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Cyber based influence campaigns 04th - 10th May 2026 Report
- CRC
- May 14
- 22 min read
[Introduction]
Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW).
Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns.
Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media.
We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc.
During the 04th to the 10th of May 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities.
[Contents]
[State Actors]
Russia
The War in Ukraine
Iran
[AI Related Articles]
[Cyfluence Attack]
BO Team Cyber Threats and Possible Connection to Hacktivism
[General Reports]
NewsGuard’s Index Proves Surge in Americans’ Vulnerability to Misinformation
Antisemitic Conspiracies Spread Through Social Media Algorithms
Trump’s Assassination Attempt Creates Waves of Misinformation in the Media
Foreign Manipulation Takes Advantage of the Alberta Separatist Debate
The Evolution of South African Media and Its Effect on Society
Jailbroken AI Models Fuel Disinformation and Malicious Operations
[Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation]
[ Report Highlights]
According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, Ukraine’s recent decision to expand outreach to non-Russian national minorities within the Russian Federation has become a new target for manipulation.
A recent NewsGuard audit found that Anthropic’s AI chatbot Claude has become more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns, showing a significant increase in repeating false claims sourced from Russian and Iranian state-affiliated media.
A two-year study by ISD Jordan found that misinformation and online hate speech are deeply interconnected within Jordan’s digital environment.
Research by ISD showed that algorithm-driven disinformation and harmful recommendation systems on TikTok and Rumble are exposing UK minors to antisemitic content, often without users actively searching for it.
A publication by VSW Bundesverband describes how Jailbroken AI systems are enabling hostile actors to automate disinformation, bypass safety controls, and support cyber and physical attack planning at scale.
As published by TVP World, Poland’s state-owned media organizations launched a joint fact-checking initiative to combat the growing spread of disinformation.
[ Report Summary]
As published by EEAS, between December 2025 and February 2026, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns intensified alongside Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which caused severe winter blackouts and hardship.
As revealed in an EU vs. Disinfo report, the Kremlin’s decision to significantly scale back the 2026 Victory Day parade highlights a growing gap between Russia’s propaganda narratives and operational reality.
As reported by The Record, Argentine authorities have detained Russian citizen Dmitrii Novikov and ordered his expulsion over allegations that he was involved in a Kremlin-linked disinformation network operating across Latin America, Europe, and the United States.
According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, Ukraine’s recent decision to expand outreach to non-Russian national minorities within the Russian Federation has become a new target for manipulation.
As stated in a Stop Fake report, a recent claim by the Russian Ministry of Defense that it had avoided striking central Kyiv "for humanitarian reasons" is a clear example of disinformation aimed at distorting the reality of Russia’s military actions.
According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, recent pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have focused on portraying Europe as economically unstable, authoritarian, and morally corrupt.
According to a report by Resecurity, the destabilization of Venezuela following Nicolás Maduro’s reported arrest in January 2026 has significantly disrupted Iranian-linked operational networks in Latin America.
According to an article by The Hill, Iran has increasingly used disinformation and digital influence tactics as part of its response to the United States.
A recent NewsGuard audit found that Anthropic’s AI chatbot Claude has become more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns, showing a significant increase in repeating false claims sourced from Russian and Iranian state-affiliated media.
A recent article by NewsGuard highlighted a growing disinformation risk linked to AI image detection tools, as several leading systems frequently misidentify real images as AI-generated.
NewsGuard’s latest Reality Gap Index showed a sharp rise in Americans’ susceptibility to online disinformation, with 43 percent of respondents believing at least one major false claim circulating during the first quarter of 2026.
As published by Secure List, research uncovered signs of possible collaboration between BO Team and the hacktivist group "Head Mare" through shared infrastructure and overlapping activity.
A two-year study by ISD Jordan found that misinformation and online hate speech are deeply interconnected within Jordan’s digital environment.
As published by Wired, recent online discussions surrounding alleged assassination attempts against President Donald Trump have become a major example of disinformation spreading across all communities.
Research by ISD showed that algorithm-driven disinformation and harmful recommendation systems on TikTok and Rumble are exposing UK minors to antisemitic content, often without users actively searching for it.
