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Cyber based influence campaigns 10th – 16th August 2026 Report

  • Writer: CRC
    CRC
  • 11 minutes ago
  • 19 min read
Cover Image- Text: Weekly Media Update: Information Operations


[Introduction]


Cyber-based hostile influence campaigns are aimed at influencing target audiences by promoting information and/or disinformation over the internet, sometimes combined with cyber-attacks which enhance their effect (hence force Cyfluence, as opposed to cyber-attacks that aim to steal information, extort money, etc.) Such hostile influence campaigns and operations can be considered an epistemological branch of Information Operations (IO) or Information Warfare (IW).

Typically, and as customary during the last decade, the information is spread throughout various internet platforms, which are the different elements of the hostile influence campaign, and as such, connectivity and repetitiveness of content between several elements are the main core characteristics of influence campaigns. 

Hostile influence campaigns, much like Cyber-attacks, have also become a tool for rival nations and corporations to damage reputation or achieve various business, political or ideological goals. Much like in the cyber security arena, PR professionals and government agencies are responding to negative publicity and disinformation shared over the news and social media. 

We use the term cyber based hostile influence campaigns, as we include in this definition also cyber-attacks aimed at influencing (such as hack and leak during election time), while we exclude of this term other types of more traditional kinds of influence such as diplomatic, economic, military etc.

During the 10th to 16th August 2026, we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). The following report is a summary of what we regard as the main events. Some of the mentioned campaigns have to do with social media and news outlets solemnly, while others leverage cyber-attack capabilities.



[Contents]





Russia 

China







[ Report Highlights]


  • EUObserver reported that Operation Matryoshka, a Russia-linked influence network, is deploying websites impersonating BBC News and German public broadcaster ARD to spread disinformation targeting Germany's September 2026 federal election, applying the same impersonation infrastructure previously used against French audiences during the May 2026 regional elections.

  • An NYT investigation based on intelligence officials from three countries, Moldovan prosecutors, and leaked documents reveals that Russia's Kremlin ran GRU-linked paramilitary training camps in Serbia, Bosnia, and Moscow, paid hundreds of Orthodox priests to push Kremlin narratives, making Moldova the most extensively documented Russian election interference operation outside Ukraine.

  • NewsGuard documented Operation Matryoshka's campaign to exploit Germany's historical East-West divide ahead of state elections, using the hashtag #TimeToDivideGermany, and designed primarily to seed false claims into AI tools and fact-checking ecosystems rather than generate direct website traffic.

  • FPRI analyzed China's cognitive warfare playbook against Taiwan, documenting the GoLaxy Smart Propaganda System, a PLA AI platform automating content generation, multi-platform distribution, and audience targeting, as part of a broader PLA cognitive domain operations doctrine that treats information warfare as an integrated component of military operations.

  • Resemble AI's H1 2026 Deepfake Threat Report identified 15,736 confirmed victims of deepfake audio and video attacks globally in the first six months of 2026, with Grok accounting for 87% of detected synthetic audio files, with financial fraud, non-consensual intimate imagery, and political impersonation the three dominant use categories.

  • ISD Global traced the amplification pathway from false and misleading anti-migrant posts on X, Telegram, and TikTok to real-world violence at asylum seeker accommodation in Southampton and Belfast, indicating that platform enforcement actions taken after 2024 have not disrupted the underlying far-right network infrastructure.

  • A RestOfWorld analysis by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the African Union's Advisory Group on AI argued that disproportionate focus on deepfakes understates the structural risk of AI embedded in voter registration, biometric verification, and results management systems.

  • PolitiFact announced a nationwide partnership network combining state and local news organizations, university journalism programs, and digital publishers to extend coordinated fact-checking coverage to smaller markets and competitive congressional districts historically underserved by national fact-checkers ahead of the November 2026 US midterm elections.

[ Report Summary]

  • StopFake debunked a Russian propaganda claim that a Ukrainian drone damaged Portuguese F-16 aircraft stationed at Estonia's Amari Air Base, a fabrication circulating across pro-Russian Telegram channels.

  • StopFake documented how Russian propaganda channels stripped caveats from Die Zeit reporting on an incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport to falsely present the German newspaper as concluding Ukraine staged a false-flag operation, when Die Zeit's actual reporting raised questions without making any such allegation.

