During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). This weeks report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

China is increasingly using “counter-operator” measures: instead of only targeting content, it pressures the people behind influence and cyber operations through bounties, doxxing, sanctions, and “naming and shaming” (e.g., Taiwan, Canada). The aims are deterrence, degrading adversary capabilities, and narrative control.

During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). This weeks report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

Anthropic claims that Claude Code ran most parts of a cyber-espionage intrusion on its own. Experts doubt this because clear technical proof is missing. The text applies this disputed case to HIC and Cyfluence. It asks how agentic AI could speed up influence workflows, automate key tasks, and scale operations. If such autonomy becomes reliable, the technical phases of influence campaigns could expand in speed and impact.

During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). This weeks report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

The Spotlight article examines X’s new location transparency feature and its relevance for analysing Hostile Influence Campaigns (HICs). The new indicators act as a confidence booster for identifying inauthentic activity, illustrated through a previously examined Iranian influence campaign. At the same time, the article notes the feature’s limits and hints at likely adaptations in threat actors’ TTPs.