Graphika’s publication revealed that natural disasters have become prime opportunities for misinformation actors to exploit public attention and spread false narratives.
According to a report by DisinfoWatch, foreign actors are increasingly exploiting the Alberta separatist debate to spread disinformation, deepen internal divisions, and undermine trust in Canada’s democratic institutions.
A publication by VSW Bundesverband describes how Jailbroken AI systems are enabling hostile actors to automate disinformation, bypass safety controls, and support cyber and physical attack planning at scale.
According to an article by The Conversation, South African television reflects the country’s broader political and social struggles, particularly in the way information has been controlled and sometimes distorted.
According to an article by CyberNews, a new European social media platform called eYou aims to position itself as an alternative to X by offering AI-powered fact-checking in real time and emphasizing digital sovereignty.
As published by TVP World, Poland’s state-owned media organizations launched a joint fact-checking initiative to combat the growing spread of disinformation.
An article by France 24 shows how South Korea is intensifying efforts to counter AI-generated election disinformation as deepfakes, conspiracy narratives, and manipulated political content rapidly spread across digital platforms.
[State Actors]
Russia
Russian Disinformation Targets Europe
According to an article by EU vs. Disinfo, recent pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have focused on portraying Europe as economically unstable, authoritarian, and morally corrupt. In the lead-up to Victory Day on 09th of May, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) outlets spread false narratives claiming that Europe is "reviving Nazism", facing possible food rationing, and using new digital tools to spy on citizens.
A central tactic has been the distortion of real events and official statements. For example, comments by the European Central Bank about possible fuel market disruptions were falsely reframed as warnings of food rationing across Europe. Similarly, the EU’s new age verification app, developed to protect minors online, was falsely presented as a mass surveillance tool. Another recurring theme is the false accusation that Europe is reviving Nazism, a long-standing Kremlin narrative used to justify hostility toward the West and delegitimize support for Ukraine. By repeatedly labeling political opponents as "Nazis", Russian propaganda attempts to manipulate historical memory and frame Russia as a defender against fascism.
Source: EUvsDisinfo. Fake European crises and real Russian failures. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/fake-european-crises-and-real-russian-failures/
Russian Victory Day Parade Unmasks the Truth Behind the Propaganda
As revealed in an EU vs. Disinfo report, the Kremlin’s decision to significantly scale back the 2026 Victory Day parade, including the absence of tanks and heavy military equipment, highlights a growing gap between Russia’s propaganda narratives and operational reality. Officially justified by "security concerns" and alleged threats from Ukraine, the reduced parade contrasts sharply with pro-Kremlin disinformation claims that Russia’s war in Ukraine is "proceeding according to plan". The event, traditionally used to project military strength and national resilience, now exposes the limits of this narrative.
Victory Day parades have long been a central tool of Russian information manipulation. For years, they have been used to reinforce false narratives of Russia’s military superiority and moral legitimacy. These spectacles have transformed historical memory into propaganda and replaced the message of preventing future war with militarized symbolism designed to normalize confrontation.
The shrinking scale of the 2026 parade undermines this disinformation strategy. It reflects the pressure of military setbacks, internal security concerns, and Russia’s difficulty maintaining the image of invincibility it has carefully constructed. As the Kremlin continues to rely on symbolic displays and historical revisionism, the reduced parade serves as evidence that the reality of the war increasingly contradicts the propaganda narrative presented to both Russian citizens and international audiences.
Source: EUvsDisinfo. The parade that shrank Russia’s Victory Day under pressure. [online] Available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-parade-that-shrank-russias-victory-day-under-pressure/
Argentina Detained Suspected Russian Operative Linked to Disinformation Network
As reported by The Record, Argentine authorities have detained Russian citizen Dmitrii Novikov and ordered his expulsion over allegations that he was involved in a Kremlin-linked disinformation network operating across Latin America, Europe, and the United States. According to Argentina’s Ministry of National Security, Novikov was connected to "La Compañía", also known as Project Lakhta, an influence operation allegedly coordinated by Russian intelligence services and previously associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Officials accused Novikov of entering Argentina under false pretenses and participating in efforts to influence domestic affairs through propaganda, political intelligence gathering, and coordinated social media campaigns.