  • EUObserver reported that Operation Matryoshka, a Russia-linked influence network, is deploying websites impersonating BBC News and German public broadcaster ARD to spread disinformation targeting Germany's September 2026 federal election, applying the same impersonation infrastructure previously used against French audiences during the May 2026 regional elections.

  • Detector Media's weekly review of Russian disinformation for 5-11 August 2026 documented fabricated claims of Russian strikes on the Nova Poshta postal service, Matryoshka network deepfake content targeting French audiences, and an entirely invented story about a captured British mercenary in Ukraine, each serving distinct narrative goals across different geographic target audiences.

  • An NYT investigation based on intelligence officials from three countries, Moldovan prosecutors, and leaked documents reveals that Russia's Kremlin ran GRU-linked paramilitary training camps in Serbia, Bosnia, and Moscow, paid hundreds of Orthodox priests to push Kremlin narratives, making Moldova the most extensively documented Russian election interference operation outside Ukraine.

  • NewsGuard documented Operation Matryoshka's campaign to exploit Germany's historical East-West divide ahead of state elections, using the hashtag #TimeToDivideGermany, and designed primarily to seed false claims into AI tools and fact-checking ecosystems rather than generate direct website traffic.

  • NewsGuard tested Chinese-made AI chatbots including DeepSeek, Kimi, and Doubao against non-Chinese models on the same pro-China false claims, finding Chinese chatbots failed to debunk those claims 53% of the time versus 24% for non-Chinese models.

  • FPRI analyzed China's cognitive warfare playbook against Taiwan, documenting the GoLaxy Smart Propaganda System, a PLA AI platform automating content generation, multi-platform distribution, and audience targeting, as part of a broader PLA cognitive domain operations doctrine that treats information warfare as an integrated component of military operations.

  • Resemble AI's H1 2026 Deepfake Threat Report identified 15,736 confirmed victims of deepfake audio and video attacks globally in the first six months of 2026, with Grok accounting for 87% of detected synthetic audio files, with financial fraud, non-consensual intimate imagery, and political impersonation the three dominant use categories.

  • South Korea's National Police Agency arrested 419 people in 2026 for producing or distributing non-consensual AI-generated deepfake sexual content, primarily male students targeting female classmates, while deploying a physics-based AI detection system that identifies synthetic images through lighting inconsistencies and facial geometry anomalies that current AI generators cannot fully simulate.

  • The Brennan Center for Justice found that AI detection tools tested on AI-generated election-related images correctly identified fewer synthetic images on average, demonstrating that both technological and human-review safeguards for AI-generated election content are operating below reliable identification thresholds ahead of the November 2026 US midterms.

  • Futurism documented networks of AI-generated fake male personas on Facebook monetized through Facebook's own Content Monetization program, with Google's AI Overview initially presenting the fabricated identities as real people when queried by users.

  • ISD Global traced the amplification pathway from false and misleading anti-migrant posts on X, Telegram, and TikTok to real-world violence at asylum seeker accommodation in Southampton and Belfast, indicating that platform enforcement actions taken after 2024 have not disrupted the underlying far-right network infrastructure.

  • A survey of Michigan local election officials found 80% confident in voting integrity ahead of the November 2026 midterms, while 20% anticipated significant disinformation problems, with the officials concerned disproportionately representing smaller rural jurisdictions. 

  • Brazil's Supreme Court ordered Discord to suspend its livestreaming functionality after the platform repeatedly failed to comply with government orders to remove neo-Nazi content, extremist channels, and material promoting violence against minority groups, representing an escalation from individual content takedowns to targeted functional suspensions as a compliance pressure mechanism.

  • A RestOfWorld analysis by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the African Union's Advisory Group on AI argued that disproportionate focus on deepfakes understates the structural risk of AI embedded in voter registration, biometric verification, and results management systems.

  • PolitiFact announced a nationwide partnership network combining state and local news organizations, university journalism programs, and digital publishers to extend coordinated fact-checking coverage to smaller markets and competitive congressional districts historically underserved by national fact-checkers ahead of the November 2026 US midterm elections.

  • The Federal Trade Commission proposed applying Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices, to AI systems that embed or amplify ideological bias in their outputs without disclosing that bias to users, advancing a theory of liability in which undisclosed systematic political skew in AI responses constitutes a deceptive trade practice subject to FTC enforcement.

