Athena Tong argues China’s Western Pacific conduct is strategic and consistent, not episodic. Maritime gray-zone moves are paired with the PLA’s “Three Warfares” and amplified through FIMI: lawfare manufactures legal-administrative pretexts, media operations seize the narrative, and psychological pressure normalizes coercive presence.

China is increasingly using “counter-operator” measures: instead of only targeting content, it pressures the people behind influence and cyber operations through bounties, doxxing, sanctions, and “naming and shaming” (e.g., Taiwan, Canada). The aims are deterrence, degrading adversary capabilities, and narrative control.

This blog introduces the actor-specific, granular analytical approach, which assesses digital influence operations by examining actors, structures, and intentions, rather than treating them as a uniform threat. Using IRSEM’s "Baybridge" case, it shows how bureaucratic incentives and commercial self-interest can undermine strategic effectiveness.