The investigation reportedly uncovered collaboration between La Compañía and local actors aimed at discrediting the Argentine government. Authorities also linked Novikov to earlier allegations in the Dominican Republic, where he was accused of managing cyber influence operations funded through cryptocurrency. Russia denied any involvement and dismissed the accusations as anti-Russian claims unsupported by evidence.
Source: Recorded Future News. Argentina to expel Dmitrii Novikov. [online] Published 6 May 2026. Available at: https://therecord.media/argentina-to-expel-dmitrii-novikov
The War in Ukraine
Russian Propaganda Attacks Kyiv’s Outreach to National Minority’s in Russia
According to a report by The Jamestown Foundation, Ukraine’s recent decision to expand outreach to non-Russian national minorities within the Russian Federation has become a new target for manipulation. While Kyiv presents this policy as support for minority rights and resistance to Russian imperialism, pro-Kremlin narratives are likely to portray it as an attempt to destabilize Russia and provoke state collapse. These narratives aim to distort Ukraine’s diplomatic and political initiatives by framing them as aggressive subversion rather than strategic engagement with oppressed communities.
A key disinformation risk lies in the Kremlin’s likely use of this development to reinforce claims that Ukraine and its Western partners seek the "destruction" of Russia, depicting external actors as orchestrating chaos inside Russia. By exaggerating Ukraine’s cooperation with ethnic activists and military volunteers, Russian information campaigns justify further repression and rally domestic support. Disinformation surrounding Ukraine’s outreach efforts is likely to focus on fear, division, and false claims of foreign interference, while obscuring the underlying political realities of ethnic repression and regional discontent inside the Russian Federation.
Source: Jamestown Foundation. Kyiv to Expand Its Outreach to National Minorities within Russia. [online] Published 7 May 2026. Available at: https://jamestown.org/kyiv-to-expand-its-outreach-to-national-minorities-within-russia/
Kremlin Disinformation About Strikes in Ukraine
As stated in a Stop Fake report, a recent claim by the Russian Ministry of Defense that it had avoided striking central Kyiv "for humanitarian reasons" is a clear example of disinformation aimed at distorting the reality of Russia’s military actions. This narrative has been widely amplified through Russian state media and Telegram channels to create a false image of restraint, despite extensive evidence of repeated strikes on civilian areas throughout the war.
In reality, Russian forces have repeatedly targeted central Kyiv and civilian infrastructure since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Documented attacks include missile strikes on residential districts in October 2022, the destruction of parts of the Okhmatdet Children’s Hospital in July 2024, and deadly attacks on homes, schools, and kindergartens in 2025. The continued escalation of missile and drone strikes, including incidents near Kyiv’s city center in 2026, directly contradicts any claim of "humanitarian abstinence".
Source: StopFake. Fake: Russia refrained from strikes on the center of Kyiv for humanitarian reasons — Russian Ministry of Defense. [online] Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/ru/fejk-rossiya-vozderzhivalas-ot-udarov-po-tsentru-kieva-po-gumanitarnym-soobrazheniyam-minoborony-rf/
Pro-Russian Disinformation Monitoring
As published by EEAS, between December 2025 and February 2026, pro-Russian disinformation campaigns intensified alongside Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which caused severe winter blackouts and hardship. Coordinated networks across Telegram, Facebook, and news sites used emotional manipulation and fear to influence public opinion, portraying Ukraine as a burden to the EU and framing European integration as harmful. These campaigns aimed to weaken morale and shift blame for the war away from Russia.
As part of these events, propagandists promoted claims of "EU fatigue", accused the EU of corruption and weakness, and attempted to damage trust in European support for Ukraine. Disinformation also targeted Ukrainian refugees with contradictory stories, depicting them both as mistreated victims and as threats to European societies, while false claims were used to undermine relations between Ukraine and key partners such as Poland. Another major pattern was the deliberate use of manipulative and fabricated content, including gender-based disinformation and "mirrored" narratives that project Russia’s actions onto Ukraine.