[State Actors]


Russia

Operation Matryoshka Deploys Fake Websites to Target Germany's 2026 Election

An investigation published by EUObserver states that Operation Matryoshka, a Russia-linked influence network, is deploying websites impersonating BBC News and German public broadcaster ARD to spread disinformation targeting Germany's September 2026 federal election, with fabricated content designed to undermine confidence in German democratic institutions and amplify divisive narratives by routing them through the reputational authority of trusted international and domestic broadcasters.


The investigation states that Operation Matryoshka's targeting of Germany's federal election represents systematic adaptation of proven infrastructure across sequential European electoral cycles; the same BBC and broadcaster-impersonation methods previously deployed against French audiences during May 2026 regional elections are now being applied to Germany's federal vote, indicating an operational doctrine of reusing tested influence infrastructure rather than developing bespoke campaigns for each national target.


Source: EUobserver. Operation Matryoshka: Russia using ‘BBC news’ fakes to pervert key German vote. [online] Published 11 August 2026. Available at: https://euobserver.com/231951/operation-matryoshka-russia-using-bbc-news-fakes-to-pervert-key-german-vote/ 


Russian Fabricated Nova Poshta Strikes, Matryoshka France Deepfakes, and Invented British Mercenary

A report published by Detector Media states that Russian disinformation during 5th to 11th August 2026 included fabricated claims of Russian strikes on Nova Poshta, Ukraine's largest private postal and logistics company, designed to demoralize the Ukrainian civilian population by manufacturing evidence of logistical collapse, alongside Matryoshka network deepfake content targeting French audiences and an entirely invented story about a captured British mercenary fighting in Ukraine.


The report states that the week's three simultaneous fabrication tracks illustrate the Kremlin's multi-audience targeting doctrine: the Nova Poshta narrative targets Ukrainian civilian morale, the Matryoshka deepfakes target French electoral opinion ahead of Germany's September vote, and the British mercenary fabrication sustains the false NATO-involvement framing used in Russian domestic propaganda and Global South channels to justify escalation, three geographically distinct audiences served by three operationally distinct but simultaneously active fabrication tracks.


Source: Detector Media. Strikes on Nova Poshta and a fabricated “British mercenary.” Review of Russian fakes from August 5–11, 2026. [online] Published 13 August 2026. Available at: https://en.detector.media/post/strikes-on-nova-poshta-and-a-fabricated-british-mercenary-review-of-russian-fakes-from-august-5-11-2026


Russia's GRU Training Camps Targeted Moldova 

An investigation published by The New York Times states that Russia conducted one of the most extensive foreign election interference operations documented outside Ukraine against Moldova, deploying GRU-linked training camps in Serbia, Bosnia, and Moscow to build paramilitary shock troops; paying hundreds of Orthodox priests approximately USD 1,000 each to campaign against EU membership from the pulpit; and funding exiled oligarch Ilan Shor's Skolkovo-based vote-buying scheme, which enlisted over 150,000 Moldovans through 240 Telegram chatbots and paid approximately USD 20 million to 38,000 activists ahead of Moldova's 2024 EU membership referendum, according to leaked documents, three Western intelligence services, and Moldovan prosecutors.


According to the investigation, Putin privately told military commanders in December 2025 that Russia's strategic goal for 2026 is 'the collapse of NATO and the E.U. from within, with Moldova ranked second only to Ukraine in Kremlin priorities, both because it sits between NATO members and Ukraine and because Russia still seeks to create a land bridge through southern Ukraine to Transnistria, the Russian-controlled breakaway region inside Moldova, making the documented scale of covert investment in Moldovan electoral politics a strategic imperative rather than a peripheral influence campaign, and one whose methods (GRU paramilitary training, priest networks, chatbot-coordinated vote-buying, CEC hacking) represent a composite template for Russian electoral subversion that Western intelligence expects to be adapted for future targets.


Source: The New York Times. Putin’s Russia Seeks to Destabilize Moldova. [online] Published 14 August 2026. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/14/world/europe/russia-moldova-putin.html


Matryoshka Pushes Fake Reports to Exploit Germany's East-West Divide

An investigation published by NewsGuard states that Operation Matryoshka has produced at least 20 fabricated videos and news reports depicting German news outlets, celebrities, and business leaders as advocates for the redivision of Germany into its communist-era East and West, circulated under the hashtag #TimeToDivideGermany ahead of Germany's state elections, with the broader Matryoshka campaign comprising 723 fake news reports mimicking 134 real news brands, including Der Spiegel and Deutsche Welle among the most imitated, and designed primarily not to generate traffic to fake websites but to seed false claims that propagate through organic repetition, harm credible media reputations, overwhelm fact-checkers, and manipulate AI language models that synthesize across sources.


