While influence operations typically exploit anger and outrage, this report reveals a subtler vector: weaponized nostalgia. Case studies from Romania (a 75-page Russian-linked Facebook network idealizing the communist era) and Okinawa (PRC-aligned campaigns invoking Ryukyuan history) show how idealized pasts are used to erode trust in the present, evade detection, and normalize anti-Western narratives, all without ever announcing themselves as political.

During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). This weeks report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

Hybrid threat actors increasingly exploit credibility in influence campaigns by posing as research institutes, news outlets, or open-source investigation platforms to appear trustworthy. This blog examines three models: OSINT investigation platforms, impersonated news outlets, and pseudo research institutes—all leveraging borrowed legitimacy to spread misleading narratives while disguising state-dictated agendas.

Commissioned by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation For Freedom Malaysia in late 2025, as part of a Study on Perceptions of Geopolitics and Regional Issues, this dedicated CRC report examines how Chinese and Russian influence affects Malaysia’s digital information environment and public opinion. The report integrates the results of two recent national surveys, narrative intelligence findings, and a media environment analysis.

Hybrid threat actors increasingly exploit credibility in influence campaigns by posing as research institutes, news outlets, or open-source investigation platforms to appear trustworthy. This blog examines three models: OSINT investigation platforms, impersonated news outlets, and pseudo research institutes—all leveraging borrowed legitimacy to spread misleading narratives while disguising state-dictated agendas.

Unresolved integration trauma represents a structurally distinct vulnerability vector that Russian and Iranian intelligence services actively exploit — yet current analytical frameworks fail to capture it. When belonging is chronically denied, an offer of identity and community operates at a more fundamental level than ideology, making integration-traumatised recruits both harder to detect and less likely to recognise themselves as targets.

This blog article examines the paradox of authoritarian information control through the case of Russia and Telegram. While the Kremlin seeks to restrict the platform and promote the state-aligned messenger MAX, Telegram remains essential for military communication, propaganda, and influence operations. This creates a structural dilemma: authoritarian regimes aim for total control over information flows but remain dependent on open digital platforms they cannot fully govern.

This blog article examines the paradox of authoritarian information control through the case of Russia and Telegram. While the Kremlin seeks to restrict the platform and promote the state-aligned messenger MAX, Telegram remains essential for military communication, propaganda, and influence operations. This creates a structural dilemma: authoritarian regimes aim for total control over information flows but remain dependent on open digital platforms they cannot fully govern.

The prelude and opening stages of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine were one of history's most intense periods of hostile cyber and influence activity. This study examines the conflict's information dimension from late 2021 to April 2022 via a novel analytical paradigm adapted from strategic marketing and audience segmentation.