the US, Romania, and Moldova. While the US has strengthened its election security infrastructure since 2016, Germany lacks a similarly coordinated approach. Initial measures have been taken, such as establishing a task force within domestic intelligence. Still, the question remains: how can Germany develop a long-term strategy to safeguard its electoral processes?

A recent report by Taiwan's National Security Bureau illuminates the escalating influence operations (IO) conducted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2024. These campaigns, which utilize social media platforms, disinformation networks, and cutting-edge technologies like deepfakes, aim to destabilize Taiwan politically and socially. As tensions rise, Taiwan intensifies its defenses to counter these threats and protect its sovereignty.

This Blog Post examines how Romania's 2024 presidential election was annulled due to coordinated disinformation campaigns and foreign interference. It highlights the role of influencers, social media platforms, and covert networks in boosting the popularity of far-right candidate Călin Georgescu. The post also addresses illicit financing and the broader implications for the integrity of democratic systems.

This Blog Post by the Cyfluence Research Center analyzes a recent influence operation. The focus is on the X account “ElectionsFocus.” The operation targets the U.S. electoral system and promotes election denialism among Democratic voters. The goal is to undermine trust in democratic processes. The content is AI-generated and spread via platforms like X and Bluesky. Suspicious Medium blogs and videos amplify the messages. Initial clues suggest a possible origin in China. However, further investigation is needed for a definitive assessment.