The investigation states that Operation Matryoshka's German redivision campaign represents a documented strategic inversion in Russian messaging about Germany, shifting from the prior Kremlin position of crediting Russia for Germany's peaceful reunification to actively attempting to reverse it, a shift attributable to Germany's sustained military and financial support for Ukraine, and one that exploits residual East-West socioeconomic tensions as a social fault line to fracture the domestic political consensus underpinning Germany's Ukraine policy, with the redivision framing calibrated to audiences in the former East Germany where support for continued Ukraine assistance has historically been lower.


Source: NewsGuard. Russia’s Push to Re-Divide Germany. [online] Available at: https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/russias-push-to-re-divide-germany


Russian Fabrication Claims Ukrainian Drone Damaged Portuguese F-16s 

An analysis published by StopFake states that Russian propaganda spread a false claim that a Ukrainian drone struck and damaged Portuguese F-16 aircraft stationed at Estonia's Amari Air Base, a fabrication circulating across pro-Russian Telegram channels and websites without any corroborating evidence and contradicted by both Estonian and Portuguese defence officials who confirmed no such incident occurred.


The analysis states that the fabricated claim follows an established Kremlin pattern of inventing drone incidents at NATO facilities to portray alliance member states as direct participants in the Ukraine conflict, with the specific targeting of Portuguese aircraft at an Estonian base designed to simultaneously strain Portugal-Estonia relations and amplify narratives of NATO complicity in Ukrainian strikes against Russia.


Source: StopFake. Fake: Ukrainian Drone Damaged Portuguese F-16s at Estonian Air Base. [online] Published 15 August 2026. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-ukrainian-drone-damaged-portuguese-f-16s-at-estonian-air-base/


Russian Manipulation False-Flag Allegation at Leipzig Airport

An analysis published by StopFake states that Russian propaganda channels misrepresented reporting by the German newspaper Die Zeit to falsely claim the outlet concluded Ukraine staged a false-flag operation at Leipzig/Halle Airport, when Die Zeit's actual reporting raised questions about an incident without making any such allegation, with Russian sources stripping all qualifiers and caveats to convert acknowledged journalistic uncertainty into a definitive claim of Ukrainian culpability.


The analysis states that the manipulation follows a documented Kremlin technique of selectively quoting or misrepresenting credible Western media to lend false authority to disinformation narratives, exploiting the reputational capital of established outlets like Die Zeit to reach audiences that would reject the same claim when it originates from Russian state media. This technique makes the false narrative self-insulating against debunking, since the cited outlet genuinely exists and did publish the source article.


Source: StopFake. Manipulation: Die Zeit Says Ukraine May Have Staged a False-Flag Operation at Leipzig Airport. [online] Published 14 August 2026. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/en/manipulation-die-zeit-says-ukraine-may-have-staged-a-false-flag-operation-at-leipzig-airport/


China

Chinese AI Chatbots Fail to Debunk Pro-China False Claims

A report published by NewsGuard states that Chinese-made AI chatbots, including DeepSeek, Kimi, and Doubao, failed to debunk pro-China false claims 53% of the time, more than double the 24% failure rate of non-Chinese models tested against the same claims, with Chinese chatbots frequently responding to politically sensitive topics including Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, and Uyghur detention with evasive non-answers that leave false claims unchallenged rather than factually correcting them.


As states in the report, the systematic divergence between Chinese and non-Chinese AI models on pro-China false claims indicates political alignment embedded in Chinese AI training and guardrail design, with the deflection pattern, declining to answer rather than denying, representing a technically less detectable form of bias than active repetition of false claims, since models that refuse to address sensitive topics leave users without corrections while avoiding the more easily documented behavior of directly reproducing propaganda narratives.