Source: European External Action Service (EEAS). DARE Compilation Q1 2026 (English). [online] Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/DARE_Compilation_Q1_2026_ENG.pdf
Iran
IRGC Influence Networks in Latin America
According to a report by Resecurity, the destabilization of Venezuela following Nicolás Maduro’s reported arrest in January 2026 has significantly disrupted Iranian-linked operational networks in Latin America, forcing IRGC and Hezbollah-affiliated actors to shift activities toward Colombia and Ecuador. These networks continue to rely on criminal partnerships involving drug trafficking, money laundering, and logistical cooperation with local cartels and armed groups. While regional authorities have intensified arrests, sanctions, and counterterrorism cooperation, Iranian-linked structures remain adaptive and capable of reorganizing across new operational environments.
As part of this activity, Iranian state-backed media platforms, cultural centers, proxy communication channels, and encrypted social media networks are reportedly used to recruit sympathizers and manipulate local political discourse. Under the cover of cultural diplomacy and religious outreach, these networks allegedly promote ideological messaging and create influence ecosystems designed to support broader strategic objectives while obscuring operational intent. Despite operational setbacks, Iranian-linked actors are increasingly shifting toward digital influence and information warfare, which makes counter-disinformation efforts as critical as traditional counterterrorism measures. Strengthened cyber intelligence, regional coordination, and proactive monitoring of online influence networks are essential to limit Iran’s ability to exploit instability across Latin America.
Source: Resecurity. Iranian Proxy Networks in Latin America Post-Maduro: IRGC. [online] Published 5 May 2026. Available at: https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/iranian-proxy-networks-in-latin-america-post-maduro-irgc
Iran's Digital Manipulation During the War
According to an article by The Hill, Iran has increasingly used disinformation and digital influence tactics as part of its response to the United States, turning social media into a central battleground during the ongoing conflict over the last months. Through sarcastic messaging, AI-generated videos, and other tailored content, Iranian-linked accounts have sought to flood the information environment with material designed to undermine U.S. credibility and weaken support for President Trump.
Experts describe these efforts as a form of "sharp power", the deliberate use of communication platforms to destabilize opponents by exploiting their own media systems and narratives. Iranian digital campaigns have mirrored and reversed earlier U.S. social media messaging, repurposing American political imagery, internet humor, and viral formats to create counter-narratives.
A recent analysis by CSIS added that Iranian disinformation campaigns framed the conflict as a corrupt and costly war serving elite interests, using manipulated content to amplify concerns about economic hardship, political corruption, military sacrifice, etc. These narratives were often boosted by verified accounts and amplified by aligned Russian and Chinese messaging ecosystems. The analysis stressed that democratic societies must adapt to this evolving information battlefield by responding faster and more effectively to digital disinformation. The central warning is that in modern warfare, controlling the information environment is as critical as military operations, and credibility has become a decisive strategic asset.
Source: The Hill. Iran’s social media war. [online] Available at: https://thehill.com/newsletters/technology/5863155-irans-social-media-war/
[AI Related Articles]
Anthropic’s Chatbot Influenced by Russian and Iranian Propaganda
A recent NewsGuard audit found that Anthropic’s AI chatbot Claude has become more vulnerable to disinformation campaigns, showing a significant increase in repeating false claims sourced from Russian and Iranian state-affiliated media. Claude repeated pro-Kremlin falsehoods in 15 percent of responses to typical user prompts, a sharp rise from previous audits, and for the first time cited Russian state-controlled outlets such as RT and sites linked to the Pravda disinformation network. The chatbot also cited Iranian state-affiliated media when responding to false claims related to the U.S.-Iran conflict.
The findings highlighted how coordinated disinformation ecosystems exploit the structure of web-based AI systems. Networks such as Pravda, which reportedly published millions of articles amplifying Kremlin falsehoods, can flood search results and increase the likelihood that AI models treat repeated propaganda as credible information. This creates a serious amplification risk, where chatbots not only repeat false narratives but also direct users toward deceptive sources, exposing them to further misinformation. Similar patterns were observed in Iranian state-controlled media, where false economic and geopolitical claims were repeated without sufficient verification of sources.
Experts attribute this trend to different reasons, such as limited transparency in how AI systems prioritize sources, possible performance adjustments affecting response quality, and the growing manipulation of online information spaces by state-backed influence operations. The audit underscored a critical challenge for AI platforms: without stronger source validation and safeguards, chatbots risk becoming accidental distributors of disinformation, reinforcing hostile information campaigns.
