Unresolved integration trauma represents a structurally distinct vulnerability vector that Russian and Iranian intelligence services actively exploit — yet current analytical frameworks fail to capture it. When belonging is chronically denied, an offer of identity and community operates at a more fundamental level than ideology, making integration-traumatised recruits both harder to detect and less likely to recognise themselves as targets.

The Iran War (Operation Epic Fury) has redefined modern conflict, revealing how cyber operations and influence campaigns, collectively termed "cyfluence", now function as primary offensive tools alongside military force. From the hijacking of a prayer app to broadcast takeovers and AI-generated deepfakes, the war demonstrates that shaping perception has become as strategically vital as controlling territory.

This blog article examines the paradox of authoritarian information control through the case of Russia and Telegram. While the Kremlin seeks to restrict the platform and promote the state-aligned messenger MAX, Telegram remains essential for military communication, propaganda, and influence operations. This creates a structural dilemma: authoritarian regimes aim for total control over information flows but remain dependent on open digital platforms they cannot fully govern.

This blog analyzes a recent cyfluence operation that briefly hijacked Iranian state TV amid a nationwide internet blackout. It focuses onRecently, activists briefly hijacked Iranian state television. This blog analyzes the events surrounding what may be a recent cyfluence operation.

Following Iran’s nationwide internet blackout, the sockpuppet accounts driving several coordinated narrative strands abruptly stopped posting in near unison. This repeated blackout-to-silence pattern is a strong indicator of foreign CIB and materially increases confidence in attribution to Iran-based operators.

The Spotlight article examines X’s new location transparency feature and its relevance for analysing Hostile Influence Campaigns (HICs). The new indicators act as a confidence booster for identifying inauthentic activity, illustrated through a previously examined Iranian influence campaign. At the same time, the article notes the feature’s limits and hints at likely adaptations in threat actors’ TTPs.