While influence operations typically exploit anger and outrage, this report reveals a subtler vector: weaponized nostalgia. Case studies from Romania (a 75-page Russian-linked Facebook network idealizing the communist era) and Okinawa (PRC-aligned campaigns invoking Ryukyuan history) show how idealized pasts are used to erode trust in the present, evade detection, and normalize anti-Western narratives, all without ever announcing themselves as political.

During the last week we observed, collected and analyzed endpoints of information related to cyber-based hostile influence campaigns (including Cyfluence attacks). This weeks report is a summary of what we regard as the main events.

Commissioned by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation For Freedom Malaysia in late 2025, as part of a Study on Perceptions of Geopolitics and Regional Issues, this dedicated CRC report examines how Chinese and Russian influence affects Malaysia’s digital information environment and public opinion. The report integrates the results of two recent national surveys, narrative intelligence findings, and a media environment analysis.

Hybrid threat actors increasingly exploit credibility in influence campaigns by posing as research institutes, news outlets, or open-source investigation platforms to appear trustworthy. This blog examines three models: OSINT investigation platforms, impersonated news outlets, and pseudo research institutes—all leveraging borrowed legitimacy to spread misleading narratives while disguising state-dictated agendas.

AI chatbots are no longer just amplifying propaganda, they're building emotional bonds to deliver it. By exploiting loneliness and parasocial dependency, today's large language models can shift political opinions by up to 10 percentage points, outperforming traditional campaign tools. As autonomous AI agents coordinate influence operations without human direction, loneliness has become the defining attack surface of modern information warfare.

CRC researchers have identified an emerging coordinated influence network targeting English-language discourse on the South China Sea. The network combines Chinese state-affiliated institutions, researchers, and inauthentic social media accounts to promote pro-PRC narratives. With ~35% bot-like amplifiers and activity surging around key regional events, the campaign shows clear signs of centralized coordination in its early establishment stages.

Athena Tong argues China’s Western Pacific conduct is strategic and consistent, not episodic. Maritime gray-zone moves are paired with the PLA’s “Three Warfares” and amplified through FIMI: lawfare manufactures legal-administrative pretexts, media operations seize the narrative, and psychological pressure normalizes coercive presence.

China is increasingly using “counter-operator” measures: instead of only targeting content, it pressures the people behind influence and cyber operations through bounties, doxxing, sanctions, and “naming and shaming” (e.g., Taiwan, Canada). The aims are deterrence, degrading adversary capabilities, and narrative control.

This blog introduces the actor-specific, granular analytical approach, which assesses digital influence operations by examining actors, structures, and intentions, rather than treating them as a uniform threat. Using IRSEM’s "Baybridge" case, it shows how bureaucratic incentives and commercial self-interest can undermine strategic effectiveness.

Cyber influence operations increasingly target financial systems, supply chains, and intellectual property.

Introduction Executive Summary In the fourth part of our ongoing series on Chinese Influence in Southeast Asia, our Focus shifts to Malaysia. As with all papers in this series, the aim is to create a foundation upon which more detailed research can be conducted in the form of specific case studies. Numerous factors contribute to Malaysia being a focal point for influence operations. The nation boasts the fifth largest economy in Southeast Asia, representing approximately 12%

Introduction Executive Summary In the third part of our ongoing series on Chinese digital influence in Southeast Asia our focus is on the Philippines. The aim of this paper is to create a foundation on which more detailed research can be conducted as specific case studies. With increasing tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea more research is urgently needed on Chinese influence operations targeting both the Philippines and the discourse around the

Introduction Executive Summary In the second part of our ongoing series on Chinese digital influence in Southeast Asia we are taking a closer look at Indonesia. Indonesia has the largest population and economy in Southeast Asia and is the most populous Islamic country in the world. It boasts large deposits of natural resources such as oil, gas, nickel, gold, tin, and copper. It is one of the largest agricultural exporters in the world with nearly 30% of the land in the countr

Introduction Executive Summary In the fourth part of our ongoing series on Chinese Influence in Southeast Asia, our Focus shifts to Malaysia. As with all papers in this series, the aim is to create a foundation upon which more detailed research can be conducted in the form of specific case studies. Numerous factors contribute to Malaysia being a focal point for influence operations. The nation boasts the fifth largest economy in Southeast Asia, representing approximately 12%