top of page

An Unsolicited Website Makeover: Can Hack & Deface Attacks Effectively Disrupt Hostile Influence?

2 days ago
9 min read

Recap

On 25 August 2026, OpenAI exposed a Russia-linked influence operation built around the International Burke Institute (IBI), an Israel-based “think tank”. On 22 October, CRC and other outlets published follow-up investigations, revealing more about the operation and the individuals behind it.


Within hours of the reports’ publication, IBI’s website was defaced and transformed into a satirical underwear catalog. A week later, the site was back online, and its operators were already complaining about the hack.


This blog examines what the hack-and-deface attack achieved, how it fits into broader efforts to disrupt FIMI, and what influence defense stakeholders and practitioners can learn from it.


IBI’s Temporary Transformation

CRC’s investigation report, published in tandem with several articles from journalistic outlets (VSquare, Shomrim, and The Insider), revealed new findings on the ongoing Russian-linked information operation and the entities involved.


As mentioned, the main branch of the exposed apparatus is the obscure, albeit now-infamous IBI, which uses the domain ibi[.]institute as its online-facing front. This “research institute” tried to build legitimacy by misattributing academic work, falsely listing experts, using a sockpuppet researcher, and relying on inauthentic, coordinated amplification.


Shortly after the publications exposing all this, both IBI’s website and main Telegram channel were defaced, and by the next day, The Insider attributed the timely takeover to the cyber-vigilantes behind Rotten Reliable News (RRN[.]world).


After taking over the website, the hacktivists kept the institute’s initials, logo, pseudo-academic tone, and structure, but changed the thematic subject:

  • The International Burke Institute became the “Ilya Boxer Institute.”

  • The “Burke Sovereignty Index” became “The Boxer Sovereignty Index, 2026 Edition,” rating boxer shorts in the language of policy reports.

  • Country rankings were replaced by images of SDA head Ilya Gambashidze modeling underwear.

  • Every page was signed “With love, made by RRN.world — Rotten Reliable News,” a play on Reliable Recent News, a Doppelgänger campaign outlet.


Figure 1 – IBI’s defaced homepage and Telegram channel (Screenshot: CRC)


On October 23, 2026, the X account @RRN_media officially claimed the operation. The post said the SDA built the think tank so Western media would cite it, and that after the SDA took the site down, the group archived it on GitHub.


Figure 2 – Claim of responsibility by X account @RRN_media and “Operation Family Boxers” GitHub repository (Source: GitHub).


The GitHub repository, “operation-semeynye-trusy” (“Operation Family Boxers”), preserves the parody site. Its README is a mock project proposal whose title mirrors the leaked SDA proposal for an Israeli think tank.


However, the disruption did not last. IBI restored its website and was publishing new posts by 2 November, 2026. It also regained control of its Telegram channel, which by now returned to regular posting.


On 29 October, 2026, IBI's newly appointed director Roy Jankelowitz published a statement calling the hack a crime under Israeli law and saying it had been reported to the authorities.


Figure 3 – Excerpt from a statement published by IBI Director following the website's hijack and defacement.


RRN replied on 30 October, 2026, with a parody statement justifying the hack, citing Israeli rules on foreign funding, and recalling evidence of plagiarism committed by IBI and its operators.


Figure 4 – Excerpt from a statement published by RNN regarding IBI’s accusations and the website hack.


A Dedicated FIMI Disruption Actor

Rotten Reliable News operates rrn[.]world, a domain that once served the SDA’s Doppelgänger campaign. DomainTools now describes it as an investigative site focused on the SDA, and the group says it took the domain from the SDA. Its operators, funding, and any state ties are unknown. It also operates an X account promoting its investigations and counter-actions against Russian influence and information operations.


The Cyfluence Kill Chain

From an operational perspective, RRN’s cyber-influence kill chain had to take place, at least mostly, out of sight. The actors had to conduct preliminary reconnaissance, mapping IBI’s website and Telegram channel, before finding an exploitable vulnerability that would allow them to gain initial access. The next phases likely included actions designed to maintain persistent access. Lastly, the attackers had to generate their alternative content before deploying it.


In practice, the IBI website takeover did not require highly sophisticated offensive expertise. According to RRN, the initial intrusion and subsequent privilege escalation phase were fairly simple, leveraging a basic vulnerability involving a “user to admin creation without any gating”. The attackers also shared behind-the-scenes insights into IBI’s platform, calling it a “dirty vibe coded site”.


The visible part of the attack chain began with the defacement of the hijacked assets and the parody posts. More importantly, the chosen timing was probably not accidental: the external defacement closely followed the published exposés on IBI, bringing RRN’s message to curious site visitors exactly when public interest and media coverage reached a peak. This points to careful planning and execution, including the necessary completion of early phases in the attack chain prior to the publication of the legitimizing investigation reports.