Source: NewsGuard. As Chinese AI Models Gain Popularity in the West, Their Chatbots Fail to Debunk Pro-China False Claims More Than Half the Time. [online] Published 13 August 2026. Available at: https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/chinese-ai-chatbots-fail-to-debunk-pro-china-false-claims-more-than-half-the-time


China's PLA Deploys GoLaxy Smart Propaganda System Against Taiwan

An analysis published by FPRI states that China's People's Liberation Army is deploying the GoLaxy Smart Propaganda System, an AI-powered platform that automates content generation, multi-platform distribution, and audience targeting for cognitive warfare operations against Taiwan, enabling the PLA to produce and distribute tailored influence content at a scale and speed that previously required substantially larger human operational infrastructure, as part of a broader PLA cognitive domain operations doctrine integrating information warfare with conventional military planning.


According to the analysis, GoLaxy represents a structural shift in Chinese cognitive warfare capabilities against Taiwan from manual content production to AI-automated pipeline operations, enabling continuous rather than episodic influence campaigns that simultaneously target multiple audience segments, Taiwan's civilian population to undermine confidence in democratic governance and military preparedness, international Chinese-language communities to shape diaspora opinion, and English-language media to influence foreign policymaker perceptions, with automation reducing per-campaign operational cost and enabling the sustained tempo that episodic human-operated campaigns cannot maintain.


Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Inside China’s Cognitive Warfare Playbook Against Taiwan. [online] Published 13 August 2026. Available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/08/inside-chinas-cognitive-warfare-playbook-against-taiwan/


[AI Related Articles]


Grok Produced 87% of Synthetic Audio Files

A report published by Resemble AI states that its H1 2026 Deepfake Threat Report identified 15,736 confirmed victims of deepfake audio and video attacks globally in the first six months of 2026, with Grok accounting for 87% of detected synthetic audio files, a concentration attributable to xAI's comparatively permissive voice synthesis content policies relative to competing models, and with financial fraud, non-consensual intimate imagery, and political impersonation comprising the three dominant use categories.


The report states that the concentration of synthetic audio production in a single platform at 87% represents a systemic vulnerability in the deepfake threat landscape, where policy decisions by one AI provider can materially alter the global distribution of harmful synthetic content, and that the 15,736 victim figure represents only confirmed cases from reports reaching Resemble AI's detection infrastructure, with researchers assessing actual victim numbers as substantially higher given the fragmented reporting environment and the volume of content that evades automated detection


Source: Resemble AI. The H1 2026 Deepfake Threat Report. [online] Published 12 August 2026. Available at: https://www.resemble.ai/resources/h1-2026-deepfake-threat-report


South Korea's KNPA Arrests people for Non-Consensual Deepfake Sexual Content

An article published by SBS News states that South Korea's National Police Agency arrested 419 people in 2026 for producing or distributing non-consensual AI-generated deepfake sexual content, with those arrested primarily male students targeting female classmates using commercial AI image manipulation tools, and with the KNPA deploying a physics-based AI detection system that identifies synthetic images through lighting inconsistencies, shadow geometry errors, and physiologically impossible facial proportions invisible to human reviewers.


According to the article, the KNPA's physics-based detection approach represents a technically distinct counterstrategy to existing deep-fake identification methods. Rather than training classifiers on known synthetic content patterns that degrade as generation models evolve, physics-based analysis identifies violations of physical laws that current AI generators cannot fully simulate, providing detection capability that is less vulnerable to adversarial model updates and remains effective as generation quality improves.


Source: SBS News. Police Apprehend 419 Suspects Using AI to Track Deepfake Production and Creation Processes. [online] Published 13 August 2026. Available at: https://news.sbs.co.kr/english/article.do?news_id=N1008703923


AI Detection Tools Correctly Identified Fewer AI-Generated Election Images

A report published by the Brennan Center for Justice states that AI detection tools tested on AI-generated election-related images correctly identified fewer than 4 of 14 synthetic images on average, with human reviewers performing no better than the automated tools, demonstrating that both technological and human-review safeguards for AI-generated election content are operating below reliable identification thresholds ahead of the November 2026 US midterm elections.


The report states that while AI is increasingly deployed to fight election disinformation through automated monitoring and content labelling, the same AI capabilities are simultaneously enabling adversaries to produce higher volumes of more convincing disinformation at lower cost, with the detection gap documented in the report indicating that the offensive application of AI to election influence operations is currently outpacing the defensive application, creating a structural asymmetry that platform moderation systems and human reviewers are not yet equipped to close.


