Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect. During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

Persistent Russian campaigns targeting European states occurred alongside reported US-linked activities including a domestic covert influencer network, as well as an alleged hostile operation in Greenland. Concurrently, state responses are growing more assertive, evidenced by Indonesia’s heightened regulatory pressure on tech platforms and Denmark's formal diplomatic summons.

This week, we turn to a case study from Philstar. The report examines a coordinated influence operation on X (formerly Twitter) that was active from late 2024 to mid-2025, with the goal of framing Vietnam as the main aggressor in the South China Sea.

Persistent Russian campaigns targeting European states occurred alongside reported US-linked activities including a domestic covert influencer network, as well as an alleged hostile operation in Greenland. Concurrently, state responses are growing more assertive, evidenced by Indonesia’s heightened regulatory pressure on tech platforms and Denmark's formal diplomatic summons.

Recent studies and reports have drawn attention to Iran’s ongoing efforts to influence public debate in the United Kingdom. Building on this foundation, our analysis offers additional insights and highlights nuances that might otherwise be overlooked. This Spotlight demonstrates how our findings complement existing knowledge while raising new questions for continued research and monitoring.

This week, our Weekly Blog highlights a recent DFRLab report uncovering a coordinated network of at least 215 cross-platform accounts – 116 on Facebook, 79 on TikTok, and 17 on Instagram. Between December 2024 and June 6, 2025, these accounts generated 8,514 posts, attracting more than 16 million views and 681,000 likes. The investigation reveals how pro-Russian influence targeting Romania Moldova has been systematically amplified through this network, exploiting major social