The clearest counter-influence components of this operation are best displayed in its post-hijack phase. Beyond the temporary technical disruption (or denial of service) and content deletion, the hack’s most effective influence-driven aspect is the high profile mockery achieved by the defacement and the subsequent coverage and amplification across platforms.


Alignment and Attribution

Since RRN has not been identified or linked to a specific actor, any attribution remains speculative. Two broad models could explain the group’s activity:

  • Unaffiliated hacktivists. An independent group which can act quickly, draw on grassroots credibility, and operate without legal or diplomatic constraints. It may, however, have fewer resources and less formal coordination. Its actions could also disrupt a target before investigators or authorities can collect evidence.

  • A nation-state actor. A state-aligned or state-backed group could draw on greater operational expertise, resources, and intelligence to conduct repeated counter-FIMI operations. Working through a proxy could also provide the state with some degree of deniability.


So far, RRN’s observed capabilities and activity pattern appear more consistent with a semi-independent (proxy) group, than with a clearly state-sponsored actor. This allows the group operational flexibility, alongside potential coordination with influence defense practitioners, investigative journalists and even various intelligence agencies.


RRN’s Disinformation Disruption Record

The IBI hack fits a wider, ongoing pattern of counter-actions, most of them self-reported by RRN. Below are recent examples that exhibit the group’s operational focus and capabilities:

Date

Action

Target

Verification

October 22-23, 2026

Defacement of IBI's website and Telegram channel.

SDA-linked fake think tank.

Reported by The Insider; claimed by RRN.

October 9–23, 2026

Public replies in English, French and German warning users they were replying to Russian bot accounts.

Suspected bot-farm accounts on X.

Observed on @RRN_media X account.

October 11–13, 2026

Claimed repeated takedowns, largely through abuse reports, of French-language sites including “notrepays”.

SDA-linked French-language sites.

RRN self-claim.

DomainTools lists notrepays[.]fr and notrepays[.]today as taken down.

May 19, 2026

Published “Repost Today”, mapping 45 WordPress sites laundering RT, Sputnik, TASS and Storm-1516 content, with an open-source detection tool on GitHub.

Content-laundering network.

Self-published.

2023–2026

Domain rrn[.]world moved from SDA control to an anti-SDA project; RRN states it took the domain from the SDA.

Doppelgänger’s RRN brand.

Status confirmed by DomainTools.

 

A recurring feature of RRN’s operations is its reuse of targets’ branding. By repurposing SDA assets into self-parody, RRN mocks Russia’s "disinformation machine" while leaving a distinctive calling card.


Hack-and-Deface as a Cyfluence Counter-Operation

The recent IBI hack joins a growing list of documented counter-FIMI cyber-influence events. In October 2025, we analyzed a hack-and-leak operation which effectively disrupted Ilan Shor’s pro-Russian influence efforts shortly before the election in Moldova. In that analysis, we defined cyfluence counter-operation as a hybrid offensive action that is designed to disrupt adversarial information operations, while combining both cyber and cognitive mechanisms.


In that aspect, the observed hijacking and defacement of IBI's website should be considered a defensive cyfluence action, aimed at achieving four primary effects:


  • Deny a credibility asset – While the parody was live, every back-link, syndicated article, and AI summary pointing to IBI led to a joke. The fact that both the website and Telegram channel were quickly restored, makes this a limited achievement.

  • Indicate attribution at the point of contact – Anyone (including automatic scrapers and LLMs) reaching the site was exposed to the IBI-SDA link. While the altered website was up, the clear attribution had a greater impact. Post remediation, the GitHub archive keeps it publicly available.

  • Narrative inversion through ridicule – Just as IBI abused the form of credible scholarship, RRN's parodic version borrowed IBI’s own form. This made the counter-narrative more impactful and attractive for media coverage, resulting in extended reach.

  • Impose operational costs – IBI suffered an outage, and its remediation efforts took time and resources, according to the organization. It was also forced to create a backup Telegram account. This is an achievement in imposing costs and diverting operators' attention.


Despite these successes, the hack also produced an unintended effect: it gave IBI a victim narrative, which its director used within a week. RRN’s own reply contested that narrative and extended the ridicule into a second round, keeping the case in view.


Figure 5 – A diagram showing the four counter-FIMI effects resulting from the hack-and-deface attack.

 

Risks, Limitations, and Legal Questions

The IBI case raises questions that go beyond whether the hack “worked”. Threat researchers, platforms, and governance stakeholders should consider the following questions:

  • Legality - IBI is a legally registered association. Exposure as a FIMI asset does not create a legal exemption for hacking it. Although RRN answered the legal argument with its own justification, citing Israeli law on foreign funding and foreign agents, the action remains unlawful.