Source: Brennan Center for Justice. Does AI Fight or Fuel Election Disinformation? [online] Available at: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/does-ai-fight-or-fuel-election-disinformation


Facebook AI-Generated Silver Fox Personas Accumulate Up to One Million Views

An article published by Futurism states that Facebook is hosting networks of AI-generated fake male personas, presented as 'silver fox' relationship advisors with names including 'Uncle George,' 'Leo Davidson,' and 'The Male Insight', accumulating between 126,000 and over one million views per video, monetized through Facebook's own Content Monetization program as well as e-book sales and page resale, with Google's AI Overview initially presenting the fabricated personas as genuine people when queried, extending inauthentic identities into mainstream search results as a secondary amplification vector.


According to article, the AI-generated silver fox persona networks represent a documented case of commercial-scale coordinated inauthentic behavior operating within platform monetization structures rather than against them -- with Facebook's Content Monetization program directly rewarding the engagement generated by fabricated personas, creating a financial incentive structure in which the platform's own revenue model subsidizes AI-generated inauthentic content at scale, and with Google's AI Overview propagating fabricated identities into search as a secondary credibility amplifier, illustrating how AI-generated personas can exploit both social media and search AI systems simultaneously to build false legitimacy.


Source: Futurism. Facebook Is Filling With Viral AI-Generated Silver Foxes Wooing Women by Ranting About How Terrible Men Are. [online] Published 13 August 2026. Available at: https://futurism.com/artificial-intelligence/ai-generated-silver-foxes-facebook


[General Reports]


Online Anti-Migrant Narratives on X, Telegram, and TikTok Preceded Violence in Southampton and Belfast

An analysis published by ISD Global states that online anti-migrant narratives circulating on X, Telegram, and TikTok directly preceded and contributed to real-world violence at asylum seeker accommodation in Southampton and Belfast in August 2026, with ISD researchers tracing the amplification pathway from initial false or misleading posts about alleged crimes by migrants to coordinated resharing by established far-right network accounts and subsequent physical violence.


The analysis states that the Southampton and Belfast incidents replicate the causal amplification pathway documented during the August 2024 UK riots, in which online disinformation about a single crime allegation cascaded through coordinated far-right networks into national disorder, indicating that the enforcement actions platforms took in response to the 2024 riots have not dismantled the underlying network infrastructure, which remained fully operational and responsive to new triggering narratives in August 2026.


Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. From Posts to Protests: Southampton and Belfast. [online] Published 20 June 2026. Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/posts-to-protests-southampton-and-belfast/


Michigan Local Election Officials Anticipate Significant Disinformation Problems Ahead of November 2026 Midterms

An article published by The Conversation states that a survey of Michigan local election officials found 80% confident in voting integrity ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections, while 20% anticipated significant disinformation problems, with officials citing social media-spread false claims about voter registration procedures, mail ballot rules, and polling locations as the primary threat vectors, and with smaller rural jurisdictions reporting substantially less capacity to monitor and respond to disinformation than larger county offices.


As the article states, the 20% of officials anticipating significant disinformation problems disproportionately represented smaller rural jurisdictions with fewer staff resources for public communication and counter-messaging, indicating that the distribution of disinformation vulnerability among election administrators is not uniform -- with smaller offices systematically less equipped to respond to the volume and velocity of social media disinformation than major urban offices, creating pockets of elevated electoral risk in jurisdictions that national counter-disinformation resources are least likely to prioritize.


Source: The Conversation. Michigan’s Local Election Officials Are Confident in Voting Integrity Ahead of November’s Midterm Election. [online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/michigans-local-election-officials-are-confident-in-voting-integrity-ahead-of-novembers-midterm-election-289133


Brazil Orders Discord to Suspend Livestreaming

An article published by The Record states that Brazil's Supreme Court ordered Discord to suspend its livestreaming functionality after the platform failed to comply with multiple government orders to remove neo-Nazi content, channels promoting violence against minority groups, and extremist material, with the court finding Discord's content moderation response insufficient and threatening broader platform restrictions if compliance is not achieved.


The article states that the Brazilian government's action against Discord represents an escalation in its regulatory approach to platform non-compliance, moving from individual content takedowns toward targeted functional suspensions that apply operational pressure while stopping short of a full platform ban, following a pattern established in Brazil's 2024 extended suspension of X for similar compliance failures, indicating that Brazilian courts are prepared to apply the same functional-suspension model to other platforms that repeatedly fail court-ordered content removal.


