Norway´s Threat Assessment Report 2025

This week, we examine Norway’s most recent national threat assessment (1), which delineates key developments and emerging dynamics within the country’s security environment. The central state threat actors are Russia, China, and Iran.(2)

Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 11 (Courtesy of PST) — *Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 11* (*Courtesy of PST)*

At the CRC, our focus is on digital hostile influence. This report highlights nicely that in the context of a broader system of hybrid warfare, digital hostile influence is one of many tools used by state actors. These are constantly adapted to shifting conditions and countermeasures. These so-called hybrid means may include cyber operations, sabotage, covert procurement, economic pressure, recruitment of human sources, and targeted influence and digital hostile influence campaigns. (3)

These tools do not operate in isolation—they are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Information obtained through cyberattacks or recruited sources can feed directly into digital hostile influence efforts, for example, to manipulate the political and societal discourse. Acts of sabotage, including those targeting civilian infrastructure, can create fear, undermine trust in institutions, and ultimately shift public opinion. (4)

Russia

The threat posed by Russia has intensified. In 2025, the Russian intelligence services are expected to continue operating through digital influence campaigns targeting Norway’s support for Ukraine. In this context, acts of sabotage are feared. As mentioned above, such actions are not solely aimed at the physical destruction of targets but also intended to influence public opinion, for instance, through media coverage and disinformation. It is also feared that information obtained through cyberattacks may be used in subsequent influence campaigns to undermine trust in political institutions and actors. (5)

Noteworthy are historical references, such as a Russian information operation targeting the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. (6)

Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 26, Courtesy of PST — *Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 26* (*Courtesy of PST)*

China

China’s influence campaigns are increasing significantly and are part of its broader global power strategy. The country is showing a growing willingness and capability to target Western populations directly, including Norway. Digital influence operations are at the core of these efforts and are being systematically expanded. (7)

A new trend is the involvement of commercial actors, who, for example, sell fake user accounts, produce propaganda videos, or recruit influencers. As a result, these campaigns are gaining in professionalism and reach. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) has also grown considerably. (8)

There is also a referal to the "Viking United News" domain attributed to the Chinese disinformation campaign known as "Paperwall". (9)

Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 15, Courtesy of PST — *Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 15*, *Courtesy of PST*

Iran

Through Influence campaigns, Iran seeks to exert its influence through propaganda networks and the fostering of radicalization. A notable example is the AnzuTeam campaign, which primarily targets Sweden. However, there are indications that individuals in Norway were also targeted via SMS. (10)

Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 25, Courtesy of PST — *Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 25*, *Courtesy of PST*

Disinformation and Influence Campaigns Ahead of the 2025 Elections

In light of the upcoming Norwegian parliamentary and Sámi parliamentary elections in 2025, an increase in threats and smears against politicians is anticipated, particularly when controversial issues garner significant public attention. Frequent public appearances during the campaign will likely make politicians more visible—and therefore more vulnerable—to confrontation. Additionally, it is expected that state actors will seek to exploit the election period to exert influence, using disinformation and propaganda to shape public opinion and steer political decisions in line with their interests. (11)

[Footnotes

(1) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025. [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025].

(2) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 8 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(3) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, pp. 8, 25 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(4) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 12 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2

(5) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, pp. 12, 25 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(6) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 26 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(4) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, pp. 14-15 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(5) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, pp. 18-20 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(6) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 25 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(7) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 14 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(8) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 15 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(9) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 15 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(10) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 25 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]

(11) Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2025. National Threat Assessment 2025, p. 47 [online] Available at: https://www.pst.no/globalassets/2025/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025/_nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2025_uu-engelsk.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2025]