Source: NewsGuard. Anthropic’s AI Chatbot Is Leaning More on Russian and Iranian Propaganda Sources, NewsGuard Audit Finds. [online] Published 4 May 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/anthropic-ai-chatbot-claude-russia-iran-propaganda/
AI Image Detection Tools Mislead Users and Empower Fake News
A recent article by NewsGuard highlighted a growing disinformation risk linked to AI image detection tools, as several leading systems frequently misidentify real images as AI-generated. In tests involving authentic photos from the 2026 U.S.–Iran conflict, some tools incorrectly labeled genuine images as fake, with one tool producing false positives 40 percent of the time.
The findings showed how unreliable detection results can fuel disinformation campaigns. In one notable case, social media users cited an AI detector’s incorrect classification to falsely claim that an authentic video of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was fabricated, using this to support false rumors about his death. The audit also revealed major inconsistencies between tools, with different systems often giving contradictory assessments of the same image.
This lack of industry standards makes it easier for disinformation actors to cite results that support false claims selectively. Therefore, AI detection tools should not be treated as definitive proof of authenticity or manipulation but should be combined with human verification and source analysis to counter visual disinformation effectively.
Sources: NewsGuard. Leading AI image detection tools mislead online users, often declaring authentic content fake. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/leading-ai-image-detection-tools-mislead-online-users-often-declaring-authentic-content-fake/
[Cyfluence Attack]
BO Team Cyber Threats and Possible Connection to Hacktivism
As published by Secure List, in the first quarter of 2026, the BO Team cyber group shifted its attacks from healthcare organizations to manufacturing, telecommunications, and oil and gas sectors, while continuing to justify its actions through political messages shared on Telegram. This messaging reflects a disinformation strategy, as it presents the group’s operations as politically motivated activism while hiding their real objectives, which increasingly point toward covert cyberespionage rather than public disruption. Nevertheless, the investigation also uncovered signs of possible collaboration between BO Team and the hacktivist group "Head Mare" through shared infrastructure and overlapping activity, which suggests that BO Team may be part of a broader coordinated cyber threat network.
Sources: Securelist (Kaspersky). BoTeam campaign, ZeroNetKit, Headmare. [online] Available at: https://securelist.ru/tr/boteam-campaign-zeronetkit-headmare/115429/
[General Reports]
NewsGuard’s Index Proves Surge in Americans’ Vulnerability to Misinformation
NewsGuard’s latest Reality Gap Index showed a sharp rise in Americans’ susceptibility to online disinformation, with 43 percent of respondents believing at least one major false claim circulating during the first quarter of 2026, which makes nearly double the 22 percent recorded in December 2025, and with only seven percent of respondents correctly identifying all three tested claims as false. The findings suggested a significant deterioration in the public's ability to identify false narratives, while uncertainty about online information also increased.
The most successful false narratives involved politically and emotionally charged topics, including a false claim accusing CNN of fabricating Iranian ceasefire statements or an AI-manipulated image of an Iranian missile. The CNN-related falsehood proved especially effective, generating over 35 million views and misleading nearly a quarter of respondents. The report highlighted the increasing role of AI-generated and AI-edited content in modern disinformation campaigns. Although respondents performed somewhat better at identifying the manipulated missile image as false, widespread uncertainty shows that synthetic media continues to challenge public verification skills.
Source: NewsGuard. Q1 2026 Reality Gap Index Report. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Q1-2026-Reality-Gap-Index-Report-1.pdf
Online Misinformation and Hate Speech in Jordan
A two-year study by ISD Jordan found that misinformation and online hate speech are deeply interconnected within Jordan’s digital environment. Events such as the Gaza conflict and instability in Syria triggered significant spikes in sectarian, nationalist, and gender-based abuse across social media platforms. The research showed that disinformation often creates the conditions for hate speech to spread by fueling fear, polarization, and identity-based tensions.
