This blog article examines the paradox of authoritarian information control through the case of Russia and Telegram. While the Kremlin seeks to restrict the platform and promote the state-aligned messenger MAX, Telegram remains essential for military communication, propaganda, and influence operations. This creates a structural dilemma: authoritarian regimes aim for total control over information flows but remain dependent on open digital platforms they cannot fully govern.

This blog analyzes a recent cyfluence operation that briefly hijacked Iranian state TV amid a nationwide internet blackout. It focuses onRecently, activists briefly hijacked Iranian state television. This blog analyzes the events surrounding what may be a recent cyfluence operation.

Following Iran’s nationwide internet blackout, the sockpuppet accounts driving several coordinated narrative strands abruptly stopped posting in near unison. This repeated blackout-to-silence pattern is a strong indicator of foreign CIB and materially increases confidence in attribution to Iran-based operators.

The Spotlight article examines X’s new location transparency feature and its relevance for analysing Hostile Influence Campaigns (HICs). The new indicators act as a confidence booster for identifying inauthentic activity, illustrated through a previously examined Iranian influence campaign. At the same time, the article notes the feature’s limits and hints at likely adaptations in threat actors’ TTPs.