  • The victim narrative - The hack potentially shifted part of the conversation from IBI’s methods to the hackers’, allowing IBI to cast investigative reporting as complicit and the IBI as the victim.

  • Short shelf life - In this case, the impacted platforms were restored within days. The wider infrastructure (official channels, amplification assets, and associated entities) was untouched.

  • Attribution and accountability - Given that RRN is anonymous, it can be easily framed as a proxy for Western intelligence services. Meanwhile, the same techniques can be used by malign actors and false-flag operations against legitimate institutions.

  • Interference with formal processes - Although seen as a quick remedy, unauthorized Intrusions might complicate evidence collection and due process by regulators, registrars, and law enforcement examining the same infrastructure, and may strengthen the affected party's position in legal proceedings.

  • Pre-empting state action - State actors have legal tools against hostile influence assets. The US, EU, and UK have sanctioned the SDA’s head, and US authorities seized Doppelgänger domains in September 2024. In Israel, IBI is subject to rules on registering associations and disclosing foreign funding. A hack can undermine these routes: it alerts operators, prompts them to move or clean up infrastructure, contaminates evidence, and turns the asset’s owner into a crime complainant. IBI did exactly that when it reported the hack to the authorities.

    On the other hand, state action is slow and often partial. DFRLab found Doppelgänger sites still active a month after the US seizures, and to our knowledge, despite the allegations against IBI and repeated requests by CRC and other partners, no Israeli authority has taken action.


Conclusion

As a perception operation, the IBI defacement worked. It imposed costs, placed attribution, ridiculed the influence asset itself, and embarrassed operators, at peak attention. As a disruption, it largely failed. The hack and overall downtime only lasted for a few days. Eventually, IBI restored its site, resumed publishing, and reframed itself as the victim of a criminal offense, while the network behind it remained intact.


The takeaway for counter-FIMI operations is that hack-and-defacement attacks can complement exposure, platform enforcement, and legal action, but they can't replace them. What this specific effort lacked is not tactical acumen but a lasting effect, such as permanent deletion of content or the exposure of valuable information. In that sense, rogue hack-and-leak attacks targeting hostile influence assets (e.g. the recent breach of John Mark Dougan's laptop, which undoubtedly deserves its own blog) might be less amusing, but they seem to be a more cost-effective defensive countermeasure.



[References:]

  1. Cyfluence Research Center (CRC), Mapping the Russia-Linked Influence Infrastructure Behind the “International Burke Institute”, October 22, 2026.

  2. VSquare (Martin Laine, Delfi Estonia), Journalist Admits to Receiving Cash to Promote Fake Russian Think Tank, October 22, 2026.

  3. Shomrim (Uri Blau), An Alleged Russian Influence Operation, an Israeli Think Tank and the People Behind It, October 22, 2026.

  4. The Insider, “Write like a 38-year-old Israeli woman”: The Kremlin used fake media and fabricated “experts” to spread disinformation in Israel, October 22, 2026.

  5. The Insider, Kremlin-linked Israeli “think tank” turns into a boxer-shorts parody hours after The Insider’s investigation, October 23, 2026.

  6. RRN.world (@RRN_media), Post on X claiming the IBI website defacement, October 23, 2026.

  7. RRNworld, operation-semeynye-trusy (“Operation Family Boxers”), GitHub repository, accessed October 25, 2026.

  8. International Burke Institute, Statement by the International Burke Institute on the Hacking of Its Website, October 29, 2026.

  9. RRN.world, Sovereignty Begins at the Waistband, October 30, 2026.

  10. RRNworld, repost-today, GitHub repository, accessed October 25, 2026.

  11. DomainTools Investigations, Threat Intelligence Report: The SDA / Structura / Doppelgänger, Influence Operations, Infrastructure, Reach, and Potential, May 11, 2026.

  12. OpenAI, Disrupting a new covert influence campaign from Russia, August 25, 2026.

  13. Meta, Threat Research Indicators – H2 2026 Russia CIB network, August 2026.

  14. Cyfluence Research Center (CRC), Dancing with Cyfluence – Travolta, Telegram & the Moldovan Leak, October 12, 2025.

  15. Cyfluence Research Center (CRC), Behind the Curtain: Leaked SDA Files, Russian Influence Operations, and Defensive Cyfluence, June 2026.

  16. State of Israel, Computers Law, 5755-1995 (via WIPO Lex).

  17. DFRLab, Doppelganger websites persist one month following US government seizures, October 9, 2024.

bottom of page