The report identified three dominant forms of harmful content: misogynistic abuse targeting women in public life, sectarian hate directed mainly at Shia communities and other minorities, and exclusionary nationalist discourse that deepens social divisions. These narratives are frequently reinforced by coordinated harassment campaigns and manipulated through regional information flows. Arabizi, which is Arabic written in Latin characters and numbers, is often used to evade platform moderation systems, exposing major gaps in Arabic-language content detection and enabling harmful disinformation to circulate with limited oversight.
Jordan’s online disinformation challenges cannot be treated as purely domestic, as regional narratives and external influence regularly shape local discourse. To change the situation, the report called for stronger digital governance, clearer legal definitions, greater transparency in Arabic-language moderation, and digital literacy programs focused on how disinformation spreads through algorithms and online echo chambers.
Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). Mapping Digital Hate: Jordan. [online] Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Mapping-digital-hate_Jordan.pdf
Antisemitic Conspiracies Spread Through Social Media Algorithms
Research by ISD showed that algorithm-driven disinformation and harmful recommendation systems on TikTok and Rumble are exposing UK minors to antisemitic content, often without users actively searching for it. TikTok’s recommendation algorithm gradually pushes young users from lifestyle-related content toward conspiracy theories and politically charged antisemitic narratives. Rumble presents a more direct threat, exposing users immediately to overt hate speech and violent conspiracy content through its "Editor’s Picks" feature.
algorithms amplify disinformation by connecting mainstream topics, such as lifestyle content or discussions around the Israel-Palestine conflict, to extremist narratives. Interactive features, including comments, stickers, and sounds, further accelerate the spread of harmful misinformation by linking seemingly benign posts to coded antisemitic messaging. Additionally, the findings highlighted major failures in platform moderation and content detection, particularly in identifying coded hate speech and preventing algorithmic escalation. It showed that reactive content removal is insufficient, calling instead for stronger regulation, algorithmic transparency, and proactive safeguards under the UK Online Safety Act.
Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). Amplifying Antisemitism: How Recommender Algorithms Serve Harmful Content to Children. [online] Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Amplifying-Antisemitism_How-Recommender-Algorithms-Serve-Harmful-Content-to-Children.pdf
Trump’s Assassination Attempt Creates Waves of Misinformation in the Media
As published by Wired, recent online discussions surrounding alleged assassination attempts against President Donald Trump (for further information, see W18 April Cyfluence Report) have become a major example of disinformation spreading across both left-wing and right-wing communities. Following the White House Correspondents’ Dinner incident, social media was quickly flooded with unsupported claims that the attack was staged. These narratives then expanded to include the 2024 Butler, Pennsylvania, assassination attempt, with influencers and commentators promoting conspiracy theories despite the lack of credible evidence.
The disinformation relies on the selective interpretation of incomplete information, misleading video clips, and speculative claims presented as proof. Viral posts pointed to Trump’s public reactions, the positioning of photographers, security procedures, and limited public details about the attackers as supposed evidence of orchestration. However, available reporting, witness accounts, and official investigations contradict these claims, showing that many of the so-called "anomalies" are either misrepresented or taken out of context.
Source: WIRED. There is no evidence the Trump assassination attempts were staged. People still believe they were. [online] Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/there-is-no-evidence-the-trump-assassination-attempts-were-staged-people-still-believe-they-were/
Natural Disasters Disinformation Networks
Graphika’s founder's appearance on "60 Minutes" on the 26th of April was published in Graphika this week, revealing that natural disasters have become prime opportunities for misinformation actors to exploit public attention and spread false narratives. Because such crises focus widespread public attention on a single event, extremist groups use these moments to push misleading content and amplify distrust in official institutions. These campaigns often present distorted or alternative explanations designed to exploit fear and uncertainty during emergencies.
Foreign influence networks, including white nationalist networks, have increasingly used disaster zones to promote themselves through highly visible aid efforts while spreading conspiracy theories that undermine trust in government agencies such as FEMA. By portraying themselves as more effective than official responders, they seek to recruit supporters and legitimize their agendas. Foreign state-linked actors have also weaponized disaster-related disinformation. Chinese influence networks, for example, have used U.S. natural disasters to promote narratives of American government failure while portraying China’s crisis response as superior.