Source: The Record. Brazil orders Discord to suspend livestreaming after teen suicide. [online] Published 13 August 2026. Available at: https://therecord.media/discord-brazil-orders-suspension-livestreaming 


Voter Registration and Biometric Verification Systems Pose Greater Structural Risk Than Deepfakes

An analysis published by Rest of World states that disproportionate public focus on AI-generated deepfakes in election contexts understates the structural risk of AI systems embedded in electoral administration itself, with India's machine learning-based voter verification system linked to the Aadhaar biometric database algorithmically deleting approximately 5.5 million voters from rolls without notice across two states, a 93% algorithm error rate that required Supreme Court intervention before the program was halted and subsequently revived nationally in 2021, and with AI chatbots including ChatGPT and Gemini providing voting information to users without dedicated electoral accuracy guardrails.


The analysis states that the governance gap in AI-administered elections is structurally distinct from the deepfake threat: while deepfakes operate through audience perception of fabricated content, AI embedded in voter registration, biometric verification, and results management can determine who is permitted to participate before any ballot is cast, with algorithmic exclusion operating within administrative processes whose opacity makes it systematically harder to detect, challenge, and reverse than fabricated media, and with election technologies hosted by private vendors beyond national oversight introducing accountability gaps in which no domestic legal framework governs data transfers, audits, or error correction, particularly in African electoral contexts where the AU Advisory Group has identified concentrated vendor dependency as a systemic risk.


Source: Rest of World. AI Elections, Deepfakes, and Voter Chatbots. [online] Available at: https://restofworld.org/2026/ai-elections-deepfake-voter-chatbot/


[Appendix - Frameworks to Counter Disinformation]


Nationwide Partnership Network to Fact-Check Critical 2026 Midterm Elections

An article published by Poynter states that PolitiFact announced a nationwide partnership network combining state and local news organizations, university journalism programs, and digital publishers to provide coordinated fact-checking coverage of the 2026 US midterm elections, designed to extend capacity beyond PolitiFact's own reporters to smaller markets and competitive congressional districts not covered by major national fact-checkers.


According to the article, the distributed partnership model directly addresses the documented geographic gap in fact-checking coverage identified in prior election cycles, in which disinformation spreading in smaller media markets and competitive House districts received substantially less verification attention than claims circulating in high-profile Senate and gubernatorial races, with local partners' constituency-specific knowledge enabling faster response to localized disinformation narratives that national fact-checkers lack the contextual expertise to evaluate quickly.


Source: Poynter. PolitiFact Announces Nationwide Partnership Network to Fact-Check Critical 2026 Midterm Elections. [online] Published 13 August 2026. Available at: https://www.poynter.org/news-release/2026/politifact-announces-nationwide-partnership-network-to-fact-check-critical-2026-midterm-elections/


FTC Proposes Regulating Undisclosed AI Ideological Bias

An article published by CyberScoop states that the Federal Trade Commission proposed applying Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, to AI systems that embed or amplify ideological bias in their outputs without disclosing that bias to users, advancing a disclosure-focused theory of liability in which AI models that systematically skew responses in politically partisan directions while presenting themselves as neutral constitute a deceptive trade practice.


The article states that the FTC's ideological bias proposal sits at the intersection of consumer protection and AI governance, with critics arguing that defining ideological bias as deceptive requires normative judgments about political balance outside the Commission's mandate, while proponents argue that undisclosed AI bias is analogous to undisclosed material product limitations, and that a disclosure obligation does not require the FTC to define correct political views, only to ensure users are informed when a model's outputs systematically favour particular political perspectives.


Source: CyberScoop. The FTC Wants to Regulate AI for Ideological Bias. [online] Published 10 August 2026. Available at: https://cyberscoop.com/ftc-regulating-ai-ideological-bias/


[CRC Glossary]


The nature and sophistication of the modern Information Environment is projected to continue to escalate in complexity. However, across academic publications, legal frameworks, policy debates, and public communications, the same concepts are often described in different ways, making collaboration, cooperation, and effective action more difficult.


To ensure clarity and establish a consistent frame of reference, the CRC is maintaining a standard glossary to reduce ambiguity and promote terminological interoperability. Its scope encompasses foundational concepts, as well as emerging terms relating to Hostile Influence and Cyfluence.


As a collaborative project maintained with input from the community of experts, the CRC Glossary is intended to reflect professional consensus. We encourage you to engage with this initiative and welcome contributions via the CRC website.










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