The Iran War (Operation Epic Fury) has redefined modern conflict, revealing how cyber operations and influence campaigns, collectively termed "cyfluence", now function as primary offensive tools alongside military force. From the hijacking of a prayer app to broadcast takeovers and AI-generated deepfakes, the war demonstrates that shaping perception has become as strategically vital as controlling territory.

This blog article examines the paradox of authoritarian information control through the case of Russia and Telegram. While the Kremlin seeks to restrict the platform and promote the state-aligned messenger MAX, Telegram remains essential for military communication, propaganda, and influence operations. This creates a structural dilemma: authoritarian regimes aim for total control over information flows but remain dependent on open digital platforms they cannot fully govern.

AI chatbots are no longer just amplifying propaganda, they're building emotional bonds to deliver it. By exploiting loneliness and parasocial dependency, today's large language models can shift political opinions by up to 10 percentage points, outperforming traditional campaign tools. As autonomous AI agents coordinate influence operations without human direction, loneliness has become the defining attack surface of modern information warfare.

CRC researchers have identified an emerging coordinated influence network targeting English-language discourse on the South China Sea. The network combines Chinese state-affiliated institutions, researchers, and inauthentic social media accounts to promote pro-PRC narratives. With ~35% bot-like amplifiers and activity surging around key regional events, the campaign shows clear signs of centralized coordination in its early establishment stages.

This study examines the complex dynamics of pro-Palestine mobilization at Columbia University post-October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. It uses the Cyfluence Secuitry Paradigm and a multi-descipline approach to track how grassroots activism, digital framing and amplification, and persistent hostile influence threats shaped and drove narratives and on-campus mobilization. This is a granular deep-dive into next-gen hybrid cognitive threats and their potential impact on U.S. soc

Following Iran’s nationwide internet blackout, the sockpuppet accounts driving several coordinated narrative strands abruptly stopped posting in near unison. This repeated blackout-to-silence pattern is a strong indicator of foreign CIB and materially increases confidence in attribution to Iran-based operators.

The Spotlight article examines X’s new location transparency feature and its relevance for analysing Hostile Influence Campaigns (HICs). The new indicators act as a confidence booster for identifying inauthentic activity, illustrated through a previously examined Iranian influence campaign. At the same time, the article notes the feature’s limits and hints at likely adaptations in threat actors’ TTPs.

This blog introduces the actor-specific, granular analytical approach, which assesses digital influence operations by examining actors, structures, and intentions, rather than treating them as a uniform threat. Using IRSEM’s "Baybridge" case, it shows how bureaucratic incentives and commercial self-interest can undermine strategic effectiveness.