Source: Graphika. What We Told 60 Minutes: What Happens Online When Natural Disaster Strikes. [online] Available at: https://graphika.com/posts/what-we-told-60-minutes-what-happens-online-when-natural-disaster-strikes
Foreign Manipulation Takes Advantage of the Alberta Separatist Debate
According to a report by DisinfoWatch, foreign actors are increasingly exploiting the Alberta separatist debate to spread disinformation, deepen internal divisions, and undermine trust in Canada’s democratic institutions. While Alberta’s political and economic grievances are legitimate topics for democratic debate, external influence campaigns seek to distort these concerns by portraying separation as inevitable or widely supported. This manipulation threatens Canada’s "cognitive sovereignty": the public’s ability to make political decisions free from foreign interference.
The report identified three main disinformation sources: covert Russian influence operations, overt amplification by U.S. political figures and influencers, and AI-generated "slopaganda". Russian-linked media networks have repeatedly promoted narratives depicting Alberta as exploited and primed for separation, while U.S.-based influencers have amplified annexation and instability narratives to massive online audiences. At the same time, AI-generated political content can imitate authentic Canadian commentary and make coordinated manipulation harder to detect. The greatest concern is that these disinformation efforts exploit existing public distrust and information gaps, particularly during sensitive political moments such as petition verification, referendum campaigns, or post-vote disputes. The report emphasized that strengthening media literacy, improving rapid-response systems, and supporting independent journalism are essential to countering foreign manipulation before such narratives take hold.
Source: DisinfoWatch. Foreign interference targeting Canada and Alberta. [online] Available at: https://disinfowatch.org/foreign-interference-targeting-canada-and-alberta/
The Evolution of South African Media and Its Effect on Society
According to an article by The Conversation, South African television reflects the country’s broader political and social struggles, particularly in the way information has been controlled and sometimes distorted. Introduced only in 1976 after years of government resistance, television was initially used by the apartheid regime as a tool of propaganda and exclusion. By limiting access and carefully controlling content, the state used broadcasting to reinforce disinformation, preserve racial segregation, and isolate South Africans from global narratives and alternative perspectives.
With the arrival of democracy in 1994, television underwent a major transformation. The broadcasting system shifted from a state-controlled monopoly to a more diverse and competitive media environment, with the SABC redefined as a public broadcaster meant to inform, educate, and represent all communities. This period marked an effort to replace propaganda with inclusive storytelling and nation-building. However, later years saw renewed challenges, including political interference, financial mismanagement, and forms of institutional manipulation that threatened editorial independence and raised concerns about the spread of biased or misleading information.
Today, South African television operates in a digital era shaped by streaming platforms and algorithm-driven media. While these platforms offer opportunities to globalize local stories and amplify marginalized voices, they also create new risks of disinformation through commercial influence and unequal control over narratives. The history of South African television highlights the continuing struggle to ensure the media remains a source of accurate representation rather than distortion. Therefore, the fight against disinformation is central to the country’s democratic future.
Source: The Conversation. Propaganda machine to public good: A brief history of 50 years of TV in South Africa. [online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/propaganda-machine-to-public-good-a-brief-history-of-50-years-of-tv-in-south-africa-280085
Jailbroken AI Models Fuel Disinformation and Malicious Operations
A publication by VSW Bundesverband describes how jailbroken AI models are being exploited by hostile actors to support disinformation operations, cyber activities, and potential physical attacks. By bypassing built-in safeguards, these manipulated systems can generate harmful content that would normally be restricted, including propaganda narratives, malicious guidance, and operational planning materials. The report highlights growing concerns that such capabilities are increasingly accessible to state-linked groups and extremist networks seeking to amplify influence campaigns and destabilizing activities.
According to the article, the primary tactic involves “jailbreaking” AI systems through specially crafted prompts designed to override safety controls and content restrictions. Once compromised, the models can be used to automate the creation of persuasive false narratives, coordinate deceptive online messaging, and assist in producing detailed instructions for malicious operations. The article emphasizes that these techniques lower the technical barrier for conducting influence and disruption campaigns at scale. The actors referenced in the article include state-affiliated entities, cybercriminal groups, and other malicious organizations seeking strategic advantages through AI-enabled manipulation. The report frames the issue as part of a broader information security challenge in which generative AI tools are increasingly weaponized for hostile influence operations, disinformation dissemination, and coordinated destabilization efforts.
Source: Verein für Sicherheitspolitik (VSW) Bundesverband. Studie: Desinformation. [online] Available at: https://www.vsw-bundesverband.de/wp-content/uploads/Studie-Desinformation.pdf
[Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation]
South Korea Battles Surge In AI-Driven Election Disinformation
A France24 article examines how South Korea is confronting the rapid expansion of AI-driven disinformation ahead of national and local elections, as increasingly sophisticated generative AI tools enable the production of highly convincing fabricated content. South Korean election authorities and digital forensic teams have identified a sharp rise in manipulated media, including fake television reports, AI-generated political propaganda songs, and fabricated videos targeting political candidates. The report highlights that false AI-generated election content increased dramatically between the 2024 general election and the subsequent presidential campaign, reflecting the accelerating use of generative AI in influence operations. Election officials described the challenge as a constant “whack-a-mole” struggle, with disinformation spreading rapidly across social media platforms, chatrooms, and politically aligned online communities.
The article further details how conspiracy narratives surrounding election fraud and vote-rigging have amplified distrust in democratic institutions, including claims promoted by supporters of former president Yoon Suk Yeol. Authorities have responded with strengthened legislation introduced in 2023, allowing the removal of deceptive AI-generated election content and imposing severe penalties on repeat offenders. Detection efforts combine AI-based forensic software with human review to identify manipulated imagery and media. The report emphasizes that hostile information tactics increasingly exploit emotionally persuasive AI-generated narratives, deepfake content, and coordinated amplification across digital platforms, while online harassment and intimidation campaigns against election workers further contribute to the destabilization of the information environment.
Source: France 24. AI disinfo tests South Korean laws ahead of local elections. [online] Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260507-ai-disinfo-tests-south-korean-laws-ahead-of-local-elections
eYou as a European Alternative to X With AI Fact-Checking
According to an article by CyberNews, a new European social media platform called eYou aims to position itself as an alternative to X by offering AI-powered fact-checking in real time. Founded by French entrepreneur Grégoire Vigroux and his partner Jasseem Allybokus, the platform was developed after surveys showed widespread concern about fake news and algorithm-driven echo chambers on social media. eYou use multiple large language models simultaneously to reduce bias and improve fact-checking accuracy, while also dividing its feed into followed accounts, discovery content, and a curated news section powered by sources such as Agence France-Presse.
The platform also places strong emphasis on European data sovereignty. According to the company, all user data is stored in Belgium under GDPR protections to reduce dependence on American and Chinese technology platforms. Unlike many social networks, eYou currently operates without advertising and presents itself as a more user-centric and responsible alternative focused on reducing misinformation rather than maximizing engagement. As of now, most users are based in Romania, where the company operates, although the platform is also seeing growing interest from users in the United States.
Source: Cybernews. Eyou social media. [online] Available at: https://www.cybernews.com/tech/eyou-social-media/
Poland Launches a New Initiative Against Disinformation
As published by TVP World, Poland’s state-owned media organizations launched a joint fact-checking initiative called "Sprawdzam to" ("I’m checking this") to combat the growing spread of disinformation. The project, created by Telewizja Polska, the Polish Press Agency, and Polish Radio, will operate through a new online platform that will publish fact-checks, investigative reports, and analysis of how false information is created and spread. The initiative aims to strengthen public access to verified information and improve awareness of media manipulation.
The launch comes amid increasing concerns over foreign disinformation campaigns targeting Poland’s information space. Polish officials have linked many of these operations to Russia and Belarus, describing them as part of hybrid warfare designed to create confusion, weaken public trust, and destabilize the country. According to officials, false narratives have accompanied incidents such as Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace and acts of railway sabotage, with online campaigns attempting to shift blame onto Ukraine or NATO.
Source: TVP World. After the drones came the trolls, now Poland is fighting back online. [online] Published 7 May 2026. Available at: https://tvpworld.com/93126173/drones-sabotage-and-trolls-polands-new-front-line-is-fact-checking
[CRC Glossary]
The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult.
To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence.
As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website.
